BurmaNet News, September 10, 2009

[Editor]

September 10, 2009 Issue #3794

INSIDE BURMA
Mizzima: Lawyers meet Suu Kyi to discuss appeal
DVB: Three prisoners from 2007 uprising released

ON THE BORDER
NLM: Township of Shan State (North) has restored peace

ASEAN
Irrawaddy: Junta gas profits stashed in Singapore banks
DVB: Burma could face ASEAN expulsion if it goes nuclear
Irrawaddy: The military’s role in Asean nations

REGIONAL
IPS: Chinese pipelines in Burma to push ahead amid criticism
Xinhua: China says no involvement in Myanmar's domestic issues
Times Now (India): Myanmar: No Chinese bases on Coco islands
IANS: Dhaka disputes maritime boundary claims of India, Myanmar

INTERNATIONAL
BBC: Gas firms 'prop up Burma's junta'
Independent: Burmese generals pocket $5bn from Total oil deal

OPINION / OTHER
Bangkok Post: A stateless boy exposes Thailand's vulnerability and dilemma

____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

September 10, Mizzima News
Lawyers meet Suu Kyi to discuss appeal - Mungpi

New Delhi - Detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers met her
for about two hours on Thursday and discussed the appeal to be filed
against her sentence.

“We were allowed to meet her for about two hours and we basically
discussed the appeal to be filed,” Nyan Win, one of her lawyers said.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers had filed a petition requesting the High Court
to allow them to appeal against the decision by the Insein prison court,
which sentenced her to a three-year prison term with hard labour.

The High Court accepted the submission and fixed September 18 for the
hearing of arguments by Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers.

Though the district court had sentenced her to three years in jail, an
executive order by Burma’s military supremo Snr. Gen Than Shwe halved Aung
San Suu Kyi’s sentence to 18 months and allowed her to serve time at her
lakeside home on Rangoon’s University Avenue.

Meanwhile, United States on Wednesday urged the Burmese regime to give the
Nobel Peace Laureate a fair hearing on her appeal.

State Department spokesperson Ian Kelly told reporters during a regular
press briefing that “We are aware that Aung San Suu Kyi will have an
appeal heard in a couple of weeks. I don’t have the exact date right now.
But we would urge a fair hearing of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal.”

Kelly said the US has made it clear to the Burmese government bilaterally
as well as highlighted it at the multilateral level, like the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of the need “to open up its political
process, and most of all the need to free the more than 2,000 political
prisoners that are incarcerated in Burma.”

“And we, of course, are not alone in those concerns. Our allies in Europe
have also called for the release of political prisoners,” Kelly added.

____________________________________

September 10, Democratic Voice of Burma
Three prisoners from 2007 uprising released

Three people imprisoned after allegedly speaking to foreign media prior to
the September 2007 uprising have been released, despite a police crackdown
in the lead up to this year’s anniversary.

The men, all from Pakokku town in central Burma’s Magwe division, were
arrested on the brink of the monk-led uprising in 2007.

Authorities accused the three of inciting riot after allegedly handing
information to foreign media outlets about the looming protests.

Pakkoku became the flashpoint of the uprising which swept the country
after police broke up a peaceful demonstration on 5 September, injuring
three monks.

Family members of the three men, Nay La, Thar Aung and Sein Linn, said
that they were released from Thayet prison on Sunday and are in good
health.

Their co-accused, Thant Shin, was given the same two-year term, plus a
seven-year sentence under the Emergency Act.

The news comes amidst a government crackdown on suspected activists prior
to the two-year anniversary of the uprising.

In recent weeks a number of monks have been intimidated and arrested, with
the government fearing a repeat of their role in the protests.

Although by protocol monks are apolitical, the community withdrew
religious services for the country’s military generals during the
uprising.

The sight of thousands of monks marching through the streets in their
saffron robes led to the September 2007 uprising being named the Saffron
Revolution.

Some of the estimated 138 fatalities from September 2007 were monks, with
eye-witness accounts of troops beating and smashing the heads of monks
against walls.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

September 10, New Light of Myanmar (MNA)
Township of Shan State (North) has restored peace

Laukkai — Laukkai Township of Shan State (North) has restored peace and
stability and shops, stores, restaurants and meat and fish shops bustled
yesterday.

Moreover, Win Thuza shops of the Ministry of Industry-1 sold rice to local
people. The students from Laukkai No 2 Basic Education High School
attended classes regularly with peace of mind. For the rest and recreation
of the local people from Kongyan township and Tatmadaw members of the
local battalions, Tatmadaw mobile public relation unit performed music and
dance.

____________________________________
ASEAN

September 10, Irrawaddy
Junta gas profits stashed in Singapore banks: ERI – Simon Roughneen

At a Bangkok press conference on Thursday, Earthrights International (ERI)
launched two reports alleging that oil giants Total and Chevron are linked
to “forced labor, killings, high-level corruption and authoritarianism” in
Burma.

The reports, titled “Total Impact” and “Getting it Wrong,” examine how
revenue from the Yadana gas project sustains military rule in Burma and
undermines Western sanctions.

