BurmaNet News, Jan 28, 2004

[editor at burmanet.org]

Jan 28, 2004 Issue # 2413


INSIDE BURMA
AFP: Myanmar accuses United States of working to destabilize Asia
BBC Monitor: Arakan leaders meet prime minister, support road map
AP: Fire at popular tourist site kills 20 Buddhist pilgrims
Irrawaddy: Illegal Temples Destroyed in Myawaddy

BUSINESS / MONEY
IFI: SEC examines Calandra's Ivanhoe links

REGIONAL
Asahi: NGO'S web site geared to asylum seekers

OPINION / OTHER
Mizzima: Two-Level Game: SPDC Divided on Peace
Ascribe Newswire: Imagining a National Reconciliation in Burma: Beyond
Cease-Fire

LETTERS
IHT: Isolating the regime in Myanmar is not the answer



INSIDE BURMA
___________________________________

Jan 28, Agence France Presse
Myanmar accuses United States of working to destabilize Asia

Myanmar on Wednesday accused the United States of attempting to
destabilize Asia over the past 15 years and urged its most vocal critic to
join with it in helping to shift the country towards democracy.

Citing a series of "steps forward" it claimed had made Myanmar "more
stable and peaceful than at any time in history", the junta said the
United States had in the meantime "consistently attempted to destabilize
Myanmar."

"It has imposed sanctions, undermining the economy and creating hardship
for the Myanmar people," it said, referring to punitive measures tightened
last year after the May detention of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

"It tried to prevent Myanmars admission to ASEAN. And, even though the
United States is the worlds largest market for illegal drugs, Washington
refuses to help Myanmar fight narcotics," it fumed in a statement.

The United States is one of the Southeast Asian nation's harshest critics
and the two countries frequently engage in verbal jousts.

Last year US President George W. Bush led a chorus of global protest after
Myanmar's generals detained and then placed under house arrest Nobel peace
laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, for the third time since 1988.

The junta complained that Washington gives "tens of millions of dollars to
various Myanmar expatriate groups, with no accountability or
responsibility. These groups have made no contribution toward stability in
the region, and often raise tensions in the region instead."

Instead, Myanmar urged the United States "to join with us and regional
partners in developing a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Myanmar...
This is better than promoting poverty, instability, drugs and armed
conflicts."

In response to the huge international outcry over Aung San Suu Kyi's
detention and a crackdown on her opposition National League for Democracy
party, Myanmar introduced a seven-point plan for democracy in August.

The plan, which has as its first step a national convention aimed at
drafting a new constitution, was greeted sceptically by the international
community.

_________________________

Jan 28, BBC Monitor
Arakan leaders meet prime minister, support road map

SOURCE: TV Myanmar, Rangoon, in Burmese 1330 gmt 27 Jan 04

Gen Khin Nyunt, chairman of the Work Committee for Development of Border
Areas and National Races and prime minister, received an Arakan ethnic
delegation led by U Saw Tun Oo from Aung Zeya Nyeinchanyay Village, who
had returned to the legal fold, at Zeyathiri Beikman Hall on Konmyinttha
Hill in Yangon Rangoon at 1715 local time today.

Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt was accompanied by Col Tin Hlaing, minister
of home affairs; Brig-Gen Ohn Myint, minister of mines; Brig-Gen Maung
Maung Thein, minister of livestock breeding and fisheries; Brig-Gen Thein
Zaw, minister of telecommunications, post, and telegraphs; Maj-Gen Thein
Swe, minister of the Prime Minister's Office; Brig-Gen Khin Maung, deputy
minister of agriculture and irrigation; Brig-Gen Than Tun, minister of
progress of border areas and national races and development affairs;
Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, vice chief of the Military Intelligence; Lt-Col Pe
Nyein, director-general of the State Peace and Development Council Office;
U Soe Tint, director-general of the Government Office; and responsible
departmental personnel.

At the meeting, the ethnic leaders welcomed and expressed their support
for the seven-step future policy programme of the state and explained that
they would harmoniously participate in the implementation of the policy
programme under the guidance of the state government. In addition, the
ethnic leaders requested state assistance in education, health,
agricultural, and economic sectors for regional development.
_________________________

Jan 28, Associated Press
Fire at popular tourist site kills 20 Buddhist pilgrims

fire engulfed lodgings and shops at a popular tourist attraction in
Myanmar, killing at least 20 Buddhist pilgrims and leaving another 10
missing, an official said Wednesday. More than 30 others were injured.

