BurmaNet News, August 17, 2005

[Editor]

August 17, 2005 Issue # 2784


INSIDE BURMA
Narinjara News: Perks to join the Burmese Army
Irrawaddy: Keeping the censors sweet
SHAN: Phoney surrender in the wind

BUSINESS / MONEY
Xinhua: Myanmar encourages local traders to sell more gems in next emporium

REGIONAL
Nation: Davao to host Asean tourism forum

INTERNATIONAL
Irrawaddy: Wrangle prolongs allocation of Unocal payout

OPINION / OTHER
Irrawaddy: A win-win-win proposition for Thaksin
Irrawaddy: The upturned chair

____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

August 17, Narinjara News
Perks to join the Burmese Army

The Burmese army is providing incentives of 10,000 kyats (about $10) and
two 50 kilograms rice bags to new recruits. This is due to low interest in
joining the Army in Burma.

“At the recruitment center in Dewan Rao in Akyab, one can get 10,000 kyats
and two bags of rice if he goes and joins the army. But sometimes it is
only one bag of rice” says a youth from Akyab.

Even with the incentives, there has not been much show of interest from
Arakanese youths.

The same youth from Akyab continues, “Though the economic condition is
pretty dire, most try to work as much as they can in whatever job they can
get. They don’t want to join the Burmese army. There are some who don’t
see any other option, and face some difficulties such as failing the exams
etc. But most of them are from the rural areas.”

Before the 1988 Uprising, new recruits had to be at least five feet two
inches, with at least a primary school pass, good health, and aged between
18 and 30. Now however, the new recruits do not have to have an education,
nor meet a standard requirement for height, health or age. Children are
allowed into the army, although they are kept at regional postings rather
than in the cities.

The regional military authority in Arakan State is organizing recruitment
detachments to visit rural areas to attract new soldiers from the remote
villages.

The local Arakanese people are commenting that in fact the military junta
is intentionally making unemployment high so that more recruits can be
enticed into the army.

Due to the low number of new recruits, the soldiers who want to retire
from the services have to get two new recruits in their place, says a
retired army officer.

In the 1990s, economic difficulties in Arakan State resulted in many youth
joining the Burmese Army, hence a quarter of the Burmese Army currently is
Arakanese.

____________________________________

August 17, Irrawaddy
Keeping the censors sweet - Clive Parker

Bribery is a part of everyday life for Burma’s press


>From the outside, the three-story building at number six is as nondescript

as the other houses and businesses on Wingabar Road just outside downtown
Rangoon. Inside, however, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division
headquarters stands out from the majority of the capital’s Spartan offices
and government departments because of its abundant furniture and
electrical appliances.

“The PSRD office is lavishly decorated, even the toilet,” said one regular
visitor, a journalist who requested anonymity.

A closer look at the DVD players, televisions, stereos and furniture that
fill the building reveals small identification tags, each with the name of
a leading Burma publication. The labels allow Burma’s censorship board to
keep track of the journals that have paid up in full—each appliance and
piece of furniture is a mandatory bribe.

“If a new journal is approved for publication it has to give some
‘donation’ to the office,” the journalist says.

This, however, is just the beginning of a process that costs the Burmese
media thousands of dollars every year in what is often described as an
“unofficial tax.” Each editorial submission must be made by filling out an
application listing every news article at a charge of about US $1 per
form. PSRD employees also expect regular sweeteners—a new flask, coffee
maker or rice cooker—to keep the censorship process ticking over,
journalists in Rangoon say.

But while most government departments are susceptible to the kind of
bribery that undermines the rigid policies in Burma—a country which ranks
in the top five most corrupt in the world—the PSRD cannot allow the press
more editorial leeway, regardless of the price. The repercussions would be
too severe for the recently appointed head censor, retired Maj Tint Swe,
and his team.

“Bribing only helps to have your journal edited faster,” says the
journalist. “It does not help sensitive stories pass.”

Burma’s leading sports publications use this method to ensure that reports
of the evening’s big match are available first thing in the morning, a
factor which has helped magazines dedicated to football become the highest
selling in the country.

Not paying these additional bribes can mean a delay of a few days. When
the PSRD took the last of Burma’s newspapers, The Myanmar Times, under its
wing in November 2004, the paper was forced to move its deadline forward
two days to allow the censors sufficient time before publication. With the
former head censor of the newspaper, Brig-Gen Thein Swe, in jail as a
high-ranking member of the disbanded Military Intelligence, The Myanmar
Times was suddenly forced to deal with the PSRD. As its editors soon
acknowledged, bribery was going to become a fact of life.