The NGO also said that two Singapore-based banks—Overseas Chinese Banking
Corporation (OCBC) and DBS Group—function as “offshore repositories” for
junta revenues accruing from the Yadana gas project.
Security guards gesture to photographers to stop taking photos of the DBS
Group bank in Singapore in April. The bank is accused of laundering the
Burmese junta’s siphoned gas profits. (Photo: Reuters)

The report said that Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council
has earned almost US $5 billion from the gas pipeline project.

By using an outdated exchange rate, the junta declares a fraction of the
revenues to the State budget, enabling it to siphon the rest off. The
junta calculates revenue at just 6 kyat to the dollar when the de facto
rate is closer to 1,000.

According to a confidential International Monetary Fund (IMF) report
obtained by ERI, revenue "contributed less than 1 percent of total budget
revenue in 2007/08, but would have contributed about 57 percent if valued
at the market exchange rate."

The report says these rates allow the regime to list a mere $29 million of
the Yadana earnings, leaving around $4.8 billion unaccounted for, which
ERI believes to be lodged in the Singapore banks.

ERI’s Matthew Smith said that the information about offshore accounts in
Singapore comes “from confidential and reliable sources,” but could not go
into more detail.

“We expect the Singapore government and banks to do the right thing based
on Singaporean law relating to money laundering, which prohibits any such
transactions and requires banks to report these,” he added.

According to Smith, the two banks were informed in writing during the past
week about the content of the reports, but ERI has yet to receive a
response.

ERI is an environmental NGO based in the US, but was founded by Ka Hsaw
Wa, an ethnic Karen and former Burmese student activist in exile since his
involvement in the 1988 demonstrations against military rule.

ERI says that Total, Chevron and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand
Export and Production (PTTEP)—the other non-Burmese company involved in
Yadana—have earned a combined $1.3 billion since commercial production
started in 2000.

The gas is piped into Thailand where it generates electricity for the
Bangkok area, and in total makes up 60 percent of Burma's gas exports to
Thailand. Total has been a major investor in the Yadana project since
1992, holding a 31.24 percent stake, with Chevron on 28 percent.

In a recent Newsweek interview, Total CEO Christophe de Margerie said that
critics of the company's operations in Burma can “go to hell,” adding that
the gas imports into Thailand have helped reduce air pollution in Bangkok.

In a June 26 letter to ERI published in the “Total Impact” report,
Vice-President Jean-Francois Lasalle refused to answer a number of
questions sent to Total by ERI. According to the letter, this was because
ERI “presents allegations as facts,” and is “more interested in harassing
our companies, in line with a divestment agenda, than in a real dialogue
about how to improve people's lives.”

Total has cited its socioeconomic work in the pipeline area, and the
“overall improvement in living conditions for the 50,000 people” who live
in the pipeline area. Total refers ERI to a report by US-based CDA
Collaborative Learning Projects, which gave the findings of a 20-day
impact assessment of the oil company's operations related to the Yadana
project.

However, the positive CDA report was dismissed as a whitewash by ERI, with
report author Naing Htoo saying CDA’s methodology was deeply flawed, given
that CDA lacked autonomy after being hired by Total to do the impact
assessment.

ERI accuses Total and Chevron of complicity in human rights abuses
throughout the history of the project.

____________________________________

September 10, Democratic Voice of Burma
Burma could face ASEAN expulsion if it goes nuclear - Than Win Htut

Burma may be forced to revoke its membership of a regional Asia bloc if it
is found to be building a nuclear plant for weapons, the bloc’s chief said
last week.

Although no hard evidence has emerged of Burma becoming nuclear,
speculation over the regime’s ambitions has heightened in recent months.

A report released in August after two years of investigations by an
Australian academic and a Thailand-based journalist quoted two Burmese
defectors as alleging that the government is attempting to construct a
nuclear plant in the country’s north.

The United States has also expressed concern about the growing
relationship between Burma and North Korea, whom earlier this year
confirmed it had carried out a nuclear test.

ASEAN, which by protocol follows a policy of non-interference in domestic
matters of member states, appears to be increasingly uneasy about Burma’s
membership of the bloc.

Thailand, who holds the revolving ASEAN chair, has said in recent months
that continuing unrest in Burma is tarnishing the bloc’s image, an issue
that will no doubt be compounded by rumours of a nuclear Burma.

The general secretary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Surin Pitsuwan, said on Saturday that Burma could face expulsion
if a nuclear plant is found, the Thai News Service reported today.

ASEAN has a status as a nuclear-free zone, following a 1995 treaty signed
in Bangkok.

“It’s a long-standing ASEAN instrument that we wish for Southeast Asia to
be a nuclear weapons-free zone,” a Thai foreign ministry official told DVB
today.

“It’s nuclear weapons that we are talking about; I don’t believe it
applies to nuclear energy.”

What appears to be growing cooperation between Burma and North Korea was
brought to light earlier this year following the revelation by DVB of
North Korean involvement in a network of suspected military tunnels
running throughout Burma.

Furthermore, a North Korean ship being tracked by the US navy on suspicion
of carrying weaponry appeared to be heading towards Burma, before turning
around.

