BurmaNet News: January 16, 2004

[editor at burmanet.org]

January 16, 2004, Issue #2407

INSIDE BURMA
AFP: Myanmar releases 26 members of Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party
The Nation: RECONCILIATION: Karen leader in Rangoon for talks
Irrawaddy: Karen Prisoners Hope Ceasefire Leads to Freedom

MONEY
AP: Large natural gas deposit discovered off western Myanmar

REGIONAL
Irrawaddy: Shan Ceasefire Group Denies Arrest Rumors
DVB: KIO purges top leaders

OTHER / OPINION
Mizzima: Burma Still Safe for Indian Rebels
Asian Tribune: Ethnic Conflict in Burma: Historical Formation, Cause of
Conflict and Contemporary Politics


INSIDE BURMA
___________________________________

Agence France Presse, January 16, 2004
Myanmar releases 26 members of Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party

Twenty-six members of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's National League
for Democracy (NLD) party were released from detention Friday, the ruling
military junta said.

"A total of 26 NLD members who were under detention are being released
today. They are all in good health and are back home together with their
respective families," the junta said in a statement.

No names or details of those released were provided.

Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and all the members of her party's
decision-making Central Executive Committee (CEC) were detained along with
dozens of others after clashes last May 30 between NLD supporters and a
pro-junta gang in northern Myanmar.

Authorities have slowly but steadily released some of the activists from
jails, including five senior NLD members in November, but Aung San Suu Kyi
herself remains under house arrest.

That same month the United Nations' rights envoy to Myanmar, Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, demanded the junta release some 1,300 political prisoners,
particularly the elderly and infirm.

After the government began historic contacts with Suu Kyi in October 2000
the ruling generals began releasing prisoners in small batches in a
gesture to support the reconciliation process.

But the releases slowed to a trickle last year as the dialogue stalled,
and then collapsed completely with Aung San Suu Kyi's detention and
subsequent house arrest in May.

___________________________________
The Nation, January 16, 2004
RECONCILIATION: Karen leader in Rangoon for talks

Bo Mya says formal cease-fire pact, role in drafting constitution among
priorities

Bo Mya, the leader of Burma's largest minority rebel group, arrived in
Rangoon yesterday for a second round of peace talks with the military
junta.

Through the mediation of Thai authorities, the vice president of the Karen
National Union (KNU) travelled by military plane to the Burmese capital
for the first time since leaving Rangoon to join the Karen insurgency in
1958.

Speaking to reporters before his departure from Mae Sot district, Bo Mya
said his team would spend five days discussing a number of issues with the
junta's generals, including a formal, written cease-fire agreement,
boundary demarcation and development plans in Karen State.

The KNU also insists on participating in the constitution drafting by the
National Convention due to take place early this year, he said.

'What we need first of all is signing of a peace pact. . .the other issues
can be discussed step by step later,' he said.

The rebels and the junta last month reached a gentleman's agreement to
stop fighting in KNU-occupied areas.

Thailand played a crucial role in the peace talks by persuading the ageing
guerrilla leader to lead KNU negotiators to Rangoon.

A Thai military source close to the deal said Bo Mya's presence in the
negotiation team was a good sign for Burmese reconciliation since he had
been in the lengthy struggle for Karen autonomy for more than half a
century.

'Sitting in the circle of the talks, he can make a quick decisions on
every negotiating point,' the source said. 'Bo Mya is the sole person who
can speak on behalf of the KNU.'

The KNU and the junta made several attempts to start peace talks in the
1990s but the talks did not last long since Bo Mya, who has never before
sat in as the head of a negotiation team, accepted no compromises. This
time he leads the 20-strong KNU delegation and will meet the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) Chairman Than Shwe and Prime Minister Khin
Nyunt during the five-day mission in Rangoon.

The Karen have fought against Rangoon's rule for more than 50 years. They
faced setbacks in 1995 and 1997 after major government offensives. The
junta has reached cease-fire agreements with 17 ethnic groups since 1989.

___________________________________

Irrawaddy, January 16, 2004
Karen Prisoners Hope Ceasefire Leads to Freedom
By Kyaw Zwa Moe

A senior leader of Burma’s ethnic Karen, Gen Bo Mya, is in Rangoon,
talking with top leaders from Burmas military junta about ending the
fighting that has plagued his people for decades. Meanwhile, government
authorities continue to hold members of his rebel group in prisons across
Burma.