The fierce blaze broke out early Tuesday near the Kyaik-tiyo Pagoda, the
so-called Golden Rock temple, 160 kilometers (100 miles) northeast of the
capital, Yangon.

The exact cause of the fire was not immediately known, but official
newspapers blamed the blaze on "carelessness" without citing details.

A fire department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said a
strong wind fanned the flames which started in the wooden and
thatched-roofed buildings, more than 120 of which were destroyed.

He placed the death toll at about 20 with another 10 still missing and
more than 30 injured. There were no foreigners among the casualties, he
said, although the pagoda is popular with overseas visitors to Myanmar,
also known as Burma.

Government-controlled newspapers made no mention of casualties and said
the fire was contained within four hours.

The incident occurred at the height of the pilgrimage season when faithful
Buddhists flock to the small shrine precariously perched on a gold-plated
boulder atop a cliff.

Legend has it that the boulder maintains its fine balance because a strand
of the Lord Buddha's hair is preserved inside the pagoda.

The deadliest fire in recent decades occurred in March 1988 when more than
110 people died and 20,000 were left homeless in the city of Lashio, 450
miles (724 kilometers) northeast of Yangon.
_____________________________

Jan 28, Irrawaddy
Illegal Temples Destroyed in Myawaddy - By Aung Su Shin/Mae Sot

January 28, 2004—Buddhist temples in Myawaddy are being destroyed by local
authorities and the Sangha Council, or Burma’s Buddhist monastic
community.

"We have ordered that all illegal wats [temples] go away from Myawaddy,"
said Zaw Tipala, the Myawaddy Sangha council’s secretary.

"We have principles for the setting up a wat or pagoda. You must get
permission from the Sangha council, local authorities and the land
department," he added. "We will allow the wats which have followed these
procedures."

We are Buddhist. Why don’t we follow our religion? —Ngwe Tin

Zaw Tipala said the reason of the order is confusion caused by illegal
temples and fake monks in Myawaddy.

There are many cases in Myawaddy of men who have fled jail or the military
impersonating monks, said Zaw Tipala. Some even travel across the river to
Mae Sot, Thailand to collect alms. "We strongly prohibit these sorts of
acts," he said.

Sandaw Bata, whose temple was destroyed, said that he was told temples
were targeted because of the monks’ contact with armed ethnic groups. But
he accused officials of using that association as an excuse.

"Among all the wats they have destroyed, there are many good ones," said
Sandaw Bata. "They fear the monks from those wats will become their rivals
one day."

Ngwe Tin, the main donor of U Sandaw Bata’s temple, said he was upset by
its destruction and that there appears to be no religious freedom in
Burma.

"We are Buddhist. Why don’t we follow our religion?" he asked. "The
destruction of wats makes us sad."

Ngwe Tin added that he had permission from the Sangha council chief to
build the temple and has lost faith in the council over their decision to
destroy it.

The Sangha council secretary said they have destroyed four large illegal
wats and many small huts in the jungle around Myawaddy. Sandaw Bata said
26 temples have been destroyed so far.

Zaw Tipala said genuine monks from illegal temples can relocate to legal
ones in Myawaddy or they return to their hometowns.


BUSINESS / MONEY
_____________________________________

Jan 28, IFI - Burma
SEC examines Calandra's Ivanhoe links

Compiler's note: Ivanhoe Mines (Canada) invests in the large copper mine
at Monywa.  The
article talks about the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's
examination of Thom Calandra, who has been supportive of Ivanhoe Mines.

The report of forced labor at Mawchi in Karenni State, mentioned in Eric's
comments, is here:
http://www.csw.org.uk/Latestnews.asp?Item=423
(Christian Solidarity Worldwide)

Investment guru's endorsement of energy, mining companies has raised
suspicion Washington: Barrie McKenna: Report on Business: 24-01-04

Investing guru Thom Calandra's enthusiastic endorsement of Canadian
promoter Robert Friedland's high-flying energy and mining companies
appears to be at the centre of a probe by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Mr. Calandra, author of the on-line newsletter The Calandra
Report, abruptly resigned Thursday as chief commentator for the CBS
MarketWatch website after missing a deadline to hand over personal stock
trading records to the company.

