BurmaNet News: August 26 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

August 26 2003 Issue #2313

INSIDE BURMA
Irrawaddy: Who’s Who In the Junta’s Line-up
AFP: Myanmar's new prime minister to be junta's fall guy: analysts
Irrawaddy: New Emperor or New Scapegoat?
DVB: No official coverage on General Maung Aye’s visit to China

DRUGS
Nation: Drug lords must hustle their stash

MONEY
Xinhua: Vietnam's pharmaceutical export expected to rise

REGIONAL
Malaysiakini: 50 more asylum-seekers arrested in KL, 30 Burmese
AFP: Thailand hails Myanmar reshuffle as positive development

EDITORIALS
Japan Today: No change in sight after SPDC's reshuffle
Irrawaddy: Sanctions Are Working in Burma


----INSIDE BURMA----

The Irrawaddy   August 26, 2004
Who’s Who In the Junta’s Line-up

The Burmese junta reshuffled senior positions yesterday, announcing that
Intelligence Chief Khin Nyunt was to become Prime Minister. Sr-Gen Than
Shwe, however, will stay on as head of state. Five aging ministers
retired, making room others within the junta to take on new posts. Here is
a brief background on some of the men taking on different
responsibilities.

   Prime Minister
   Gen Khin Nyunt (Serial No: BC 8468 and School: OTS-25)

Appointed commander of the Infantry Battalion No 20 in 1960, Khin Nyunt
went onto serve as a staff officer at the Defense Ministry’s Bureau of
Special Operations in the 1970s. In 1982, he was appointed Tactical
Operations Commander of the 44th Light Infantry Division.

After North Korean terrorists attacked visiting cabinet ministers from
South Korea in Rangoon in 1984, he was recalled to the capital to head the
Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence, the old name for Burma’s
intelligence arm.

Khin Nyunt was close to the late Gen Ne Win, and was instrumental in
suppressing the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. He held the position of
Secretary One in the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) for
15 years. In 1992, he was the target of an aborted assassination attempt
by members of the armed forces who were opposed to his pro-China stance.
He is also the man credited for ceasefire agreements with Wa druglords and
several other ethnic groups.

Five years ago, he publicly disowned his son Ye Naing Win when he decided
to marry a foreign woman against his father’s wishes. Observers say Khin
Nyunt’s influence began to wane after authorities sentenced Ne Win’s
relatives for high treason in September 2002.

Khin Nyunt is seen as a moderate and has met with opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi on several occasions.

   Secretary One of the SPDC
   Lt-Gen Soe Win (Serial No: BC 11701 and School: DSA-12)

Soe Win was commander of the Northwest Command before being promoted to
Air Defense General in 2001. He was later promoted to Secretary Two of the
SPDC. He is seen as a hardliner, particularly in his attitude to the
opposition. "The SPDC not only won’t talk to the NLD [National League for
Democracy] but will also never hand over power to the NLD," Soe Win
reportedly said.

Soe Win is believed to be the mastermind behind the May 30 ambush on Suu
Kyi and her party members in Upper Burma. He is also a member of the Panel
of Patrons of the junta’s political arm, the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA). Soe Win is known as a staunch henchman of
Sr-Gen Than Shwe.

   Secretary 2 of the SPDC
   Lt-Gen Thein Sein (Serial No: BC 11252 and School: DSA-9)

In 1992, Thein Sein was a general staff officer at the War Office in
Rangoon, but within four years he was sent to eastern Shan State, where he
became local Peace and Development Council Chairman and Triangle Region
Commander. In November 1997, he became a member of the SPDC.

He was appointed adjutant general in 2001, replacing Gen Win Myint, who
was the junta’s Secretary Three at that time. He is also chairman of the
Central Organizing Committee for Myanmar War Veterans Organization. He is
believed to hold negative views about neighboring Thailand, and has long
been tipped by observers to take on higher responsibilities within the
SPDC.

   Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office
   U Ko Lay

He served as a Colonel in the military and became the mayor of Rangoon in
the 1980s under Gen Ne Win. He was head of the city in 1988, when
thousands were killed by the military in the pro-democracy uprising. He is
close to Khin Nyunt, and is rumored to be a womanizer and is notoriously
corrupt. U Ko Lay has, however, proved himself as a resilient political
figure, surviving several purges over the past decades.

   Minister of the Prime Minister's Office
   Maj-Gen Thein Swe

Sources differ about the background of Thein Swe. He may have been
Chairman of the Kayah (Karenni) State Peace and Development Council or
head of the External Intelligence Division at the Defense Ministry. He may
also be a director of the government-controlled Internet service provider,
Bagan Cybertech. Details will be updated or corrected when they become
available.

   Religious Affairs Minister
   Brig-Gen Thura Myint Maung

Formerly Deputy Home Affairs Minister.

   Forestry Minister
   Brig-Gen Thein Aung

Formerly Deputy Energy Minister. Thein Aung is also a Central Executive
Committee member of the USDA.