More than 100 members of the Karen National Union (KNU) have been
incarcerated for their involvement in fighting successive Burmese
governments, says the Thai-based Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners–Burma (AAPP).

Gen Bo Mya, deputy chairman of the KNU, landed in the Burmese capital for
his first ever visit yesterday. He was scheduled to meet Prime Minister
Gen Khin Nyunt today to discuss an official ceasefire agreement and the
affairs of Karen people. But KNU prisoners are not on the agenda at this
time.

The prisoner issue will be discussed only after the KNU gets a written
ceasefire agreement, said Padoh Mahn Sha, general secretary of the KNU. He
added that the number of Karen prisoners is more than the figure provided
by the AAPP.

Padoh Mahn Sha said military authorities have jailed not only KNU members,
but ordinary Karen people who they accuse of abetting the KNU, Burma’s
largest armed ethnic group. He said many Karen are confined to prisons in
Irrawaddy Division and getting information on their well-being is
difficult, a fact corroborated by the absence of information about KNU
prisoners in Irrawaddy Division prisons available from AAPP. Irrawaddy
Division is home to many ethnic Karen people.

A former political prisoner, Wai Moe, said Karen prisoners often fail to
get extra food and the same medical treatment as their fellow inmates and
therefore suffer unduly.

Last month, according to the AAPP, a KNU member died of tuberculosis at
Insein Prison outside Rangoon, since he did not receive proper treatment.
Saw Sar Htoo Saw, 53, was arrested in 1982 and was on death row when he
died.

Malnutrition is a main killer of the KNU inmates said Wai Moe, who served
time alongside numerous KNU members. He said the Karen prisoners largely
depend only on the insufficient food provided by the prison, since their
families cannot travel to the prison and provide them with additional
food. Many of the inmates families live near KNU headquarters along the
Thai-Burma border.

Wai Moe said that in 1992 and 1993, more than 20 elderly Karen people died
of malnutrition after being denied proper food and medical treatment by
prison authorities in Myingyan Prison in Magwe Division. Wai Moe, who was
also detained in Myingyan Prison, said all of them were arrested after the
KNU’s failed military campaign in Bokalay, Irrawaddy Division, in 1991. He
added that they were former members of the Karen National Defence
Organization, which like the KNU was also founded in 1948.

After the Bokalay campaign, several hundred Karen villagers were thrown
behind bars for their alleged support of the KNU. Dozens of the villagers
were reportedly tortured to death in detention centers by government
troops and military intelligence officers.

Wai Moe said that Saw Yin Thit and Saw Ei Tha , two Karen farmers in their
twenties from Bokalay died of torture in Myingyan Prison in the mid-1990s.
He said that they were sentenced to 20 years after being convicted of
supporting 1991 KNU campaign.

Another former political prisoner, Ko Ye, spoke of a 48-year-old KNU
prisoner who died in Thayet Prison in Pegu Division in 2001. He said Saw
Yin Thit, a KNU member who suffered mental illness, died of malnutrition
after being detained for 20 years.

Even Christian priests died at the hands of prison officials. The
president of a Seventh-day Adventist Church, Saw Hla Chit, 55, died after
being denied proper medical treatment at Insein prison in 1997. One of his
close friends from Rangoon said the priest was arrested because of his
connections with the KNU and later sentenced to eight years hard labor.

Wai Moe said Karen prisoners will continue to suffer in Burma’s jails and
KNU leadership should make an effort to win their freedom. Otherwise, he
says, more deaths may be inevitable.


MONEY
___________________________________

Associated Press, January 16, 2004
Large natural gas deposit discovered off western Myanmar
By Aye Aye Win

A major natural gas field has been discovered in an area off western
Myanmar being explored by a South Korean-Indian consortium, the state-run
press reported Friday.

The find in the Bay of Bengal could evolve into one of cash-strapped
Myanmar's largest foreign exchange earners. Gas exports to Thailand
already constitute a leading export.

