Class M

Fri Aug 14 10:35:24 EDT 2020

Further from the NTSB accident report, which I finally found a copy of

Abstract On May 18, 1986, 14 of the 23 passenger cars of a Norfolk and Western Railway Company (N&:W) passenger excu1􀇕sion train powered by a steam locomotive derailed near Suffolk, Virginia. Of the app1roximately 1,000 train passengers, all of whom were N&W employees and their relatives and guests, 177 were injured; 19 of the injured were hospitalized. The estimated cost of damage was $231,530. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that ttie probable cause of this accident was the failure of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company (N&W) to train its Maintenance of Way Department employees adequately in the Inspection and repair of continuous welded rail and the ff1ilure of the Maintenance-of-Way Department management to monitor the implementation of the N&:W's maintenance-of-way practices by its employees. Contributing to the seveiity of the accident was the N&W's decision to use equipment without tlghtlock couplers and passenger cars with modified interiors having severe injury-producing mechanisms. 

The conclusions of the report:
1.  The operation of the train was not a causal factor in the derailment. 

2.  The signal system was not a causal factor in the derailment. 

3.  The effects of a progressive lateral displacement of the track under the train was confirmed by the statements of passengers in the oars that passed over the turnout and did not derail.

4.  The reconstruction of the turnout disclosed deformed closure rails and heel block bolts. Derailment marks on the closure rails were consistent with derailment marks on the lead truck of the first car to derail,

5.  Impact marks on the frog assembly bolt nuts indicated that the frog was intact before the train derailed and that it was destroyed by the impact from derailing wheels.

6.  The maintenance activities in March on the middle track, combined with increasing temperatures, created conditions that resulted in improperly adjusted rail.

7.  The track foreman responsible for the Rhoulder ballast cleaning received minimal instructions for the operation, and he was delegated supervisory responsibilities to Implement the standard procedures ot the Maintenance of Way Department without a clear understanding of what was expected.

8.  The repairs to replace the switch brace bolts damaged by the shoulder ballast cleaner created a track disturbance resulting In a misalignment of the track approaching the turnout.

9.  The Signal Department was not notified as required by Maintenance of Way Department standard procedures of track work being performed at a switch that had a track shunt circuit switch protection.

10. Failure to relieve the rail stresses when realigning the approa<'h track to the turnout combined with the track maintenance on the middle track contributed to Increased rail stresses in the turnout.

11. The offset measurements at the approach track and switch included the effects of the laterally displaced track and derailment action.

12. The relief track inspector had not performed FRA-type compliance inspections for 9 years and was not aware of the repairs and resultant track alignment problem at the turnout. His failure to know the class of track inspected, his inability to interp1'et his reports, and his percepti on of kinks in the track was a reflection of hi.s lack of qualifications and training.

13. There is no requirement for track inspectorR to be requalified on the FRA Track Safety Standards or the N&W Maintenance of Way Standards.

14. The N&W's interpretation of the FRA Track Safety Standards for track inspection resulted in the inspection of two and three tracks at one time with no prescribed procedure for traveling each track during the inspection cycle.

15.	The FRA Track Safety Standards do not address the number of tracks that can be inspected from one track not• on which truck the inspector must be traveling to perform the inspection.

16. The N&W does not require regular medical and/or visual examina.tions of track inspectors.

17. The road master and assistant roadmaster believed that track inspections were being performed, as required, because the standards had prescribed inspection schedules and pr ocedures. However, no systematic performance evaluations were in effect to establish competency in track inspection.

18. The track foreman and section foreman did not notify their supervisors of any track misalignment problem in the derailment area before the train derailed.

19. The switch stand did not contribute to the cause of the accident.

20. Contributlng to the major injury-producng forces was the overturning of passenger cars without tlghtlock couplers and the hard, unyielding surfaces and loose objects in those cars.

21. The Interior features of the commissary car and unsecured equipment in that car contributed to passenger injuries.

22. Toxicological testing should have been performed to demonstrate the N&W's support for toxicological testing following an accident.

23. The timely, effective, and professional response to the emerg6ncy was a result of the preparedness and training of the Tidewater Em\?rgency Medical Services Council and the familiarization training provided by the N&W.

The whole report is 61 pages, but the probably cause, and identification of specific issues are the important parts.

Ken Miller

> On Aug 14, 2020, at 9:51 AM, NW Modeling List <nw-modeling-list at nwhs.org> wrote:
> 
> Roger
> 
> The wreck in the swamp was May 26, 1986. The program ended in December 1994. After the wreck, which was, if I recall correctly, according to the FRA accident report was due to a broken track part that had been damaged by the proceeding coal train and broke after the 611 had passed over it. Again, going by recollection, the 611 was doing 58 mph in 6- mph zone.
> 
> The cars that were overturned and sideways in the train were older cars which did not have tite-lock couplers, which probably made the accident worse. So, after the wreck, all the old Southern heavyweight coaches, including Missionary Ridge and W. Graham Claytor were removed from service. The tool car 1407 was equipped with tite-locks and the others retired and sold off. 
> 
> The operating rules dropped the speed limit on all steam locomotives to 40 mph. Prior to that, the local restrictions were all that was there. I rode the cab on the first trip north of Lynchburg and we sat on 69 mph tops there. Several occasions I rode were high speed, we hoped to be able to go to 80 on the Santa Fe on the way to Kansas City, as that was track speed there, but the Santa Fe shut use down with a wad of speed restrictions as we were ready to depart. We made some decent speed at the usual locations on the Norfolk Division and Scioto Division at times before the restrictions, as well as former NKP territory.
> 
> Other places we had to plod along...
> 
> Ken Miller
> 
>> On Aug 12, 2020, at 6:01 PM, NW Modeling List via NW-Modeling-List <nw-modeling-list at nwhs.org <mailto:nw-modeling-list at nwhs.org>> wrote:
>> 
>> Jimmy,
>> 
>> I think the derailment was near the end of that first restoration. At first they let her run and after the accident they restricted her speed.
>> 
>> Roger Huber
>> Deer Creek Locomotive Works
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, August 12, 2020, 04:26:40 PM CDT, NW Modeling List <nw-modeling-list at nwhs.org <mailto:nw-modeling-list at nwhs.org>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 8/11/2020 5:29 PM, NW Modeling List via NW-Modeling-List wrote:
>> > Shame the NS wouldn't let the 611 have her head a run like that.
>> 
>> Roger,
>>     There was at least one early video made of 611 running around 70 
>> mph after the first restoration. I don't remember which one it was and 
>> it was maybe up on the NKP trackage or somewhere thereabouts.
>> 
>> Jimmy Lisle
>> 
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