BurmaNet News: October 17, 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

October 17, 2003 Issue #2349

INSIDE BURMA
AP: Myanmar troops take Karen rebel base, hundreds displaced
SHAN: Karens fighting tooth and nail

ON THE BORDER
BP: Relocation of 17,000 refugees to go ahead
Irrawaddy: Border Sweep Precedes Apec
BP: Border site in Burma to be developed

MONEY
Nation: Petroleum Demand up 4%; Imports of natural gas from Burma up 15.9%
Bloomberg: Ivanhoe May Sell Myanmar Mine, Shares to Raise Cash
World Markets Analysis: Unocal Promises Further Investment in Thai Energy
Sector

REGIONAL
JEN: Japan, Indonesia agree Myanmar's Suu Kyi must be freed

INTERNATIONAL
AFP: Powell raps Southeast Asian nations over tolerance of Myanmar
AFP: US students arrested at Myanmar embassy demo

OPINION / OTHER
PR Week: Think Before You Move Into Burma
Irrawaddy: The Need for Two-Way Traffic (Part Two) by Ashley South


----INSIDE BURMA----

Associated Press Worldstream   October 17, 2003
Myanmar troops take Karen rebel base, hundreds displaced

In a major offensive, Myanmar government forces have taken an ethnic Karen
stronghold near the border with Thailand, leaving about 1,500 people
homeless and in hiding, observers in northern Thailand said Friday.

The offensive against the 7th Brigade headquarters of the Karen National
Liberation Army began last month in Pa-An district of Karen State,
opposite the Thai town of Mae Sot, a Western relief worker said on
condition of anonymity.

A Western journalist who visited the scene of the fighting on Wednesday
said 80 Karen guerrilla defenders had been holding out against 400 Myanmar
government troops besieging the stronghold, about 5 kilometers (3 miles)
inside Myanmar.

It fell Thursday, but most of the defenders apparently escaped, said the
relief worker.

Mahn Sha, the secretary general of the rebels' political wing, the Karen
National Union, denied any major loss by his forces, saying his guerrillas
held no permanent positions in the area. He told The Associated Press by
telephone that sporadic fighting has been going on for the past 10 days,
after about 3,000 government troops entered the Pa-An area.

Mahn Sha claimed 120 government soldiers had been killed in the fighting
and Karen casualties numbered only 12 wounded. The claims could not be
corroborated and KNU's reports in the past have sometimes proved to be
exaggerated.

The Karen have been fighting for autonomy from Myanmar's central
government for more than five decades. Concerted government offensives in
1995 and 1997 wiped out all their major fixed headquarters, and the rebels
now fight a low-level guerrilla war.

A few hundred refugees are believed to have crossed over to Thailand
during the current offensive, and some of the estimated 1,500 displaced
persons still in the area may follow, said the relief worker.

Twelve Myanmar army battalions and three battalions of a pro-government
ethnic guerrilla force, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army are involved in
the offensive, said the relief worker, who has long-standing contacts with
the Karen.

Myanmar's government has not publicly commented on the fighting.


Shan Herald Agency for News   October 17, 2003
Karens fighting tooth and nail

The Karens are opposing the biggest onslaught since the battle of
Manerplaw in 1995, reports Network Media Group on Wednesday (15 October),
quoting Tato Hmu, the Karens' 7th Brigade chief of organization.

According to two officers from Karen National Liberation Army, the Karen
National Union's armed wing, it was rather extraordinary Rangoon should be
waging a major military operation during the monsoons. The present fight
that was launched since 5 August has been taking place along a 20-km front
between Karen State's Myawaddy district and Tak province's Mae Ramart and
Thasongyang district.

On the Burmese side are 11 battalions, mostly from Hmawbi-based Military
Operations Command #4 and elements from 999th Brigade, Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army, a splinter group that made peace with Rangoon in 1994,
while on the Karens' side are 7 battalions including All Burma Students
Democratic Front's 8th Battalion.

"Our forces are reacting well," says Saw Sarky, Europe-based Karen
representative, "engaging them both in the front and on the rear." He
cited two frontal clashes on 13-14 October when the Karen rebels killed 6
and wounded 23 "many of them seriously." The KNLA's other units also
employed diversionary tactics elsewhere. He reported two ambushes on 3
October and 9 October.

The first, staged by the KNLA's Third Brigade, in Nyaunglebin district,
killed 6, wounded 4 and captured a number of weapons including one 60 mm
mortar from the Burma Army's Light Infantry Battalion 109.

The second, staged by the 6th Brigade on Light Infantry Battalion 299 in
Dooplaya district, killed 5 and wounded 9, 5 of whom seriously including a
column commander, Maj. Myint Win.

