TNI/BCN Report, ERROR

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Summary of Main Issues Arising from the Conference:

Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar)

14 – 15 December 2003
Amsterdam, TNI - BCN


Background

The Transnational Institute (TNI) and the Burma Centre Netherlands (BCN)
jointly started a project on “Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar)” early
last year. The project aims to strengthen Burmese civil society groups,
political opposition and ethnic groups in developing alternatives for the
current repressive drug control policies; and to stimulate national and
local authorities and the international community to rethink their drugs
eradication strategies in line with a coherent approach to development,
national reconciliation and democracy building in the country.

The main activity in 2003 was an international conference, convened in
December in Amsterdam, to discuss the dilemmas for drug policy responses
in Burma. In preparation for this conference a research mission was
undertaken in September to the Thai/Burma border, to Rangoon, and into the
Wa hills in Shan State. The mission visited groups in armed opposition,
met with civil society organisations, had extensive discussions with
ceasefire groups; talked to drug control officials of the military
government in Rangoon; spoke with UNODC representatives in the capital and
local staff of the Wa Alternative Development Project, and visited
villages dependent on poppy cultivation.

The key findings from the research mission were presented in a special
conference issue in the TNI Drugs & Conflict booklet series, written by
the project team: Martin Jelsma of the TNI Drugs & Democracy Programme,
Pietje Vervest of the TNI Asia Programme and BCN, and Tom Kramer,
Burma/Myanmar expert working for the project as a consulant. The booklet
was launched at the conference in Amsterdam and distributed widely
–English and Spanish edition- among the international drugs policy
community and the Burma-involved groups and policy makers. It provides
background on the opium economy, the ceasefire agreements, the involvement
of various ethnic groups as well as the SPDC with the drugs trade, the
impact on farmers of the opium bans and the different international policy
approaches towards Burma. The booklet can be downloaded in pdf format from
www.tni.org/drugs

Based on the discussions we had and on the expertise gathered over the
years in the field of drugs and conflict, the publication highlighted the
unfolding drama in Shan State caused by the opium bans. Enforcement of
tight deadlines in the Wa special region will result in major food
shortages and may jeopardise the fragile social stability in the areas.
The conclusions in the booklet call for a more humane option by
simultaneously easing of drug control deadline pressures and increased
international humanitarian aid efforts. It also calls for strategies to
include the voices of the opium farmers themselves in the debate on
international assistance to drug eradication policies. Local communities
in drug growing areas, or their representatives, have not been able to
participate in any of the decision-making processes of anti-drugs
strategies that have such a tremendous impact on their livelihoods.
The Conference

The Conference on 14/15 December 2003 was a unique gathering, the first
one bringing some of the opium farmers’ voices out, behind closed doors to
ensure frank and open discussion. Invited were some 50 participants,
including around 20 people from Burma –from both ceasefire regions and
exile groups-, international experts on the drug issue, Burma support
groups and representatives from European Ministries and development NGOs.
The conference aimed to identify problems related to current drug control
efforts and to specify policy proposals for a more humane drugs policy.

The event opened with an introduction by TNI director Fiona Dove who
opened the floor to four keynote speeches: Adrian Cowell, whose brilliant
documentary The Opium Convoys was also screened during the conference,
spoke on Opium Anarchy: The Shan Opium Trade and the War on Drugs; Chao
Tzang Yawnghwe spoke on Civil war and drugs in Burma: Political impacts of
the illicit economy; Tom Kramer (consultant for the TNI/BCN project) on
Ethnic conflict in Burma and the dilemma’s for international engagement;
and Jeremy Milsom (UNODC) on The Long Hard Road out of Drugs: The Case of
the Wa.

The first panel debate, chaired by Rita Gebert, provided a fascinating
panorama of local views and experiences from the opium regions, with
Saengtjuen Sarawin (S.H.A.N), Daniel Aung (Lahu) and several other
speakers talking from exile as well as from inside perspectives; some,
working and living in Shan and Kachin State, prefer for that reason their
names not to be listed in the report.

A second panel, chaired by Martin Jelsma (TNI) provided the bigger
international context, with Christoph Berg, Natalie Bartelt and Dunja
Brede, three representatives from the German GTZ Development-oriented Drug
Control Programme presenting the new “Drugs and Conflict” discussion
paper, and Alain Labrousse (former OGD) drawing parallels with the Taleban
opium ban in 2000 in Afghanistan. The speaker from Colombia, Ricardo
Vargas, unfortunately had to cancel at the last moment; Colombian lessons
from the drugs and conflict nexus will appear in the book based on the
conference papers to be published later in 2004.

On the second day, chaired by Brid Brennan (TNI) regional perspectives
were provided by Don Pathan (The Nation, Bangkok) on Thailand; Soe Myint
(Mizzima, New Delhi) on India; and Guilhem Fabre (University of Le Havre)
spoke on The Black Hole of China White, illuminating the largely unknown
role of China as a drugs market and as the main regional power in the Shan
State.