____________________________________

September 9, Irrawaddy
The military’s role in Asean nations – Simon Roughneen

Most of Southeast Asia has experienced military rule at some stage since
the Colonial Era ended, and the political role of the region's military
institutions has shaped and influenced politics right up to the present
day.

The often-decisive interventions of the military in national politics have
restricted the development of democracy, freedom of speech and human
rights in many countries. In 2008, of the 10 member-states of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), only Indonesia was deemed
a fully free country by the US-based Freedom House, an NGO that monitors
democracy and human rights.

Implicitly, a behind-the-scenes power-brokering process played by powerful
military elites in Southeast Asian countries is a key factor in inhibiting
democratic development across the region.

At a September conference at the Institute for Security and International
Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, these issues were among
those discussed by scholars who examined civil-military relations in
Burma, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

In the Southeast Asian region, Burma stands out, however, due to the sheer
longevity of military rule and the entrenchment of the army in all sectors
of society and the economy.

ISIS Director Thitinan Pongsudhirak remarked that in 1960, Burma was a
democracy, having the highest GDP per capita in the region and with a
relatively-advanced economy and noted education sector.

However, these days, the entrenchment of military rule is so thorough, it
is more appropriate to use the term “military-civil relations,” according
to Win Min. In a deep irony, the very military institution established by
Burmese icon Aung San has kept its founder’s daughter and national
democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 14 of the past 20
years, as part of its strategy to retain control of the country under a
new constitution and elections scheduled for 2010.

The Napyidaw junta is regarded as introverted at best, and outright
hostile to cosmopolitan or outside influences at worst, so it is debatable
what lessons they have drawn from other countries in the region, which
have either experienced military rule or felt the weight of the army bear
down on day-to-day politics. There are both parallels and differences
between the various cases that can perhaps shed some light on the nature
of military rule in Burma.

Indonesia under Gen Suharto seems to be the closest comparison with
contemporary Burma, even if optimism about present-day democratization
across that vast archipelago does not have any Burmese parallel right now.

Like Burma, the Indonesian army played a central role in winning
independence, which entrenched the military’s centrality and authority.
Like Burma, Indonesia is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country—albeit on
a vaster scale.

Fears among the military elites in both that peripheral or ethnic minority
regions could secede were used to justify for an overweening military
influence in both countries and ultimately a military coup in the case of
Burma in 1962. In Indonesia, the army retained a dwifungsi (dual function)
in both defense/security and government, between 1957, when democratic
rule was discarded, and 1998, when the long era of Suhartos's
military-backed authoritarianism ended amid chaos and near civil war.

Under Suharto, the military was given corporate representation in
government and state-owned corporations. Each military branch has its own
foundation, operating businesses in the financial sector, travel industry,
manufacturing and resource extraction. Similarly, as Win Min outlines, the
Burmese army monopolizes the economy through a crony system.

Two vast conglomerates predominate—the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings
(UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation (MEC)—both of which have been
led by active military officers. Most of the inward FDI is channeled
through UMEH, and both entities are involved in a wide array of business
across the full spectrum of the national economy.

Since 1998, the Indonesian military has relinquished its reserved seats in
parliament and retreated from its dominance of politics in the
archipelago, under pressure from a long-suppressed democratic movement.

While this does not mean that civilian control over the military has been
asserted, it is a clear difference between Indonesia and Burma, where the
2008 constitution is geared toward giving the military effective control,
under a civilian veneer, in a future Burma.

Under the new constitution, the proposed new military commander-in-chief
will have greater authority than the president (who almost certainly will
be a retired military officer in any case) in key areas.

Twenty-five percent of national members of parliament and 33 percent of
regional MPs will be active military officers appointed by the military
chief, and there is no plan to phase this out.

Constitutional amendments will require a 75 percent majority, with the
military effectively having a veto over the legislation process. Massive
power will be vested in the new National Defense and Security Council,
which can declare a state of emergency, and will have more military
officers than civilians.

Closer to Burma, Thailand reached a nadir of sorts in civil-military
relations with the 1992 coup and Black May crackdown. Military involvement
in politics retreated until the September 2006 coup which ousted Thaksin
Shinawatra, who transgressed some red lines by appointing some of his
supporters to top military positions.

Echoing the Burma case somewhat, as noted by Paul Chambers, a senior
research fellow at the University of Heidelberg, in his presentation to
the ISIS conference, battling political parties (the yellows and the reds)
and external threats (the Cambodia border dispute) have been used to
justify or facilitate an increased role for the military in politics in
the post-Thaksin era, and the 20008 Internal Security Act gives the
military ample scope to transgress on democratic principles and the
civilian realm.

The military is dominant in the Thai Ministry of Defense, and the National
Security Council is paralleled by the MoD Defense Council. However, in
comparison with Burma, military dominance of Thai politics is
relatively-light, or covert, rather than in-your-face.

Chambers sees the Thai military as reverting to hidden-hand rule-by-proxy,
enabling it to avoid perpetrating another Black May, or even another
September 2006 coup. Prof Suchit Bunbongkarn of ISIS believes that the
Thai military is somewhat averse to direct rule, as recent political
developments have underscored the complexities of government in a
challenging political environment.