With all of Burma’s written press now under its jurisdiction, the PSRD has
an even greater stranglehold on Burma’s media and access to the country’s
richest publication—The  Myanmar Times charges advertising rates up to 10
times higher than competing journals and receives considerable funding
from the Tokyo-based Sasakawa Foundation.

Not surprisingly, a censorship board in the ascendancy is bad news for
Burma’s already much-maligned press. With the long serving Maj Aye Tun
also purged for his links to MI in May, Burma’s publications now have to
deal with a man who another Rangoon-based journalist describes as “a lot
smarter than the last one.” Maj Tint Swe, who writes for a military
strategy journal and First Eleven, a sports publication, under the
pseudonym Ye Yint Tint Swe, is a tougher character than his predecessor,
Burmese journalists say, because he catches the tricks used to try to
sneak information through the process.

At the beginning of July, retired Maj Tint Swe plugged the gaps in Burma’s
censorship guidelines, announcing that opinion pieces would no longer be
tolerated and there could no longer be any criticism of China, India or
Asean. Natural disasters will only be reported on if it serves “the
interests of the nation,” according to the revised rules.

Burma’s Press Scrutiny and Registration Division declined repeated
invitations to respond to the information in this article.

____________________________________

August 17, Shan Herald Agency for News
Phoney surrender in the wind

Both business and ceasefire circles in northern Shan State have recently
been chatting about another possible "exchange of arms for peace" ceremony
by an ex-ceasefire officer, reports Mao Mao from the border:

The subject of their talks is Mao Liang, a former officer with the rank of
first lieutenant in the Shan State Army "North". He was driven from Muse
on the Chinese border to Lashio 110 miles away on Friday, 12 August, to
attend a meeting with Maj-Gen Myint Hlaing, Commander of Northeastern
Region Command, to discuss arrangements for the ceremony, said sources.

"The general idea is for him to lead some 20 men hired by Sai Htun Aye
(top businessman in Muse who is reputedly close to Gen Myint Hlaing) and
submit arms provided also by him to the regional commander," said a
businesswoman from Muse, opposite China's Ruili.

Mao Liang will be getting 10 million kyat ($ 10,000) for his role,
according to the sources.

It is not yet known where the ceremony is to take place, between Muse and
Lashio.

The last one had taken place in Lashio on 23 July, when 119 men led by Sai
Ku, acting commander of 6th Brigade, Shan State National Army, the group
that had already terminated truce after almost 10 years, and Sai Yi, a
former officer from the SSA "North".

"Actually, Sai Ku had less than 40 men," said an SSNA officer, whose main
group has long since joined the anti-Rangoon SSA "South" of Col Yawdserk.
"The rest were furnished to Sai Yee by Sai Htun Aye."

Sai Yi, 50, not to be confused with Col Sai Yi, leader of the SSNA, is a
native of Nawngkham, a village between Zegao and Ruili across the border.
A former member of the Communist Party of Burma, he later joined the SSA
"North", switching afterwards to Kyaw Myint's Namkham based Panhsay
militia force and then to Bo Mon's Tangyan-based Manpang militia force, Bo
Mon is a business partner of Sai Htun Aye.

Sai Htun Aye, 40, also known as Sai Htun Aye "Soso-pyay-pyay" by the name
of his hotel in Mandalay, rose to prominence following the Burma Army's
operation against Mongkoe Defense Army in 2000 when his insider
information had led to the Burma Army's victory. The Burma Army's
attacking forces were then led by a brigadier general named Myint Hlaing.

On 16 June, Sai Htun Aye's Yueliendao (Moonshine Island) casino on the Mao
was closed and himself arrested after a joint Sino-Burmese raid uncovered
an arms cache and an undisclosed amount of drugs. Two days later, he was
set free. "And since 23 July, after Sai Yi's 'surrender', his casino is
the only one in operation along the border," said a disgruntled gambler.

Most casinos along the Sino-Burma border have gone out of business after
Beijing placed restrictions on its countrymen early in the year followed
by Rangoon's crackdown on casinos on the Chinese border.

Sources however are unable to find out the rationale behind the plan.
"Perhaps what the generals want is a demoralizing effect it will likely
result among the members of the SSA 'North'," reasons an SSA 'South'
commander. "It is part of their stratagem to bring the North to its
knees."

