BurmaNet News, March 11, 2009

Editor editor at burmanet.org
Wed Mar 11 15:20:26 EDT 2009


March 11, 2009, Issue #3669


INSIDE BURMA
Kaladan Press: UN refugee Chief visits Arakan State
Mizzima News: Chinese nuclear expert dies in Burma
SHAN: Wa continue to resist census taking
DVB: Son of KNU leader joins pro-junta splinter group
Irrawaddy: Than Shwe’s new pagoda hides more than a Buddha relic
New Light of Myanmar: U Than Swe appointed as Permanent Representative of
Myanmar to UN

ON THE BORDER
Kachin News Group: Chinese company secretly spirits away minerals from
Northern Burma

DRUGS
Irrawaddy: ‘Yaa-Baa’ bust in Tachilek

REGIONAL
DVB: Economic crisis causes thousands of Burmese migrants to lose jobs

INTERNATIONAL
Irrawaddy: Signatures wanted to free political prisoners

OPINION / OTHER
Bangkok Post: Burma's Rohingyas in flight and the solutions to their
plight – Vitit Muntarbhorn
Asia Times: Myanmar's military as a Ponzi scheme – Norman Robespierre
Inner City Press: UN's Ban meets with Obama, no pesky UN press, Myanmar
convergence described - Matthew Russell Lee



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

March 11, Kaladan Press
UN refugee Chief visits Arakan State

The Chief of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Antonio Guterres on an official visit to Burma to discuss with the Burmese
authorities on the issue of Rohingya boatpeople. The Chief visited Arakan
State on March 10, in the afternoon, according to a businessman from
Sittwe.

The chief visited Burma on March 7 for six days official visit and will
leave on March 12. The UNHCR chief discussed a wide range of issues on
Rohingya with the Burmese authorities and met with UNHCR’s partners and
beneficiaries in Burma during his trip.
The UN staffs who have been working in northern Arakan were called to
Sittwe, the capital of Arakan State, before arrival of UN Chief at Sittwe.
The refugee Chief met with UN staffs and discussed about the Rohingya
matter, said a close aide of army who declined to be named.

The Rohingya people were very happy for hearing of UN refugee chief to be
visited to the northern Arakan, but, unfortunately, maybe, the chief was
barred or had no time to visit to northern Arakan. Therefore, the native
Rohingya people did not able to express their sad experiences under the
rule of Burmese military junta to the refugee Chief.

But, the SPDC authorities organized some people to talk with refugee
Chief, when the UN Chief visits to the northern Arakan. They especially
motivated them (some people) to say that “they are not Rohingyas, they are
Bengali”, according to sources from Maungdaw.

On March 9, UN refugee chief traveled to Naypyidaw, Burma's remote capital
about and met the junta's ministers in charge of foreign affairs, home
affairs, immigration and border areas, the U.N. official said.

The UN refugee agency has expressed concern over the fate of hundreds of
Rohingya Muslim migrants who were rescued in Indian and Indonesian waters
in recent months claiming to have fled Burma and to have later been abused
by Thai authorities, sources said.

Today, the Chief will return to Rangoon before flying to the south of the
country where the migrants illegally board boats bound for neighboring
countries.

Arakan is home to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslim ethnic group
that has made headlines recently following reports hundreds who fled by
boat to escape poverty and hardship were mistreated by the Thai military.

Burma does not recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group. Rights
organizations say they have been harassed since the junta seized power in
1962, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) says
more than 200,000 live in Bangladesh, effectively stateless.

Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win during the 14th ASEAN Summit in Thailand
said Burma does not have a Rohingya minority, but said it agreed to accept
the boatpeople if they identify themselves as “Bengalis” born in Burma.

The root cause of this latest exodus from Burma is the junta's treatment
of its Muslim minority, especially in Arakan state. The regime refuses to
accept that they are Burmese citizens. "In reality, the Rohingya are
neither Myanmar people nor Myanmar's ethnic group. And what is more they
are” ugly as ogres’, the Burmese consul general in Hong Kong, Ye Myint
Aung, wrote in a letter circulated to the press.
____________________________________

March 11, Mizzima News
Chinese nuclear expert dies in Burma – Sein Win

A nuclear scientist from Beijing University died at the Central Hotel in
Rangoon while attending a meeting organized by Burma’s Nuclear Department
under the Ministry of Science and Technology.

Mr. Zhang Peixin (47) was found dead in his hotel room on the last day of
the meeting.

Mr. Zhang arrived in Burma on February 22nd, but failed to appear at the
meeting hall on March 1st, his departure date. Personnel from the host
Ministry and an Assistant Hotel Manager then broke into his room, finding
him dead on the bed. After receiving the information from the hotel,
police and medical personnel rushed to the scene for inspection. They
later confirmed the death without finding any marks or injuries on the
body.

