BurmaNet News, December 3, 2009

[Editor]

December 3, 2009 Issue #3852


INSIDE BURMA
DVB: UN aid ‘loaned’ to Chin famine victims
Irrawaddy: Tatmadaw founder calls on soldiers to work for people's sake

ON THE BORDER
SHAN: Burmese Army, Wa; both on high alert
Right Vision News (Pakistan): Bangladesh: BDR chief to visit Myanmar next
week

HEALTH
DVB: HIV/AIDS rates in Burmese prisons high
DPA: Myanmar suspends doctor for fatal appendectomy

INTERNATIONAL
BBC News: Gambari to head Darfur UN mission

OPINION / OTHER
Indian Defence Review: Prospects for democratization in Myanmar: Impact on
India – David I Steinberg
Irrawaddy: One-sided engagement won't work – Aung Zaw



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

December 3, Democratic Voice of Burma
UN aid ‘loaned’ to Chin famine victims – Francis Wade

Aid given by the United Nations to malnourished villagers in Burma’s
northwestern Chin and Kachin states may be coming in the form of repayable
loans, an investigation has found.

Moreover, in some cases the loans are allegedly tied to a 200 percent rate
of interest on repayment, according to Christian Solidarity Worldwide
(CSW) and the Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART).

Chin state is currently suffering from an acute food crisis, due largely
to a mass rodent infestation which is destroying farmland and food
supplies. A joint CSW-HART delegation has recently visited the India-Burma
border near to Kachin and Chin states.

The delegation was told by representatives of the Chin Famine Emergency
Relief Committee that in at least 17 villages in Paletwa township, the
worst affected part of Chin state, the local UN Development Programme
(UNDP) has distributed international funds in the form of loans, instead
of providing food aid.

“Villagers claim they have been told they must repay twice the amount they
are given, either in cash or in rice bags”, said a statement released by
the group.

Aye Lwin, from the Community Development for Remote Township Project, a
subsection of the UNDP in Burma, told DVB today that UNDP officials had
spoken with community leaders in several of the townships in Chin state
and would be preparing an official report.

The UNDP is operating two food aid programmes in the region; a “rice
assistance programme” and a “rice bank activity”, he said. For the latter
“the villagers need to pay back the rice. This is our regular programme”.

He denied however that the UNDP had set the interest rate cited in the
CSW/HART report.

“The UNDP never set up the interest rate. For the rice bank activity,
interest rates are basically set by the village community; all the village
members,” he said.

“They organize a meeting and they discuss the activity and they try to
agree on the rules and regulations, including the interest rates.”

He added that from UNDP observations, the interest rates agreed by the
community were generally between 30 and 50 percent. “The 100 to 200
percent figure is the market price increase, not the UNDP’s,” he said.

“The UNDP’s purpose is just to facilitate the community; we never dictate
or influence the community to do this or do that. The decision maker is
basically the community members.”

Baroness Caroline Cox, chief executive of HART, who led the delegation to
the region, said that if reports of aid being loaned were true, then it
would call into question the legitimacy of aid provided by governments.

“The whole thing seems extraordinary; that food aid given by the British
governments or other organizations is made into a loan at all,” she said.

She added that a lot of the communities in the region were yet to receive
any food aid despite money being made available for them.

Moreover, because of the inaccessibility of the region from Rangoon, “we
urge everyone to allow cross-border aid from India to reach these
inaccessible places,” she said.

____________________________________

December 3, Irrawaddy
Tatmadaw founder calls on soldiers to work for people's sake

Former Brig-Gen Kyaw Zaw, one of only two founders of the Tatmadaw
(Burmese armed forces) still alive, on Thursday called on Burma's military
to work for the sake of the country's people.

“I would like to tell the junta and soldiers that the people of Burma are
the parents [of the Tatmadaw]. Therefore I would like to say to the
soldiers: “Look at the faces of the people! Don't see the people as your
enemies”,” he said.

“I am so sad that my beloved people are still in poverty. I am so sad
about that,” he added.

Kyaw Zaw issued the statement to mark the occasion of his 90th birthday,
which he celebrated in Kunming, in China’s Yunnan Province, today. He has
lived there as an exile since 1989.