The Nation, 15 October, also reports the Burma Army's continued use of
forced portering in the Karen campaign.


----ON THE BORDER----

Bangkok Post   October 18, 2003
Relocation of 17,000 refugees to go ahead

The relocation of more than 17,000 refugees from a camp in Mae Sariang
district of Mae Hong Son province will go ahead in a bid to end
deforestation.

Governor Supoj Laowansiri said the planned relocation of 17,062 refugees
to a site in Sop Moei district should be completed by December. His
confirmation came after yesterday's meeting with authorities and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The UNHCR earlier voiced concern over the refugees' safety, saying the
proposed site in Ban Mae La Un was only four kilometres from the
Thai-Burmese border. But Mr Supoj said security forces would be deployed
at the 800-rai camp.

Authorities said deforestation in Salween forest, near the current camp,
necessitated the move.


The Irrawaddy   October 17, 2003
Border Sweep Precedes Apec
By Aung Su Shin/Mae Sot

Nearly 500 Burmese migrant workers and beggars have been handed over to
Burmese authorities in Myawaddy as part of a security sweep ahead of this
week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) meeting in Bangkok,
according to Col Sanit Komonwanit, immigration chief for Tak Province.

The two-day operation was a coordinated effort by Mae Sot police and
immigration officials and Myawaddy border security forces. The groups also
agreed to share information about the movement of people who could
potentially harm the security of Thailand and Burma.

"We are monitoring the activities of groups which are dangerous for the
country," said Mae Sot district chief Virut Phusingh. He added that the
Thai and Burmese authorities will keep close watch on suspected drug
dealers and illegal migrant laborers in an effort to tighten security for
the Apec meeting.

Sanit said special measures are also being taken to prevent Burmese
students and political activists from sneaking into Thailand so they can
participate in protests during the Apec meeting. Authorities have the
names and photos of those suspected of wanting to illegally enter Thailand
for protests and terrorist activities and passports will be heavily
scrutinized, he added.

The Apec meeting takes place on Oct 21 and 22


The Bangkok Post   October 17, 2003
Border site in Burma to be developed
By Supamart Kasem

A multi-million-baht farming, industrial and tourism development is being
promoted for a 400,000-rai border area in Burma opposite Mae Sot.

A two-day meeting ended yesterday between the National Social and Economic
Development Board (NESDB), Thai Chamber of Commerce, and public and
private sectors to discuss the project.

NESDB deputy secretary-general Somjet Terakoop said the NESDB was
examining a site along the Thai-Burmese border under the Mae Sot-Myawaddy
economic zone scheme.

``Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra says Thai-Burmese cooperation in Mae
Sot and Myawaddy is his first priority and wants to speed it up by
assigning his deputy Korn Dabbaransi to oversee guidelines,'' Mr Somjet
said.

The development would be based along the 18km Myawaddy-Tingkanyinaung
route to be built in the next 18 months with a 119-million-baht Thai
subsidy.

Labour-intensive manufacturing involving beef, leather, rubber wood and
furniture could move there.

The site was also good for growing crops and start-up factories, said Mr
Somjet.

The project would be in line with the Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS)
of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Burma to narrow economic gaps and
encourage alien workers in Thailand to go home.

The strategy focuses on developing ``twin towns'' including Mukdahan-Laos'
Suwannakhet, Trat-Cambodia's Koh Kong, Mae Sai-Burma's Tachilek, Mae
Sot-Burma's Myawaddy, Kanchanaburi-Burma's Payathonsu, and Ranong-Burma's
Kawtaung.

On Nov 11-12, leaders of the countries will meet in Burma's Pagan,
Mandalay, to discuss the ECS in detail.

Mr Somjet said the plan would help put about one million Burmese workers
in Thailand back to work in Burma and discourage more from entering
Thailand in search of jobs.


----MONEY----

The Nation (Thailand)   October 17, 2003
LATE NEWS:

PETROLEUM: Demand up 4%

PTT Plc reported that petroleum demand this year had increased by 4.3 per
cent from last year.

Vice president of corporate public relations, Pongpayak
Sathienpakiranakorn, said domestic petroleum consumption this year 'has
reached 1.04 million barrels per day, while consumption of natural gas has
grown by 5.1 per cent to 396,200 barrels per day'.

Thailand has imported 919,900 barrels per day, up 8.1 per cent from the
same period last year - 14,500 barrels of refined products per day (down
36.2 per cent); 785,200 barrels of crude per day (up 8.4 per cent); and
120,200 barrels of natural gas from Burma per day (up 15.9 per cent).