The new find in Block A-1 off Myanmar's Rakhine state contains "a
world-class commercial-scale gas deposit" estimated to hold 4.2 trillion
to 5.8 trillion cubic feet of gas, with a topside potential of 14 trillion
cubic feet, the New Light of Myanmar newspaper said.

Similar figures were given in reports Friday in the South Korean and
Indian press. Its actual value to Myanmar is impossible to estimate,
however, because of fluctuations in energy prices and the lack of public
details on the contract signed between the government and the exploration
companies.

It takes several years to bring a field into production.

The block's exploration partners are South Korea's Daewoo International,
also the operator, with a 60 percent share; India's ONGC Videsh with 20
percent; and Korea Gas Corp. and Gail India with 10 percent apiece.

Daewoo signed the exploration contract for the block with the state Myanma
Oil and Gas Enterprise in August 2000.

The find was being celebrated by the exploration partners as well as by
Myanmar.

"Considering the annual consumption of Korea is about 1 trillion cubic
feet, this is a tremendously huge amount of gas," an unnamed official at
Daewoo was quoted as saying by South Korea's Joongang newspaper.

India's Financial Express quoted Gail chairman Proshanto Banerjee as
saying "We are happy with the reported discovery and are looking forward
to more such finds from the neighboring structures in the same block."

The discovery also represents a coup for regional oil companies in their
rivalry with the Western majors.

After previously hermetic Myanmar began allowing foreign investment in
1988, the government has permitted foreign companies to conduct onshore as
well as offshore oil and gas exploration.

But there is pressure from Western governments on companies based in their
countries not to do business in Myanmar because of the military regime's
poor human rights record and failure to restore democracy.

That pressure, along with legal sanctions - the United States has allowed
no new investment for several years - have provided an opening for
smaller, mostly Asian oil companies to invest in Myanmar.

However, the French oil company Total and Unocal from the United States
retain big, long-standing operations in Myanmar.
REGIONAL
___________________________________

Irrawaddy, January 16, 2004
Shan Ceasefire Group Denies Arrest Rumors
By Naw Seng

A ceasefire group from Burma’s Shan State has denied news reports that
some of its leaders are under house arrest.

Maj Aung Kyaw, a commander from the Shan State Nationalities Peoples’
Liberation Organization (SSNPLO), told The Irrawaddy via telephone from
the group’s headquarters in Naung Tao, southern Shan State, that his group
did not arrest any of its leaders.

“All the news reports are rumors. There are no problems,” said Aung Kyaw.
“This is our organization’s affair.” He added that the group merely
replaced some its top leaders.

Former Chief of Staff Col Shwe Byan was replaced by Col Chit Maung, who
also serves as the group’s general secretary, according to Aung Kyaw. News
reports said Col Shwe Byan and several military commanders were forced to
resign and were put under house arrest.

Chit Maung was part of an SSNPLO’s delegation which met with Burma’s Prime
Minister Gen Khin Nyunt last Wednesday in Rangoon to lend support to the
junta’s planned National Convention. The group signed a ceasefire
agreement with the Burmese military government in October 1994.

Hkun Okker, Chairman of the Pa-O Peoples’ Liberation Organization (PPLO),
an opposition group based on the Thai Burma border, believes that SSNPLO’s
power struggle is linked with their support of the National Convention.
Aung Kyaw denied any connection.

The SSNPLO is one of nine ceasefire groups which have said they will
attend the National Convention, which will reportedly convene soon.

___________________________________

Democratic Voice of Burma, January 15, 2004
KIO purges top leaders

The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) purged some of its top leaders
after an investigative body found them guilty of plotting a coup attempt.
The alleged coup took placed on 7 January at the organisation’s HQs
Liaison Bum, Kachin State in Northern Burma.

Colonel Lasang Aung Wa, organization’s intelligence chief, and his deputy
Lietenant-Colonel Padip Gam Aung, along with KIO Vice President
Brigadier-General Hpauyam Tsam Yan, were forced out of their positions.

Dr Tu Ja, KIO’s General Secretary and head of the investigative body said
the men were purged “without punishment." The commission found that the
purged officers were the root of last week’s problems, he added.

James Lum Dau, a KIO central committee member living in Thailand, said
that the committee purged its members according the KIO law but he did not
elaborate on what laws governed the treatment of the alleged coup leaders.