____________________________________
BUSINESS / MONEY

August 17, Xinhua General News Service
Myanmar encourages local traders to sell more gems in next emporium

Yangon: Myanmar is encouraging national gem traders to sell more quality
gems, jade, pearl and jewelry at a state-sponsored gems show planned for
October, reiterating that the foreign exchange proceeds will be designated
as legal export earning.

The 14th Mid-Year Gems Emporium will be held as in the previous years on
the basis of competitive bidding, according to the state- run Myanmar Gems
Enterprise (MGE) Wednesday, which is the sponsor of the show.

Mid-year gems emporium was introduced in addition to the annual ones since
1992 to boost the country's foreign exchange earning.

Hundreds of foreign gem traders from across the world, especially from
China's Hong Kong, Thailand and Japan, are being expected to join the
event as before.

In the last nine-day gems emporium in March this year, which was the 42nd
annual one, 29 million US dollars worth of locally- produced quality gems,
jade, pearl and jewelry were put on sale in the presence of nearly 600
merchants from 25 countries and regions.

According to the MGE, Myanmar produced about 5,000 tons of jade and an
average of about 118 million dollars worth of them were sold alone
annually in the whole country.

Meanwhile, to expand the gem market and boost foreign exchange earning,
Myanmar has introduced special jade and gem sale in June since last year,
adding to the annual and mid-year events traditionally held in March and
October respectively.

Myanmar started to hold gem shows annually in 1964 and since then the
country has earned a total of over 500 million dollars from all such
events.

Myanmar, a well-known producer of gems in the world, possesses nine gems
-- ruby, diamond, cat's eye, emerald, topaz, pearl, sapphire, coral and a
variety of garnet tinged with yellow.

There are three famous gem lands in Myanmar -- Mogok in Mandalay division,
Mongshu in Shan state and Phakant in Kachin state.

To develop gem mining industry, Myanmar enacted the New Gemstone Law in
1995, allowing national entrepreneurs to mine, produce, transport and sell
finished gemstone and manufactured jewelry at home and abroad.

Since 2000, the government has started mining of gems and jade in joint
venture with 10 private companies under profit sharing basis.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

August 17, The Nation
Davao to host Asean tourism forum - Suchat Sritama

The city of Davao in the Philippines will host the Asean Tourism Forum
(ATF) next year following Burma's decision not to host the meeting in
Rangoon due to political pressure.

An official announcement of the decision will be made this week by the
Philippines' Department of Tourism secretary, Joseph H Durano, who will
visit Davao on Saturday.

The Burmese government decided to forego the Asean chairmanship next year
after some Asean dialogue partners - notably the United States and the
European Union - implied that they would not participate in the Asean
meetings if Burma was the host country.

An executive from the ATF working group said the forum in Davao would
follow the same programme as that prepared for Burma. However, there was
no confirmation on whether Navitas Management, which was appointed as the
event organiser for the Rangoon ATF, would organise the event in the
Philippines.

Another source close to the department said it was very likely that TTG
Media would be assigned the task. The Singapore exhibition organiser was
reportedly short-listed to organise the ATF in Davao in 2007. When asked
how much work was needed before the event, the executive replied: "A lot."

The city of Davao has 3,000 hotel rooms, including budget accommodation
and that in the mid-range category. The ATF requires about 1,500 rooms for
delegates.

The city is also looking for an 11,000-square-metre venue for the Asean
travel exchange, Travex, a main event at the ATF. A tourist official in
Davao said a possible venue for the exhibition would be the Central Bank
Convention Hall.

Davao - located in the southern part of Mindanao Island - was originally
selected to host the ATF in 2007.

It is still possible that Rangoon will be allowed to host the ATF in 2007
in place of Davao.

The ATF is one of region's biggest tourism events. The meeting will be
attended by 10 Asean tourism ministers along with a number of private
operators, who will discuss business opportunities as well as tourism
development in Asean countries.

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

August 17, Irrawaddy
Wrangle prolongs allocation of Unocal payout - Clive Parker

A dispute over representatives’ fees is delaying the allocation of
Unocal’s multi-million dollar settlement to the alleged victims of human
rights abuses suffered during construction of Burma’s Yadana gas pipeline,
sources close to the case say.

More than eight years after the landmark case was first heard, all parties
will return to the Los Angeles courtroom on September 15 because the
Bangkok-based Federation of Trade Unions Burma is unhappy with the fees it
is due to be paid from the settlement, which is reported to total US $30
million. The exact figure has not been disclosed as part of an agreement
between both sides.