The total cost of imported refined products was Bt5.35 billion, down 20.5
per cent from last year, equivalent to Bt1.38 billion.

Meanwhile, imports of natural gas from Burma were up 15.9 per cent, at a
total cost of Bt30.64 billion.


Bloomberg   October 16, 2003
Ivanhoe May Sell Myanmar Mine, Shares to Raise Cash (Update2)

Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. said it may sell its copper mine in Myanmar and plans a
$50 million sale of new stock to raise cash for development of a property
in Mongolia that may hold $40 billion worth of gold and copper.

The Vancouver-based company has hired HSBC Holdings Plc and Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce to advise on the mine sale, Ivanhoe Chief
Executive Robert Friedland said in an interview. The equity sale, to an
unnamed institutional investor, will take place within the next two days,
he said.

Ivanhoe also has applied to list its stock on the Nasdaq Stock Market,
giving the company greater access to the world's largest capital market,
he said.

Ivanhoe last month said it plans to retain control of its Turquoise Hill
property in Mongolia and may sell minority stakes to help raise cash for
the development.

Friedland was co-chairman and a major shareholder at Diamond Fields
Resources Inc., which discovered the world's largest nickel deposits at
Voisey's Bay in Newfoundland. He sold Diamond Fields to Toronto-based Inco
Ltd. for C$4.3 billion ($3.27 billion) in 1996.

Ivanhoe currently has shares traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, the
Australia Stock Exchange and over the counter in the U.S. The Canadian
shares fell 60 cents, or 5.3 percent, to C$10.65 in trading today. The
stock still has more than tripled in value since Ivanhoe announced its
Mongolian discovery in July.

Project Cost

Friedland said the Mongolia project will cost between $400 million and $1
billion, ``depending on the scale of the development.'' He said he's in
discussions to get much of the financing from government lenders in Japan,
Korea and China.

The Myanmar mine is valued on Ivanhoe's books at $90 million and probably
will sell at ``a very significant premium to that,'' Friedland said.

The Canadian government has urged companies not to invest in Myanmar, a
Southeast Asian nation known as Burma before being renamed by the ruling
military regime. Canada in July said it will refuse visas to Myanmar
officials to protest the imprisonment of opposition leader Aung San Suu
Kyi.


World Markets Analysis   October 17, 2003
Unocal Promises Further Investment in Thai Energy Sector

Unocal is promising to step up its presence in the Thai oil and gas
sector, with the prospect of US$10bn of new investment over the coming
decade.
WMRC Perspective

Significance
 Unocal is already one of the largest oil and gas producers in Thailand
and has invested over US$7bn over the last two decades.

Implications
 The company is offering the prospect of new investment as a sweetener in
its negotiations to secure extensions on existing gas field contracts.

Outlook
 The deal should ensure that Unocal extends its contracts on existing
projects and looks to further exploration opportunities in the Gulf of
Thailand.

Unocal Pledges to Maintain Leading Position in Thai Gas Sector
Unocal's Current Assets

Field/Block* Stake
 Field 1 80%
 Field 2 80%
 Field 3
 71.25%
 Pailin 35%
 Arthit 16%
 Kaphong/Platong (mostly oil) 70%

*Unocal's main upstream concession partners are PTT Exploration and
Production (PTTEP) and Mitsui Oil Exploration Co (Moeco).

Unocal has stated that it will sign a preliminary agreement to invest up
to US$10bn in Thailand over the next decade, in return for a 10-year
extension on its contracts for the 1,2 and 3 (also known as Yala, Plamuk
and Surat) offshore gas fields. The contract for Unocal 1 is currently due
to expire in 2012, with Unocal 2 and 3 expiring in 2010. The new contracts
are also likely to be welcomed by the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT
Ltd), as they would allow the company to retain its position as the sole
offtaker from the fields.

Unocal is the largest gas producer in Thailand with natural output
averaging 1.1 Bcfd. This is equivalent to nearly half of Thailand's
overall production of 2.4 Bcfd. Unocal recently joined ChevronTexaco and
PTTEP in signing new gas tariff agreements for the Pailin field, in which
it holds a minority stake (see Thailand: 8 October 2003: PTT Extends Gas
Contract with ChevronTexaco). However, the deal for the 1-2-3 fields would
be far more significant for both Unocal and PTT as this complex currently
accounts for over 65% of Unocal's total output.