Doctors from Rangoon General Hospital’s Forensic Department conducted a
post mortem and found Mr. Zhang’s heart’s main arteries were blocked and
narrow, according to police sources.

Sources who investigated the case said that the deceased was alone in the
hotel room when he died.

His wife and daughter traveled to Burma and cremated his remains at Yeway
Cemetery on March 6th at 4:20 p.m., returning to China with the ashes.
____________________________________

March 11, Shan Herald Agency for News
Wa continue to resist census taking

Latest reports from the Sino-Burma border say the United Wa State Army
(UWSA) is still refusing entry to census takers coming from Kengtung, the
capital of Shan State East.

A team of 27 government officials who arrived on the Wa border checkpoint
Kho-Hsoong on 26 February were forced to return to Kengtung.

Col Than Tut Thein, G1 from Kengtung-based Triangle Region Command, was
dispatched to Panghsang, the Wa headquarters last week. “He returned empty
-handed on 6 March after spending two days in Panghsang,” said an officer
from the Wa’s closest ally National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan
State (NDAA-ESS), commonly known as the Mongla group by the name of its
main base.

Meeting Col Sai Hsarm, Commander of the UWSA’s Mongpawk-based 468th
Brigade on his way back, he had reportedly stressed on two points:

* To inform Kengtung as soon as Panghsang is ready to admit census
officials

* Not be swayed by exile media “trying to bring the two sides on a
head-on collision course”

Tension between the UWSA and the Burma Army has been high since the
beginning of the year. According to the Wa’s own estimates, they are being
besieged by at least 50 Burma Army infantry battalions.

Mongla, on the other hand, has permitted junta officials to conduct census
in its domain, but refused to divulge the group’s own roster.

Local people meanwhile are skeptical about the process which is expected
to last until the end of March. “They are taking back our white cards
(temporary IDs issued before the May 2008 referendum) without issuing us a
substitute in return,” said a villager.

A permanent ID is a pink card.

The ruling military generals are taking a nationwide census in preparation
for the 2010 general elections. The New Mon State Party (NMSP) has also
refused to provide information on its members and their families, reported
Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA) yesterday.
____________________________________

March 11, Democratic Voice of Burma
Son of KNU leader joins pro-junta splinter group – Aye Nai

A son of the late Karen National Union leader, Bo Mya, has joined a
pro-government Karen splinter group led by General Htein Maung, KNU
General Secretary (1) Hla Ngwe said.

Nay Soe Mya met with Htein Maung in Rangoon on 15 February, when UN human
rights envoy Tomas Ojeas Quintana was there. When news of this visit
reached the KNU, he was expelled, said Hla Ngwe.

He then went to Naypyidaw to meet with Major General Yeh Min.

“You can say that he joined them after he went there," said Hla Ngwe.

Bo Mya and his wife Lar Poe, who is the chairwoman of the Karen Women’s
Organisation, have four sons and three daughters. Nay Soe Mya is the sixth
child.

"We didn't give him the permission,” said Hla Ngwe. “He went there of his
own accord, and his mother tried to stop him.”

Nay Soe Mya had reportedly told the KNU that he went to see his uncle and
only visited Rangoon.

“We warned him not to do this kind of thing, and he disappeared,” said Hla
Ngwe. “We thought he went to Bangkok, and we learned later that he went to
Mr Quintana on 18 March.

“We expelled him after that."

"His father did his revolutionary activities from the start to his death
under the leadership of our organisation,” continued Hla Ngwe. “His
children and wife became central committee members.

“We persuaded Nay Soe Mya to carry out the revolution like his father, and
not to do like his uncle,” he added.

“Even his family could not stop him when it comes to anti-revolutionary
self-interest and personal thinking.”

____________________________________

March 11, Irrawaddy
Than Shwe’s new pagoda hides more than a Buddha relic

Burmese junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe, his wife Kyaing Kyaing and members
of their family led ceremonies marking the consecration in Naypyidaw of a
replica of Rangoon’s famous Shwedagon Pagoda.

The Naypyidaw pagoda, visible from every road leading into Burma’s new
capital, is 99 m high, less than one meter lower than the original. Like
the Rangoon pagoda, it is covered in gold foil, and its consecration was
completed by hoisting its htidaw (sacred umbrella) and placing a huge
seinbudaw, or diamond bud, at its apex.

Thousands of precious stones—diamonds, rubies, pearls and jade—were
donated to adorn the pagoda, which has been given the name Uppatasanti, or
"Peace Pagoda."
The regime daily The New Light of Myanmar reported that Than Shwe and his
family donated a Buddha tooth relic to be placed inside the pagoda. The
relic came from China, the newspaper said.