The Philippines has a lurid history of coups and attempted coups, right up
to the present administration under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Similar to Indonesia and Thailand, the armed forces of the Philippines
sees itself as having a de facto legitimate political role, with ample
opportunity for side-interests in business and the economy.

However, though none of the militaries under discussion appear to be
monolithic, it is arguable that the Philippines is more fractured when it
comes to allegiances to mainstream politics and politicians.

That has had some positive impact, however, and offers a point of
clarification for the Burmese case. With the recent death of Cory Aquino,
there has been much reminiscing about the causes and consequences of the
1986 People's Power revolution in Manila, which ended the authoritarian
kleptocracy of Ferdinand Marcos.

The army did not turn on protesting civilians on that occasion, a marked
contrast with the military reaction to the Saffron Revolution in Burma,
the second anniversary of which has just passed.
Perhaps the junta has learned from this example, by keeping a large,
powerful and united military through its monopolization of the economy,
and after 2010, a faux-legitimate civilianization of military rule. This
will build upon the top-down, bottom-up system of control the junta has
been crafting since military rule almost collapsed in 1988.

Politically, this involved ceasefires with the ethnic insurgencies,
weakening the urban opposition and pro-democracy activists, and weakening
links between the ethnic groups and the Burmese opposition.

Meanwhile, the regime aims to enlarge the army to 500,000 troops, despite
already having the largest standing army in the region. By establishing a
mass organization known as the USDA, thought to number 24 million members
(though it’s unknown how many of these members are enthusiastic or
consenting signatories), and peace/development councils staffed by
military and ex-military members all the way down to the ward/village
level, the junta is seeking optimum control at all levels of society under
a civilian veneer.

While it is impossible to know the true opinion of the mass of Burmese
soldiers about how the ruling generals govern the country, it appears the
junta has worked to forestall any splits or reformism in the corridors of
power that could assist or give a green light to pro-democracy activists
or lead to a more successful Saffron Revolution II.

After the purge of Gen Khin Nyunt and his apparently reformist
intelligence cadre, the military retired about 3,000 officers in 2007-8
and reappointed them to the civil service. Win Min regards this move as
setting-up another bulwark against potential dissidence in the
bureaucracy, should another Saffron Revolution break out.

According to Andrew Selth of Griffith University, blogging on the Web site
Lowy Institute for International Policy in April 2008, the 2007 protests
and ensuing international condemnation of the regime focused minds among
the junta top brass, who now appear to have closed ranks and set aside any
differences for now.

The upshot? A flawed constitution and undemocratic electoral process; the
return of Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest, with another 2,100 political
prisoners under lock and key, and the possibility of renewed war with
ethnic minority groups.

The junta appears determined to maintain the balance of military-civil
relations in Burma decisively in its own favor and as seen in the recent
offensive against the Kokang in northern Shan State, it will not shy away
from offending China, its chief ally and patron, to achieve its goal of
maintaining military control of the country.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

September 10, Inter Press Service
Chinese pipelines in Burma to push ahead amid criticism – Antoaneta Bezlova

Beijing — Despite fresh international criticism of Beijing’s backing for
an unpopular regime as the Burmese junta, China sees its alliance with the
country’s military as a matter of simple economic expediency and is
determined to forge ahead with controversial joint dual oil and gas
pipelines that will ensure greater energy security for its robust economy.

This month sees the first digs on the mammoth infrastructure project that
will connect China’s northwestern province of Yunnan with Burma’s western
coast.

The proposed gas pipeline will transfer gas from the offshore Shwe gas
fields in Arakan state all the way to the capital Kunming of Yunnan
province and possibly further inland in China. The twin oil pipeline will
be used to transfer oil shipped from the Middle East and Africa bypassing
the strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait shipping route.

After Burmese activists released a detailed report Monday on the project
forecasting it will trigger social unrest and create a public relations
fiasco for the Chinese company involved, a state-run newspaper in Beijing
rejected the allegations, saying the project was unlikely to be stopped.

The Shwe Gas Movement, a group of Burmese exiles in Bangladesh, India and
Thailand, also said the junta's recent offensive against ethnic rebels
near the pipeline route showed that the regime had no concerns about
providing stability for investors, which could translate into great
security risks for the project undertakers.

"China is not afraid of the threat and criticism," the ‘Global Times’—a
paper published by the state news agency—quoted an anonymous Chinese
official familiar with the issue. "When Myanmar (Burma’s official name)
was constructing a pipeline to Thailand in the 1990s, Myanmar activists
also criticized the government, but the voice is barely heard now."

Outside observers though believe the new pipeline project carries greater
potential risks than the pipeline conveying gas to Thailand, which they
described as a "vehicle for a proliferation of human rights abuses" during
its construction and after—such as the widespread use of forced labor and
forced evictions.

"Such practices, in the likelihood they would re-occur with respect to
this latest pipeline, could very well be the spark to set off a broader
conflict," said Sean Turnell, a Burma expert at Macquarie University in
Australia. "Of course, exacerbating matters is the fact that Chinese
energy firms have a less than stellar record themselves when it comes to
the ruthlessness with which they pursue energy deals."