Continued investment in gas projects is especially important for Thailand
as production needs to keep pace with new pipeline capacity. A third major
pipeline heading north from the Gulf of Thailand is currently under
construction. New investment could focus on additional oil and condensate
production as well as natural gas. Unocal currently produces and exports
around 20,000 bpd of crude oil, mostly from the 1-2-3 fields but also from
the smaller Kaphong and Platong fields. Unocal has also indicated that it
may invest in power projects in order to expand the captive market for its
gas (see Thailand: 2 April 2003: Unocal Budgets US$300m for Thailand
Projects). Unocal is also involved in the Yetagun and Yadana gas projects
in neighbouring Myanmar, which also supply gas to power projects in
Thailand.

Outlook and Implications

Unocal has faced pressure from PTT to cut tariffs, which acts as the sole
offtaker for domestic gas production. Unocal's latest offer of massive new
direct investment is likely to be welcomed by PTT and the Thai government,
but it also sends a message to PTT not to drive too hard on current gas
price negotiations and risk forsaking a longer-term relationship. With
Thailand's energy demand growing so rapidly, PTT and the government will
be at pains not to alienate such a major energy investor.



----REGIONAL----

Japan Economic Newswire   October 17, 2003
Japan, Indonesia agree Myanmar's Suu Kyi must be freed

Japan and Indonesia agreed Friday the Myanmar junta must release
pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, a Japanese Foreign Ministry
spokesman said.

Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Indonesian Foreign Minister
Hassan Wirajuda also promised to make the special Tokyo summit among
leaders of Japan and Southeast Asia in December successful, Press
Secretary Hatsuhisa Takashima said.

In their meeting at a Bangkok hotel on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum ministerial talks, Kawaguchi praised
Indonesia's efforts to approach Myanmar, including sending former Foreign
Minister Ali Alatas to the country last month.

The two ministers shared the view that Myanmar's junta must release Suu
Kyi and show specific steps to carry out reforms in its road map to
democratization and national reconciliation, Takashima told reporters.

Kawaguchi expressed hope that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), which is chaired by Indonesia this year, will continue efforts to
deal with the junta, the spokesman said. Myanmar is a member of ASEAN but
not part of the APEC forum.

She also said in the meeting that resolving Myanmar issues will likely
lead to the success of the Japan-ASEAN special summit, he said.

'The two ministers agreed to make careful preparations in the coming two
months so that the special summit will not end up being simply a ritual or
celebratory gathering, but a fruitful conference,' Takashima said.

Kawaguchi told Hassan she hopes Japan and ASEAN will issue a joint
statement during the summit indicating a vision of their future
relationship.


----INTERNATIONAL----

Agence France Presse   October 17, 2003
Powell raps Southeast Asian nations over tolerance of Myanmar

US Secretary of State Colin Powell on Friday rapped Southeast Asian
nations over their failure to push military-run Myanmar to release
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and make democratic reforms.

"There is more that the nations of Southeast Asia can do," he told
reporters accompanying him as he flew to Bangkok for a meeting of the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministers.

"There is more that the recent ASEAN conference could have done with
respect to pointing out the failures of the regime in Burma to do what the
international community expects it to do, to release Aung San Suu Kyi, to
let her participate in the life of the country and restore the democratic
process."

The United States tightened sanctions on Myanmar after Aung San Suu Kyi
was detained at an undisclosed location following a bloody clash between
her supporters and pro-junta demonstrators on May 30.

She was admitted to hospital last month for major gynaecological surgery
and afterwards taken to her home to begin her third stint under house
arrest since beginning her political career in 1988.

The Myanmar junta's refusal to release the democracy leader before the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Bali earlier this
month was expected to attract criticism at the meeting.

But instead, regional leaders hailed recent events in the military-run
state as "positive developments" and said international sanctions would
not help bring about democratic change.

The ASEAN resolution also lent its support to the regime's new "roadmap"
to democracy, which envisages "free and fair" elections and a new
constitution but does not mention Aung San Suu Kyi or any timeframe.

Powell dismissed the ruling generals' promises of reform and said their
treatment of the 58-year-old Nobel peace laureate was a "travesty".

"They are trying to divert attention by discussing roadmaps that really do
not serve the purpose of getting back to democracy and allowing this woman
to be free, to speak out and to represent the interests of the Burmese
people in an open way."

US President George W. Bush is expected to issue a strong condemnation of
Myanmar when he arrives in Bangkok for Monday's APEC summit.

"You can believe the president will talk quite a lot about the need for
freedom in Burma," in talks with Thai leaders, among others, said Bush's
national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

However, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has said the United States
did not understand the issue well and that he would resist pressure from
Bush to do more to intervene in the neighbouring nation's internal
affairs.


Agence France Presse   October 17, 2003
US students arrested at Myanmar embassy demo

US Secret Service agents arrested four students at a sit-down protest at
Myanmar's Washington embassy Friday, as activists called on President
George W. Bush to use his Asian tour to highlight the plight of the
military-ruled state.