Many KIO central committee members, including Dr Tu Ja, met Gen Khin Nyut,
the Prime Minister of Burma’s military junta, State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) last year to lend support the junta’s planned ‘National
Convention’ and its ‘road map’. Nevertheless, KIO leaders deny that the
current crisis comes from the organisation’s support for the junta.

KIO signed a ceasefire agreement with the junta in 1994.


OTHER / OPINION
___________________________________

Mizzima, January 16, 2004
Burma Still Safe for Indian Rebels
By Surajit Khaund

Will the Burmese Junta be able to drive the militants from north-east
India out of Burmese territory?   Can they move the insurgents out of
remote areas where they have been firmly based for decades?  These are
questions with no easy answers.

At least twelve underground rebel groups from India's north-east use
mountainous parts of Burma close to the border for training and
organisational purposes.  The insurgent groups have set up camps inside
Burma and opposite to the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and
Manipur.  These areas are so difficult to access that it is almost
impossible for the Burmese army to launch operations against them.

An Indian army official who did not wish to be named told a group of
journalists yesterday that it is not possible for the Burmese army to take
any offensive against the ultras that are undergoing training in the
region.  "These areas are covered with a chain of mountains.  Moreover
there is no proper road [to mount] any [military] operation”, he said.  He
went on to say that while the Burmese army is currently considering the
situation, they are yet to carry out any operation.  He stated that the
Indian army has geared up vigilance along the Indo-Burma border to prevent
infiltration of underground members fleeing to Burmese territory following
the recent onslaught by the Royal Army of Bhutan.

Information has arrived from Moreh indicating that the Burmese Junta has
already reached agreements with various Manipur based militant groups. 
The Junta has requested that the underground group leaders not increase
their operations or move bases into other parts of Burma.

After this agreement was reached the underground groups have restricted
their activities.  However, it is known that the Burmese Junta did not
sign any agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland –
Khaplang (NSCN-K) faction.  The Junta has demanded that these guerillas
vacate their Burmese bases. "The NSCN-K has a strong base near Kachin
opposite Mon district of Nagaland.  The Junta has not been successful in
taking any offensive [against this base]", claimed the Moreh informant.

The leadership of several underground groups has convened a meeting near
Moreh today to discuss their future strategy in the aftermath of the
Burmese Junta’s most recent action.
___________________________________

Asian Tribune, January 16, 2004
Ethnic Conflict in Burma: Historical Formation, Cause of Conflict and
Contemporary Politics
By Sai Wansai

To understand the ongoing ethnic conflict in Burma, one would need to look
into the historical formation of the region, the basic cause of conflict
and contemporary politics.

Historical Formation

Early history, before the British colonization in 1885, of the place we
now called Burma was dotted with power struggle between the Mon, Burmese
and the Shan. All these three major rivalries had been victors at one time
or the other.

Modern day or real political intercourse between the non-Burmans and the
Burman came lately only after the end of Second World War.

In the course of the national liberation movement, the Shan, Kachin and
Chin signed the historic Panglong Agreement in 1947 with Burma, as
separate political entities, and gained joint independence together with
the Burman from the British in 1948.

Thus, it should be clear from the outset that the country we all know as
Burma or Myanmar, as termed by the Burmese military regime, is quite a new
political entity or a country made up of at least three countries, namely:
Burma Proper, Karenni State and Shan States. The Shan and the Karenni
joined Burma in their struggle for self-determination from the British and
jointly attained independence on January 4, 1948. During this formation
period, the Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen and Mon were not yet assigned to
the administrative status of states, even though they have lived at their
respective states from time immemorial.

However, in 1962 the Burmese military sized state power in a coup and
declared the Union Constitution abolished. In so doing, the Burmese
terminated the only existing legal bond between them and the other ethnic
nationalities. The declaration of the suspension of the Constitution was
in effect a self-denunciation that Burma had overnight become an
aggressor-nation instead of partner. Thus, in a legal-constitutional
sense, the Union of Burma ceased to exist.