China's largest oil and gas producer, China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC), is due to start the construction of the dual pipelines at a total
length of nearly 4,000 kilometres in September. The deal is expected to
provide the Burmese military, which has ruled the country with an iron
grip since a 1962 coup, with at least US$ 29 billion over 30 years.

Although Burma ranks 10th in the world in terms of natural gas reserves,
its per capita electricity consumption is less than 5 percent of
neighboring Thailand and China, as its government exports most of the
country’s energy resources.

The Shwe Gas Movement report, titled ‘Corridor of Power’, charges that gas
revenues in the past have been lavishly spent by the junta on building a
new capital and satisfying the extravagant wishes of its ruling generals.

"People across Burma are facing severe energy shortages, and this massive
energy export will only fuel social unrest," said Wong Aung, spokesperson
of the Shwe Gas Movement. "These resources belong to our people and should
be used for the energy needs of our country."

China—the exclusive buyer of Burma’s Shwe offshore gas reserves—sees the
pipelines as one of the pieces in a greater energy domino played by
Beijing to secure its energy supplies.

Burma’s pipelines constitute part of CNPC’s four-fold strategy to avoid
China’s dependence on imported oil shipped by sea. Since 2004 Beijing has
negotiated the construction of overland pipelines in four different
directions, connecting Chinese energy buyers with suppliers in Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Burma.

"The greatest significance of Burma’s pipelines for China lies with the
possibility for solving our reliance on the Malacca shipping route," said
Long Changwei, expert at China University of Petroleum. "Once it is built,
the pipeline will be a reliable alternative for oil flowing in from the
Middle East and Africa. Even if there is a crisis in the Malacca Straits,
China’s exposure to it will be greatly minimized."

In addition, the development of a deep sea port on Burma’s western coast
will provide China with access to the Bay of Bengal—a strategic advantage
in its attempts to expand its sphere of influence over the Indian Ocean.

Yet there are flip sides to this new energy corridor. The proposed
pipelines run through the northeastern Shan State, where as recently as
late August, ceasefire ethnic minority armies fought against the regime.
The clashes between the Burmese military and the Kokang rebels that sent
tens of thousands of refugees fleeing across the Chinese border have
raised the possibility that there might be more social strife and armed
conflicts if the pipelines project gets underway.

CNPC is going to have to be "very careful," said Macquarie University’s
Turnell. "What was once a simple deal to extract cheap gas for China could
blow up into a diplomatic crisis should the pipeline aggravate the
incipient conflict between ethnic groups long backed by China, and a
regime in Burma that was long thought of as likewise a client of China."

In a longer term, China’s willingness to help an unpopular regime stay in
power could turn out to be short-sighted as it encourages latent anti-
Chinese sentiment. Chinese communities that have worked very closely with
military regimes in South-east Asia and become immensely rich in the
process have been targeted before, as evidenced by violent anti-Chinese
riots in Indonesia when the Suharto regime fell in 1998.

The Shwe Gas Movement report suggests that China would be in a better
position to trade with Burma under a stable government. It also argues
that the current military rulers’ political roadmap does not aim at
bringing peace and political stability to the country.

____________________________________

September 10, Xinhua
China says no involvement in Myanmar's domestic issues – Editor, Li Xianzhi

Beijing -- Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu on Thursday
reaffirmed China's no involvement policy in Myanmar's internal affairs and
called for peaceful solutions.

Jiang made the comments in response to a question whether Myanmar's action
to send troops to Kokang region was based on China's information.

"China never interferes in Myanmar's internal affairs and would like to
see Myanmar resolve its issues through peaceful consultations," she said.

Armed conflicts broke out in Myanmar in August after a move-in of the
government troops in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang region. The
standoff between the two forces have triggered large outflux of border
inhabitants into the neighboring Yunnan Province's Nansan area.

____________________________________


September 10, Times Now (India)
Myanmar: No Chinese bases on Coco islands

With reports of China's growing presence in the Indian ocean area, India
has for the first time taken an assertive position to combat the growing
threat of China around the Indian region.

The Vice Admiral of the Indian Navy Anoop Singh has told TIMES NOW that
India has raised the issue of China with Myanmar. Earlier reports had
surfaced that China was attempting to establish bases in Myanmar's Coco
Islands. The Vice Admiral has said that India has raised the issue with
the Myanmar government which has replied saying that there are no Chinese
bases anywhere near Myanmar and certainly not at the Coco Islands.

The Coco Islands are a 20 sq km bit of land close to the Andaman coast. It
is about 200 kms away from Maynmar.

____________________________________

September 10, Indo-Asian News Service (IANS)
Dhaka disputes maritime boundary claims of India, Myanmar

Dhaka - Bangladesh has sent a diplomatic note to the UN against Myanmar's
maritime boundary claim on the extended continental shelf in the Bay of
Bengal and will soon register its protest against India's claim there.
Sandwiched between the two neighbours, Dhaka will send its own claims only
by July 2011, a minister told parliament Thursday.