As supporters chanted "Free Burma" at diplomats seen watching events from
behind embassy curtains, agents loaded the students from Washington-area
universities into a van after they sat down in the middle of the road.

Those arrested included Aung Din, a former political prisoner in Myanmar,
in a protest timed to coincide with the birthday of student leader Min Ko
Naing, incarcerated for 14 years in jail in Myanmar.

"Those of us who live in freedom must raise our voices for those who live
under tyranny," said Aung Din.

A phalanx of uniformed secret service agents blocked access to the
embassy, three months after demonstrators scuffled with diplomatic staff
after scaling a balcony on the mansion in Washington's diplomatic quarter.

The Service is responsible for protecting 170 foreign missions in the US
capital.

Demonstrators called on Bush to use a visit to Thailand beginning Saturday
to highlight the plight of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who is under
house arrest in Yangon.

Earlier Friday, US Secretary of State Colin Powell rebuked Southeast Asian
nations over their failure to press Myanmar for the Nobel laureate's
release.

"There is more that the nations of Southeast Asia can do," he told
reporters accompanying him as he flew to Bangkok for a meeting of the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministers.

"There is more that the recent ASEAN conference could have done with
respect to pointing out the failures of the regime in Burma to do what the
international community expects it to do, to release Aung San Suu Kyi, to
let her participate in the life of the country and restore the democratic
process."

The United States tightened sanctions on Myanmar after Aung San Suu Kyi
was detained at an undisclosed location following a bloody clash between
her supporters and pro-junta demonstrators on May 30.

She was admitted to hospital last month for major gynaecological surgery
and afterwards taken to her home to begin her third stint under house
arrest since beginning her political career in 1988.


----OPINION / OTHER----

PR Week   October 17, 2003
Think Before You Move Into Burma
By Mark Johnson

The Burma Campaign UK has claimed a number of scalps in its drive to
expose companies dealing with a country renowned for its poor human rights
record. Mark Johnson looks at the reputational risk facing companies that
do business with such countries



Imagine yourself relaxing on the canopied observation deck of your
cruiser, admiring monasteries, pagodas and shrines as they slip by on the
banks of the Ayeyarwady River. This is the romance of travel as offered by
Orient Express on its Road to Mandalay Cruise in Burma.

Companies doing business in Burma have not always found it such plain
sailing. Orient Express was recently criticised by pressure group the
Burma Campaign UK (BCUK) for continuing to operate and market its cruise
despite human rights abuses under the country's repressive military
dictatorship (PRWeek, 9 May).

The danger faced by any company operating in a country with a poor human
rights record is that it will be seen as offering a stamp of approval to a
brutal regime, posing a serious threat to its reputation.

Many companies have pulled out, including Compaq, Reebok, Premier Oil,
British Home Stores and Burton. Despite having met senior BCUK
representatives in July, Orient Express is adamant its Road to Mandalay
Cruise will continue to operate a full season of cruises this year and
next, according to trains and cruises PR manager Kathryn Malone.

'As much as anyone else, we want democracy in Myanmar (the name used by
the Burmese government since 1989),' says Malone. 'We don't look at it in
political terms. We've operated in Myanmar since 1995. Unlike other tour
operators, we have our own people on the ground, many of whom are Burmese,
and they want to see tourism continue.'

BCUK has threatened a media campaign against Orient Express if it fails to
pull out, a tactic that recently caused both WPP and JJB Sports to cut
ties with the country (PRWeek, 22 August and 3 October).

BCUK's strategy is to starve the military regime of foreign investment.

It does this by compiling reports on firms, mainly British, that operate
in the country, based on intelligence collected by the exiled Federation
of Trade Unions, Burma, which works from neighbouring Thailand.

It exposes companies that have any financial involvement with Burma - even
if the company has only a small stake in the country, as in the case of
WPP, which inherited Burmese advertising agency Bates Myanmar as part of
its acquisition of Cordiant Communications in July.

BCUK campaigners present their findings to the 'offending' firms, offering
them a last chance to withdraw from Burma before a public campaign is
launched.

BCUK director John Jackson says: 'We've written to most of the UK's
high-street retailers in the past year. Often they don't write back to us
and it's only when the public campaign starts that they ask: why didn't
you get in touch with us first?'

Companies are then added to either the 'Dirty List' (those that persist in
investing in Burma) or the 'Clean List' (those that cease trading there).

British American Tobacco (BAT) is a BCUK target, and Hutchison Whampoa -
whose interests include mobile business 3 and retailer Superdrug - is also
in its sights. Hutchison operates a major port in Rangoon called Myanmar
International Terminals Thilawa.