The construction of the new pagoda is seen by many Burmese as a
continuation of the tradition of Burmese kings who built pagodas as acts
of penance for the wars they conducted.

According to one scholar, Maung Aung Myo, Uppatasanti is the name of a
sutra written by a monk in the early 16th century. It was intended to be
“recited in time of crisis especially in the face of foreign invasion,"
wrote Maung Aung Myo in a paper entitled The Road to Naypyidaw: Making
Sense of the Myanmar Government's Decision to Move its Capital, for the
Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore.

Work on the pagoda began in 2006, following the regime’s removal of its
administrative capital from Rangoon to Naypyidaw, in November 2005.

Most observers and even some government officials say moving the capital
from Rangoon to the remote Pyinmana area was the sole idea of Than Shwe.
The astrologers on whom he and his family rely reportedly suggested
relocating the capital after foreseeing bloodshed and natural disaster for
Rangoon.

Although hundreds of monks attended the consecration, they were kept well
away from its central ceremonies, which were performed by the Than Shwe
family, military leaders and senior government officials, including Vice
Snr-Gen Maung Aye, Gen Thura Shwe Mann and Gen Thein Sein.

Official newspapers reported that thousands attended the festivities
surrounding the consecration. They made no mention, however, of a
fairground disaster on the eve of the festivities, in which 20 people are
reported to have died.

____________________________________

March 11, New Light of Myanmar
U Than Swe appointed as Permanent Representative of Myanmar to UN

The Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council of the Union of
Myanmar has appointed U Than Swe as the Permanent Representative of the
Union of Myanmar to the United Nations, New York.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

March 11, Kachin News Group
Chinese company secretly spirits away minerals from Northern Burma

While working on dam projects for hydroelectric power in northern Burma,
Chinese companies are secretly spiriting away unidentified minerals to
their country, said local sources.

Two or more sub-Chinese companies in the Chinese government’s China Power
Investment Corporation (CPI) have been taking away different kinds of
minerals to their country from areas around N’Mai River (N'Mai Hka in
Kachin) hydropower project in Chipwi (Chibwe) east of Burma’s northern
Kachin State since the CPI’s hydropower inspectors arrived in Chipwi in
2007, according to residents of Chipwi.

Local eyewitnesses told KNG, that some unknown minerals are tidily put in
wooden boxes and some are not. The trucks are covered with opaque plastic
when minerals are loaded in the trucks and transported to China mostly at
night, added the eyewitnesses.

Local Kachin villagers always see the Chinese taking away mineral from the
areas around them but they have no idea what kind of minerals are being
taken away by the Chinese, local villagers told KNG.

According to businessmen on the Sino-Burma border, minerals like
Aluminium, Silver and Lead are found in the hydropower project site in
Chipwi.

The project site is protected by Burmese army soldiers and no one is
authorized to go inside the projects site or watch the activities of
Chinese workers, said sources in the Kachin ceasefire group in the area,
the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).

A NDA-K officer told KNG recently, Chinese trucks loaded with unidentified
minerals from Chipwi hydropower project site cross the Sino-Burma border
which is controlled by the NDA-K. However, both NDA-K and Burmese military
authorities are not authorized to check Chinese workers’ activities in the
project site and trucks crossing the two countries’ border.

In December last year, the number of Chinese workers in the Chipwi
hydropower project site increased from over 300 to about 1,000, said
residents of Chipwi.

Under the agreement between the governments of China and Burma, the Chipwi
hydropower project in N’Mai River is being implemented by Asia World
Company in Burma and CPI.

The project is one of seven hydropower projects in Mali and N’Mai Rivers,
and the Mali and N’Mai Rivers’ Confluence called the Mali-N’Mai Zup in
Kachin or Myitsone in Burmese and it is estimated to generate 2,000 MW of
electricity.

____________________________________
DRUGS

March 11, Irrawaddy
‘Yaa-Baa’ bust in Tachilek – Lawi Weng

About 2 million amphetamine pills and 1 million kyat (US $1,000) in cash
were seized from a 10-wheel truck on March 8 by the Burmese authorities in
Tachilek Township, near the Thai-Burmese border, according to a policeman
in Tachilek who spoke to The Irrawaddy on Wednesday.

“We found two small oil barrels hidden beneath the body of the truck,” he
said. “We were suspicious and searched them. We found the pills inside
them.”

The policeman said that the truck had been driven from Kengtung Township
in Shan State, some 105 kilometers (66 miles) north of Tachilek. The truck
driver was arrested, but his colleague escaped by running away. The truck
is reportedly owned by a Shan ethnic woman who lives in Tachilek.

The policeman said he believed that the truck brought the amphetamines
from Kengtung to store at her house in Tachilek for distribution.

The pills were seized at a checkpoint in Mae Yan village, at the northern
entrance to Tachilek.