Dana Welch, his San Francisco-based lawyer, said the SEC has asked for
records of his stock trades, copies of his newsletter and copies of e-mail
alerts he sent to his subscribers.   The SEC opened an informal probe into
his trading in December after Forbes Magazine raised questions about his
enthusiasm for Mr. Friedland's Ivanhoe Energy Inc. and Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.,
she said.  Although a letter he received from the SEC did not mention the
Ivanhoe companies, she assumed that the Forbes article was the trigger,
she said. "In my experience, that's the way the SEC works. They see
something in the press and they look into it."  The article said that "no
one applauds louder than Thom Calandra" for Ivanhoe Mines and Ivanhoe
Energy, companies with substantial market capitalization but scant profit.

According to The Wall Street Journal, the SEC probe is focused on whether
Mr. Calandra bought stock ahead of news about the companies he was writing
about and then sold the stock after prices rose, a form of "pump and
dump."  In a Nov. 10 issue of the paid-subscription newsletter, Mr.
Calandra said Ivanhoe Energy shares, then trading at roughly $6 (U.S.) on
the Nasdaq, would soon be propelled as high as $15 because of projects in
Iraq and China.  In the same issue, he readily admitted that he had
"exposure to Robert M. Friedland's Ivanhoe complex" and has flown for free
to Mongolia, China and London aboard Ivanhoe Mines' corporate jet. He also
acknowledged that he owns shares in Ivanhoe Energy and African Minerals, a
privately held nickel and platinum stock controlled by Mr. Friedland.

"I paid full price for my shares in the open market, with no
company-sponsored discounts of any type," Calandra wrote. "When I sell
them is my business because I have every right to profit from my intense
research."  In a statement, he suggested that he resigned in part because
of the stress of the SEC inquiry. "While it's been tremendously rewarding
professionally, it has also been stressful," he said of his eight years at
MarketWatch. "And the SEC's informal inquiry adds to this stress. So I've
decided to take time off to focus on my family, who I adore. I look
forward to the conclusion of the SEC's inquiry."

**********
Commentary by Eric Snider

The article above is a shortened version of one that appeared in
Saturday's Report on Business published by the Toronto Globe and Mail. 
After Calandra's 'push and pump' promotion in the CBS Marketwatch
newsletter, Ivanhoe Mining shares more than doubled in value to C$ 16 on
the Toronto Exchange.  They quickly fell back to the present $9-10 level. 
It doesn't require too much imagination to come to the conclusion that
some of the Ivanhoe crowd also managed to dispose of stock option holdings
during the sudden upsurge in price.  The company
has yet to report a profit since it was set up in the mid-nineties.

The SEC itself has been blithely ignoring U.S. government sanctions on
companies that invest in Burma and allowed Ivanhoe Mining to trade on the
NASDAQ exchange for the last couple of months.   Lately, the company has
changed its tune on getting rid of the coppermine at Monywa.

Company now says the joint venture company that owns the Monywa mine has
made a proposal to its Japanese debenture holders, Marubeni and
Nissho-Iwai, that its debt payments be rescheduled, so that profits from
the current mining operation can be channeled into developing the
Letpadaung expansion project.

The mining scene in Burma has come in for yet more bad publicity with a
report this week that forced labour is being used to construct a road to a
new tungsten mine in the Mawchi area of Kayah (Karenni) state.  A
Christian solidarity group in the U.K. reported that Karenni villagers
in the southwest part of the state were being forced to build  the road in
an area southeast of Mawchi, long a centre for tin and tungsten mining in
the southern part of the state -
[http://www.csw.org.uk/Latestnews.asp?Item=423].

The British group reported that  hundreds of Karen and Karenni villagers
have gone into hiding in a nearby area in Karen state where emergency food
and medical supplies were running out.  It said the villagers were
attacked by three battalions of the Burmese army late last week.


REGIONAL
____________________________

Jan 28, Asahi News Service
NGO'S web site geared to asylum seekers

Information for asylum seekers in Japan is now only a mouse click away.

Set up in late December by a Tokyo-based nongovernmental organization, the
online multilingual manual for asylum seekers provides practical tips for
gaining refugee status in this country.

Officials at the Japan Association for Refugees (JAR) say they hope that
the manual-available in English, French, Burmese, Chinese, Persian and
Turkish-will help fill an information void for those seeking asylum.