   Cooperatives Minister
   Maj-Gen Htay Oo (Serial No: BC 12133 and School: OTS 43)

Formerly Chairman of the Irrawaddy Division Peace and Development Council,
and Commander of South-West Command.


Agence France Presse   August 26, 2003
Myanmar's new prime minister to be junta's fall guy: analysts
By Sarah Stewart

A political reshuffle in Myanmar, where a moderate general has been
installed as prime minister, is a bid to shift blame over the arrest of
Aung San Suu Kyi and serious economic woes, analysts said Tuesday.

Observers say that by making military intelligence chief General Khin
Nyunt its new public face, the ruling junta hopes to end a deadlock with
the international community over the opposition leader's detention since
May.

Khin Nyunt is seen as a relatively urbane and outward-looking figure in a
junta staffed by notoriously secretive, paranoid and uneducated military
men who have run the economy into the ground and rendered it a pariah
regime.

But after being axed from his role as Secretary One in the all-powerful
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in the reshuffle announced
Monday, Khin Nyunt has little real power and will be a lame-duck head of
government.

"It puts Khin Nyunt in a difficult position because although he is
nominally in charge of the day-to-day running of the country, he is not
going to be able to change policy," said Debbie Stothard from pressure
group Altsean-Burma.

"But if things go wrong, he will be the one who takes the blame."

Khin Nyunt was responsible for handling a UN-sponsored national
reconciliation process with Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi which
began in October 2000 with tentative talks between the two sides.

But the process collapsed after her detention, which also triggered a
tightening of tough United States and European Union sanctions that has
plunged the economy into chaos and left the generals struggling to cope.

As prime minister Khin Nyunt will be responsible for sorting out the
economic mess and getting foreign governments off Myanmar's back over the
issue of Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains in custody at a secret location.

If it is confirmed that he has lost his role as chief of the feared
military intelligence arm of the junta, which forms his current power
base, Khin Nyunt's fall from grace will be complete.

"If he is replaced as military intelligence chief, then Khin Nyunt is a
general without an army," said Aung Zaw, editor of Thailand-based Myanmar
affairs magazine Irrawaddy.

The only tools at his disposal to carry out the herculean tasks of
breaking the political deadlock and putting the economy on its feet would
be the cabinet, a toothless institution which defers policy decisions to
the military.

"That's why people see this as the demise of Khin Nyunt because if he
can't run the cabinet effectively, they will show him the door and ask him
to leave," said Aung Zaw.

The architect of the reshuffle, Myanmar's leader Senior General Than Shwe,
passed the post of prime minister to Khin Nyunt but remains the most
powerful figure in the land as chairman of the SPDC and military
commander-in-chief.

"In military-ruled Myanmar the people who control the army call the shots,
and they are the commander in chief and the deputy commander-in-chief
(General Maung Aye)," said one Yangon analyst.

"This is Than Shwe's way of sidelining Khin Nyunt and at the same time
placating him with this post of prime minister."

Than Shwe was the guiding hand behind the May 30 arrest of Aung San Suu
Kyi, which occurred after a pro-junta mob attacked her convoy during a
political tour of northern Myanmar.

It is believed the plot was carried out by Lieutenant General Soe Win, who
was appointed Secretary Two in February and then promoted to Secretary One
to replace Khin Nyunt in the latest reshuffle.


The Irrawaddy   August 26, 2003
New Emperor or New Scapegoat?
By Aung Zaw

The reshuffle of Burma’s junta has caught everyone by surprise.
Intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt is now Prime Minister, the position
previously held by Sr-Gen Than Shwe and long seen as a merely ceremonial
post.

The appointment of an intelligence chief to head the cabinet has left
people puzzled. This is the first time in Burmese political history that
the head of military intelligence has gone on to chair the cabinet. The
question now being asked is, how long can Prime Minister Khin Nyunt hold
onto the post?

Khin Nyunt was always regarded a top military leader. He rose to power
shortly after the military’s bloody coup in 1988. But as a protégé of the
late dictator Gen Ne Win, Khin Nyunt has been effectively sidelined in
recent years.

Over the past 15 years, many top cabinet ministers and generals have been
ruthlessly purged, but Khin Nyunt has survived it all unshaken. He has
clipped the wings of opponents and rivals in the past. Powerful regional
commanders who resented Khin Nyunt were summoned to Rangoon, given cabinet
positions and then given their marching orders. Will Khin Nyunt now suffer
the same fate?

Statements from the junta, however, suggest Khin Nyunt has top-level
backing. "In order to be able to carry out the interests of the state and
the entire people more effectively, the State Peace and Development
Council [SPDC] has appointed General Khin Nyunt as the state prime
minister with effect from today," a recent information sheet from the
junta reads.

Khin Nyunt has been saddled with an enormous task and as a veteran
journalist in Rangoon explained, the motives behind his mission seem
sinister. "He has to carry out projects and run [the government’s]
day-to-day affairs. But it is not Khin Nyunt who calls the shots in Burma,
it’s still Than Shwe."