Tachilek sits on the Thai-Burmese border in Shan State and is known to be
the crossing point for the majority of amphetamine pills (known in Thai as
“yaa-baa”) into Thailand. The drugs are reportedly manufactured and
distributed by various armed ceasefire groups in Shan State.

On November 17, Burmese authorities seized 50,000 tablets at the Nine
Stars Hotel in Tachilek, while last week Thai authorities confiscated an
amphetamine-manufacturing machine in Mai Sai, on the Thai side of the
border.

The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is the most renowned opium and drug
producer in the region and several of its leaders are on the United
States’ wanted list as drug traffickers.

The UWSA allegedly continues to produce large amounts of amphetamine
pills, and Burma remains the largest source of the drug in Asia, according
to the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.

Last week, authorities in Tachilek Township issued a warrant for arrest of
Naw Kham, a alleged Shan drug lord who is also wanted in China, Laos and
Thailand.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

March 11, Democratic Voice of Burma
Economic crisis causes thousands of Burmese migrants to lose jobs – Naw
Noreen

The number of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand and Malaysia that are
losing their jobs as a result of the global economic crisis is soaring,
according to a Bangkok-based migrant workers group.

Thousands of migrant workers have lost their jobs in the last year and
some factories have had to be closed down, said Kyaw Thaung of Burmese
Association in Thailand.

"Within two months, the number became thousands,” he said.

“A garment factory that makes clothes for foreign countries has to fire 15
workers every week, and last week a factory that makes sports garments
fired 60 workers on the pretext of finding tuberculosis on them.”

A worker at a factory in Bangkok said that 25 workers were made jobless
last week.

"Given that there is no proper reason, employers are firing them by means
of finding faults with them such as having diseases," said Than Zaw Oo.

About 60 Burmese workers were fired from a knitting factory on the pretext
of lacking in skills.

Many of these workers are not going back to Burma, hoping that they will
get a new job where they are, Thant Zaw Oo said.

Malaysia has also seen cuts in employee numbers, and the Malaysian
government is allowing some migrant workers to return to their countries
without being prosecuted for not having legal status.

But many workers say that they will not return to Burma and will stay on
by any means possible, an official in charge of workers from National
League for Democracy - Liberated Areas (Malaysia branch) said.

"Many factories have closed: it might be about 40 per cent, maybe more,”
he said.

“Burmese workers in their tens of thousands may have lost their jobs."

Burmese PM General Thein Sein said that there are jobs at the ready for
workers returning to Burma.

Maung Maung, who is going back to Burma in the coming week, doubts however
that there will be a job for him in Burma.

"I will have to hold discussion with my family and do my best,” he said.

“No one wants to go abroad and leave their families. We went abroad
because we faced difficulties and hoped that we would get a job.”

“We have the desire to make our country develop,” he added.

“The people who are ruling the country will understand if possible and, if
they can do their best, we will not face difficulties like this."

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

March 11, Irrawaddy
Signatures wanted to free political prisoners – Min Lwin

Two Thailand-based rights groups, the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners—Burma (AAPP) and the Forum for Democracy in Burma, are on Friday
launching a global campaign to mark Burmese Human Rights Day.

Called the “Free Burma’s Political Prisoners Now” campaign, the
organizers’ committee said it aims to collect signatures for a petition
calling for the release of political prisoners in Burma, and hopes to
collect 888,888 signatures by May 24, the date when Aung San Suu Kyi is
due to be released from house arrest.

“Our main reason for the campaign is to raise awareness among the
international community about the plight of political prisoners in the
country and to put more pressure on the Burmese military government,” said
Tate Naing, the secretary of AAPP.

“The release of all political prisoners is the essential first step toward
democracy and national reconciliation in Burma,” he added.

The campaign pamphlet explains that there are currently over 2,100
political prisoners languishing in Burmese prisons and that they have all
been jailed because they chose to work for democracy and human rights.

“Political prisoners have not committed more crimes than that of
expressing their political believes either through word or through
action,” Aung San Suu Kyi was quoted as saying in the campaign pamphlet.

“Some of our political prisoners were arrested on grounds other than those
associated [with] political activities, but we all knew that the real
reason [for] their imprisonment was their political affiliation.”

Suu Kyi is the general secretary of the opposition National League for
Democracy and has been under house arrest for 13 of the last 19 years. She
remains the only Nobel Peace Prize winner behind bars.

Another political prisoner is Mya Aye, who held a 45th birthday party for
himself on Tuesday in Loikaw Prison in Karenni State.

Mya Aye is serving a 65-year sentence for his involvement in political
activities. He was arrested on August 21, 2007, at his home along with 12
other activists, including Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi, Htay Win Aung, Min
Zeya and Kyaw Min Yu (aka Jimmy), after leading a march on August 19
against sharp increases in the price of fuel and other commodities.

