BurmaNet News: December 19, 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

December 19, 2003 Issue #2391

INSIDE BURMA
AP: Myanmar's military government says human rights group's visit
"constructive"
UN Wire: Myanmar Opposition Continues Calls For Tough Stand On Regime
Mizzima: SPDC's Soldiers  Accused of Looting Local Residents in Shan State
DVB: Relationship between KNU and Burma’s junta SPDC

MONEY
The New Light of Myanmar: Burma, China Sign Agreement On Economic,
Technical Cooperation, Loan Provision
Indo-Asian News Service:  India, Myanmar, Thailand to discuss highway project

REGIONAL
AFP: Indian, Myanmar, Thai foreign ministers to discuss highway project

INTERNATIONAL
AFP: UN's Annan welcomes democracy commitment from Myanmar
Irrawaddy: US Issues Religious Freedom Report

OPINION/OTHER
UN Wire: Interview With UNODC Myanmar Representative Jean-Luc Lemahieu


INSIDE BURMA
___________________________________

Associated Press, December 19, 2003
Myanmar's military government says human rights group's visit "constructive"

Myanmar's military government on Saturday welcomed a visit by one of the
strongest critics of its human rights record as "constructive involvement
of the international community."

London-based Amnesty International concluded a 17-day fact-finding tour of
Myanmar on Friday, but failed to meet with detained pro-democracy leader
Aung San Suu Kyi.

Catherine Baber, Amnesty's deputy program director for Asia, and
researcher Donna Guest declined comment on their trip before departing for
Bangkok, Thailand, where they were scheduled to hold a press conference
Monday.

The team from the human rights group visited several prisons and met with
government officials and leaders of Suu Kyi's National League for
Democracy, who were recently released from detention.

"The visit reflects the spirit of openness and international cooperation
which are helping to make Myanmar's transition to democracy a success,"
said a statement from the government spokesman's office. Describing the
visit as constructive, the statement said Myanmar welcomed groups such as
Amnesty to conduct "honest, unbiased reporting on the situation in the
country."

"Much of what has been written about Myanmar has been based on rumor,
ideology and conjecture, rather than fact," the statement said.

It was unclear why the team could not meet with Suu Kyi, who was detained
at the end of May after a clash in northern Myanmar between her followers
and a pro-government mob. The 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner is now under
house arrest in the capital, Yangon.

Amnesty made its first-ever official visit to Myanmar, also known as
Burma, early this year. It later said human rights conditions in Myanmar
were improving, but still fall "short of international law."

The current junta came to power in 1988, and refused to hand over
authority when Suu Kyi's party won elections in 1990. Western governments
and nongovernment groups accuse it of human rights abuses, including the
imprisonment of dissidents, forced labor and brutal treatment of ethnic
minorities.

Amnesty has issued numerous reports detailing such alleged abuses.

___________________________________

UN Wire: December 19, 2003
Myanmar Opposition Continues Calls For Tough Stand On Regime
By Steve Hirsch

YANGON, Myanmar — Opposition leaders here and in exile in neighboring
Thailand continue to oppose this country's ruling military junta, the
State Peace and Development Council, and called on the outside world
during a series of recent interviews to toughen its stand against the
SPDC, often lauding U.S. sanctions against this country.

The interviews were conducted before one of the ethnic groups opposed to
the government, the Karens, agreed to a temporary cease-fire early this
month and before the junta announced it would hold a constitutional
convention that it had proposed in August next year.  U.N. Myanmar envoy
Razali Ismail said today he plans to visit Yangon next month.  It is not
clear whether or how these developments change the situation.

Those interviewed included representatives of both main components of the
opposition — Yangon-based pro-democracy forces and non-Burman ethnic
minorities, which have been fighting the central government for decades
and have joined forces with the prodemocracy forces.

At the same time, though, the junta does have supporters, and interviews
with villagers during a visit to the remote Wa region near the Chinese
border and with recent immigrants over the border in Thailand indicate
some or many in the peripheral, poor regions of the country are probably
not concerned with the events here in the country's capital that are of
such importance to the outside world.

Yangon Activists Unswerving In Opposition To Government

Yangon activists interviewed, at least some of whom risked potential
arrest and lengthy imprisonment by talking to a reporter, were unswerving
in their opposition to SPDC proposals for a "road map" toward democracy,
including the constitutional convention.

Some of those interviewed predicted that the people of this isolated
country are so fed up with what they see as SPDC intransigence and
unwillingness to take meaningful steps toward democracy that they might
increase their actions to bring pressure on the government in the near
future.

U.N. Wire attempted, without success, to reach government spokesman
Colonel Hla Min for an interview for this story.

The May 30 attack on opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's convoy was a
seminal event, according to many of the activists interviewed here and in
Thailand.  Suu Kyi is under house arrest here and has been in detention
since the attack, which many in the opposition believe to have been an
attempt on her life.

After the attack, one activist here said, everything changed and any
interest the government might have had in dialogue with the opposition
disappeared.

The outside world "has been stupid," this political leader said, and
"naive" in believing that the Yangon government, which he said has lied
many times in the past, had any interest in democratization.

The opposition's belief in its cause is now stronger, he said, and people
are willing to take risks and make sacrifices in the name of reform.  For
its part, he said, the SPDC shows no sign of making a serious move toward
democracy, but cannot decide what to do.

The government's proposed convention is not a worthwhile effort, he said. 
He called on the United Nations, the European Union and the West to refuse
to endorse or recognize the convention unless Suu Kyi's opposition
National League for Democracy participates.

Despite SPDC claims of interest in progress, another opposition leader
cited continuing arrests and other harassment of pro-democracy activists
between the time Suu Kyi was released from detention in May 2002 and her
rearrest this year, even though last year's release was supposed to open a
new chapter in Myanmar's movement toward democracy.

In that activist's opinion, the government has chosen not to solve the
situation peacefully, and he dismissed the road map as the government's
affirmation that the country will continue under a military dictatorship.