Jackson sees travel book publisher Lonely Planet as a key target for a
reinvigorated campaign over the coming months because its guide to Burma
encourages tourism.

BCUK has a keen sense of moral certainty. Jackson derides the suggestion
that foreign investment could encourage a transition to pluralism and
democracy, arguing that because most companies in Burma are at least
part-owned by the regime, nearly all investment funds it.

BCUK has had its victories. WPP is committed to pulling out of Burma; and
JJB Sports chief executive Tom Knight says: 'We only realised when it was
pointed out to us (by BCUK) that one of our suppliers had used Burma. We
have letters from all our suppliers confirming they will not be (using
Burma) in future.'

Jackson concedes JJB Sports is not alone in having been unaware of the
potential of this problem. Edelman international director, crisis and
issues management, Mike Seymour says companies underestimate the risk
posed to corporate reputation by supply chains.

He says: 'A CSR audit should be undertaken to provide a full analysis of
exposure of supply chains to political problems or interest groups.'

Armed with that audit, says Regester Larkin partner Michael Regester, the
most important thing a company can do if it decides to invest in such a
country is to develop robust messages as to why it is there.

'The firm needs to explain why it is 'going in' and the benefits it will
provide for all,' he says. 'This will help protect the company from an
eventuality such as this.'

With all that in mind, would you still be keen to take that cruise?
CAMPAIGN TARGETS

The 'Dirty List':
British American Tobacco Operates a joint venture with the military regime
called Rothmans of Pall Mall Myanmar
Suzuki Invested pounds 4.6m in a joint venture with regime-controlled
Myanmar Automobile and Diesel Engine Industries
Lonely Planet still publishing its travel guide to Burma


The Irrawaddy   October 17, 2003
The Need for Two-Way Traffic (Part Two)
By Ashley South

Overseas-based activists and Burma-watchers have sometimes assumed that
there is no civil society in Burma. This is far from true.

Other Road Users: Local Democracy and Civil Society

The term civil society denotes associations and networks which are
intermediate between the state and the family. These include a broad range
of community-based social welfare organizations, as well as traditional
and modern religious and cultural groups, and more overtly political
organizations. However, political parties seeking to assume state power,
such as the NLD, and the NDF or UNA members are not part of civil
society—although they may promote or inhibit its development.

Functioning civil society networks are essential for sustained, bottom-up
social and political transition in Burma, and for conflict resolution at
both the national and local levels. It is essential that the country’s
diverse social and ethnic communities enjoy a sense of ownership in any
transitional process, and equip themselves to fill the power vacuum that
may emerge, either as a result of abrupt shifts in national politics, or
of a more gradual withdrawal of the military from state and local power.
The ability of people to reassume control over aspects of their lives,
which since the 1960s have been abrogated by the military and insurgent
armies, will depend on such grassroots mobilisation.

Popular participation and civil society networks are necessary, whether
change in Burma comes suddenly, or is more incremental. Indeed, the
failure of the 1988 democracy uprising in Burma—like that of China’s 1989
Democracy Spring—can in part be attributed to the suppression of civil
society. A lack of democratic culture prevented powerful gestures from
initiating sustained political change. Unlike those in Eastern Europe in
the late 1980s, the Philippines in 1986 and Thailand in 1992, the Burmese
and Chinese democracy activists had little social space within which to
operate, or to build upon the people’s evident desire for fundamental
change.

In particular, Burma and China had no counterpart to the Catholic Church
or trade unions, which played important roles in the Polish and Filipino
democracy movements. Gen Ne Win’s regime had succeeded in denying social
groups a foothold in mainstream politics or the economy, except under
strict state control. Potential opposition was thereby marginalized, and
could emerge only in times of crisis and upheaval, presenting the military
with a pretext to clamp-down on anarchy and chaos, thus the State Law and
Order Restoration Council.

Tatmadaw (Burma’s armed forces) ideologues have long viewed their task as
one of national salvation: the defense of a centralized, unitary state,
which emerged from the struggle for independence. The military has sought
to impose a model of state-society relations, in which the ethnic minority
periphery was dominated by a strong Burman-orientated center. As pluralism
was suppressed, it was replaced with a state-sponsored nationalism. The
process of Burmanization saw diverse—and according to the military,
divisive—indigenous cultures, histories and aspirations subsumed under a
national identity, derived from the Burman historical tradition.