Mya Aye graduated from Rangoon University and was one of the leaders of
the Graduated Old Student Democratic Association (GOSDA) during the 1989
pro-democracy uprising. He was arrested for the first time on June 20,
1989, for his role as a prominent protest leader. He was sentenced to
eight years in prison, but was released in 1996.

Speaking on a video file recently, Mya Aye’s daughter, Wai Hnin Pwint
Thon, said, “When I was five months old, my father was jailed for eight
years for being involved in the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. I was four
years old when I first met him. But he was behind iron bars, so I didn’t
get a chance to embrace him.”

After he was released in 1996, Mya Aye continued his political activities
for the restoration of freedom, democracy and human rights in Burma, she
said.

“The prison authorities tortured him every way: with electricity, sexual
harassment and abuse,” Wai Hnin Pwint Thon said.

“As I got older, I realized why he was in prison,” she said. “I admired
his sacrifice for his country and his people. I think he is very brave
person.”

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

March 11, Bangkok Post
Burma's Rohingyas in flight and the solutions to their plight – Vitit
Muntarbhorn

Much ink has been spilt over the plight of Rohingyas who have sought
shelter in the Southeast Asian region in recent months, even though the
situation is hardly new.
Opinions range from the nationalistic to internationalistic - varying from
defensive claims of national security immersed in an attitude of denial,
to international law-based advocacy of their rights inviting a more open
response.

This group is currently of great interest to the international community,
because they are primarily a Muslim minority originating in theArakan (or
Rakhine) state of Burma with a particularly challenging history.

Their outflow has, for a long time, been the result of a situation of
great ambivalence in that country of origin where they are, in reality,
treated as outcasts.

Even though historically they have been there for many generations, their
ethnicity was not adequately recognised at the time of Burma's
independence.

Even today, while the authorities there seem to be willing to recognise
over one hundred ethnic groups in the country, they do not recognise
Rohingyas as a legitimate group in that list.

The past three decades have witnessed various disturbing facts which
should help to inform the need for a balanced policy, nationally,
regionally and internationally, concerning the group.

They are not allowed to move freely in Burma. They are not allowed to
marry without permission. They are impeded from accessing schools and
other services. They are extremely poor and are marginalised politically
and economically. They suffer from the uncertainties of being a stateless
people.

In effect, the Rohingyas are persecuted by a regime which instrumentalises
Buddhism for political ends and plays on the fear of Islam.

These factors thus provide for a scenario of explicit and implicit
persecution of the group which, for lack of national protection, requires
international protection.

While they may at times fit into the category of economic migrants in
their exodus, the likelihood is that concurrently, they are also refugees
("persons with a well-founded fear of persecution," according to the
international definition of "refugee") - given the oppressive background
that shapes their existence.

The outflows date back many years. In the late 1970s, tens of thousands of
Rohingyas were pressured to leave Burma, but they were later able to
repatriate to the country with UN help.

In the early 1990s, another massive outflow took place - of several
hundred thousands. Most were able to seek temporary refuge in neighbouring
Bangladesh. Again with UN help, many were able to return voluntarily to
Burma.

However, a residual number remained in camps in Bangladesh and even today,
there are some 20,000-30,000 officially in the camps there.

It is estimated that there are also some 200,000-300,000 outside the camps
who do not enjoy the formal protection offered by the camps.

Nor is their influx into Thailand new.

Today, it is estimated that there are some 20,000 Rohingyas in Thailand.
In the past few years, several thousands have been trickling into the
region by boat. Over the past few months, it is evident that the arrivals
have been mainly men. It is suspected that they are helped by third
parties - smugglers or traffickers, in their precarious voyage.

While many seem to be searching for work, the background of their
departure should not be forgotten - especially the environment of
discrimination noted above which may be interlinked with persecution.

Sadly, recent arrivals have been subjected to numerous cruelties in the
Southeast Asian region, with several reports of push-backs ("refoulement")
at sea, and physical violence and other violations committed against them.

In composition, these "boat people" may also be mixed flows; news reports
indicate that while some are Rohingyas coming from the camps or around the
camps in Bangladesh, others are coming directly from Burma - while others
are Bangladeshis (non-Rohingyas) sharing the boats.

But how can the world be really certain?

Before conjecturing too much, it is important that there be ways of
talking with the arrivals to ascertain their background and their reasons
for departure from their homesteads and/or recent shelters.

It is important to have credible third parties accessing them to listen to
their life histories and the reasons for their departure from their
country of origin and/or their country of transit.

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is
traditionally the best placed organisation to do so, in cooperation with
the authorities of the country of refuge.