Although the Justice Ministry provides a brief booklet-in 11
languages-explaining the Japanese system and procedures for gaining
refugee status, this is probably the first time a private group has
created a multilingual manual.

Since the manual was completed in December, the group said it has already
received favorable responses from asylum seekers, supporters and local
governments.

"We believe that it is important to provide information from the
perspective of nongovernmental organizations," said Eri Ishikawa, a senior
researcher at JAR.

Aside from explaining the system and procedures involved in applying for
refugee status, the manual also offers practical advice on gathering
evidence to submit to immigration bureau officials, preparing documents
and responding to questions.

The site also offers help to those whose pleas for asylum are rejected,
such as information on seeking legal advice or funds for filing a lawsuit.

Ishikawa said her group, which relies largely on donations, had intended
to create such a manual since JAR's inception in 1999, but it had to
direct its resources toward counseling services and providing emergency
funds to asylum seekers.

Last year, under a program to promote nonprofit organizations through
information technology, the group succeeded in winning a 2.1 million yen
award from Microsoft Co., the Japanese subsidiary of the software giant.

JAR used this money to finance the manual and several computer literacy
classes for asylum seekers aimed at empowering them with
information-gathering and processing skills.

Another positive result was that the group employed the language and
translation skills of the asylum seekers themselves.

Ishikawa said the group also benefited from the involvement of refugees.

"Along with certain word usage, I think we were able to improve content
with insights from the refugees themselves," Ishikawa said, adding that
one refugee persuaded the group to add more details on deportation
procedures.

For example, when an applicant has overstayed his or her visa, deportation
procedures are carried out concurrently, Ishikawa said.

Ishikawa said that the group will update the manual with planned revisions
to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law scheduled to pass
during the current Diet.

The manual can be viewed at JAR's Web site at
<www.refugee.or.jp/forrefugee/index.html>



OPINION / OTHER
_____________________________________

Jan 28, Mizzima
Two-Level Game: SPDC Divided on Peace - By Naw May Oo & Min Zaw Oo

The Karen National Union (KNU) delegation left Rangoon on Thursday, 22
January 2004, without signing a formal agreement while military clashes
and human rights abuses are still occurring in Karen areas.  Some
observers speculate that the military is using a good-cop-bad-cop strategy
to suppress the KNU under the guise of the ceasefire talk.  Further
speculation is that the KNU might have been politically “co-opted” by the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and that the talk is a
political defeat for the Karen resistance movement.

Careful analysis based on the information from the sources close to the
parties involved indicates that the SPDC’s leaders are likely to be
divided on the ceasefire issue with the KNU. The peace initiative is
indeed a set of two games played between both the opposition and the SPDC,
and among the military’s factions.

Gen. Khin Nyunt, the Prime Minister, and his associates are the prime
authors of the current ceasefire initiative, according to the sources
close to the talks. Brig. Kyaw Thein, head of the Information and
Intelligence Bureau under the Directorate of the Defense Services
Intelligence (DDSI), led the SPDC’s delegation. Thein Swe, Minister of the
Prime Minister’s Office, Brig. Than Tun, a member of the Domestic and
International Information Department, Brig. Kyaw Han, head of the Counter
Intelligence Department, were part of the SPDC’s delegation.

Gen. Khin Nyunt attended the meetings on the first and last day and
communicated key concepts of the ceasefire to the KNU delegation. Gen.
Kyaw Win, who is reportedly close to Sen. Gen. Than Shwe, also came only
on the first and last days merely to greet the delegation.  All attendees
from the side of the SPDC were senior officials from the DDSI.

Although it is naturally necessary to have senior officials of field
operations present to discuss the technical details of a ceasefire
agreement, none of the senior officials from the War Office, the Burmese
version of the Pentagon, was present at the talk. Four Bureaus of Special
Operations are responsible for coordinating operations in various Regional
Commands.  Lt. Generals Ye Myint, Aung Htwe, Khin Maung Than and Maung Bo
command four bureaus respectively, in coordination with regional and
divisional commanders.  None of them attended the meeting.

According to sources, a senior official from the SPDC delegation confessed
that it was ‘extremely difficult’ to implement the peace initiative with
the KNU because some elements, especially field commanders, seem to
believe that the Burmese Army is capable of wiping out the ethnic
insurgency. The SPDC delegation had to report to the War Office with the
notes from each day’s
meeting for further discussions and approval.