As the state extended its control over previously autonomous aspects of
social life, many civil society networks could no longer operate
independently. Meanwhile, opposition to the regime was either eliminated,
driven underground, or forced into open revolt. After the military coup of
1962, the existence of renewed armed opposition to the military government
provided a pretext for the further extension of state control, and the
suppression of diverse social groups.

Under the 1974 constitution, all political activity beyond the strict
control of the state was outlawed. Particularly hard hit were trade unions
and most professional associations, such as journalists’ groups.
Nevertheless, elements of civil society survived and—among ethnic
nationality communities in particular—have in recent years begun to
re-emerge.

Civil society capacities among ethnic nationality communities in Burma
will be examined in relation to the remaining armed opposition groups, and
in ceasefire zones and areas under government control. In practice
however, local networks often extend across the ceasefire frontline.
Civil Society Actors in Zones of Ongoing Armed Conflict

The political culture of the liberated zones has often reflected the
extractive nature of many insurgent groups’ relations to natural resources
and the peasantry or their ethnic brethren, in whose name the war was
being fought. Although, since 1988, most opposition groups have claimed to
be fighting for democracy in Burma, this ideal is not always reflected in
their practices. In fact, many aspects of life in the liberated zones have
been characterized by a top-down tributary system, similar to that in
government-controlled areas, aspects of which recalled pre-colonial forms
of sociopolitical organization. Insurgent leaders have tended to
discourage the expression of diverse opinions, and initiatives beyond the
direct control of militarized hierarchies have often been suppressed,
causing many talented cadres to leave the armed struggle. Meanwhile, for
most armed ethnic groups, insurgency became a way of life, rather than a
means to an end.

Since the 1980s, if not earlier, ethnic insurgent groups in Burma have
declined in military and political significance. Ironically however, the
decline of the old insurgent paradigm has opened the space for the
emergence of new and more participatory forms of social and political
organization among ethnic nationality communities in the border areas. In
the 1990s a number of local NGOs were organized along the China and India
borders, and particularly in Thailand and overseas. Chin, Kachin, Shan,
Lahu, Karenni, Karen, Tavoyan, Mon and all-Burma student and youth,
women’s, environmental and human rights groups began to occupy the
political space created by the declining influence of mainstream armed
ethnic groups.

Similar trends are apparent among the Karen, Karenni and Mon refugee
committees, established by dominant factions within the insurgent
hierarchies in the 1980s and early 1990s. As the insurgents lost ground
throughout the last decade, the number of refugees in Thailand grew
annually, and assumed new importance as a civilian support base, a source
of recruits and a safe haven for the armed groups. However, as the refugee
situation along Thailand border was gradually internationalized, with the
presence of more international NGOs—and since 1998, the UNHCR—the refugee
committees have been obliged to become more responsive to, if not more
representative of, their clients: the refugees.

These new models of political organization constituted one of the most
dynamic aspects in an otherwise rather bleak political scene. As a result
of their activities, all those engaged in the struggle for ethnic rights
and self-determination in Burma have been obliged to acknowledge the
importance of women’s rights, community-level participation and democratic
practices, not just as distant goals, but as on-going processes.

Civil Society Actors in Ceasefire and Government-Controlled Zones

Although the state inhibits the growth of civil society, the past decade
has nevertheless seen a tentative re-emergence of local networks among and
between communities inside Burma, beyond the zones of on-going armed
conflict. This is a complex phenomenon, owing much to the political space
created by the ceasefire process.

Despite the existence of ceasefires, the Wa and Kokang areas of Shan State
are characterised by an underdeveloped civil society sector, as is much of
Rakhine State. Meanwhile, across war-torn southern Shan State, and in
large tracts of Karenni and Karen states and in Tenasserim Division, local
societies and economies continue to be undermined by armed conflict.
Nevertheless, in Chin, Kachin and parts of Shan, Mon and Karen states,
local groups are able to provide limited humanitarian and community
development assistance from the inside, in ways which strengthen human
capital and build local capacities.

Although villagers in many ceasefire and adjacent areas continue to be
subject to a range of human rights abuses, the ceasefire process has
generally resulted in a slight improvement in conditions on the ground,
while increasing opportunities for travel and trade. The ceasefire groups
have retained their arms, and some still control sometimes extensive
blocks territory. However, the ceasefires are not peace treaties, and
generally lack all but the most rudimentary accommodation of the
ex-insurgents’ political and developmental demands.

Nevertheless, various ceasefire groups’ stated commitment to develop
former zones of armed conflict have created some opportunities for the
reconstruction of war-torn communities. However, many ethnic nationalist
cadres are more familiar with the top-down approaches used in military and
political campaigns, than with bottom-up development and conflict
resolution methods. As elsewhere in the country, local initiatives are
frequently undermined by parallel exploitative practices, and lack of
strategic planning and implementation capacities.