There has been a lessening of international pressure on the SPDC because
Khin Nyunt, the new prime minister, is seen by some in the outside world
as a moderate, but this is a "trick," the activist said.

Two other activists disagreed on the current prospects for dialogue.  One,
a former political prisoner, said the SPDC is in a trap, and will have to
engage in dialogue, probably within a year.

Another said dialogue is impossible.  That activist also criticized
Westerners who come here as tourists, and said the opposition must use all
available means against the government.  No military dictator has ever
voluntarily transferred power, he said.

He also dismissed the road map as containing nothing positive — "old wine
in a new bottle," he said, and "not a single Burmese citizen" trusts it or
the proposed convention.

Although that activist, like all of those interviewed, supports Suu Kyi as
the only possible leader of a unified opposition, he said Suu Kyi, who was
educated in England, should stop treating the SPDC like English gentlemen.
 The activist said Suu Kyi should call for some sort of popular action,
even if it is nonviolent, such as strikes, to put pressure on the
government.

People outside the country do not understand, he said, and the United
Nations cannot do anything, he added, calling it "toothless."

A number of those interviewed expressed support for the U.S. sanctions,
with one saying if the people of Myanmar can withstand life under SPDC
rule, they can withstand the impact of economic sanctions.  Another
sounded a similar note, saying the sanctions hurt the ruling generals, not
the people, saying businesses are controlled by generals or drug lords.

Ethnic Minority Activists Remain Committed

Meanwhile, in northern Thailand, one ethnic leader interviewed said the
non-Burman ethnic groups must take the initiative now that the SPDC and
NLD are in deadlock.

At the same time, another said, the ethnic opposition "never dreamed" the
government would attack Suu Kyi's convoy the way it did on May 30. 
Echoing sentiments voiced by others, that activist said he had "no doubt"
the attack was an attempt to assassinate Suu Kyi.

Another activist was critical of the outside world, particularly
nongovernmental organizations working in Myanmar for "pussyfooting around"
and being afraid of being expelled.  NGO timidity, he said, legitimizes
the government.

The SPDC will not throw the NGOs out if they use their leverage, he said,
and they should "empower civil society," not be "haunted by the fear
they'll be driven out."

This source was among those who dismissed the possibility of a general
uprising, saying life is too difficult for ordinary people in Myanmar.

The international community, one source said, should get off the fence and
make up its mind whether it is with the regime or the democratic movement.
 He expressed appreciation for the U.S. sanctions, but said they would
work better if other countries supported them.

Some Support For SPDC

There are those here in Myanmar, however, who are sympathetic to the
government and who believe it should be given more of a chance.

One businessman based here says the road map has been criticized but that
it should be welcomed — at least there is something on paper and the
document shows what steps the government should take, he said.

The SPDC, he said, must eventually talk to the NLD and the ethnic
minorities.  He noted the recent release of political prisoners and said
that criticism of the road map is "not helpful."

He said the test of the road map will occur in coming weeks and months,
but that a lack of progress toward democracy in a year would indicate a
problem.

The government's mindset is very different from that of the opposition, he
said.  The ruling generals' behavior stems from their experience, and most
of their lives have been in the military fighting communists and internal
insurgency.

The outside world needs to "dim the spotlight" on Myanmar, he said.  With
Suu Kyi on one side and the SPDC on the other, quiet diplomacy is needed,
he said, adding that the military will not tolerate dissent and cannot be
forced out.

Little Interest In Wa Region

In the Wa region of the Shan state, near the Chinese border and far from
the capital, villagers seemed generally unaware of the political
machinations between the government and the opposition, with many saying
they had never heard of Suu Kyi or the NLD.

The Wa region is remote, requiring several hours' journey by air and
winding mountain road.  Chinese or tribal languages, rather than Burmese,
are spoken and Chinese currency is used.

Villagers interviewed reported never or hardly having heard of Suu Kyi and
generally being unaware of the political situation.

Myanmar is a tightly controlled police state and even in the Wa region the
SPDC's military intelligence, or MI, is apparently present.  There were
indications that some of those interviewed may have feared retribution
from authorities if they acknowledged to a reporter that they were aware
of the NLD or Suu Kyi, but the breadth of apathy toward the political
conflict would seem to indicate that, in fact, remote parts of the
country, such as the Wa region, are out of the political process.

A variety of observers here and among the ethnic group exiles in Thailand
confirmed this impression, saying that many of those in the subsistence
agriculture villages far from Yangon know and care little about the
political conflict between the opposition and government.

Even after leaving Myanmar, though, villagers interviewed seemed
unconnected to the political struggle between the SPDC and the opposition.

One villager interviewed in northern Thailand said he knew Suu Kyi's name
and had seen her photograph and seen her on television, but knew nothing
more about her.  Another said he had seen her on television, and a third
had never heard of her.

___________________________________

Mizzima, December 19, 2003
SPDC's Soldiers  Accused of Looting Local Residents in Shan State
By Tun Naing

State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC) soldiers are reported to be
looting villagers within Shan state.

On December 17, a gang on motor bikes and armed with machine guns raided
the residence of U Sai Sein Na in Kun Hein Town in Shan state, robbing him
of cash and over 76.75 grams of gold in necklaces, bracelets and rings.

U Sai Sein Na, knowing the assailants, identified them as Saw Aung Thein
of LIB 524, Zaw Naing of IB 286 and Bo Nan of IB 246. All three assailants
are private soldiers stationed in local army battalions. U Sai Sein Na has
lodged complaints with their respective battalions.

A source close to U Sai Sein Na informed a Mizzima correspondent that, so
far, the concerned army battalions have taken no action.

Locals also said there have been at least three (3) similar robberies so
far during the month of December. It was also learned that soldiers from
various battalions in the region have jointly been looting locals.