True. As long as the ruling council exists, the PM’s portfolio will remain
ceremonial. Whether Khin Nyunt will be empowered with a new executive
mandate to run the cabinet and the country remains to be seen.

It is unclear whether Khin Nyunt has to give up his powerful role as chief
of military intelligence. If he does, it will mean he is a general without
an army. Khin Nyunt also heads various national committees on key issues
like education, culture and health. He is close to the main ethnic
ceasefire groups and keeps cordial relations with Kachin, Wa and Shan
leaders who have entered the "legal fold." He will have to sacrifice
something.

Military analysts in Rangoon told The Irrawaddy there was a lot of talk
among top leaders before reaching final decisions on the reallocation of
portfolios. "It was not about building the country or marching toward
democracy," an analyst noted. "It’s about redistributing power."

The analyst cautioned whether Than Shwe would be willing to share
executive power among the top generals. "Since the Gen Ne Win era,
decisions are always made by the person in the number one position. This
practice hasn’t been discarded," he said.

Ne Win’s Golden Boy

Khin Nyunt came under growing pressure as Ne Win’s family members were
sentenced for treason in September last year. Khin Nyunt was close to Ne
Win, and much of his own power and influence could be traced back to the
despot.

Even as his influence declined, military watchers agree that junta leaders
saw Khin Nyunt as a precious asset. A well-informed source told The
Irrawaddy that Khin Nyunt sent resignation letters to Than Shwe on more
than one occasion in the past two years. But Than Shwe insisted Khin Nyunt
stay on board.

However, rumors circulating in Rangoon several months ago suggested that
when Than Shwe does retire, he will make sure Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt
were removed from key positions.

"Khin Nyunt is up and down," said an observer in Rangoon. Some analysts
suggested that with Khin Nyunt’s charisma and loyalty, the other generals
may want Khin Nyunt as a frontman to fend off growing international
pressure and displeasure from Asean members.

Junta Under Pressure

Another journalist in Rangoon says the current reshuffle is a reaction to
growing international pressure and economic sanctions. Burma returned to
the global spotlight after opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and many of
her supporters were detained in May this year. Alarmed, the US government
slapped fresh sanctions on Burma and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (Asean) even broke with convention and issued a formal rebuke on
its pariah member.

With the growing international pressure, some top Burmese leaders might
hold that Khin Nyunt in the Prime Minister’s job is the best way for Burma
to tackle international critics, economic woes and appeal for
international assistance, some analysts commented.

"I don’t think he has been sidelined," a journalist in Rangoon said. Khin
Nyunt is known as a workaholic, but a "moderate force" among the
top-ranking junta leaders. He has often been the junta’s international
face and met with diplomats and greeted foreign delegations. "I think he
can deal with Burma’s problems and bring about the release of Suu Kyi,"
the journalist said. As Prime Minister, Khin Nyunt can travel to Asean
nations and other neighbors, he added.

But other observers don’t hold such optimism. Ludu U Sein Win, a Burmese
political observer and writer in Rangoon sees the reshuffle as purely
cosmetic. "In essence it is nothing—it is old wine in a new bottle," he
said.

Some exiled politicians say the reshuffle was an effort to mute the
moderates. "I think Khin Nyunt has been marginalized and more hardliners
have been brought in," said Aung Moe Zaw chairman of the Democratic Party
for a New Society (DPNS), now based in Thailand.

Who’s In Charge?

Back in Rangoon, diplomats and observers say Than Shwe is still the boss.
Now in his early 70s, Than Shwe is believed to be building his own
dynasty. Other observers say he may be preparing to leave his chairman
post in the near future.

Than Shwe has carefully picked people to fill top posts since the
mid-1990s and judged all suitors on one main criterion: their loyalty to
the Tatmadaw (armed forces). After yesterday’s reshuffle, he stays on as
chairman of the SPDC and remains Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
Strangely, he keeps the title of defense minister, even though it is under
Khin Nyunt’s command. But analysts believe that Than Shwe will start
assigning key positions to rising stars Shwe Mann and Soe Win.

Soe Win, a known hardliner and formerly Commander of the Northwest
Command, was elevated to Secretary Two in February this year. Yesterday he
became Secretary One.

Last year, Shwe Mann, a former Commander of Southwest Command, was named
Joint Chief of Staff, a position created just for him. Observers in
Rangoon say Shwe Mann is being groomed to fill the shoes of Gen Maung Aye,
the SPDC’s number two.

In the past two months Shwe Mann and Soe Win have been spotted travelling
through Burma. The duo met with several ceasefire groups and military
observers suspect they want to take over some of Khin Nyunt’s old duties.