If it is found that the circumstances and personal situation of those who
seek refuge - objectively and subjectively - indicate that they left their
country of origin because of actual or potential persecution, they are
entitled to international protection. They should not be pushed out or
pushed back from the country of refuge, whether at sea, on land or by air;
this encapsulates the international law principle of "non-refoulement".

It is important to relay that message emphatically to border authorities,
including the armed forces, immigration officials and police, as well as
the message of the duty to rescue people at sea.

The tendency to classify arrivals as "illegal immigrants" under national
immigration law should not undermine that overarching duty.

And what is to be done?

After a rather haphazard beginning in recent months, the various countries
of refuge, particularly Thailand, are now moving towards more humane
solutions, based upon dialogue, consultation and shared responsibility.

Yet, one of the strange ironies of the current situation is that while
there has been much advocacy vis-a-vis countries of refuge in relation to
deficiencies in their treatment of those who seek refuge, much less has
been said concerning the country of origin. Clearly, it is Burma which is
the most important element of the equation and which should bear the brunt
of the responsibility.

Unless the root causes of displacement and the marginalisation of the
Rohingya people are dealt with effectively there, there can be no genuine,
long-term solutions. And the plight of the Rohingya people is closely
intertwined with the challenge of human rights and democracy in Burma as a
whole.

The issue of statelessness also needs to be dealt with concretely by the
country of origin. Food security, economic and social development, respect
for their religion and culture, freedom of movement, political
participation, property ownership, access to schools and livelihood
opportunities, and the right to marry are but some of the key issues to be
dealt with at the source.

Even if those who are now seeking refuge in other countries did not have
Burmese nationality before their exodus, there are still ways of
ascertaining that they were long-time residents there. Evidence of this
status can be gauged from the various forms of registration in Burma, such
as "family lists". In the event of their possible return to the country,
they need to be reinstated on such lists and to be assured that they will
be treated humanely.

Indeed, it is worth recalling the international position that even those
who do not have a country's nationality are entitled to respect for their
human rights - as human rights are the rights of all persons irrespective
of nationality and other origins.

In the quest for solutions, there are various possibilities open to
dialogue and related action. There is the 10-country Asean channel, but
Bangladesh is not part of this forum. There is the channel known as the
Bali process which involves over 50 countries on measures to deal with
aspects of migration in the Asia-Pacific region. However, to date, this
process has tended to deal with transnational crime, and human trafficking
and smuggling, rather than the plight of those who seek refuge.

If the Bali process is to be used in regard to the latter, there needs to
be strong injection of the human rights element and refugee protection
into the forum.

On another front, there is a possible tripartite/quadripartite process,
involving Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh and the UN. Or there could simply be
a bilateral channel between Thailand and Burma on aspects of the Rohingya
issue.

The door should thus be open and not closed, on the basis of shared
responsibility and humanitarian responses.

Vitit Muntarbhorn is a Professor at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn
University. He has helped the United Nations in a variety of capacities,
including as an expert, consultant and Special Rapporteur. He is the
author of "The Status of Refugees in Asia," published by Oxford University
Press.
____________________________________

March 11, Asia Times
Myanmar's military as a Ponzi scheme – Norman Robespierre

Rank inflation and an ever-expanding flag officer corps are unable to
provide sufficient promotion opportunities within Myanmar's military,
known as the Tatmadaw. The civil government structure is at risk of
further militarization as the country slowly moves towards the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) military regime's unique interpretation of
democracy.

On September 17, 1988, the day before the Myanmar military staged a coup
and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), there were
only two officers above the rank of major general in the entire Tatmadaw.
They were General Saw Maung, the defense forces chief of staff, and
then-Lieutenant General Than Shwe, the army's vice chief of staff.

In current nomenclature, these positions would be referred to as CINC
(defense forces) and CINC (army). Today, the Tatmadaw has no less than 24
senior flag officers serving in lieutenant-general or above billets on
active service (See Table).

The 1,200% increase in senior flag ranks far outpaces the approximate 250%
increase of the entire Tatmadaw over that same period. This expansion of
the upper tier has been central to Senior General Than Shwe's ability to
stay firmly in control.

By expanding promotion opportunities within the Tatmadaw, Than Shwe has
successfully ensured continued loyalty of the officer corps. The expansion
of the flag ranks provides more opportunities for advancement, allowing
Than Shwe to dangle the carrot of self-interest that often entices
officers' to continue to support the system.

Expansive reorganizing
Illustrative of Than Shwe's efforts to expand promotion opportunities was
the reorganization of the Tatmadaw in November 2001. According to a senior
Myanmar military official intimately familiar with the Ministry of
Defense's planning process at the time, the major reorganization of the
Tatmadaw was done to expand promotion opportunities for the officer corps
and reduce the power of regional commanders.