___________________________________

Democratic Voice of Burma, December 19, 2003
Relationship between KNU and Burma’s junta SPDC

The informal talks between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Burmese
military junta, the SPDC are improving, according to the KNU’s
vice-chairman, General Saw Bo Mya.
The comment came after a meeting between General Saw Bo Mya and the SPDC
liaison officer Colonel Sann Pwint on 15 December at Bangkok.
The KNU also sent delegates to Rangoon on 3 December for initial talks.
Despite the improvements on oral ceasefire agreements and talks, many
things needed to be finalised, according to General Saw Bo Mya.
According to him the SPDC troops are not burning down Karen villages and
farms this year and neither are they attacking the rebels during the dry
season offensive.
He added that the KNU agreed to talk to the regime because the regime is
not demanding the organisation to lay down arms and ‘enter legal fold’
anymore.
The KNU has been fighting Rangoon government for more than 50 years for an
autonomous Karen State for the Karen people.

MONEY
___________________________________

The New Light of Myanmar: December 19, 2003
BURMA, CHINA SIGN AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL COOPERATION, LOAN
PROVISION

Yangon (Rangoon),18 December: Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs U Khin
Maung Win and Assistant Minister of Commerce Mr Chen Jian of the People's
Republic of China signed the agreement on economic and technical
cooperation together with the agreement on provision of a loan at low
interest rate at the meeting hall of the Ministry of National Planning and
Economic Development at 0930 (local time) yesterday.

Also present on the occasion were Deputy Minister for Finance and Revenue
Col Hla Thein Swe, Deputy Minister for Rail Transportation Thura U Thaung
Lwin, Deputy Attorney-General Dr Tun Shin, Chinese Ambassador Mr Li
Jinjun, departmental officials and staff of the Chinese embassy.

___________________________________

Indo-Asian News Service, December 19, 2003
India, Myanmar, Thailand to discuss highway project

Foreign ministers of India, Thailand and Myanmar will meet in New Delhi
next week to discuss a 1,360-km transnational highway linking the three
countries, officials said on Friday.
The ministerial meeting on December 23 will be preceded by meetings of two
task forces set up to study the technical and financial aspects of the
project.
Foreign Minister U Win Aung will lead Myanmar's delegation and Foreign
Minister Surakiart Sathirathai will head the Thai team. They are visiting
India at the invitation of External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha.
In April, the technical task force completed the field survey for the
highway and agreed on a route alignment.
The upcoming task force meetings will carry forward the work done earlier
and discuss other issues, like the financing of the project.
The foreign ministers will review the deliberations of the task forces and
give directions for "further expeditious progress", the spokesperson said.
The three countries had agreed to build the highway that will run from
Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand through Bagan in Myanmar at a
meeting of their foreign ministers held in Yangon in April 2002.
The highway will provide the north-eastern region with direct access to
the Southeast Asian nations and pave the way for its accelerated economic
development.

REGIONAL
___________________________________

Agence France Presse, December 19, 2003
Indian, Myanmar, Thai foreign ministers to discuss highway project

The foreign ministers of India, Myanmar and Thailand will meet next week
in New Delhi to discuss plans for a 1,360-kilometer (845-mile) highway
connecting the countries, the Indian foreign ministry said Friday.

Yashwant Sinha of India, Win Aung of Myanmar and Surakiart Sathirathai of
Thailand will hold talks Tuesday and hear reports from task forces
examining the project's financial and technical feasibility, a ministry
statement said.

The foreign ministers agreed at an April 2002 meeting in Myanmar to build
the highway from Moreh to Mae Sot, border points in India and Thailand
respectively.

India has tried to improve relations with Myanmar in recent years, hoping
to counter what it sees as growing Chinese influence in its eastern
neighbour and to draw closer to the economic giants of Southeast Asia.

Relations had been strained after the military seized power in Myanmar in
1988, with New Delhi granting sanctuary to exile groups.


INTERNATIONAL
___________________________________

Agence France Presse, December 19, 2003
UN's Annan welcomes democracy commitment from Myanmar

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said on Friday he welcomed signs that the
ruling junta in Myanmar has committed to steps to move the nation toward
democracy.

Annan "welcomes the government's intention to reconvene the national
convention and draft a new constitution in 2004," his spokesman Fred
Eckhard said in a statement.

"The secretary general is also encouraged by the commitment made by
Foreign Minister Win Aung of Myanmar that the Myanmar authorities would
implement their seven-step roadmap for the country's democratic transition
in an 'all-inclusive' manner," he said.

At a 12-nation meeting in Bangkok on Monday, the foreign minister said the
junta would hold a convention to draft a constitution next year as a first
step in the road map plan.

According to Thai officials, he also reportedly agreed to let the National
League for Democracy (NLD) of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi take part
in the convention.

Suu Kyi is currently under house arrest for the third time since the
current military government came to power in 1988. It refused to recognise
the results of elections in 1990, which were won by the NLD.

A national convention was called in 1993 and then suspended three years
later when the NLD withdrew.

Annan's special envoy to Myanmar, Razali Ismail, who also attended the
Bangkok meeting, said earlier Friday he was hopeful about the prospects
for democracy and that he hoped to make another visit to the country next
month.

"I am not in a position to talk to you about the specifics (of the road
map) but we are encouraged by the commitment to want to take the necessary
steps," he told reporters in Kuala Lumpur.