Thakin Thein Pe, a veteran politician and friend of independence hero Gen
Aung San, thinks that the junta is desperate. He doubts whether Khin Nyunt
will be able to wear a civilian outfit when he becomes Prime Minister and
from his home in the capital, Thakin Thein Pe says little will change
unless the government changes its overall policy approach.

Other Burmese observers hold the same pessimistic outlook. In 1997, the
junta changed its name from the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) to SPDC. In a statement, the junta said it was committed to
working for democracy and development in the country. But six years later,
there are very few signs that Burma is heading in that direction.

But maybe the optimists will win out, and new political developments may
emerge within months. Then again when it comes to Burma, history has shown
it is usually best to be pessimistic.


Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB)   August 25, 2003
No official coverage on General Maung Aye’s visit to China

General Maung Aye, one of the top SPDC officials was received by the
Chinese President, Hu Jingtao on 22 August.

The news was reported by CCTV, the state-owned television.

According to a Burmese who lives on the Sino-Burmese border, “in the news,
Hu said that China doesn’t like interfering other countries’ domestic
affairs. China also rejects the US action and does not support the
international blockades. He hopes the Burmese generals would solve their
domestic problems fairly within Burma.”

Although General Maung Aye’s trip to China was reported by the
international media, the military owned media imposed news blackout inside
Burma.

Local residents in Rangoon said that was the first time for the government
media to impose news blackout on an official visit.

The former editor of Botahtaung newspaper, U Htein Linn pointed out, “I am
very surprised. In the past when the state leaders including
Lieutenant-General Maung Aye went on a state visit, state media tended to
mention the news in advance or at least the radio and newspapers announced
the news.”

According to U Htein Linn, people heard of the news from foreign news
media. There have also been many discussions about the trip. Some people
believe that the visit was not for political matters but military matters.

Meanwhile, U Htein Linn said that ‘The New Light of Myanmar’, state owned
newspaper is reducing its print run due to people’s lack of trust on the
government after the Dipeyin incident and the paper’s soaring price.


----DRUGS----

The Nation   August 25, 2003
Drug lords must hustle their stash

Ethnic insurgencies maintain their rule by finding new customers and new
routes for their heroin, opium and methamphetamines

With the exception of last Wednesday's clash between a caravan of drug
smugglers and Thai troops, it has been unusually quiet on the northwestern
front since the Thai government announced an all-out assault on drug
traffickers six months ago. For decades, the area bordering Burma's Shan
state has been the scene of sporadic gunfights between incoming mule
trains hauling opium and heroin and Thai security forces waiting to
intercept them.

Some of the world's highest-quality opium and heroin - and in recent
years, methamphetamines, locally known as ya ba - have made their way
through these border areas and, afterwards, to major cities around the
globe.

The recent quiet had been attributed to the government's all-out
three-month war against drug dealers that ended in the deaths of 2,500
people. Across the border in Burma - the source of the billions of
methamphetamine pills and tonnes of opium and heroin that flow into
Thailand and southern China - reaction has been strong. A senior Thai Army
intelligence official observing the northern border has said many Burmese
warlords are becoming frustrated, not knowing what to do with the millions
of methamphetamine tablets they are currently sitting on. They are holding
out in hope that the local drug market will get over the psychological
effect of the anti-drug war and restart itself up. Like many observers,
they see the current hiccups as temporary.

But while many traffickers sit around and wait for the local market to
start up again, others have chosen to re-route their illicit goods.

Alternative routes include the Mekong River and the Andaman Sea. Officials
say ya ba tablets that are being confiscated in the Northeast and in
fishing towns on the western coast have the same content as those
confiscated in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. Regional drug experts say this
development has resulted in the widening of the drug threat across Asia.

Sandro Calvani, regional representative of the UN Office of Drug and
Crime, has been quoted as saying the seizures of methamphetamines in
countries bordering Burma are on the rise - evidence that those behind the
traffic are actively searching for new markets outside of Thailand.

Speed pills bearing the Wa logo from Burma are turning up in Laos, India
and Cambodia, regional drug officials add.

While dismissing reports that pill-making operations have been relocated
to their side of the Mekong River, the Vientiane government has admitted
that methamphetamines are a growing problem in the landlocked country.
Cambodia's top anti-drugs officer, Teng Savong, says more young people are
turning to drugs. He, too, blames the flood of illegal substances coming
from Burma.

Besides methamphetamines, heroin trafficking routes have also been
affected. The world-famous "China White" - grade-four heroin produced in
northern Burma but traditionally trafficked through southern China - has
sought out new routes through northern Vietnam for the international
market, officials say.

In Burma's northeast frontier where drug warlords roam freely,
construction and business activities have also been dealt a big blow, says
a Chinese businessman with links to some of the Burmese opium warlords.

Making matters worse, Shan businessmen complain that their free access to
Burmese banks has become severely limited. According to a report from Shan
Herald Agency for News, Burmese banks that once welcomed trafficker cash
no longer allow the unquestioned transfer of money. And in some cases,
access to money in these banks has been blocked, thus forcing many dealers
to borrow money from private moneylenders who charge 5-per-cent monthly
interest. For a country that traditionally turns a blind eye to the
illicit activities of drug lords, such a restriction is quite
unprecedented.