There are, however, a number of success stories. These cannot be described
in detail, due to the need to protect vulnerable groups and individuals
working inside Burma.

The key players in the tentative re-emergence of civil society networks
over the past decade have often been members of religious and social
welfare networks. Many of these were established in the 1950s, only to be
suppressed by the military government after 1962. However, in recent
years, Chin, Karen, Mon, Pa-O, Shan and other literature and culture
committees have been among the few specifically ethnic organisations
tolerated by the government. As the state school and higher education
systems have continued to deteriorate, such groups have pioneered
alternative community education approaches. For example, 55,000 school
students attended summer Mon literature and Buddhist teacher training
programs in 2003; 70 percent of them were women.

Thus far, only a few indigenous Burmese NGOs have been allowed to register
legally with the authorities. The two most well-known were established
after the KIO ceasefire, and although their importance to the broader
scale of development initiatives in Burma should not be overestimated,
both are often seen as models which other fledgling local NGOs might
emulate.

The Metta Development Foundation was established in 1998, and by 2003 had
a budget of over US $500,000 and 13 full-time staff. It is active in parts
of Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states as well as the Irrawaddy
Delta. Metta projects include Farmer Filed Schools, income generation
programs, health worker training, water and sanitation projects, and a
number of rural development schemes. The Metta approach is participatory,
stressing the empowerment of community-based groups, and their eventual
coalescence into local NGOs.

The Shalom Foundation was founded in 2001 by the Rev Saboi Jum, a key
figure in the KIO ceasefire process. It employs 12 full-time staff, and
works on mediation and conflict resolution issues, building local capacity
in these key sectors.

New organisations like Metta and Shalom are not countrywide institutions
or membership groups, but often act as facilitators and innovators for
longer-established associations. In many cases these are religious bodies,
among the few non-government controlled social institutions allowed to
exist in Burma.

Although emergent civil society networks are often associated with
Christianity, many Buddhist associations exist too, and the sangha
(Buddhist council) has great potential as a catalyst in civil and
political affairs. Local Buddhist associations tend to be focussed on
merit-making, which can include social and community welfare and
educational activities, as well as pagoda-building. In many parts of
Burma, mosque and temple associations assist the poorest of the poor.
However, such non-formal, traditional networks tend to more localized and
centered on individual monks, who may not conceptualize or present their
aims and objectives in a manner readily intelligible to Western agencies.
Such initiatives are therefore often invisible to Western (and
Western-trained) staff, and the dominance of Christian groups in the
welfare sector is potentially divisive, in a mainly Buddhist society.

It is vital that donors and international agencies entering Burma—either
via refugee communities, across the border, or through Rangoon—realize
that they are not operating in a void. Impressive local initiatives do
exist, and are often worthy of support. Although the role of foreign aid
is limited, it can contribute towards the creation of an enabling
environment, strengthening local efforts to achieve peace and development,
in ways which have generally been neglected by outside observers.

Foreign aid to Burma is not a zero-sum scenario: donors do not have to
choose between supporting democracy or development in Burma. The challenge
is how to support local civil society, without overwhelming its limited
absorption capacities.

Having it Both Ways: Two-Way Traffic on the Road to Transition

Efforts to empower civil society and support bottom-up democratization in
Burma have often been hostage to other political agendas—in particular,
the struggle for national-level political change. The NLD and other
stakeholders want to see a national and elite-level political settlement
in place before they endorse local development activities.

It is argued that relief and development work inside the country will "let
the SPDC off the hook", by providing goods and services that are the
responsibility of the government, and by endorsing and legitimizing the
regime’s policies. Such concerns should be taken seriously. However, if
provided via local NGOs and community organizations, humanitarian and
other forms of assistance can be delivered in ways which build local
capacities, and contribute towards grass-roots democratization—both inside
the country and in border areas.

In the current political climate, with national level-dialogue between the
NLD and SPDC stalled, re-emergent civil society networks represent an
important vehicle for long-term, bottom-up democratization in Burma. As
well as their intrinsic value, these local networks can form the base for
political change at the national level. The promotion of civil society
therefore relates to the constitutional concept of countervailance, in
which sovereignty resides in plural points of power, with functional
checks and balances to preclude the centralization of authority.

However, the re-emergence of civil society networks is not in itself
sufficient to produce political transition. This still requires concerted,
explicitly political actions.

This is the final in a two-part series.

Ashley South is the author of a political history of lower Burma, Mon
Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. His current
research on internal displacement in Burma is funded by the MacArthur
Foundation. The opinions expressed here are his own.