___________________________________

Irrawaddy, December 19, 2003
US Issues Religious Freedom Report

The US State Department released its fifth annual religious freedom report
yesterday, listing Burma as a "country of particular concern" because of
the military government’s restrictions on religious freedom.
The International Religious Freedom Report for 2003 says restrictions on
religious practice is a problem worldwide, but cited Burma, China, Cuba,
Laos, North Korea and Vietnam as the worst offenders.
The report was submitted to the US Congress and could move Washington to
place sanctions on countries that violate religious freedom. The report
comprises individual chapters dedicated to evaluating religious rights in
every country.
Burma’s military regime systematically banned efforts by Buddhist monks to
promote human rights and political freedom, says the report. The military
has also prohibited religious minorities, particularly Christians and
Muslims, from building new churches or mosques in their communities, the
report adds.
The junta’s Religious Affairs Ministry has said it allows religious groups
to construct new buildings in most areas.
By official figures, 90 percent of Burma’s 42 million people are Buddhist,
four percent are Christian and another four percent are Muslim.
The report also says discrimination against non-Buddhist is high in
civilian and military services. Burma’s cabinet only has one non-Buddhist
minister and zero non-Buddhists have risen above the rank of
Brigadier-General in the military.
The junta discourages Muslims from entering military service, and
Christian or Muslim military officers who want a promotion are encouraged
by their superiors to convert to Buddhism, the report says.
Anti-Muslim violence continued in 2003, the report said, adding that the
government restricted travel rights for Muslims and monitored activities
of Muslim groups.
The US State Department also named Burma a country of particular concern
in 1999, 2000 and 2001.

OPIONION / OTHER
___________________________________

UN Wire, December 18, 2003
Interview With UNODC Myanmar Representative Jean-Luc Lemahieu
By Steve Hirsch