The SPDC delegation, on many occasions, returned to the talks with sullen
faces the next day just to scrap the preceding day’s agreements because
the War Office struck them down. “We also have to do many things on our
side [to accomplish the peace initiative],” said Gen. Khin Nyunt.

DDSI’s Role in Ceasefire

Gen. Khin Nyunt’s role within the SPDC was revitalized through a promotion
to Prime Minister after the Depayin violence that killed scores of the
National League for Democracy’s (NLD) supporters. The Depayin massacre
consequently put intense international pressure on the SPDC, including new
economic sanctions by the United States. Gen. Khin Nyunt apparently was
allowed to gain new power in order to orchestrate political maneuvers
amidst the crisis emerging out of the Depayin violence.  It is important
to note that Gen. Khin Nyunt and the DDSI advocated for and initiated
ceasefire arrangements even before the military takeover in 1988.  The
initial strategy of the ceasefire tactics was intended to strangle the
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) by manipulating the ethnic sentiment among
the rank and files of CPB’s military units.

The military intelligence has established a connection with Kokang leader,
Phone Kyar Shin, since December 1987 when many ethnic-based units became
disenchanted with the CPB’s Burman leadership. After the Kokang group
(MNDA) broke away from the CPB in March 1989, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt,
personally met with Kokang leaders to implement a ceasefire agreement.

This ceasefire with the Kokang sparked a domino effect on other
CPB-breakaway ethnic groups in the Shan State and one group after another
has been enticed to sign agreements since 1989.  Currently, fifteen armed
groups have agreed officially to a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC while
it unofficially has made deals with six splinter groups that are still
armed.  Not surprisingly, the ceasefire tactic has paid off for the
intelligence faction, as it has been able to strengthen its power base
inside the military leadership to compete with the field commanders. The
intelligence faction in the military continues to utilize the ceasefires
with the opposition groups to overcome the field-commander faction in the
intra-military power struggle.

Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt and his associates have earned credit for the
ceasefire agreements, which has granted them respect and also made them a
powerful asset in the SPDC leadership.  However, the intelligence group’s
ceasefire arrangements seem to go beyond the intra-group power struggle.

It is apparent that the SPDC’s ceasefire agreements with the armed ethnic
groups were not really necessitated by military stalemates or crises for
the SPDC.  Unlike the current Sri Lankan ceasefire that was largely made
necessary by the military stalemate, the Burmese military did not
encounter serious military pressure from the oppositions.

The military managed to repel the initial phase of the oppositions’
offensives right after the 1988 uprising. The Burma Army, after the 1988
uprising, had lost only one major tactical base, Mae Thawaw, which was
later recaptured by the regime. The army, again, has stepped up its
campaigns against the resistance movement since 1993 and currently
occupies over 90 percent of the active rebel bases.

Within the SPDC’s current internal power struggle, some elements in the
regime seem to view the civil war as unnecessary in order to control the
ethnic rebellion.  At the same time, the SPDC’s intent in pursuing further
ceasefires is not solely to reunite with ethnic rebels as it continues to
commit apparent human rights abuses.  The SPDC is still constantly
pressuring the existing non-ceasefire groups such as the Chin National
Front (CNF), the Karenni Progressive Party (KNPP), and the KNU to enter
ceasefire agreements. (The SPDC-KNPP ceasefire collapsed three months
after signing.)

Nevertheless, some elements in the regime seem to rationalize the civil
war as an undesired by-product of the development of the country. Some
military leaders seem willing to de-escalate the violent conflict to a
non-fighting stage if such de-escalation benefits the SPDC politically.
The SPDC still refuses to address the political settlement of ethnic
issues despite the existing ceasefire agreements.

Under the ceasefire agreements, the rebels are allowed to keep their army
and limited territorial control in addition to the privileges of
extracting natural resources and drug trafficking. The regime has made
ceasefire agreements even with small groups, like Kayan National Guard
that had only about 50 armed troops.

Peace Needs Both Levels

Even though some KNU senior officials are doubtful of the military’s
intention for peace, the KNU leadership as a whole and the military
commanders are willing to respect the ceasefire agreement if both sides
ratify it.  In contrast, SPDC’s commitment to the agreement seems
unsettled among the leadership.