Those representing the 15 plaintiffs under the assumed names John Doe I
and John Roe III—the FTUB, Earth Rights International, International
Rights Labor Fund and their lawyers—were due to be reimbursed for expenses
incurred in fighting the case. However, those involved say the general
secretary of the FTUB, Maung Maung, is demanding higher fees, meaning the
funds are now frozen until the dispute is settled.

“The process was a fair process under which people documented their hours
and expenses and were reimbursed accordingly. Only the FTUB sought to get
an arbitrary and large amount of money,” said a lawyer representing the
four John Doe plaintiffs who requested anonymity until the dispute has
been settled.

“I view this as a completely frivolous, bad faith effort by the Federation
of Trade Unions of Burma to try and extract money from this settlement
process,” he added.

Representing the FTUB, Maung Maung had also made “outrageous demands” to
sign the non-disclosure agreement on the total amount of the settlement,
the lawyer said, a request the plaintiffs and their representatives
refused.

A representative of Earth Rights International, Ka Saw Wa, told The
Irrawaddy that allocation of the funds had been stalled because of the
dispute: “A complication is the plaintiffs already agreed and signed the
final settlement, but one of the FTUB people did not sign it—his name is
Maung Maung—he did not sign the settlement agreement because he does not
agree with a term of the settlement,” he said, refusing to say whether
money was the sticking point.

The FTUB claims it has a problem with one clause of the agreement stating
that no part of the payout can be given to political parties or armed
groups, Ka Saw Wa said. Those involved in the case accuse Maung Maung of
using this tactic so that the agreement will have to be renegotiated,
which will provide the FTUB with an opportunity to demand a bigger cut.

“They [FTUB] are going to ask the court to change the terms [of the
agreement],” Ka Saw Wa said.

Maung Maung and the FTUB were unavailable for comment.

Those involved in the case say they do not know how long the dispute will
take to settle, although they hope the funds will not have to be returned
to Unocal, which may delay the process further.

The plaintiffs—who include a woman whose baby died from burns in 1994
after a Tatmadaw (Burmese armed forces) soldier allegedly kicked them both
into an open fire—have already been waiting five months for the settlement
to be distributed.

The payout was finally agreed on March 21 this year in what was considered
a major victory by human rights campaigners. Unocal had managed to avoid
the case going to court by contesting the plaintiffs’ allegations on
technical grounds for eight years until September 2004 when a judge
finally ruled the oil company could be held accountable for its actions in
Burma under the US Alien Tort Claims Act.

Both sides then agreed an out-of-court settlement to be split three ways
between the 15 plaintiffs, those representing the group—including the
FTUB—and the villagers affected by Tatmadaw rights abuses during
construction of the Yadana pipeline in Tennasserim division.

For its part, Unocal—which was taken over by Chevron Corporation on August
10—says it is not involved in how much the plaintiff’s representatives
will receive and maintains it did nothing wrong during construction of the
controversial pipeline.

The company’s general manager of public relations and communications,
Michael Thacher, told the Irrawaddy: “We have helped improve the lives of
more than 40,000 people working and living in the pipeline region through
improved healthcare, education, and employment opportunities.”

_____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

August 17, Irrawaddy
A win-win-win proposition for Thaksin - Thitinan Pongsudhirak

If the Thai prime minister adopted a more principled stance on Burma, it
would improve Thailand’s image

His critics and detractors notwithstanding, Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra can not be accused of passivity. He is famously bold and
pro-active in his domestic dealings, having monopolized Thailand’s
political space with virtual authoritarian rule, and implemented a raft of
populist policies that have earned him an unprecedented second term for an
elected leader. What Thaksin has done at home has been mirrored by his
foreign policy activism. The Thai leader has devised a foreign policy
platform that revolves around a clutch of regional initiatives,
underpinned by the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Ayeyarwady-Chao
Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy and a series of strategic
bilateral free-trade agreements. His audacity in past foreign relations
included his swift military response to the arson and looting of the Thai
embassy in Phnom Penh in January 2003. Thaksin’s assertive-ness can also
be seen in his defiance of past human rights criticisms by the UN and the
US State Department. “The UN,” he once blustered, “is not my father.”