The full afternoon was devoted to an open-minded debate, chaired by Pietje
Vervest (TNI/BCN) and Adrian Cowell, on some of the controversial issues
on the table: policy dilemmas around drugs control, sanctions and
humanitarian aid, and moving the discussion towards formulating a more
humane drugs policy. Introductory remarks were given by Aung Moe Zaw
(NCUB), Jeremy Milsom (UNODC), and Chao Tzang Yawnghwe. The key questions
addressed were:

Will the Kokang 2002 and Wa 2005 opium ban effectively put a end to opium
production in these regions, or will it trigger a humanitarian disaster in
northern Shan State, forcing farmers to go back to opium production? Are
there possibilities for the international community to provide more
assistance directly to the poppy growing communities, given the heated
debate around the sanctions aimed to isolate the military government in
Rangoon? The international community has largely ignored developments in
the cease-fire areas; should a specific approach to these regions be
designed? Can Alternative Development projects contribute to peace and
democracy building? In Burma there are no civil society organisations
representing for instance poppy farmers; how can their interests and their
proposals best be brought to the international community? What could be
guiding principles for a future drugs policy in Burma?

Summary of Main Issues Arising from the Conference

The “Drug” and the Narco-Economy:

There has been a demonization of opium which has by association demonized
the people who cultivate the poppy.  Therefore, it seems the “war on
drugs” (i.e., repressive drug policies) is always waged on farmers. 
There’s a need to “shift the battleground!”

There needs to be a differentiation made between opium and ATS (and other
chemical drugs on which farmers do not depend for their livelihoods).
Whereas opium growing is about poverty, ATS production is about greed.

There are widespread and extremely negative linkages which spring from the
narco-economy:  associations between weapons and drugs (violence/conflict
issue), money laundering (further entrenching position of those who have
vested interests in the black economy), etc.

Opium eradication is also used as an excuse to use (military- and/or
militia-sponsored) violence against ethnic minority farmers.  The
narco-economy is closely linked with the suppression of farmers.

The Producers: Erosion of Livelihoods

There has been both a gradual, and now with opium bans, dramatic erosion
of rural highland livelihood bases.  This actual erosion of livelihood
base is combined in certain areas with major threats to livelihood which
have serious human rights implications, that is, confiscation of land
(insecure land tenure) and forced relocation.

In short, basic needs are not now being met for a majority of
opium-producing highland families:  how will the situation be when there
is a sudden and dramatic decline in opium production (foreseeable with the
enforcement of the bans). There is every reason for great anxiety about a
looming humanitarian crisis.

Farming families are heavily taxed (opium, rice taxes are the norm, even
for those who have deficits in both commodities!) which also contributes
to their uncertain livelihood base. Among many serious implications of a
severely eroded rural livelihood base, would be curtailed schooling for
children, increased health problems related among others to malnutrition,
greater labour migration into areas and settings where there are even
greater health/social risks, including risks of addiction and HIV/AIDS
(logging camps, mines, hotels/casinos, brothels).
Reaching Farmers:

It is not just a question of “reaching” farmers with assistance, it is an
issue of empowering them in order to build up civil society. But what are
the mechanisms available to the international development community to do
this? With whom is it possible to cooperate? Who has the legitimacy to be
an intermediary between the development community and the affected
peoples?

Clearly not the military government. The ceasefire groups, however, are
too easily portrayed as allies of the SPDC and drug traffickers. See for
example the inclusion of the UWSA on the US kingpin list. Developments in
the ceasefire areas are ignored, including the slowly opening
possibilities for local and international NGOs to operate in these
regions. Community based organisations, including church and religious
groups, can provide other channels.

The Local Consumers:

Highland villages in some areas already have opium, heroin (notably Kachin
State) and ATS users and addicts.  In certain areas there is injecting
drug use and very high rates of HIV/AIDS infection.  Local bans on opium
production may cause some addicts turn to other substances including
heroin and ATS (depending on price and availability), which could lead to
increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection.

It shouldn’t be forgotten that some producers are also consumers. This has
implications for development assistance, which should include HIV/AIDS
prevention and drug treatment. Demand reduction and treatment policies of
local and national authorities are highly repressive, including practices
of rounding up addicts, forced treatment, prison sentences for small
possession, etc. Drugs and Development assistance, including UNODC
projects, should also have the task to educate about and implement
non-repressive assistance to problem users.

Politics and Drugs:

Is there no “drug solution” possible without a political solution? What is
required here is some more ‘outside-the-box’ thinking, the question as it
stands is a false dilemma. A ‘solution’ for the ‘drugs problem’ is
difficult to conceive under any political circumstances. Still many
victims of repressive drug policies, farmers and consumers, can be helped
and many problems related to drug use, addiction and HIV infection can be
alleviated and reduced.