Burma has always made it clear that its priority is internal stability,
not the bad habits of foreign addicts. And so as awkward as it may be, the
military government of Burma co-exists with these warlords and drug armies
who have come under its "legal fold" by entering into cease-fire
agreements.

But being in the legal fold is still a far cry from a meaningful peace or
political settlement. In a previous interview with The Nation at his
Panghsang headquarters, Bao Yu-xiang - chairman of the United Wa State
Army - made it clear that his outfit was determined to see its right to
exist incorporated into Burma's constitution.

Bao's group, which signed a cease-fire agreement with the Burmese in 1989,
has been accused by the US government of being the world's largest armed
drug-trafficking group.

Burma old hands say that unless a meaningful political settlement can be
reached, Burma's ethnic groups will continue to turn to the drug business
to finance their armies and maintain the territory under their control.


----MONEY----

Xinhua General News Service   August 26, 2003
Vietnam's pharmaceutical export expected to rise

HANOI: Vietnam is expected to export 25-30 million US dollars worth of
pharmaceutical products in 2003, local newspaper Youth reported on
Tuesday.

This figure represents a sharp increase compared with the just 20 million
dollars exported annually over the past few years. However, it is expected
to equal to only five percent of the country's pharmaceutical import
turnover this year.

Vietnam's pharmaceutical products are exported to Russia, Common Wealth of
Independent States, and Asian and African countries. The industry is also
seeking ways to infiltrate into many new markets, such as America and
Europe.

Vietnam is scheduled to implement a great trade promotion program with an
aim to introduce its pharmaceutical products in Russia and Myanmar in
October.


----REGIONAL----

Malaysiakini   August 26, 2003
50 more asylum-seekers arrested in KL
By Yoon Szu-Mae

Police arrested about 50 asylum-seekers of various nationalities this
morning, mainly outside the office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur.

Brickfields OCPD Zulhasnan Najib Baharuddin said the foreign nationals in
the group included 30 Burmese, 18 Indonesians,one Bangladeshi and one
Thai.

About 30 of them had been detainedby 9.45am at roadblocks mounted around
the UNHCR building in Bukit Petaling and were taken away in police trucks
to the Brickfields police station.

At a press conference this afternoon, Zulhasnan described this as an
on-going "normal crime prevention to look afterthe whole district".

He said the detainees have been sent to the Langkap detention centre in
Perak as they did not have valid travel documents. Among them were four
women and a young child.

Last week, 239 asylum-seekers were arrested at the same location and are
now being held at various detention centres, awaiting repatriation.

UNHCR refugee eligibility co-ordinator Evan Ruth expressed concern that,
if the police persist in arresting asylum-seekers who are attempting to
apply for UN protection, then it will no longer be able to fulfill its
mandate to provide support and protection to refugees in Malaysia.

Ruth said he was surprised by today's police operation, as recent meetings
with Foreign Affairs Ministry officials had indicated that the agency
would be allowed to continue conducting interviews with asylum-seekers
this week.

"They told us that they would speak to the police...we took that as some
form of assurance that (the police) would not be here," he said.

He said no asylum-seekers had come to the agency after last Tuesday
because of heavy police presence at the gates of the UNHCR office.

Twelve repatriated

Ruth also said 12 Acehnese among the 239 asylum-seekers arrested last week
have been repatriated.
"It appears they went voluntarily as we were told that their travels costs
were borne by their relatives. We were only able to independently verify
that five people returned voluntarily - and none of them lived in Aceh,
although they are Acehnese," he said.

Last week, a Bernama report had quoted Perak immigration director Ishak
Mohamed as saying that 120 of the detainees had volunteered to return
home.

Ruth said the number was nowhere as high as that because the remaining 214
people under detention have confirmed to UNHCR officers that they would
like to seek asylum through the agency.

Of these, 70 individuals were transferred yesterday to the illegal
immigrants' detention centre in Lenggeng, Negri Sembilan, while 30 more
have been sent to Machap Umboo, Melaka. No reasons were given to the UNHCR
for their relocation.

Ruth said officials in Langkap have assured UNHCR officers that detainees
will not be deported if the agency has determined that they are eligible
for refugee status.

UNHCR had previously said all asylum-seekers go through a vigorous
interview process before being granted a refugee status and, in the case
of Acehnese, temporary protection letters.

Its Geneva headquarters has noted that the safety of Acehnese is of
particular concern should they be forcibly repatriated to Indonesia, given
the state of conflict in their home province.

'No threat'

Meanwhile, protests from Malaysian civil society groups continue to pour
in. Citizens' International joined the fray in expressing concern over the
treatment of those genuinely seeking protection through UNHCR.