Along with the late Burmese independence hero Gen Aung San and late
dictator Ne Win, he is one of the “Thirty Comrades” who are founders of
the current Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw was formed in Bangkok, Thailand, in
December 1941, after the thirty comrades were trained by the Japanese
Imperial Army on China's Hainan Island.

Kyaw Zaw remained with the Tatmadaw when most of the Thirty Comrades left
to join the Communist insurgency shortly after Burma’s independence in
January 1948. He was well-respected among his fellow soldiers as a
commander in the fight against insurgents and the Kuomintang, which
invaded eastern Burma in the early 1950s after losing China's civil war to
the Communists.

In 1957, however, he was forced to retire by Gen Ne Win, the then chief of
staff of the Tatmadaw, after he was suspected of having contact with
former colleagues in the Communist leadership.

Finally, after years of being monitored by the military intelligence
services, he fled in 1976 to the Communist Party of Burma’s territory in
northern Burma.

Although the Thirty Comrades are regarded as heroes of Burma’s
independence struggle, many of them met tragic or unhappy ends.
Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Gen Aung San, who is often
described as the father of the Tatmadaw, was assassinated just months
before Burma regained its independence.

Other members of the group, such as Bo Let Ya and Bo Zeya, were killed
fighting against the military regime established by Gen Ne Win in 1962.
After that regime collapsed in 1988 and was replaced by another junta
loyal to Ne Win, Aung San and Ne Win became the only members of the Thirty
Comrades who continued to be honored.

However, the new regime started to downplay Aung San's role after his
daughter became an icon of the democracy movement. Pictures of Aung San
were removed from government offices and Burmese banknotes.

In December 2002, Ne Win joined the ranks of the Thirty Comrades who met
unhappy ends when he died at the age of 91 while under house arrest.

By that time, the current junta head, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, had taken total
control of power, arresting Ne Win and members of his family in February
2002 and charging a number of his close relatives with treason.

Many now criticize the current regime's treatment of the Tatmadaw’s
founding members.

“The current military leaders in Naypyidaw want to ignore the role of the
Thirty Comrades. They do not care about the founders’ role,” said Chan
Tun, a veteran politician in Rangoon. “It seems the generals forget the
roots of the Tatmadaw.”

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

December 3, Shan Herald Agency for News
Burmese Army, Wa; both on high alert – Hseng Khio Fah

The Burmese Army and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) are said to have been
put on high alert and are intensively preparing for an anticipated
military showdown, according to a reliable source coming to the Thai-Burma
border.

Over 10 tanks of the Burmese Army were said to have been despatched to
Tangyan, 83 miles south of Lashio, Shan State North, since the first week
of October.

It is now redeploying its troops, rebuilding bunkers and trenches around
Wa territory with food supplies mainly at its Loi Panglong base, northwest
of the Wa capital Panghsang, said a source close to the Wa leadership.

Likewise, the UWSA units on both the Thai-Burma and the Sino-Burma border
are also into preparations since they were informed that the Burmese Army
was intensively reinforcing its troops and weapons in border areas facing
its mountain bases.

According to senior officers from the Wa, there is an 80 per cent
likelihood of an impending offensive by the Burmese Army.

“We have informed all our units to pay more attention,” a source quoted
one of the Wa senior officers as saying.

Meanwhile, its southern fighters along the Thai-Burma border are
reportedly shifting their families to safer areas since last week, said
the source.

The relationship between the Burmese Army and the Wa Army has been
increasingly souring after the Wa  told Lt-Gen Ye Myint, Naypyitaw’s chief
negotiator that it would stand by its 14 November presentation that junta
officers would not be allowed to run the Wa forces at the battalion level.
They would however be allotted two seats in either of its two military
regions: one for deputy commander and the other for deputy chief of staff.

Ye Myint had earmarked the end of December as the new and the final
deadline for the acceptance of its proposal for the group to be
transformed into the Burmese Army-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGF).