Field commanders of the SPDC are defiant of Gen. Khin Nyunt at the
operational level. They perceive the intelligence officials as
opportunists who receive privileges without sacrifice. When Gen. Khin
Nyunt issued an order to stop using forced labor in 2001 because of the
pressure from the International Labor Organization (ILO), the field
commanders ignored it.   Although the War Office issued operational
expenses for ‘porters,’ the military units never utilized the money to
hire people.

Past decisions allow field commanders to act autonomously today.  In 1996,
Gen. Maung Aye instructed military units to be prepared to be self-reliant
without depending on the central command to support them logistically. 
The deteriorating economy and the sky-rocking price of basic goods do not
have any effect on the military personnel.

Essentially, field commanders become small warlords in various regions.
Many battalions depend on funds secured by each company.  Battalions in
the northern and eastern border regions reportedly have to send a certain
amount of funds to divisional or regional command headquarters.

Gen. Khin Nyunt insisted that both sides be ‘serious’ about the current
peace initiative, sources close to the recent ceasefire talks said. While
the KNU officials raised questions on the ongoing operations and human
rights abuses in Karen areas, Gen. Khin Nyunt acknowledged that some
elements, who do not agree on the peace initiative, were undermining the
ceasefire. Although a ceasefire agreement was not officially signed, both
delegations seem to be satisfied with the process. The KNU delegates
received handsome treatment from the SPDC delegation.

Nevertheless, it will still be, undoubtedly, difficult to fully implement
the ceasefire and peace deal between the KNU and the SPDC even if the
truce is ratified.  The hard-line faction and isgruntled field commanders
are  less likely to be duped by the truce.

At the moment, a formal agreement to a ceasefire between the KNU and the
SPDC apparently demands much patience, sincerity, and political
willingness.

Naw May Oo is the Director of Communications and Min Zaw Oo is the
Director of Outreach and Strategy at Washington-based Free Burma
Coalition.
____________________________

Jan 28, Ascribe Newswire
Imagining a National Reconciliation in Burma: Beyond Cease-Fire -- by Saw
Kaw Htoo, Naw May Oo and Saw Kapi

[Following is an editorial by Saw Kaw Htoo, Naw May Oo and Saw Kapi. Saw
Kaw Htoo is Research Associate at the Institute of Education and
Development Studies (IEDS). Naw May Oo is with KNU's Foreign Affairs
Department and is Director of Communication at the Free Burma Coalition
(FBC). Saw Kapi is a representative of the Karen National Union (KNU) in
the United States. The opinions expressed herein are entirely the
authors'. This article does not represent the official position of any
organization.]

The Karen National Union delegation led by General Saw Bo Mya traveled to
Rangoon last week for talks with top leaders of the Burmese military
regime. The trip marked Gen. Bo Mya's first trip to Burma's capital since
the inception of the Karen revolution in 1949, and it could be seen as an
obvious gesture toward national reconciliation and finding a political
solution with the regime.  Of all the ethnic resistance forces that have
engaged in cease-fire talks with the military regime, only the KNU flew
into Rangoon directly from a foreign capital. Although there was no
official media report about the arrival of KNU team, Prime Minister Khin
Nyunt reportedly told the KNU delegation that the result of the meetings
between the two sides would be announced to the country.

The people of Burma, most of whom have endured tremendous sufferings under
successive Burmese military regimes for the last half-century, are hoping
that the ongoing peace efforts by the KNU and its legendary leader General
Bo Mya bear fruit this time. Since there were no preconditions set for the
talks, it was supposed that both sides would discuss quite openly all
matters of concern.  Although the KNU team's main focus in this round of
talks was to formalize a cease-fire deal with the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), it pursued this negotiation process with a
long-term goal of gaining the right to self-determination for the Karen
people in a future democratic Burma. In fact, the KNU decided to go ahead
with the planned talks amidst continuing human right violations by the
SPDC troops in several Karen areas. Several Karen communities have already
raised concerns over the regime's continued atrocities in Karen villages,
the plight of Karen refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and,
lately, about Karen political prisoners now in jails throughout Burma. It
is easy to realize that peace and national reconciliation, in practice,
are more than agreements between leaders from the two sides.