"Most of the Acehnese asylum-seekers are not combatants but innocent
civilians who pose no threat to the security of Malaysia in any way. They
are here waiting to be accepted by other countries," said chairperson SM
Mohamed Idris.

"The very fact that they were detained on their way to the UNHCR office
proves that they were seeking protection under the UN refugees' convention
and (did) not (intend) to remain in Malaysia."

He added that such asylum-seekers must be treated as victims, and not as
"opportunistic" illegal immigrants.

Yesterday, Foreign Affairs Minister Syed Hamid Albar had commented that
"it is not right for UNHCR to register the Acehnese as possible refugees
when they are not refugees".

He said that, if the UN agency was allowed to issue temporary protection
letters, it would "create problems" and "encourage people to come to
Malaysia".

In mid-May, the Indonesian government mounted an all-out military
offensive to crush the long-running separatist movement in Aceh, after a
peace initiative broke down.

This triggered a massive outflow of civilians seeking escape from the
violence from both the military and separatists.

Indonesia's national human rights body Komnas-HAM has announced that it
will be recommending that UN investigators probe human rights violations
in Aceh and breach of humanitarian law under the Geneva Convention.


Agence France Presse   August 26, 2003
Thailand hails Myanmar reshuffle as positive development

Thailand, which has proposed a roadmap for democracy in military-ruled
Myanmar, on Tuesday welcomed the recent shakeup at the top in Yangon and
said the move could help Myanmar better deal with the outside world.

A political reshuffle saw General Khin Nyunt shifted out of the nation's
third most powerful post on Monday and installed as prime minister,
nominally in charge of the day-to-day running of the country.

Analysts saw the moderate Khin Nyunt's ousting from the role as Secretary
1 in the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) as a bid to
shift blame over the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and serious economic woes,
but Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra hailed it as a positive
development.

"The reshuffle shows that Myanmar is changing in its administration
process to be more international ... to make the world community accept
Myanmar," Thaksin told reporters.

"It is good and it is (heading towards) the way Thailand wants Myanmar to
be," he added.

The Thai leader, however, did not say whether the reshuffling of Khin
Nyunt would lead to the release of Myanmar's pro-democracy leader Aung San
Suu Kyi, who was arrested in May after a clash between her supporters and
a junta-backed mob.

"I could not say this change will lead to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi
but I can say it is a positive developement," he said. "They will open
more, they will listen more, and the democratic process will progress in a
positive way."

Thaksin's administration laid out a "roadmap" for democracy to Myanmar as
a way of easing international pressure on its military-ruled neighbour to
free Aung San Suu Kyi.

When asked whether Thailand's plan would make any difference to Myanmar's
actions, he said: "Yes, I hope everything will be okay, that I can say."

The junta's detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and wider crackdown on democracy
activists has outraged the international community but the ruling generals
have consistently refused to give any timeframe for her release.


----EDITORIALS----

Japan Today   August 26, 2003
Discussion: No change in sight after SPDC's reshuffle
By Khur Tai Korn Khaw

Speculation of the SPDC's reshuffle, that General Khin Nyunt is gaining
upper hand and General Than Shwe had effectively demoted Khin Nyunt to the
ceremonial job of Prime minister and so on, has been rife and a lot more
would still find their way to mass medias.

The point is that General Than Shwe is keeping his posts as chairman of
the ruling military body, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and
defense minister. This means, he is still the guy who would call the shots
and the replacement as Number Three slot - SPDC Secretary-1 -, Soe Win, is
seen as more of a hardliner and closer to Than Shwe.

Whatever the case, the Burmese junta's attitude towards the opposition
camps doesn't look anything like changing, if it is not becoming more
harsh and entrenched.

Thus, it is fair to conclude that the trio, General Than Shwe, Maung Aye
and Khin Nyunt, would likely stick it out together, rather than going
against each others for the time being to survive the West sanctions, if
not for any other reason.

The reconciliation talks, which the mainstream democratic oppositions have
endorsed, would likely have to wait until the SPDC is ready. And it would
be only ready, if the military could, in any future constitution, secure
25% seats for its group in both houses of parliament, state and regional
assemblies. On top of that the Presidential system it proposes would have
to be headed by someone with military experience. Also, the active-duty
army commander would have to be the commander-in-chief and vested with
exercising State power in any emergency. These are some major points,
which the military have been floating and would like to see incorporated
in any future constitution, to secure its political position.

In short, anything less than the above mentioned wouldn't be worth
thinking and the junta might as well sit it out or go on the way it is now
until conditions are favorable to move further.

The democratic oppositions and non-Burman ethnic nationalities are again
stuck with this "deadlock" position to advance their reconciliation
rhetoric. The pressing problem now is "how to get the junta to the
negotiating table" and all of us know that we can't be only talking among
ourselves without creating some push and incentive for the adversary to
join the table. The key words for the opposition now would be "creativity,
innovative and boldness", if we are to make headways in our deliberation.
............