Yet when it comes to Thailand’s relations with Burma—an issue on which
Thaksin’s centralized and personalized foreign policy platform pivots—the
self-styled “CEO Prime Minister” has been conspicuously timid. Thailand’s
Burma policy under Thaksin has been characterized by accommodation and
appeasement, at times bordering on flattery. It has rendered “constructive
engagement” completely elastic in accordance with the preferences of the
State Peace and Development Council, Burma’s ruling military regime.
Whatever the SPDC wants, the Thaksin government seems willing to comply.
For a nationalist leader who has told off the UN and the US, Thaksin has
uncharacteristically kowtowed to the SPDC’s whims, letting Bangkok play
second fiddle to Rangoon.

When the SPDC snubbed Thailand’s roadmap for domestic political
reconciliation and reform early last year and came up with its own
seven-point roadmap, the Thaksin government’s lame excuse was that its
initiative was set up to “show a way forward” for the junta. When Gen Khin
Nyunt, the former Burmese prime minister, was purged from the SPDC’s
hierarchy in October 2004, the Thaksin government readily accepted its
counterpart’s official explanation of corruption and graft. Gen Khin
Nyunt’s downfall, in fact, bankrupted Thaksin’s hitherto bilateral
relationship with Burma, which centered on cordial ties between the
respective leaders of both countries. As Thaksin had invested substantial
diplomatic energy and resources in cultivating ties with Khin Nyunt, the
latter’s demise was disastrous for Thailand’s Burma policy. It also
exposed the myopia and fundamental flaws of Thaksin’s personalized
diplomacy. More recently, when the dumbfounded SPDC implicitly blamed
Thailand as a sanctuary for the unknown perpetrators of the bomb blasts
that convulsed Rangoon last May, Thaksin’s wimpish reply was that Thailand
“does not harbor terrorism.” His government failed to launch an official
protest against the SPDC’s blatant accusation.

In effect, Thaksin’s Burma policy is a manifest failure. The overstretched
constructive engagement with Rangoon has cost Thailand considerable
political capital in its international standing. It has also hindered
Thailand’s role in Asean, whose principal members have recently called for
political dialogue in Burma between the military government and the
civilian-led opposition, the National League for Democracy. Indeed,
despite being the regional organization’s frontline state, Thailand missed
the boat on Asean’s strengthened position vis-a-vis Rangoon. The SPDC’s
recent decision to forgo the rotating chairmanship of Asean was much more
a result of the collective pressure from Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Singapore than from Thailand.

In an era when Thailand’s national interest is entwined with the vested
interests of its prime minister’s family-owned businesses, Thaksin’s
spongy Burma policy is not surprising. The Shin telecommunications
conglomerate currently has a stake in Burma’s sole internet service
provider, with wide-ranging satellite interests in the pipeline. Thus when
Thaksin deals with the SPDC, it is difficult to demarcate where his
family’s telecom interests end and where Thailand’s national interest
begins.

The SPDC’s recent diplomatic retreat on the Asean chairmanship is likely
to affect the fluctuating geopolitical dynamics of South and Southeast
Asia. Although Burma may now be nudged closer to China’s embrace, with
India as a rival suitor, Asean has staked its position. For Thailand to
play a leading role befitting its frontline status, akin to its efforts
vis-a-vis Cambodia throughout the 1980s, it needs to firm up its Burma
policy. If Thailand’s firmer posture elicits constructive changes in
Rangoon, Bangkok will earn international credibility. If nothing changes
in Rangoon, the international community will still respect Thailand. A
more principled stance on Burma would also allow Thaksin to keep the
domestic criticisms of his conflicts of interest at bay. This is a
win-win-win proposition that would enhance Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart
Sathirathai’s bid to be the next UN secretary general. It would also
elevate Thaksin’s statesmanship and international stature in his stumbling
but ongoing quest for regional leadership.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak is assistant professor of international political
economy, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

_____________________________________

August 17, Irrawaddy
The upturned chair - Aung Zaw

Did Burma’s Asean move hide an ulterior motive?

Burma is full of ironies. One surfaced at the recent Asean annual meeting
in Laos, where a sigh of relief could be heard at the announcement that
Burma would renounce its chairmanship of the bloc in 2006. The irony is
that when Burma was welcomed into Asean in 1997, member governments
thought they would be able to tame the generals and persuade them to
accept social and political reforms. A bonus was offered by the
possibility of plucking Burma out of China’s sphere of influence.

This year, however, Asean foreign ministers wanted Burma to forgo the
controversial Asean chairmanship. When it did, they were pleased. But
didn’t Asean want Burma on board in order to foster movements there
towards democracy? Why was it still not suitable for chairmanship?