Information Minister Abul Kalam Azad informed parliament about the
government's diplomatic move on behalf of Foreign Minister Dipu Moni who
is currently visiting India, Star Online reported.

The contentious issue pending resolution has gained urgency in view of oil
and gas finds in the upper reaches of the Bay of Bengal.

Dhaka cleared two proposals earlier this month, awarding blocks to an
American and an Irish multinational firm for exploration, but it took care
that the blocks were 'safe' and not liable for dispute by either
neighbour.

Myanmar and India made their submissions to the UN Dec 16, 2008, and May
11, 2009, respectively.

The deadline for officially registering the claims of the 150 nautical
miles or more areas of the continental shelf beyond 200-nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone is July 27, 2011.

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

September 10, BBC News
Gas firms 'prop up Burma's junta'

Energy giants Total and Chevron have been accused of propping up Burma's
military government through their gas projects in the country.

Rights group Earth Rights International says this has allowed the
government to siphon off $5bn (£3bn) in revenue.

The money has reportedly been stashed in banks in Singapore, instead of
being used to ease poverty in Burma.

The rights group also accuses Total and Chevron of ignoring forced labour,
killings and high-level corruption.

The two companies deny the allegations and say they play a positive and
constructive role in communities, with development and educational
programmes.

Two Singapore banks named in the report also denied involvement.

Government 'lifeline'

Earth Rights International has published two reports about the Yadana gas
pipeline project, which transports gas overland from offshore fields to
Thailand.

''Total and Chevron have essentially provided the military regime with its
single largest lifeline - that being the revenue generated from the
project," said Matthew Smith, the co-ordinator of Earth Rights
International's Burma project.

He explained that, in research conducted over a two-year period, sources
explained how the Burmese generals kept the money out of the country's
budget and stored it in bank accounts in Singapore.

"Of the $4.83bn generated since 2000, approximately $4.8bn of that is not
included in the national budget, and our sources indicate that the
military regime is storing its illicit revenue and ill-gotten gains in two
foreign banks in Singapore," he said.

The report names the two banks, but both issued statements denying
involvement in Burma's Yadana project and saying the findings are untrue
and without basis.

The allegation of human rights abuses are against the Burmese army which
provides security for the Total and Chevron operated pipeline.

Sanctions?

Sean Turnell, an associate professor of economics at Macquarie University
in Sydney who follows energy issues in Burma closely, says the way the
ruling generals make so much money raises the issue of sanctions.

''As we know, countries like the United States and Europe have fairly
strict financial sanctions on Burma," he said.

"Burma's generals are able to evade these using other countries and I
think what could be an interesting step forward would be for the countries
that are levying these sanctions to try and pressure some of the other
countries to similarly apply sanctions."

Chevron and Total are not restricted by economic sanctions imposed on
Burma's rulers by the US and the European Union.

According to the BBC's Asia correspondent Alistair Leithead, there is a
debate over whether sanctions should be strengthened or abandoned as an
international approach towards Burma, where the majority of people live in
severe poverty.

____________________________________

September 10, The Independent
Burmese generals pocket $5bn from Total oil deal - Andrew Buncombe

An impoverished nation is deprived as pipeline cash is deposited in
foreign bank accounts, report claims

The Burmese military junta has earned almost $5bn from a controversial gas
pipeline operated by the French oil giant Total and deprived the country
of vital income by depositing almost all the money in bank accounts in
Singapore, a new report claims.

Campaigners say Total has also profited handsomely from the arrangement,
with an estimated income of $483m from the project since 2000. Campaigners
say that the windfall from the Yadana pipeline, operated by Total and two
other partners, has been so huge that it has done much to insulate the
country's military rulers from the impact of international sanctions
imposed over its human rights abuses. The report from EarthRights
International (ERI), published today, argues that this makes Total and
their partners a major factor in reinforcing the regime's intransigence.
And it claims that while their people suffer some of the worst standards
of living in Asia, with miserable state investment in health, education,
infrastructure and everything else that affects the lives of ordinary
people, the self-perpetuating military elite has grown obscenely wealthy.

The pipeline in eastern Burma, which carries gas from rich fields in the
Andaman Sea through Burma and into Thailand, has long been controversial.
Campaigners have regularly claimed that the authorities have used forced
labour in the project, security for which is provided by the Burmese armed
forces. Last month, Total rejected claims that forced labour was still
being used.

Yet the information contained in the report from ERI, a respected
Thailand-based group, provides the most detailed insight yet into the vast
sums earned by the regime from the pipeline and what happens to that
wealth.

In the report, Total Impact, which has taken two years to research, the
group says the junta, headed by General Than Shwe, manages to avoid
including almost all its dollar gas revenues in the national budget by
using an artificially low exchange rate. This way it calculates its
revenue as just 6 kyat to the dollar when the real rate is closer to
1,000. According to a confidential IMF report obtained by ERI, the natural
gas revenue "contributed less than 1 per cent of total budget revenue in
2007/08, but would have contributed about 57 per cent if valued at the
market exchange rate". The report says that at these rates, the regime has
listed just $29m of its earnings while around $4.8bn is unaccounted for.