Recent SPDC line up:

SPDC Secretary-1 Gen Khin Nyunt -- prime minister
SPDC Secretary-2 Lt Gen Soe Win -- SPDC Secretary-1
SPDC Member Lt Gen Thein Sein -- SPDC Secretary-2

Ministers permitted to retire
1. Lt Gen Min Thein -- SPDC Chairman Office minister
2. Brig Gen Abel - SPDC Chairman Office minister
3. U Pan Aung -- PM Office Minister
4. Lt Gen Tin Ngwe -- Cooperatives Minister
5. U Aung Khin -- Religious Affairs Minister

New Ministers appointed
1. [Rangoon Mayor] U Ko Lay -- PM Office Minister
2. [MI Head of Dept] Maj Gen Thein Swe -- PM Office Minister
3. [Deputy Home Minister] Brig Gen Thura Myint Maung -- Religious Affairs
Minister
4. [Deputy Energy Minister] Brig Gen Thein Aung -- Forestry Minister
5. [Southwest Commander] Maj Gen Htay Oo -- Cooperatives Minister


The Irrawaddy   August 26, 2003
Sanctions Are Working in Burma
By Philip S Robertson, Jr

(This commentary is in response to The Irrawaddy’s interview with David
Steinberg ["Sanctions Rarely Work", Vol 11, No3]. Steinberg is the author
of several books on Burma and commented on the country’s political
situation and US-Burmese relations in the April issue.)

Once the truth about the brutal attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the
National League for Democracy (NLD) at Depayin on May 30 was revealed, the
almost unanimous passage by the US Congress of the Burma Freedom and
Democracy Act imposing a ban on Burmese imports and other sanctions
against the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) was a foregone
conclusion. Many observers now view the debate about sanctions as over.

Yet it cannot be forgotten that the EU has yet to act beyond tightening
visa requirements, and other countries in Asia and the Pacific haven’t
even gone that far, so the policy debate remains relevant and ongoing.
Since one assumes that critics of sanctions policy such as Georgetown
University’s David Steinberg may continue to profess naïve platitudes such
as "it is better to negotiate than to isolate" while failing to adequately
appreciate that imposing sanctions is negotiating by other, arguably more
effective means, a review of the rationale and the efficacy of sanctions
against Burma is in order.

The successive military regimes of Burma have been one of the least
compromising regimes in modern Asian history. Military propaganda has
inculcated the Tatmadaw (armed forces) with a vision of self as the
saviors of the Union of Burma, and this has been reinforced by the social
and economic privileges granted to soldiers and their families as a "class
apart" in Burma. SPDC incompetence in foreign policy is offset, in part,
by a single-minded tenaciousness to crush all opponents, internal and
external, of the state. Steinberg and others have noted the general lack
of civil society in Burma, whether it be trade unions, community
organizations or self-help associations. The obvious question is why
Steinberg and the anti-sanctions camp then believe that providing
smatterings of humanitarian assistance will somehow result in a change of
heart and policy in the SPDC.

The premise of aid for a political settlement was explicitly rejected by
the junta when the Chilston Park negotiations (the secret meeting among
senior government officials from Europe, Southeast Asia and the US and UN
representatives to discuss an "aid-for-reform" plan) became public. The
hope of encouraging moderates in the SPDC (when Steinberg himself noted,
"I don’t know who the ‘moderates’ may be
") is putting hopes ahead of
facts, and shows the professional policymakers’ unfortunate penchant for
tinkering when short-terms results are not immediately forthcoming. This
approach ignores the fact that a comprehensive solution for the
restoration of democracy and accountable government in Burma will only
take place in a much longer time frame.

Let me make a few points clear to understand why implementing stringent
sanctions is the most effective policy in seeking political change in
Burma. Like many other military regimes in Southeast Asia’s history, power
and access to riches go hand in hand. The same is true for Burma, except
military control is even more formal. The Union of Myanmar Economic
Holdings (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) are the two
major industrial conglomerates controlled by the military, and they have
managed to dominate many of the key economic sectors of the country.

According to the leaked 1995-96 annual report of UMEH, this conglomerate
was formed in 1990 as "a special public company, with shareholders limited
to the Directorate of Defense Procurement, Ministry of Defense, Defense
Regimental Institutes, and other bodies of the Defense Services and War
Veterans." UMEH shares offices with the Directorate of Procurement of the
Ministry of Defense. In that report, two of the main objectives of the
UMEH are "to support military personnel and their families" and "to try
and become the main logistics and support organization for the military by
gradually establishing industries." Among some of the industries in which
UMEH is invested are banking, tourism, import and export of foodstuffs,
gems and jade mining and sales, construction materials, leasing of fishing
boats, real estate and general retail.