The regime must cease its violent practices in Karen areas to prove its
readiness to negotiate in good faith. From the KNU point of view,
face-to-face meetings with the SPDC give them an opportunity to formally
present their concerns, and at the same time to seek other overarching
political ends. While both sides agreed that talks are fruitful and
progressing, much needs to be done on both sides for negotiating a formal
cease-fire agreement; setting up a process of monitoring infringements of
the truce; and deciding how to deal with the more than 250,000 internally
displaced people in the Karen state. The delegation came back with an
understanding that both sides must start working on their respective
concerns before they can come up with a formal signed agreement. After
more than half a century of civil war, the situation is now ripe for
resolution.

Although the Burmese military regime has managed to weaken the KNU forces
considerably in the last decade, the prospect for a complete victory by
either side is dim. Currently, a cease-fire agreement is a necessary and
important step but not a panacea for solving the deeper political
problems. A formal cease-fire agreement should lay the groundwork for a
mutually agreeable political settlement. This would include the drawing of
military demarcation for the SPDC and KNU troops; the initiation of a
national political dialogue that would incorporate all the political
stakeholders, including the popular leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and
National League for Democracy party, popularly elected in 1990; the
drafting of a national constitution; and a nationwide referendum. The SPDC
must convince the people of Burma that it is sincerely following the path
to democracy and national reconciliation, which should take place within a
reasonable time frame.

The regime must also foster a situation that would encourage the NLD to
join its proposed resumption of the National Convention. While negotiating
with the SPDC, the KNU may want to keep its options open by not discarding
completely the proposed resumption of National Convention. What may be
more imperative - and feasible - for the KNU and all the opposition groups
to do, however, is to convince the SPDC to change the unfair National
Convention guidelines and principles that compelled the NLD to walk out in
1996. As the very first step, a viable ceasefire agreement must be
achieved on mutually acceptable terms. Amid many concerns and
uncertainties, some relevant examples of recent cease-fire agreements
between governments and armed opposition groups and their consequences may
offer useful lessons for our own.

Recently, the Indian government and a Tamil resistance group agreed to
hold talks. And there is also the cease-fire agreement recently signed
between the two warring factions in Sudan. In December 2001, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) expressed their willingness to
engage in talks with the then newly-formed Sri Lankan government, the
United National Front (UNF), by announcing a unilateral cease-fire. In
response to the ceasefire, the UNF government cautiously announced the
cessation of hostilities. Naturally, concerns were raised over the Tigers'
sincerity about and commitment to a cease-fire agreement. The LTTE
responded by extending the unilateral cease-fire until February 2002 to
seek a more positive response from the UNF government towards entering
into political negotiations. Eventually, both sides agreed to have foreign
monitors to oversee the process. After periods of intense clashes and
uncomfortable situations, the ceasefire between the LTTE and the UNF
Government came into effect. Both parties nevertheless recognized that a
final settlement to the ethnic conflict has yet to be implemented.

According to the principles enunciated in the Thimpu talks, Tamils were to
be recognized as a nation with a homeland and the right to
self-determination.  Although the two parties could not agree on the
condition upon which LTTE would become a separate state, they were
prepared to settle for a viable alternative to a separate Tamil state.
With the help of the international community, the parties came up with a
solution - a united Sri Lanka in which the Tamil aspirations for regional
autonomy would be respected. The cease-fire in Sri Lanka demonstrates that
third party intervention is necessary, whether it be local or
international -- and that it sould be absolutely up to the two parties in
question to decide whether and whom they invite as the third party. In the
case of Sri Lanka, both the government and LTTE specifically invited the
Norwegian government to mediate, and so it did. Most importantly, Sri
Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga's honesty and political courage
were vital to resolving the ethnic conflict and war between the government
and the LTTE.  She has acknowledged that, "international mediation is very
often useful in helping the two opposing sides to find new and creative
ways in which they can settle their problems in a manner that both sides
can gain." It is instructive to look at the current negotiation between
the KNU and SPDC in the light of these examples.