U.N. Wire’s Steve Hirsch interviewed U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
Myanmar Representative Jean-Luc Lemahieu on UNODC’s Myanmar program and on
Myanmar-related drug issues.  This interview took place at UNODC’s Yangon
headquarters.
U.N. Wire:  How do you appraise the UNODC opium reduction program here,
how good a job are you doing?
Jean-Luc Lemahieu:  Well, I think that with the limited resources
available to us, we are not doing badly at all.  Having said that, put it
in a mirror, I mean, we are totally failing to cover the overall problems
of opium reduction in Myanmar as such.  While the activities in our
project area might be going on well and while success is definitely there,
we only cover 2 percent of the total needs, so that means 2 percent of the
total needs within the country.  And UNODC's interventions are too
small-scale at this moment.  We get requests every day from Kachin, from
Shan, from any direction for assistance, which we cannot provide because
we don't have the resources available.
U.N. Wire:  Do you mean 2 percent of the villages, 2 percent of the people?
Lemahieu:  No, if you say that 350,000 households are involved in opium
cultivation in the Shan state only, so perhaps 400,000 households
nationwide, of that we cover 40,000 people.  Each household has about four
to five family members – hence UNODC covers 40,000 of an estimated
2,000,000 people in need.  If you see as well where the concentration of
the opium cultivation is, then, obviously, we have already been successful
in reducing a lot of that opium cultivation, at the same time.  Actually,
at this moment, while there is a huge humanitarian need, the intervention
scale of UNODC is rather limited.
U.N. Wire:  Is that because of Western reluctance, reluctance by the
United States?
Lemahieu:  It is definitely a lack of financial resources.  The Wa project
was initiated in 1996, ’97, as a pilot activity, to illustrate what we can
do, and then we would move up first to the northern Wa and finally to the
Kokang, both areas with a high opium poppy concentration.
Due to the lack of financial resources, we were even up to 2001 not sure
if we could continue the pilot project, much less to expand to the Kokang.
Today, because of the emergency situation in this part of the country, we
are forced to again consider expansion.  We have something to show with
regard to our pilot activities — the concept works.  Moreover through the
partnership agreements that we are setting up, we might increase the
impact and move further up to the northern Wa and to the Kokang, but it's
a huge battle for funding at this moment, and these funding constraints
are the major problem which we have.
U.N. Wire:  Do you feel, backing away from what the U.N. project does and
looking at the overall drug problem in this country, how do you appraise
your efforts' impact on opium production and export, and heroin?
Lemahieu:  Again, the scale of the project is too limited to make a big
difference nationwide, because the resources are not there.
Nonetheless we can be proud.  Within the project area, we had last year a
reduction of 19 percent, while the Wa-controlled area at large has gone up
in acreage.  Within the project area, our decline is 19 percent, which is
not so far away from the national average of 25 percent.  The big
difference is, though, that what we are doing is far more sustainable than
what nationwide has been done, because a fast reduction without
alternative income for the opium farms is just not sustainable.
So if you reduce 19 percent, but at the same time we can provide for the
basic human needs of the farmers and thus  sustain those efforts, I think
we're far more successful than what is being done at this moment
nationwide.
So, in that sense, through our comprehensive approach, where we provide
for basic human needs, we are successful within the project area.  If you
look at it from a wider scale, from a wider perspective, the difference
which we make is rather limited, although important because we demonstrate
that there is an alternative, there is a sustainable way to reduce fast,
but in a manner which provides for the basic human needs of the people.
U.N. Wire:  This is an obvious question, but it seems apparent from having
visited your project area that the elimination of opium in the Wa state
risks a severe humanitarian crisis up there.  Is that a real risk in your
mind?
Lemahieu:  It's a very real risk, worse, it is more than a risk, it's
becoming a reality.  With the Kokang, who, during the last year, have
reduced even beyond the 25 percent nationwide average, at this moment
we're providing emergency assistance for opium farmers.  So it's more than
a risk, it's reality.
U.N. Wire:  So it's going to happen?
Lemahieu:  It is there already.  It is not going to happen, it's already
there.
Obviously we still have 62,000 hectares of opium nationwide, so not all
are affected yet, but in the years to come and definitely by 2005, when
the Wa have promised to get rid of their opium, that situation will only
escalate.  Whereas now it's still limited, and where we still know how to
intervene with the limited resources available, and still we're falling
short on that, the situation is only escalating and will escalate further,
and we will not have the means and the resources in place to avoid that
humanitarian crisis.
U.N. Wire:  The Wa answer is, don't worry, all the new enterprises up
there are Wa and Chinese investments, and everything will be fine.  Are
they whistling in the dark?
Lemahieu:  They definitely are.  There are two elements here.  There's one
of pride and one of concept.
The pride of the Wa leadership is such that they might deny for too long
the problems which will occur and which they will not escape.  I mean, if
you have informal talks with the leadership, they will admit as well that
they are very much afraid to become leaders without people, because the
people might starve or move away to other places looking for income
somewhere else if they cannot find it within the Wa.  So it is a very real
issue, but obviously the formal speaking is, 'Hey where is the problem, no
problem whatsoever.'
Now there is also a difference of concept.  We have had our share of
problems in conveying our concept of participatory approaches, community
development, reaching out to the farmers directly, with the Wa leadership.
 The Wa leadership are very much Chinese-inspired, top-down.  The Wa
leadership, historically, are feudal warlords, working top-down, so they
love those mega-projects, they love the big projects which consume a lot
of investment to start with and which for us, the small UNODC, are too
risky to engage in.
If you would have support from the World Bank, from the Asian Development
Bank, you might wish to venture into development issues and mega-projects
later on, but at this stage, with limited resources, it's definitely not
the way to go for us.  So there is, as well, a little confrontation with
regard to concepts.  They are not used to seeing people working from the
bottom up.  We go directly to the villages, we go directly to the opium
farms and the families, we acknowledge that opium is being grown because
of poverty — in essence, what we talk about is a poverty issue.  The opium
is there because of the poverty issue.  So if you can take on the poverty