The morale in the Tatmadaw had been particularly poor in the late 1990s. A
500% raise for the military granted on Armed Forces Day in 2000 improved
the situation somewhat. However, according to the source, there remained
an undercurrent of dissatisfaction among field-grade officers over the
scarce opportunities for advancement.

That was caused in part by the long tenures of regional commanders, who
used their positions to consolidate significant powers. They were
essentially warlords and controlled virtually all of the weaponry and
manpower of Myanmar's ground forces, which were engaged in combat with
ethnic insurgent groups. Than Shwe could not risk taking action against
any one regional commander as the others might band together and stage a
mutiny against him.

At the time, the regional commanders were also members of the SPDC, a
designation which made them technically higher than ministers. As a
result, ministerial decrees were difficult to implement, with regional
commanders deciding on which decrees to enforce or ignore. The dilemma was
resolved then by luring the SPDC-member regional commanders from their
fiefdoms to accept promotions within the War Office. In a policy shift,
new regional commanders were not made SPDC members.

To ensure allegiance of the new regional commanders, they were not
selected from the corps of officers next in seniority. Instead, Than Shwe
promoted officers from several rungs down the ladder. The rationale
apparently was that an officer next in line by seniority would have
assumed the position with the attitude he had earned it through his own
hard work. Conversely, one promoted early would recognize the value of his
mentor's assistance and be indebted with a sense of loyalty.

The plan required considerable expansion of the lieutenant-general
positions to accommodate the regional commanders. A number of
lieutenant-general positions were opened up by a variety of means: two
lieutenant-generals were terminated for corruption just before the 2001
re-organization. The Bureau of Special Operations (BSO), which
co-ordinates operations across regional commands, was separated into four
entities.

Additional billets also were created with the new position chief of staff
(army, navy and air force) and by forming Offices for Defense Industries,
Air Defense and Training. In the Myanmar military, offices are headed by
lieutenant-generals and directorates by major generals. The creation of
offices to justify a third star was done previously.

In August 1993, the Office of Special Studies (OSS) was created to justify
the promotion of the former head of intelligence, Khin Nyunt, to the rank
of lieutenant-general. The OSS's function and personnel were not readily
distinguishable from headquarters staff of Khin Nyunt's Directorate of
Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI).

A former military intelligence officer said in an interview that outsiders
and Western analysts attached too much significance to the formation of
the OSS, as it was essentially a paper shuffle to justify Khin Nyunt's
third star.

Rank inflation
The November 2001 reorganization is just one factor in the subsequent
expansion of the Tatmadaw's flag officer corps. Creation of new ranks,
development of new positions, and military infiltration of the civil
service has fostered rank inflation and growth of the flag officer corps.

The trend toward a larger flag officer corps was established just 18
months after the SLORC seized control of the country, when mass promotion
of generals and some colonels took place in March 1990. To maintain a
pyramid structure to military command, Than Shwe's predecessor, Saw Maung,
elevated himself to the newly created rank of senior general.

The creation of a new rank was repeated in September 2002 when the
regime's No 2 man, Maung Aye, was knighted with the rank of vice-senior
general, equating to 4.5 stars. The new rank allowed him to maintain rank
superiority when his rival Khin Nyunt put on his fourth star.

Khin Nyunt's promotion to general required a paper shuffle similar to that
associated with his previous promotion. To justify his fourth star, Khin
Nyunt was designated special advisor to the senior general. Later, his
appointment as prime minister justified the rank. Khin Nyunt fell from
power in a 2004 internal purge and is currently being held in house
arrest.

While justification of Khin Nyunt's promotions may have been an exercise
in paperwork, operational positions have been created to expand the flag
ranks. Following the precedent of the November 2001 reorganization, two
more BSOs were activated: BSO-5 covering Yangon Division and BSO-6 with
responsibility for Rakhine State and Magwe Division.

The most recent lieutenant-general position to be created is that of
Defense Services Inspection and Auditor General. While there may be some
operational utility to the creation of the BSOs, the latest created
position appears to do little more than add an additional layer of
bureaucracy.

The military bureaucracy has likewise expanded below the
lieutenant-general grade. The formation of new regional commands, an
increase in the number of operational control commands, and inception of
division-level control commands for artillery units and armor, has
significantly contributed to the expansion of the flag-level officer
corps.

Bloated civil service
Parallel to the regime's expansion of the military bureaucracy is an
ever-expanding civil bureaucracy. Shortly after the SLORC took over in
1988, the government consisted of the Office of the Prime Minister and 18
ministries led by nine ministers. Of the nine, eight were military
officers serving in positions under the Ministry of Defense.