The Burmese military regime has been attempting to hold the defunct union
together by sheer military force, whilst the real and only solution is
political. The Shan and the Karenni on their part have been waging a war
of resistance to free themselves from the Burmese oppression and
domination. This is also true for all the other non-Burman ethnic groups,
who are being subjected to the Burmese military’s Burmanization and forced
assimilation. The significant difference is that the Shan and Karenni
conflict with the Burmese military could be argued as "international", due
to the fact that the Shan and Karenni joined the Union of Burma on an
equal political footing, whereby both nations were constitutionally
granted or enjoyed the right to secede after a trial period of ten years
following the attainment of joint-independence from the British.

The non-Burman ethnic nationalities occupy 57% of the land mass and have a
population of 40% by conservative estimation.

Real Issues Behind the Conflict

To understand the ethnic conflict, it is essential to look into the issues
of conceptual differences, constitutional crisis, national identity,
majority-minority configuration and other pressing issues like human
rights violations, drugs and environmental management.

Conceptual Differences

The successive military dominated regimes, including the ruling SPDC, see
Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands
of years ago. As such, all other non-Burmans – Shan, Kachin, Chin,
Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be
controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.

On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a
newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong
Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.

Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with
its implementation of protecting “national sovereignty” and “national
unity” at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in
more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the
military and its inspiration to “racial supremacy” and to political
domination and control has no limit and this could be seen by its refusal
to hand over power to the winners of 1990 nation-wide election, the NLD,
SNLD and other ethnic parties. The genuine federalism platform, which the
NLD and ethnic nationalities embrace, is a threat to its racist mind-set
and obsession with domination and control.

Constitutional Crisis

The woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional
drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion
without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homelands were
recognized as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the
central government or the government of the Burma Mother state.

Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in
agreement that the ethnic conflict and reform of social, political and
economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only solution and
answer is to amend the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement,
where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the
constituent states, formed the basis for the Republic of the Union of
Burma.

National Identity

The views of successive Burmese governments, including the present regime,
SPDC, concerning national identity has never been clear. They have been at
a loss even as to what sort of name they should adopt; that is the reason
why they are still using "Bamar“ and "Myanmar" interchangeably for what
they would like to be termed a common collective identity, in other words,
national identity. The reality is that when one mentions "Myanmar",
"Bamar", "Burmese" or "Burman", such words are usually identified with the
lowland majority "Bamar” and have never been accepted or understood by the
non-Bamar ethnic nationals as a common collective identity to which they
also belong.

Meanwhile, just a few years back, the present Burmese military regime
changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Its aim is to create a national
identity for every ethnic group residing within the boundary of the
so-called Union of Myanmar. But since the name Myanmar has always been
identified with the lowland "Bamar", the SPDC’s effort in trying to
establish a common national identity among the non-Bamar ethnic nationals
is only doomed to fail. On top of that, this national identity was not
chosen with the consent of the non-Bamar ethnic groups, but coercively
thrust down their throats by the hated Burmese military dictatorship.

This writer has never heard anyone mentioning that he or she is a Bamar
Myanmar, Shan Myanmar, Kachin Myanmar, Karen Myanmar and so on. In the
United States, by contrast, it is normal that one considers or accepts
oneself as an American; such as, the use of Chinese American, Japanese
American, Afro-American and so on are common and widespread.

Another crucial point that most tend to overlook is that the maintenance
of the former European colonial boundaries as irreversible and sacrosanct
national state boundaries. This, in reality, only creates unending ethnic
conflicts the world over affecting international stability. Burma is such
a case, infested with ethnic and social conflicts.

The point to note here is that the successive Burmese governments'
nation-building process has totally shattered, failing even to take root
after all these years, not to mention the forging of common national
identity. It would be more pragmatic to accept the existing diversified
“national identities” of all ethnic nationalities as a fact and work for a
new common identity in the future federal union with the consent and
participation of all ethnic groups, Burman included.

Majority-Minority Configuration

The misconception of majority-minority configuration has been so
entrenched; at least in medias and academic studies, it needs some
clarification.

The Burman are majority in Burma Proper and in numerical sense, but become
a minority in the Shan States, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, and
the Mon states, where respective ethnic groups are in majority within
their own territories.