issue, we will deal directly with the roots of the opium cultivation.
So, for those two reasons, you see some, let's say, friction definitely in
the past, the situation has drastically improved by the years, because we
have been able to show and to illustrate that we can make a difference,
that we can make an impact, but definitely when we came down in the Wa,
for them it was as if we came from Mars, we came from Venus, we came from
Jupiter, we were not from this Earth.  I mean, the Wa, they didn't
understand those glossy concepts of bottom-up and participatory
approaches.  Talking with the local communities, organizing them in
structures where they could democratically say what they wanted to have,
that was never seen before.  And that obviously entailed certain risks,
which now have been taken away because the Wa have understood the benefits
of such approach.  Others have come and left, made benefits and profits on
the back of the Wa, but UNODC stayed throughout the difficult years and
demonstrated a working concept.  The Wa want to become a part of the
civilized world but years of warfare and isolation, high adult illiteracy
rates up to 95 percent, led to suspicion towards the foreign world.  What
we consider basic norms and values is in many ways foreign to them.  Only
already our presence opens total new worlds and concepts.  It has been a
slow process and we still have a long way to go but at least we give the
Wa people a fair chance.  Today we can talk about basic human needs for
the poor farmers and their families and find an understanding
interlocutor.
U.N. Wire:  Is the international community aware of the humanitarian crisis?
Lemahieu:  No.  I think that at a technical level, people within the
embassies, within the respective ministries, might be aware of the
problems, but they have an amazing difficulty in translating this to the
political decision-making level.  That of course has its own momentum, its
own mechanism, but it's not sufficiently known by the population at large,
and it is definitely denied by many of the opposition groups, who think
that any assistance to Myanmar comes too early, which from a political
point of view might have its own justification, but from the humanitarian
point, is very cynical and is basically unacceptable.  So, in that sense,
I think the international community is failing to really appreciate the
extent of the problems we are facing here.
U.N. Wire:  Will this humanitarian crisis that you see just be in the Wa
area, or broader?
Lemahieu:  I see the entire Shan state affected by this.  Obviously the
concentration of the opium itself is mainly in the Kokang and the Wa
areas, but overall in the Shan we have opium cultivation, so to whatever
extent, the entire Shan will be affected.  You will see as well that in
the Kachin, to a certain extent, the humanitarian situation will be
affected by this sharp opium reduction.  So we cannot only concentrate on
the Wa and the Kokang.
Unfortunately for us, already finding it difficult to fund our pilot
project in one particular area of the Wa, we have to be realistic if we
talk about expansion.  I mean, even talking about the KASH [Kachin and
Shan state intervention] initiative, I get smiles on the faces of many
people, saying you're too ambitious and just shooting too far, no way
you'll get that done.
So what we are trying to do is to prioritize and refocus on KOWI [the
Kokang and Wa Intervention].  But obviously the KASH intervention, the
KASH partnership, which we still are pushing as a second priority, is a
dire need.  It's reality, it's more than the Kokang and the Wa.  It is the
entire Shan.
U.N. Wire:  What will be the consequences of this crisis?
Lemahieu:  What we already see in the Kokang is, for example, internally
displaced people, people who just cannot make a living anymore and are
looking for another place to make their income.  In the first instance
what is happening, and we have seen this in our intervention area as well,
[is] that people from the outside start to relocate inside the area where
poppy growing is still allowed, so what you see is basically an increase
of opium cultivation in those areas where opium still can be grown.  That
is a traditional, normal reaction.  So that is one thing, internally
displaced people.
Secondly, you will see more human rights abuses because if you don't have
alternative income sources to offer, you need to enforce your decision, to
oblige the people not to deal with the opium any longer.  Often this is
hard-handed, this is not by talking.  Actually what you tell them is,
'Listen guys, you won't have an income next year, you will not be able to
send your children to the school anymore, you will not be able to have
medical care anymore.'  That needs to be enforced and that obviously opens
the doors for infringement on your human rights.
You will see a dropout of schools, you will see a worsening of the medical
situation, you will see social evils being replaced by other social evils.
 I mean, if you cannot derive your income for your family out of opium,
you might as well ask your pretty daughter of 14 to move to Thailand and
to make a job in one of the brothels there.
So, by lack of licit, legitimate job opportunities, you will see that
social evils which you get rid of, such as opium cultivation, will be
immediately replaced by other social evils, which, from the basic human
needs perspective, are definitely not better at all.
U.N. Wire:  Is there a link between stability in this country and the drug
trade?
Lemahieu:  Sure.  There's a direct link between stability in this country
and the drug trade.  If you go to the recent past, you don't even have to
go too far, the drug issue fueled, first of all, the ideological warfare
between communist and anticommunist forces.  After a while the profits of
the drug trade were so interesting that, forget the ideology,  I mean, if
you were communist, anticommunist, it didn't matter anymore, as long as
you could get profits out of the drug business.  Criminal groups, the
spread of HIV/AIDS through drug use, a lack of accountability, warfare,
corruption, high addiction levels, you name it, all were directly related
to the drug business.  So now, today, trying to get away from the drug
profits, and to get away from the drugs, as such, is indeed benefiting the
domestic stability.   It also benefits regional stability, since obviously
the drug business did not stop at the borders.  On the contrary, outside
powers benefited from the lucrative trade and not only enjoyed but also
continued the destabilization, creating a situation of perfect lawlessness
for a business that normally cannot stand the daylight.  The existing
political problems, ideological or ethnic, were abused and further
accelerated by the drug lords inside and outside the country.
Having said that, you can turn the question around.  It works in two ways.
 The demand for stability benefits drug control as undoubtedly
demonstrated since the Beijing Declaration of June 2001.  However, which
is more important, drug control or stability?  Drugs have been an
instrument of instability.  Drugs have been an instrument to continue
instability.  But, paradoxically, if stability warrants the overlooking of
one or two principles of drug control, that will be easily done as well. 
If [former drug trade figure] Khun Sa will never be extradited to the