Since then, the civil bureaucracy has grown to provide additional
opportunities for Than Shwe to reward kleptocrats for their support of the
system. Today, in addition to the Prime Minister's Office, there are 32
other ministries, each headed by its own minister. Only seven ministers
are "civilians" and most have prior military service, including a few
ex-generals.

According to a Myanmar source with close connections to senior military
officials, during a 2004 meeting of senior officers discussing manpower
issues, Than Shwe directed an end to the practice of ministers holding
multiple portfolios in order to provide additional promotion
opportunities.

The practice came to an end last June when Major-General Maung Maung Swe
relinquished the Ministry of Immigration and Population portfolio. While U
Aung Kyi is Minister for Labor and Minister for Relations, the latter is
purely titular with no actual brick-and-mortar ministry. With the
exception of the Minister of Defense, no minister holds an MOD operational
position.

While the creation of new ministries has broadened the avenues for
advancement to military personnel, it threatens to saddle the country with
an even more bloated and inefficient bureaucracy. If the reins of power do
some day pass to a democratically elected government, as envisaged in the
upcoming 2010 elections, it will likely find its ability to govern
handicapped by a dysfunctional ministerial structure developed under
military rule.

Moreover, the infiltration of the civil bureaucracy by military members is
likely to increase in both depth and breadth. The appointment of four
brigadier generals to the Civil Service Selection Board in 2006
foreshadowed the expected increased military involvement in the civil
service sector.

According to a recent Internet report, students of the National Defense
College (NDC) were reportedly warned by an instructor that due to
increased class size, graduates can no longer count on being rewarded with
postings at regional or division commands. Instead, they may have to
accept postings at the director-general level in ministries outside the
MOD.

Fractures in the pyramid
In some respects, Than Shwe has run the Tatmadaw like a typical pyramid or
Ponzi scheme.

Early investors in a pyramid scheme are paid with the investments of
newcomers and everyone benefits as long as the pyramid continues to
expand. When the pyramid ceases to expand, the early investors have reaped
huge rewards and the latecomers have little or nothing to show for their
investment.

The current regime leadership invested their loyalty in the system early
and has been rewarded with lucrative positions and concessions. As the
recent NDC graduates have discovered, individual rewards become smaller as
the upper tiers of the pyramid become more crowded.

The Ponzi-like nature of the system has maintained pressure for the
Tatamadaw to expand. In some units, soldiers are not allowed to retire
until they have recruited two replacements from training. This pressure
has increased unsavory practices of shanghaiing bystanders and recruiting
child soldiers. A new directorate of recruitment was added to the Tatmadaw
in 2007, either to address these issues or to focus on achieving
recruitment goals.

Further manipulation of the military and government structure to provide
more promotion opportunities for military officers is likely as the regime
moves the country toward its own version of democracy. Past methods could
be repeated to create more billets. Several of the current BSOs could be
split to provide additional three-star positions.

New regional commands could be sprouted in Magwe Division, in Karrenni
State or in Karen State, boosting the number of two-star and one-star
positions. Eventually rank inflation may see BSO chiefs move up to the
position of general and the regional commanders become
lieutenant-generals.

The further infiltration of military officers into the civilian government
structure, and the creation of new branches of the bureaucratic tree,
threaten to saddle Myanmar with an ineffective government structure under
continued military domination in the name of democracy. From where the
resources to sustain this bloated system will arise is another important
question for Myanmar's political future.

Norman Robespierre, a pseudonym, is a freelance journalist specializing in
Southeast Asian affairs. He may be reached at normanrobespierre at gmail.com

____________________________________

March 11, Inner City Press
UN's Ban meets with Obama, no pesky UN press, Myanmar convergence
described - Matthew Russell Lee

As school children pointed at the White House and threw bread to pigeons
and sparrows, a black limousine and 20-passenger bus swept by at 5:25 on
Tuesday afternoon, carrying UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and his
press-less entourage to a meeting with President Barack Obama. An Inner
City Press source emerging from the White House described it as scripted
and untransparent. He was surprised that Ban's team had not tried and
gotten any UN correspondents in.

It's a pool, he said, predicting two questions to Obama, two question to
Ban. Some taking photos through the fence asked this reporter about the
black bus waiting in the driveway. The name Ban Ki-moon did not ring a
bell with them. One mentioned Kofi Annan. The birds grabbed the bread and
flew.

The White House source mentioned a sample point of convergence. Ban paid
tribute to Burma's General Than Shwe, he said. And now U.S. gas and oil
companies have lobbied the Administration to change course on Myanmar, to
move away from sanctions and toward economic integration. They want to
make money, despite the dictatorship. They pitch it to Obama as an
alternative for now to oil for the Middle East and Venezuela. The ground
cover is to call it a helping hand despite Than Shwe's still iron gripping
fist, a change we can make you believe in.





More information about the BurmaNet mailing list