Besides, Burma was formed in 1947 by virtue of the Panglong Agreement, one
year prior to independence. This agreement was signed between the interim
government of Ministerial Burma, headed by Aung San, and leaders of the
Federated Shan States, the Chin Hill Tract, and the Kachin Hill Tract. It
could be said that this agreement is the genesis of the post-colonial,
current Burma.

Thus, the indigenous groups of Burma -- Shan, Arakanese, Chin, Kachin,
Karenni, Karen, Mon and including the Burman -- are not minorities or
majorities but equal partners in a union of territories, the Union of
Burma.

Other Pressing Issues

It goes without saying, addressing of the pressing issues can never be
completed without drugs and gross human rights violations in Shan States.
The planned Salween dam project by the Thai and SPDC regimes and the
blasting of Mekong River are also looming ecology disasters, which need to
be addressed.

Drugs

Shan Herald Agency for News recently released a report titled “Show
Business: Rangoon’s War on Drugs in Shan State”, where the investigative
findings provides evidence that the drug industry is integral to the
regime's political strategy to pacify and control Shan States, and
concludes that only political reform can solve Burma's drug problems.

In order to maintain control of Shan States without reaching a political
settlement with the ethnic peoples, the regime is allowing numerous local
ethnic militia and ceasefire organisations to produce drugs in exchange
for cooperation with the state. At the same time, it condones involvement
of its own personnel in the drug business as a means of subsidizing its
army costs at the field level, as well as providing personal financial
incentives.

Given the regime's use of the drug trade within its political strategy to
control Shan States, it is clear that no amount of international aid will
succeed in solving the drug problem unless there is political reform. As
Shan analysts have reiterated for decades, this can only be achieved
through the restoration of genuine peace, democracy and the rule of law in
Burma.

Human Rights Violations

In the absence of firm data, most estimates of Burma’s internally
displaced population remained at about 600,000 to 1 million. The most
recent estimate of displacement in Karen State alone was 200,000.”(Global
IDP Data Base estimation for internally displaced population of Shan
States as 300,000. - Source: UN Commission on Human Rights, 10 January
2002, para100)

A report from Shan Human Rights Foundation titled “Charting the Exodus
from Shan State” covering the period 1997-2002 writes:

“In April 1996, large numbers of Shan refugees from the areas of forced
relocation started arriving in Thailand. By May 1996, already an estimated
20,000 refugees had fled to Thailand. The flow of refugees continued,
until by March 1998, it was estimated that about 80,000 refugees had fled
to Thailand (Dispossessed, SHRF, 1998). In June 2002, SHRF and SWAN
estimated the total of Shan refugees in Thailand to have reached over
150,000 since 1996 ”.

Conclusion

The international community, Burman democratic forces and the non-Burman
ethnic nationalities have been trying to achieve reconciliation and
democratisation for years, without success. It seems the military regime
is also immune to the sanctions imposed by the EU and United States. The
recent Thai initiative or its engagement policy with Burma has lessened
the sanction’s impact and the military is not about to budge. With the
ongoing problems and hardship in Afghanistan and Iraq the United States is
not about to launch a humanitarian intervention or opt for a regime change
push in Burma. It seems the United Nations’ efforts to push for speedy
democratisation process through tripartite dialogue is also getting us
nowhere.

To sum up, there are three main strategic options at hand for the ethnic
nationalities and the Burman opposition groups to consider. They are:

1. To lobby for regime change
2. To attend the forth-coming National Convention
3. To lobby for “power mediation”

The regime change option seems to be quite a hard strategy to sell, let
alone implementing it in a practical term, given the United States’ and
United Kingdom’s problematic situation – at home and abroad - in relation
to the Iraq and Afghanistan occupation and nation-building process.

Attending the SPDC initiated National Convention could turn out to be the
same old game, where the military could decide, set agenda, lay down
constitutional drafting principle and even vested with power to select
participants. The whole show could be only a replay to keep the military
in power, perhaps with a slight semblance of democratic trappings. But it
could also be an arena, where the ethnic groups and oppositions could
assert some change from within, gradually making it possible to level the
playing field and widen the political space.