United States of America, despite all demands, it has everything to do
with the domestic stability.  Don't forget that Khun Sa had about 15,000
to 20,000 troops under his command and definitely had all the potential to
become a very destabilizing force within Myanmar.
So part of the agreement with Khun Sa was very pragmatic.  For Khun Sa it
implied that he promised not to fight the Yangon government anymore, move
out of the drug business, but in return was not [to] be extradited or even
prosecuted.  So stability here dominated the entire issue of the principle
of extradition related to drug control.  And that's something which is
very common within Southeast Asia at large.
Stability in Southeast Asia became precondition No. 1, definitely in a
period in which all other issues, ideological or ethnic, are superseded by
the higher principle of socioeconomic growth.  Remember the Chinese
saying, "it does not matter if the cat is white or black, as long as it
catches the mouse."  A stable and continued socioeconomic growth
throughout the region is the mouse.  If there are continued earthquakes
the cat might find it difficult to catch the mouse.  Hence stability is
required.  Drug control is subject to that.  Drug control will only follow
as a second item.  And as much as we might regret that as UNODC,
obviously, because we stand to defend the drug control principles, it's
part of the reality in which we work here.
U.N. Wire:  We haven't talked about ATS [amphetamine-type stimulants]. 
The drug business here is shifting over to ATS, which may be why the opium
production is dropping.
Lemahieu:  I don't think it is the reason why opium is going down.  Opium
has its own incentive, which is poverty.  The continued poverty of the
opium farmer and his family justifies that opium is still being grown at
this moment.
ATS does not replace the opium for the opium farmer.  ATS benefits the
midlevel man, the middleman, the trader.  I mean, the guy who goes to the
opium farmer and buys the opium from the opium farmer.  If he sees indeed
the big push to get away from the opium, the trader has two options, he
says 'OK, this is it, let me start some other business,' or he can say,
'Hey, there is something better on the market, now at this moment I don't
need the opium anyhow, let me go to ATS.'
So, at the farmers' level, ATS unfortunately — or fortunately, perhaps,
depending on what view you have — doesn't do any good for the opium farmer
or his family, if he's pushed out of the opium, that's it, he has no
income and ATS is not an alternative for him.  The poor farmer has no
access to the chemicals, the water supply, the electricity which are
prerequisites for ATS production.
At the criminal level, the middleman, traders' level, there, yes, ATS
definitely is playing the role of an alternative.  The point is that the
problems are very different.  Opium — poverty; ATS — greed.   The
middleman, the trader, is not poor to start with.  UNODC is not working
for the middleman, I don't want to provide an alternative income for the
middleman as such.
The other differences are that you can pinpoint the opium cultivation, we
have maps, we can say, 'OK, it's happening there and there and there,' and
technically as well, we know what we have to do with it.  In the Wa and in
the Shan state in general, we're rather lucky in this part of the world,
it is not necessarily expensive to get rid of the opium.
Now, obviously, ATS is very different.  I mean the labs are moving around,
it's a criminal organization, which works very pragmatically and
opportunistically in the sense that you have alliances built up now at
this moment.  We get into a business agreement, you order so many pills, I
give you the pills, you walk away and I won't see you back again for the
next three years.  So it is very hard to get your fingers on it.
What I'm trying to say is that the techniques, which we know, the
expenditure required, which is achievable, for alternative development,
for opium, is not at all applicable to the ATS business.
So you need law enforcement cooperation, and moreover, since the precursor
chemicals come within Myanmar from the outside, I don’t want to have any
of the neighboring countries complaining and crying out loud, because if
the precursor chemicals are transported through the countries to Myanmar,
then these countries should not complain that they get a return from the
precursor chemicals in the form of pills.
So you need to work in a concerted effort, and that means cross-border
cooperation, that means joint border patrols, that means confidence
building, that means as well getting rid of all your corruption on both
sides of the border.  Otherwise how do you explain where the precursor
chemicals come in and that your ATS from the border areas can be
transported towards Bangkok or other big cities?
U.N. Wire:  Some critics claim that the figures that both the UNODC and
the U.S. government have released are misleading, that most of the
eradication is because of weather or disease and that the fields are
located in valleys that are difficult to spot by satellite and far from
roads.  Are those valid criticisms?
Lemahieu:  We are open for any criticism.  We can always improve our
methodology.  We have ourselves an internal process of monitoring and
double checking, acknowledging  some aspects which definitely need some
improvement for the next methodology.  We are trying out new aspects to
improve that methodology.  We are in the learning business, we're not the
Lord himself, I mean, we just don't know everything.  So I'm always open
for criticism on that point.
On the other hand, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king and
we definitely are the one-eyed man.  So the criticism from the outside is
always very easy, we are on the inside, we are doing it, we're walking
around, we're seeing it, we have the pictures.
U.N. Wire:  But what about the specifics?  They say that weather or disease —
Lemahieu:  I have to smile because for years it was always said reduction
is part of the weather conditions.  And I acknowledge that.  But the last
year leading to this year's crop, the weather just went the other way
around.  We had  more rain in December, we had less rain in the beginning
of the planting season, meaning that the yields were much higher this
year.
So all the arguments over the last years — it's all because the weather
was very bad – let me tell you, the weather was very good last year, my
friends, so weather plays a role, no doubt about it, but you have to put
things in perspective, it goes in two ways and last year it went in the
opposite way.
The yields estimated by the United Nations experts, and again, there is an
entire scientific process going in that one — it's not that I'm standing
with my finger outside here on the roof and saying, 'OK this is what we
have' — are even higher than the estimations of the U.S. who are not
exactly to be considered the friends of the junta.  The U.S. has its own
scientific methodology, but you see, the discrepancy between the two
figures means that we always can improve and that we always can try to get
the figures correct.  But at the end of the day, the bottom line is  we're
here, we see it, we walk around, we go around, it's to the best of
existing scientific knowledge.  I stick to my figures.