The report says that "reliable sources" have indicated that the Burmese
military regime's portion of the Yadana earnings are located in two
leading offshore banks in Singapore - the Overseas Chinese Banking
Corporation (OCBC), which holds the majority of the revenue, and DBS
Group. ERI says that OCBC is Singapore's longest established local bank.

"The military elite are hiding billions of dollars of the people's revenue
in Singapore while the country needlessly suffers under the lowest social
spending in Asia," said ERI's Matthew Smith, the report's main author.
"The revenue from this pipeline is the regime's lifeline and a critical
leverage point that the international community could use to support the
people of Burma."

The apparent disregard for its people is a charge that has long been
levelled at the Burmese junta, which calls itself the State Peace and
Development Council. The group Burma Campaign UK has estimated the
regime's spending on health services is the lowest in the world – just 50
pence per person a year – while it spends up to half its budget on the
military.

Criticism of the regime increased last year in the aftermath of Cyclone
Nargis when the authorities were accused of a fatally slow and inadequate
response to the storm that left 140,000 people dead. Suspicious of the
motives of outside organisations, the authorities resisted granting entry
visas to scores of aid workers. US and other foreign vessels carrying
badly needed emergency supplies were refused permission to dock.

Yet while the regime appears happy to let its people suffer – Burma today
is the poorest country in the region – senior members of the junta enjoy
lives of luxury and excess. In November 2006, a rare insight into the
extravagance of the regime was provided by a video of the wedding party of
Than Shwe's daughter to an army officer. In the video, posted on the
internet, copious amounts of champagne was poured while gifts totalling an
estimated $50m were handed to the couple. The wedding presents included
cars jewellery and houses.

For a regime facing a series of sanctions and widespread pressure to
release political prisoners, including the detained opposition leader,
Aung San Suu Kyi, energy deals have become a key bargaining chip in its
relations with regional powers such as China and India.

The junior international partners in the Yadana pipeline are Chevron,
which is said too have earned $437m from the project, and PTTEP of
Thailand, which has earned around $394m. Burma's state-controlled Myanmar
Oil and Gas Enterprise is also involved in the operation. Last month The
Independent revealed allegations that the Yadana pipeline was still being
serviced by forced labour, claims that were denied by Total.

Last night the Burmese Embassy in London failed to respond to questions
about the report's allegations. A spokeswoman for Total said it was unable
to respond comprehensively to the claims made by ERI as it had not seen
the document. Asked about its earning in Burma, the spokeswoman said: "We
do not usually comment on our earnings per country. Nevertheless our
amount in Myanmar represents 0.7 per cent of the group's results."

She said that in 2008, the group's income was €13.9bn (around $20bn),
suggesting Total annually earns $140m from Burma and its controversial
pipeline.

A brutal regime: Military rulers who profit

Burma has been under the thumb of the military since 1962, and the current
junta has ruled since the late 1980s when it brutally crushed a democracy
movement, killing up to 6,000 people.

At the head of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) sits senior
leader Than Shwe, a former postal clerk now aged 76. Initially considered
something of a moderate, the general has shown himself to be increasingly
authoritarian and hostile to negotiations. Located in the remote jungle
capital of Naypidaw since late 2005, the SPDC's other senior members
include vice chairman Maung Aye, who has a reputation for ruthlessness and
xenophobia. Some reports suggest that he and Than Shwe are involved in a
power struggle.

Third-in-command in the military structure is Shwe Mann, Joint Chief of
Staff and co-ordinator of the special forces. A father of three sons, Shwe
Mann became a powerful figure in the regime when he was appointed head of
all three services.

Then Sein holds the position of prime minister and is considered to be a
strong supporter of Than Shwe. In May 2008, as head of the junta's
disaster preparedness committee, he became the point man for relief
efforts related to Cyclone Nargis. He was notoriously pictured on the
front page of a state-run newspaper handing out television sets when
people were desperate for food, water and electricity.

The oil giant: Total's global reach

Total's adventures with the Burmese generals have disturbing parallels
with the involvement of another French oil giant, Elf – a company Total
swallowed in 2000 – with corrupt military dictators in Africa. It's an
inglorious story that ended with one of Europe's biggest corruption trials
in 2003 and the conviction of three senior executives at Elf. Soon
afterwards the company was absorbed into Total and Elf's African
operations were rebranded.

A Paris courtroom heard how the oil riches of West and central Africa from
Gabon to Cameroon and Congo to Angola had flowed back and forth between
Elf and its client leaders – three of whom are still in power while the
third, Omar Bongo, died earlier this year.

In that case, although not in this, the company's senior management were
accused of personally profiting from the deals. Elf's former chairman,
Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, received a five-year jail sentence in 2003, as did
the former director Alfred Sirven, while the company's "Mr Africa", Andre
Tarallo, was jailed for four years and fined €2m (£1.75m).

The court heard how huge sums were paid – more than €16m annually to
President Bongo – to ensure these leaders stayed loyal to Elf. The
defendants maintained that French leaders and parties received similar
sums to ensure no one interfered with the arrangement.