The SPDC strongly encourages incoming foreign investment to partner with
UMEH or MEC, and both have joint ventures activities in garment factories,
cigarettes and alcohol, electronics and car and motorcycle assembly.
Between the UMEH and the MEC, the military has extended its reach into
virtually all aspects of the formal economy of Burma. When combined with
the economic enterprises operated directly by the Ministry of Industry 1
and Ministry of Industry 2, the regime’s domination of the economy is
clear. For this reason, sanctions have a disproportionate impact on the
military, not necessarily the people of Burma.

The junta’s domination of the economy is intended to enable it to outflank
any sort of pressure to share political power. For a regime whose power is
based on the repression of human rights and political aspirations of the
people, economic growth and prosperity is seen as an alternative source of
legitimacy. But, as Steinberg notes, the mismanagement of the economy is
clearly identified with the SPDC. Economic sanctions and campaigns against
foreign investment in Burma have effectively prevented this strategy for
political legitimacy from succeeding in Rangoon.

Moreover, sanctions create pressure against the SPDC’s base of its
political power by threatening the military leadership’s relationship with
the middle and lower level officer corps. In an army where forced
conscription and child soldiers are common, maintaining control means
keeping the loyalty of the officers. Economic sanctions reduce the size of
the "economic pie" from which the SPDC can slice pieces for its patronage
networks, and creates additional hardship for low- and mid-level military
families.

Furthermore, when the economy is weakened by sanctions, pressure grows on
the Tatmadaw to rely increasingly on seizures of land and property, and
forced labor projects—mostly agricultural—to supplement the incomes of
officers. Economic repression in these areas creates additional popular
resentment against the military, and builds support for political change.
The dearth of foreign investors (and accompanying photo ops for the
generals in The New Light of Myanmar) also has a psychological effect that
strikes at the Tatmadaw’s perception of self as highly competent managers
of national affairs, creating further pressure for change from the general
populace and, potentially, from within the military.

To the extent that sanctions force European, North American and East Asian
firms to pull out of Burma, and sour the overall business climate, the
SPDC’s reliance on Chinese firms is increased. Rather than a negative,
this trend should be viewed as positive, since it serves to increase
resentment of the general populace, as well as nationalistic Burma Army
officers, against the leadership of the SPDC that is making policy.
Steinberg points this out, when he says that "If the Burmese perceive that
Chinese control is too great, they may take out their anger against their
own government
" If Chinese economic investments are threatened, and
international opinion continues to move strongly against the SPDC, it
cannot be discounted that behind-the-scenes Chinese government pressure
may be forthcoming to improve political conditions as a way to defuse
building anti-Chinese pressure.

Extension of economic sanctions also provides critical bargaining leverage
to internal Burmese democrats, led by the National League for Democracy
(NLD). Not surprising, then, that the NLD has consistently supported
stronger economic sanctions by the international community against Burma.
In a bargaining situation where the NLD has only principles and popular
support (one which is ignored by the regime, and the second which cannot
be mobilized without casualties), the power to reduce the burden of
international sanctions is a significant bargaining chip.

Most observers agree that Aung San Suu Kyi’s words matter greatly in
Western capitals, and that she has the power to rapidly influence North
American and European policy toward Burma. Every version of the "road map"
for a future Burma, whether it be from the UN, Thailand or international
NGOs seeking to influence the road map, agrees on the basic principle that
progress in national reconciliation and movement towards a democratic
government would be rewarded by a reduction in sanctions. Politically,
decisions in the West on what constitutes "progress", and evaluations of
the degree of momentum in any future political bargaining between the NLD,
SPDC and the ethnic nationalities will depend a great deal on what the NLD
says. The latest round of US sanctions against Burma have greatly
increased the NLD’s leverage against the SPDC, and have prompted the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) to move into an
unprecedented position of seeking to facilitate change in one of its
member countries.

Thailand is now also feeling pressure, and leading an effort to develop
its "road-map" with the final aim of bringing forth a democratic Burmese
government before Burma assumes the chairmanship of Asean in 2006.

The attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers on May 30 clearly set
back the political clock in Burma, though this is likely to be temporary.
Importantly, though, it has dispelled the myth of the efficacy of a policy
of giving incentives of humanitarian aid to the SPDC (and opposing further
sanctions) that proponents like Steinberg and the International Crisis
Group have supported. Their now discredited approach ignores the
uncompromising nature of the SPDC, the connection between the military’s
economic base and their political support, and the continuing need to
bolster the leverage of the NLD in its negotiations with the military.

Ultimately, almost all observers believe that it will be a split in the
Tatmadaw that will result in the political will to negotiate, similar to
the way that the ascension of de Klerk in South Africa led to a change in
policy in the Afrikaaner circles and negotiations with the African
National Congress to create a popular, race-blind democratic government.
The quickest path to that day in Burma’s future is through economic
sanctions and increased international political pressure, and connected to
a timetabled "road map" negotiated with all internal parties in Burma. The
international community needs to close ranks behind that strategy, and
finds the necessary political will to move forward.

Philip S Robertson is the Mainland Southeast Asia Representative of the
Solidarity Center, AFL-CIO. The views expressed here are his own.