While the KNU agreed to relinquish its original demand to hold the talks
in Bangkok and go to Rangoon instead, it has proposed that international
observers be present at the talks. Unlike the UNF government in Sri Lanka,
the SPDC has refused to allow the presence of international observers, let
alone international intervention, in the negotiation process. Although
both sides agreed to hold talks inside Burma to maintain the country's
sovereignty in addressing its own problems, the presence of a third party
or international observers could, in fact, enhance the integrity of
negotiation process. As a matter of fact, international humanitarian
involvement - at least from "like-minded" countries such as Thailand,
Japan and Australia - would be necessary, if not essential, to the safe
return home of refugees and IDPs. It is in the best interest of the
Burmese regime as well as the KNU to invite the international community,
both governments and non-governmental organizations, to observe and help,
though not necessarily to intervene, in the process. Against all odds, the
KNU has made relentless efforts for peace in sending the high-level
delegation led by its Vice Chairman General Bo Mya to Rangoon in the hope
that a cease-fire agreement would significantly reduce forced relocation
and human rights violations in Karen villages and enable internally
displaced people to return to their homes and villages. As a first step in
proving its sincerity, the SPDC should demilitarize several Karen areas
and create conditions conducive to the Karen refugees' return home and
resettlement in their villages. After all, not only a deep reserve of
political will but also a vast amount of political acumen is highly
essential from all sides to resolve Burma's decades-long conflicts.

Undoubtedly the path towards national reconciliation is complex. It
requires all parties to take steps beyond cessation of fighting. Since
1948, a rigidly centralized state followed by military dominance in the
government has exacerbated ethnic tensions. For the Karens and other
ethnic nationalities of Burma, military-dominated unitary government is an
anathema; a genuine national dialogue inclusive of the forces of ethnic
nationalities and the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi is essential to finding
a feasible, acceptable and lasting alternative.
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LETTERS

Jan 28, International Herald Tribune
Isolating the regime in Myanmar is not the answer - David I. Steinberg

The opinion article by Senator Mitch McConnell and Bono ("A heroine of
democracy, left far too lonely," Views, Jan. 19) misses the point. Most of
the world would like to see the regime in Myanmar release the Nobel
laureate Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. We would like freedom for
political prisoners, the participation by all Burmese in the political
process and some form of democracy in Myanmar, previously known as Burma.
The issue, however, is not these goals, but finding the best way to
achieve them.

The United States has, in effect, called for the "unconditional surrender"
of the military regime - get out of office and then we will talk. Even in
war this can be a questionable means, but as a political and diplomatic
strategy it is doomed to failure.

Although U.S. sanctions and the freezing of Burmese assets, together with
the authors' wish to see tourism to Burma halted, may make some feel
morally superior, this is not a reason on which to base a foreign policy.

There are three main shortcomings to the approach advocated by McConnell
and Bono. First, direct confrontation and denigration of the regime in
Burma inevitably lead to its nationalistic response, as it would in any
country. The military government is forced to stand up to the United
States or any country in the face of such attacks. They make compromise
more, rather than less, difficult. Second, sanctions may hurt the regime,
but they will not bring about its demise. This is essentially a
pre-industrialized state that can limp along on its own. No neighboring
states, nor the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, approve of
sanctions against Burma. Sanctions and the lack of a tourist industry in
the end only hurt the hundreds of thousands of people who depend on jobs
related to foreign investment and travel. It helps to consider how
effective sanctions on Cuba have been.

Third, for the United States to base its policies on the status of a
single individual is a major error - whether that person be President
Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, Vladimir Putin of Russia, Prime Minister
Tony Blair of Britain or Aung San Suu Kyi. "Unwavering, uncompromising
international support," as the McConnell and Bono article advocates, will
further compound America's mistakes and prevent Washington from achieving
its goals. America did this with the shah of Iran, among others, in the
past.

McConnell and Bono call on Burma to be a top priority of the Bush
administration. U.S. policy toward Burma, in fact, is one of the lowest
priorities of all Asian countries, and nothing is going to change that, at
least until the presidential election in the United States. The perception
of America's national interests are too circumscribed and Washington is
too involved in other issues, such as terrorism. The U.S. has a one-track
foreign policy in Burma - human rights. That should be an element of any
U.S. policy, but it should be pursued in relation to a range of other U.S.
interests.

We need intelligent discourse on policy toward Burma. For now, there is a
lack of nuance, and substance is in short supply.

[David I. Steinberg is the Director of Asian Studies at the School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University.  This “letter to the editor” was
his response to an article that appeared on Jan 19, titled ("A heroine of
democracy, left far too lonely," by Senator Mitch McConnell and Bono. –
Ed]
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