In Gabon, that meant Elf could act as a "state within a state", while the
sweeteners ensured that France's military and espionage operations
operated with impunity.

Today, Total is investing nearly $5bn (£3bn) in its Africa operations and
is doing business with the same stalwarts from the Elf years: Paul Biya in
Cameroon, Denis Sassou Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville, and José Eduardo dos
Santos in Angola. What these countries have in common are sham elections,
broken constitutions, rampant corruption and mass poverty.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

September 9, Bangkok Post (Commentary):
A ticking time-bomb no one's defusing: A stateless boy exposes Thailand's
vulnerability and dilemma – Thitinan Pongsudhirak

On the face of it, the extraordinary tale of Mong Thongdee, a 12-year-old
boy of Shan parentage, should have no far-reaching ramifications.
Stateless but gifted, Mong was initially denied foreign travel rights by
Thailand's Interior Ministry for his lack of Thai citizenship.

Mong Thongdee thanks Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva for stepping in to
help him attend a paper airplane competition in Japan.

As the Thai bureaucracy played ping-pong on his aspiration to compete in a
Japan-sponsored paper plane competition on Thailand's behalf, Mong's story
eventually elicited sympathy from the right movers and shakers, led by
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

Weeks of frustration were followed by several days of facilitation. His
travel papers now in place, Mong is poised to show his skills in the Land
of the Rising Sun.

Mong's tale will surely follow him to Japan, but not for the right
reasons. The boy personifies the last two decades of what has taken place
in Burma, Thailand, Thai-Burmese relations, Thailand's economic
development, and the ineptitude and myopia of Thai policy-makers and
bureaucrats throughout.

Mong's story is a harbinger of Thailand's ticking time bomb that contains
the explosive growth of migrant labourers and their offspring who have
been left unaddressed with little prospect of advancement and
accommodation in Thai society.

His Shan ancestry is instructive. It signifies ethnic diversity in
mainland Southeast Asia that is difficult to subsume under statehood. Like
many legal and illegal migrant labourers from Burma , Mong's Shan parents
came to seek economic opportunities in Thailand.

The Shans have long been a principal ethnic group in the mainland, and
have reigned over rival ethnicities in centuries past. The fluid and
dynamic people's movements across ethnic lines transcending state
boundaries require cross-border cooperation between concerned governments.

Regional cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia is necessary to
effectively handle ethnic diversity and its varied quest for better
economic opportunities.

Moreover, the migrant labourers from Thailand's western neighbour are a
consequence of what has transpired in Burma since the late 1980s.

Economic deprivation and political persecution have driven countless
Burmese abroad. Many have ended up in Thailand's informal economy, eking
out meagre earnings in menial work, with inferior status and little access
to education and healthcare.

The initial waves of these labourers put up with all methods of unfair
employer treatment. But over time, they have spawned an entire generation
of offspring who will need to be integrated into Thai society.

In another decade, children of Burmese parents, born and bred on Thai
soil, will grow up to be young adults in need of jobs. They need to be
accommodated and brought into the fold, lest they are driven from the
informal economy to underground activities. As in Mong Thongdee's case,
they can provide talent and skills that can augment Thai society and
contribute to the Thai economy. The long-term solution for the Thai
authorities and many of the Burmese migrant labourers and those in the
Burmese diaspora is for a transformation of Burma from a reclusive
military dictatorship that mostly extracts natural resources for a living,
to a workable pluralistic body politic that can promote broader-based
economic development. However, the spectre of an engaged and modernised
Burma with international legitimacy and genuine development prospects
remains in the distance.

Even if Burma moves ahead on this horizon, the children of Burmese migrant
labourers may well choose to make their livelihood in Thailand, where they
have grown up and whose language they speak.

And the Thai economy needs them. Thailand's cold and neglected reality
centres on the migrant labourers' indispensable role in its
labour-intensive industries, from back-breaking construction work and
fisheries production to household help. More than two million Burmese
migrant labourers, close to 10% of the labour force, are estimated to be
working and living in Thailand, doing the necessary growth-promoting jobs
Thais have come to shun. These migrant labourers have helped maintain
manageable wages, and enabled Thailand to hang on to its labour-intensive
industries.

Mong Thongdee is a hapless messenger. Many thousands of children of
Burmese parentage like him need to be given proper education and
healthcare.

The Thai authorities - from directors-general, ministers and even the
prime minister - should not have treated his stateless case as a
bureaucratic exercise and publicity benefits. He is providing Thailand
with a chance and a challenge to come up with an integrated, long-term
approach towards Burmese migrant labourers whose sweat and toil the Thai
economy can no longer do without.

As Burma's military machine gears up for a major fight with its ethnic
groups along the Thai-Burma border, ahead of planned elections next year,
more labourers and refugees will come.

The Thai policy-makers and bureaucrats across the ministries need to
consider permanent residency status tied to time in Thailand and begin to
review the Thai legal regime on citizenry.

Many thousands like Mong Thongdee are out there in the Thai economy, and a
considerable handful of them can make any country proud. All of them
deserve a rightful and legitimate place in Thai society.

The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International
Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.