Lobbying for “power mediation” could also be a hard nut to crack, given
that the sympathetic countries are reluctant and undecided to commit
wholeheartedly on practical terms like the Thai government. Its recent
initiative of hosting an international meeting in December 2003, in
Bangkok, known as “Bangkok Process”, among twelve like-minded countries to
back up the SPDC’s seven steps roadmap plan, is a substantial and
practical commitment from the part of the Thaksin headed Thai government.
Like wise, the sympathetic Western governments could act, if they really
wanted to, to back up the democratic and ethnic forces.

The term "power mediation" is advanced by the Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance in its book titled “Democracy and Deep-Rooted
Conflict: Options for Negotiators”—where the mediator has the power to
persuade the parties to obey. It could use incentives and punishments to
persuade the parties to yield from their inflexible positions to reach a
compromise.

In such a situation, it looks like the SPDC’s roadmap initiative or
convening the National Convention to produce a constitution is the only
game in town. There has been speculation of the SPDC’s sidelining of the
NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, with the help of ethnic ceasefire armies.

Under the prevailing circumstances, the best bet would be probably to
apply a multi-prong approach. The adversaries of the SPDC should go on
doing the best within their limit and capacity, with a sole view of
widening the political space, which might eventually lead to a political
settlement. Some points below might be in line with an integrated grand
strategy designed to work for the pro-change outcome, under the motto of
“common goal, diverse actions” among the opposition groups.

- Since the ethnic ceasefire armies would not be in a position to reject
the SPDC’s overtures, they should be encouraged and given support to
participate in forth-coming national convention.

- The armed resistance groups should be open for ceasefire talks and
eventual participation in the national convention, if crucial amendments
are made on its 104 constitutional drafting guiding principles.

- The NLD should go on to position itself as one of the major stakeholders
possessing undisputed legitimacy and as such, entitled to decision-making
power to serve the country and the people. Protest, political mobilization
and defiance should also continue, whenever and wherever possible.

- The SNLD and UNA should continue to call for reconciliation through
tripartite dialogue and more inclusiveness as a basis for their
participation in the national convention.

- The exiled opposition groups should continue to lobby the EU, United
States and Japan for more effective sanctions and pressures and if
possible, pushed for a “power mediation” process in cooperation with the
United Nations.

The suggestion stated above is in no way an exhausted list. Many more
could be added but the aim of all opposition camps should be fixed on
“levelling the playing field” and “widening the political space”, where
all could participate in a fair and equal manner.

This would seem a tall order, vague strategy and even could be taken as
aimlessly muddling through. But social science, being a soft science, is
not something that can be steered to reach a desired goal or precise
outcome. It has never worked that way and experience teaches us that each
individual case is unique and has a process of its own.

The former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and even Georgia recently have
surprised us with speedy and astonishing outcomes. Many oppressed
non-state nations, minorities and democratic elements have benefited from
these abrupt and, at times, violent changes. Let the struggle for
democratisation and self-determination in Burma also surprises us;
hopefully, with the kind of “velvet divorce” or “rose revolution” outcome
as had happened in the former Czechoslovakia and Georgia.

- Abbreviations -

JAC: Joint Action Committee
NCGUB: National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
NCUB: National Coalition Council of Burma
NDF: National Democratic Front
NLD: National League for Democracy
RCSS: Restoration Council of Shan State
SDU: Shan Democratic Union
SNLD: Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
SSA: Shan State Army
SSA -S: Shan State Army - South
SHAN: Shan Herald Agency for News
SHAN-EU: Shan – European Union
SSNA: Shan State National Army
SHRF: Shan Human Rights Foundation
SPDC: State Peace and Development Council
SSPC: Shan State Peace Committee
SWAN: Shan Women Action Network
UNA: United Nationalities Alliance
UNLD (LA): United Nationalities League for Democracy (Liberated Area)

Sai Wansai is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU). In
addition, currently, he is also representative of the Shan States in
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), based in The Hague,
The Netherlands.

In the 90s, Sai Wansai was responsible for Overseas Information of the
Shan State People's Representative Committee. He served as Vice President
of SDU from 1996 –2000.

The SDU is the umbrella organization of Shan expatriate groups and works
closely with all Shan political organizations – the Shan National League
for Democracy, the Restoration Council of the Shan State, and the Shan
State Organization.

He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Geography) from the Mandalay Arts & Science
University in Burma and has studied Political Science at Hamburg
University, Germany.