U.N. Wire:  What about the notion of UWSA [United Wa State Army] and the
government involvement in the drug trade?
Lemahieu:  There is something ongoing here in the sense that you cannot
deny there is a close connection between Yangon and most of the
leaderships of the ethnic minority groups, including the UWSA.  After all,
the cease-fire agreements of 1989 were based on a trust relationship.  So
you try to maintain that trust relationship.
At the same time, we have seen that after 1989, suddenly the opium
cultivation inflated, it boomed up to 1996 when we had a peak and then it
went down from there on again.  To me, as an outsider and not having been
here that moment of time and definitely not wanting to call myself an
expert, but as an outsider, what has happened is that by giving autonomy
to the cease-fire groups and by not implicating yourself in going within
those areas, autonomous areas, the people within those areas did what they
did best, planting even more opium, and since there was no warfare, they
could, indeed, do this without disturbance, getting more and more and more
out of it.  At that moment of time it was obvious that national stability,
giving up the fighting, preceded the drug control issue.
The important thing is that we have seen a decrease since 1996 and that is
what really concerns me today.  We have seen a decline from 163,000
hectares, a steady decline to 62,000 hectares.  And that's spectacular,
and that is a positive sign, that's what I want to see today.
But that there are close connections between Yangon and the ethnic
minority groups, no one will deny that.  Putting that one step further and
saying that Yangon is benefiting directly from the drug trade as such, no.
 We don't have any, any operational intelligence indications that this is
happening.
Now, obviously, UNODC is not involved in operational intelligence, but we
hear from our many trusted friends in foreign law enforcement agencies,
even from the U.S. State Department annual publication on narcotics, that
there is not such a thing as one drug kingpin masterminding the drug
business within Myanmar and seated on a high throne in a Yangon office.
U.N. Wire:  The economy in this country is in very bad shape and it's a
very poor country, but the government has made major arms purchases in the
last 10 years and high officials live fairly ostentatiously.  One could
speculate that drug money is probably the only way that those purchases
could have been made.
Lemahieu:  That's one of the questions which I often get, but
unfortunately, it belongs to the fantasy world.  Why is this?  Because the
major profits are made outside of the country.  We in 2001 were very
intrigued by this and said there might be something to it, so let's try to
calculate to the best of our knowledge what the economic turnover would be
with regard to opium and heroin and ATS and we came up with a figure of
$540 million income, and that was for 2001.  Now economic turnover does
not equal profits, so that it does not mean this is pure profits.  Now
this, at that time, was nearly as much as the garment exports to the
United States of America.
People are overestimating the drug profits made within the country to a
large extent.  Look at it from another angle — don't forget that Myanmar
thrives by an informal economy.  Sixty/40 percent, as far as the United
Nations can estimate, 60 percent informal, 40 percent being formal.  Now
the informal sector is far more than only the drug business.  The informal
sector goes with logging, gems, all the natural resources available here,
to even people working outside of the country and sending some of the
money back.
So, saying that the purchase price of the MiG planes, for example, which
were bought by the government, are paid by drug money is to me very much
wishful thinking.  I mean, it's trying to prove something which just is
not there.  Where is the evidence?  The huge profits are made by
outsiders, not within Myanmar.
U.N. Wire:  So you think that the other parts of the informal economy are
enough to cover those?
Lemahieu:  If you see how the military are paying for themselves, if you
see, for example, that in most recent years the regional commands have to
generate their own funding, now a lot of that is totally unaccounted for,
but still they survive, and they survive to get a high number of troops
marching around.  So there's a lot of that unaccounted economy definitely
around, which gives an income to those official organizations.
U.N. Wire:  So, one could speculate that the arms purchases and so forth
could only have been paid for with drug money ...
Lemahieu:  I deny that, so I say no.  That's wishful thinking, according
to all calculations with regards to economic turnover, we don't have
sufficient money there to pay for it — buying you MiGs with $540 million
economic turnover, which includes what the farmers gain from it,
mathematics do not match here.
U.N. Wire:  It is said that there is active involvement by the UWSA and
military intelligence and Myanmar's army in getting the drugs out of the
country.
Lemahieu:  On the microscale level, I think that's really happening.  I
think that we have a lot of rotten apples around.  Again, the structural
system of self-financing of the army makes it nearly necessary to provide
many alternative sources of income.  So some people within the army are
not taking it too seriously with regard to whatever  drug control
directives  they might get from Yangon with regard to opium or ATS.
Definitely, there's a lot of corruption around in Southeast Asia, that's
for sure, it's obvious, it is there, it is happening.
Saying, though, that this is within the structural network where you have
one brain, mastermind sitting and masterminding all of this, no.  That
would be too easy for us — get the person, and the situation is solved. 
Myanmar is a very, very complex country with tons of different interest
groups and agendas.
U.N. Wire:  What about the suggestion that the opium has shifted westward?
Lemahieu:  What we are trying to do now, this year, and this is one of the
adjustments in our methodology with regard to the survey, is to go out
especially in the Kachin, Chin and Sagaing to see what is happening there.
 So this year we will start to check on those areas — not on a full scale
yet, because we don't have the resources.  We need $400,000 for the
survey, so far we only have $220,000.
So, meaning that, indeed, if we have the resources available we definitely
will check on that and that has not passed us either.  The balloon effect
is real, something which we have seen globally, worldwide — if you press
it down here, it pushes up somewhere else.
Logically, from a strategic intelligence point of view, it should go there
where the buyers have best access, and that's close to the Chinese border
since 60 percent of the opium enters China.  So I'm far more afraid about
the pressure the Kachin will feel in the coming months than, for example,
in the Rakhine state.  There's also a connection eventually between the
Indian insurgent groups and the arms and drug issues, so there again that
might be itself an incentive to grow some drugs.  The similarities to what
we have seen here in Myanmar in the past — drugs as a destabilizing
element — can be easily repeated.  So that's why we take in as well part
of the Chin and the Sagaing zones, especially alongside the Indian borders
to see what is happening there.
U.N. Wire:  But you don't know?
Lemahieu:  At this stage no, we're not sure at all.  We don't have any
clear indications that it is happening so far, but we're not happy with
others saying it's not happening.  We want to see for ourselves.
U.N. Wire:  Is the Myanmar government seriously interested in stopping the
drug trade?
Lemahieu:  Yes, yes, yes, they are.  The government is very much pushed by
the regional agenda.  We have entered a new era, the era of infighting,
the era of the anticommunist against communist forces, the era of the
corrupted markets fueled by drug money and whatever, is slowly but
steadily being replaced by a new era of social and economic growth
throughout Southeast Asia, and those countries which have made a lot of
headway, be it China, be it as well Thailand, want to move their economies
up from the kitchen economies fueled by all the black-, gray-zone areas
and the under-the-table dealings and the corruption, to a more
competitive, transparent, accountable regional economy.  So that means
that the entire thinking has moved to another direction, has shifted.
If Myanmar wants to be part of the regional context, it will have to move
forward.  If Myanmar wants to come back from Beijing with a $200 million
loan under its arm, it will have to move forward.  If Myanmar wants to get
the road construction from New Delhi, it needs to move forward.  If
Myanmar wants to deal with the axis of Yangon-Bangkok, it will have to
move forward.  So to me, that's the primary reason.
Some will say it's public relations.  Definitely.  If you are considered
evil by the outside and you can score somewhere on the public relations
level, you will take that.  But that's not a real incentive.  The real
incentive for me is that the regional era has moved to another direction
and Myanmar cannot stay alone here.
U.N. Wire:  How important is it that the United States keeps refusing to
certify the drug efforts by the government?
Lemahieu:  This is more a political question than a technical question. 
As the U.N., we do not express ourselves about internal decisions of our
member states.  From a technical perspective I think that most of us will
agree that Myanmar passes one or another exam, but obviously needs to do a
lot more to get the final university degree.
You have to put the yardsticks gradually and gradually higher, but if you
can show reductions of 24 percent, 25 percent, according to the United
Nations, or 39 percent according to the U.S. administration, those are
things you cannot deny.  Those are tangible, concrete results.
U.N. Wire:  What do you say to critics who say that the United Nations
should not be here, that any involvement by the United Nations is a de
facto act of support for the government?
Lemahieu:  From the international dimension, first of all, we are working
here in the Golden Triangle, which in 2001, for a short while, was the No.
1 opium and heroin producer.  Still is a very respectable No. 2 producer,
and the main emphasis is in Myanmar.  So the problems created here go far
beyond the borders of Myanmar, it's an international issue, recognized by
the international community as such.  And we have a golden opportunity to
make the Golden Triangle something of the past as things are moving in
this way.
From the regional level, the regional dimension, we are talking about the
geostrategic stability, so it's a measure of conflict prevention and
management.  The warfare within this region has been fueled by the drug
business and opium has been taken over by ATS with regard to creating
social instability, health care instability, criminal instability, the
social evils across the border.  Think about HIV/AIDS and injected drug
use, which was one of the direct outcomes of the drug trade and which has
not stopped at the borders.
So that definitely is the second reason why we need to do something, as a
conflict prevention and management element.
The third element is indeed because we think that we are part of the
political progress here.  We are doing many elements which might help the
political reform, including exposing the ethnic minority groups to norms
and values accepted by the international community, taking them away from
the uncivil society in which many of them were for many years.  Making the
entire country more accountable and transparent by getting rid of the drug
profits.  Creating initiatives such as the civil society initiative and
promoting people to think for themselves without the government, promoting
concepts such as participatory and bottom-up community development at a
grassroots level, working directly with those communities, getting the
money directly to the people themselves without going through the
government, all this helps in exposing and creating a new thinking, which
definitely will help the political reform at the domestic level.
And finally, and most importantly, even the actual context, not denied by
anybody —  you could even politically argue that the international
dimension, the regional dimension, the domestic dimension are superficial
— however, no one should have questions with regard to the humanitarian
dimension.  What we're trying to do is provide basic human needs of people
who are already damn poor.  And if you're damn poor, what you're thinking
about is how do I survive tomorrow.  Now, opium for many of those people
was the way to survive.  Now opium, seemingly, for the other reasons we
have just mentioned, might not be the instrument for you any longer to
survive.  What do you do?  What do you do?  It's a major question for a
lot of those people, which is very, very real, which has nothing to do
with thinking in Paris, London, Bangkok or wherever.  I mean, it's real
for them here and now in the Shan state.
The humanitarian dimension  is also related to HIV/AIDS and injected drug
use.  The  HIV/AIDS epidemic is still fueled up to 30 percent by the
injected drug use.  So, again, on that level, there should not be any
doubt that our presence is making a difference.  So, for those reasons, I
think it's extremely important that we are here.
U.N. Wire:  Thank you.