If a critical look is taken at Burma’s decision to defer the Asean
chairmanship, an ulterior motive can be discerned. Asean governments, and
their lawmakers, began to speak out this year on the issue of Burma and
the unlawful detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, aware that the US and EU had
announced they would boycott Asean meetings if Burma took up the
chairmanship in 2006. The junta made a careful and calculated decision. It
knew full well that by compromising with Asean partners it had nothing to
lose.

If the junta possessed the political will to achieve much needed national
reconciliation and democratic reform, as it claims, it should by now have
released Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and begun the political
reform process. Burma could then have gracefully taken up the Asean
chairmanship. But it didn’t; instead, it chose to renounce the
chairmanship. It was easier for the regime to give up the chairmanship
than to adopt reforms and release Suu Kyi. Why? Because the junta is not
willing to countenance change.

In any case, Burma is not losing valuable friends because of its
intransigence.

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, who was to have stayed on to attend
the Asean regional forum on security in Laos, skipped the meeting and went
to Rangoon instead. Three other foreign ministers—from the US, Japan and
India—also failed to attend.

Advancing as an excuse for his absence from the Asean meeting the fact
that he had never visited Burma, the Chinese foreign minister flew to
Rangoon to meet Burma’s paramount leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe. Li Zhaoxing’s
unexpected trip to Rangoon was intriguing but it also created some
uneasiness among top diplomats back in Laos. China comforting Burma—is
that what Asean envisions or wants?

Though no official announcement was made on the trip, there were two
different versions of Li Zhaoxing’s meeting with Than Shwe.  One is that
China, as an important ally of Burma’s, offered sympathy and moral support
to the regime after it had made the delicate decision to renounce the
Asean chairmanship. Some diplomatic sources in Rangoon suggested that Li
Zhaoxing had had a constructive meeting with Than Shwe. He is said to have
even encouraged Burma to adapt international norms and to have impressed
on the junta leader the need to free Suu Kyi. Diplomatic sources in
Bangkok suggested Li’s visit had more to do with Japan’s bid to join the
UN Security Council. China wanted Burma to oppose it.

No one, however, seemed to know the exact nature of the meeting.

If China were to proffer advice to Than Shwe, he may choose to ignore it,
even though Beijing remains Rangoon’s most important ally. Local news
reports in Rangoon note that Burma and China are striving to reach a
targeted annual bilateral trade volume of US $1.5 billion. China
increasingly dominates the Burmese market. So, despite western sanctions
(the US has just renewed trade sanctions) the generals will undoubtedly
survive.

Whether or not Burma is chairman of Asean, the US maintains its critical
stance towards the regime. At the Asean meeting in Laos US Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick went so far as to compare the Burma
situation to cancer.

“Countries that have political problems like this would actually become a
problem for the rest of us,” Zoellick told a news conference. “It creates
cancer within the society that has a danger of spreading,” he said, in the
company of Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win and other Asean foreign
ministers.

Though no one has any plan to cure or stop the spread of this cancer, an
increasing number of governments are thinking that a policy of engagement
offers the best possible treatment. The Chinese are not alone in engaging
the regime, and Asean itself is not abandoning its own policy of
“constructive engagement” with Rangoon. Although some Asean ministers at
the Laos meeting said pressure on Rangoon is not off, such statements are
made just to comfort the US and other western governments.

Western governments and Asean undoubtedly want to see Rangoon move in the
right direction. The past 17 years of stagnation have made friend and foe
alike uneasy and impatient.

Rangoon has no reason to feel isolated or abandoned and can look forward
to a flurry of visits by foreign dignitaries. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra sent his special envoy, Deputy Prime Minister and former
foreign minister Surakiat Sathirathai, to Rangoon just before the Asean
meeting to meet Than Shwe. East Timor’s Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta
also visited Rangoon before the meeting, saying he was willing to act as
middleman in negotiations between the junta and Suu Kyi, but also
expressing his opposition to sanctions.
Now there’s talk that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan may visit Burma this
year, in response to an invitation Than Shwe issued at the Bandung
Conference in Indonesia earlier this year. UN officials are worried,
however, that the visit would be exploited and that Annan could return to
New York empty handed. If he goes, diplomatic sources in Rangoon say it’s
likely he will be allowed to meet Suu Kyi, although critics remain cynical
about any diplomatic gestures from an otherwise unyielding junta.

One unavoidable consequence of Rangoon’s renunciation of the Asean
chairmanship is the wasted expense and effort of dressing the capital up
for the occasion—although, in view of all the high-level visits ahead,
renovating the airport might not have been such a bad idea.