How genuine is the political will of the SPDC and ceasefire groups in
particular to stop drug production and trade, on which they in part
economically depend?  Is it all just a cynical ploy to curry international
favour and gain recognition? Still, should they be pressured –through
sanctions and decertification- to become more sincere in implementing a
repressive approach? Such pressure has mainly led to more military
eradication campaigns and forced relocations.

A political solution is most probably needed in order to ensure the
sustainability of drugs control and development efforts. In this
connection, are current alternative development projects just band-aids or
piecemeal efforts with no chance of sustainability? Can the UNODC Wa
project do more under current circumstances than provide basic
humanitarian assistance to villages that have been forced to abandon
opium, so only try to soften the devastating impact of the ban?
The conflict in the Shan State has always been connected with the opium
economy –the screening of Adrian Cowell’s documentary reminded the
conference vividly. But the links between these Shan State dynamics and
the global, transnational billion dollar illicit drug industry are often
oversimplified. Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and trafficking networks
still seem to be the foremost commercial beneficiaries and the engines
that have driven the illicit economies of Southeast Asia.

One key responsibility that lies with the SPDC is the fact that its
economic policy caused many in Burma to become dependent on the informal
parallel economy including the illicit or black parts based on drug
trafficking to, and contrabands from neighbouring countries. Many of those
actively engaged in the drug-contraband market were protected by,
befriended with or directly connected to the successive military regimes.

Humane Drug Policy:

What are the elements of a humane drug policy for Burma?  In developing
such a policy, how to ensure that the views of the most affected producers
(and consumers) are included? There is a need for an international voice
and lobby work on drugs policy on Burma from the point of view of the most
affected people. Obviously, human rights need to be properly considered in
every context, including the drug control context.

One element of a humane drugs policy would be to allow farmers to continue
small scale production to meet their basic needs, and especially if there
are (elderly/sick) addicts in the household. More gradual reduction
schemes for both supply and demand are basic conditions in order to allow
economic or substance dependent people to adapt in a humane manner. How to
ensure that “harm reduction” is included on both sides of the supply and
demand side equations?

China:

With its big impact on the border areas’ licit and illicit economies, its
expanding opiates consumption market, and its ongoing influence with some
of the ceasefire groups, China is a major stakeholder (player) in shaping
northeastern Burma’s overall drug situation.  There is clearly a need to
involve China in the dialogue, but what would be effective mechanisms
available to do this?

Recommendations for Follow-up

Forum for Discussion:  Moving the Debate Forward

The issue at hand is important, affecting the lives of many thousands of
families.  Therefore, there is a need for additional, open discussion
forums such as another conference like this one (eventually with
resolutions), with an even more inclusive group of people to attend.
Representatives from ceasefire areas and NGOs working inside the country
were considered important players to become more involved in a next
meeting. The important contributions to the debates at the Amsterdam
conference coming from inside the country were highly appreciated.

Several options were discussed in terms of possible next steps to take:
one or two closed workshops gathering representatives of ceasefire groups
and local and international NGOs and development agencies working in these
regions, and subsequently another international conference to bring
together the workshop outcomes and to try to reach a common agenda and
lobby points around issues such as key components of a more humane drug
policy for Burma, viable options for humanitarian aid and community
development in areas affected by the bans, international strategies
vis-à-vis the ceasefire regions and non-ceasefire groups, and necessary
framework conditions for stronger international involvement (UN,
bilateral, NGO) in the drugs and development field. In this process,
taking the drugs issue as an entrance has the potential to open up
dialogue opportunities on adjacent policy issues and to grow beyond the
divisive dilemma whether a political solution should come first, or
whether assistance should go in now for humanitarian reasons but also to
enhance peace, democracy and civil society building.

More immediate steps to be facilitated by the conference organisers, are:

Conference report. After the current summary of the main points and
recommendations, TNI and BCN will edit the main inputs given by speakers
into a full conference report, most likely to be published as a book in
Thailand.

Follow-up mission. To avoid losing the dynamic created by the conference,
already in February talks will be scheduled in Thailand and Burma to
further explore the ideas mentioned and to set in motion the first
concrete steps.

Draft Guideline Document. To stimulate the discussion about basic elements
of a more humane drug policy for Burma, a debate paper will be elaborated
based on comments made during the conference and on similar discussions
that have taken place elsewhere in which TNI has been actively
participating.

Chinese edition. In order to report back to the Wa region and to
facilitate the inclusion of Chinese comments and views in the follow-up
process, a Chinese language edition of the Drugs & Conflict debate paper
written for the conference and some of the other conference papers will be
considered.

BCN & TNI, Amsterdam, January 2004

For more information:
mjelsma at tni.org