____________________________________

December 3, Right Vision News (Pakistan)
Bangladesh: BDR chief to visit Myanmar next week

Pakistan – Director General of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) Md Mainul Islam
will visit Myanmar next week to hold talks on various contentious issues,
especially the recent military build up and manoeuvre by the Myanmar
government at the border with Bangladesh. He will lead a six-member
delegation also to discuss the thorny issue of Rohingya refugees,
trans-border crimes, smuggling of arms and illicit drugs, and problems
faced by Bangladeshi fishermen in the Naf river and Bay of Bengal. “The
visit is aimed at building confidence between the border forces of the two
countries against the backdrop of the recent developments in the border
areas," Mainul Islam told madia yesterday. The BDR chief said they hold
talks and share information regularly with the BSF but no DG-level meeting
between the border forces of Bangladesh and Myanmar was held in the last
three years. "We hardly hold talks or exchange views even if any crisis
arises in border areas," he added. The BDR headquarters put forward the
proposal for the visit following days of tension in October this year when
Myanmar military junta mobilised massive forces at the frontier. Numerous
intelligence reports of BDR and other agencies then informed the
Bangladesh government that Myanmar was preparing for a war to establish
its control over the mineral resource rich waters of the Bay of Bengal. In
November 2008, the Myanmar government was forced to withdraw its oil and
gas exploration project, and drilling equipment from the waters claimed by
Bangladesh. Some of the intelligence reports mentioned that this year's
military build up at the border by Myanmar was nothing but manoeuvring for
gaining an opportunity to resume its explorations in the Bay of Bengal.
Some other reports however warned the Bangladesh authorities that Myanmar
might launch an attack on Bangladesh in a bid to capture the Saint
Martin's Island and a part of Teknaf to establish its hegemony in the Bay
of Bengal. During the upcoming four-day trip, the BDR chief will meet his
counterpart Nasaka chief, and the interior and home ministers of that
country.

He will also call on the Bangladesh ambassador in Yangon, according to the
itinerary the BDR headquarters sent to the home ministry. It said the BDR
chief will also visit the Bangladesh-Myanmar border at Maungdaw in Rakhine
state where the military mobilisation occurred, and where now stands a
barbed wire fence erected by Myanmar. He is being scheduled to visit the
border immigration headquarters of Myanmar and the headquarters western
command as well." The director general will discuss border issues like
smuggling of arms and drugs, recent Nasaka activities along the
Bangladesh-Myanmar border, problems faced by Bangladeshi fishermen,
illegal crossing of border and other issues of mutual interests," said a
BDR letter sent to the home ministry. The letter hoped that the visit and
cooperation of the Myanmar authorities will eventually help maintain peace
and tranquillity along the border of the two neighbours. Three senior BDR
officers and one official each from the foreign ministry and home ministry
will accompany the BDR chief during the visit. Published by HT Syndication
with permission from Right Vision News. For more information on news feed
please contact Sarabjit Jagirdar at htsyndication at hindustantimes.com

____________________________________
HEALTH

December 3, Democratic Voice of Burma
HIV/AIDS rates in Burmese prisons high – Naw Say Phaw

Medical negligence and lack of contraception in Burmese prisons are
leading to high rates of HIV infection among inmates, a political prisoner
support group has warned.

At least 10 political prisoners in Burma have died of AIDS-related
illnesses, many of whom were healthy before being sentenced, said Tate
Naing, from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma
(AAPP).

“U Hla Than, NLD’s [1990] people’s parliament representative was HIV
positive when he died in prison in 1996, according to a doctor’s report.
Ko Sithu of Rangoon University Students’ Union died of AIDS after a long
stretch in prison – we also have doctor’s confirmation on that,” he said.

A recent UN report found that HIV/AIDS rates in Burma remain high,
particularly among homosexual men, female sex workers and injecting drug
users. Around 18 percent of female sex workers are thought to carry the
disease.

The situation inside prisons is compounded by woefully inadequate
healthcare. Rangoon’s notorious Insein prison has only one hospital with
around 100 beds to cater for up to 10,000 prisoners.

Prisoners with only rudimentary medical training often double up as
practitioners in the absence of sufficient numbers of doctors and nurses.
According to a report released by a former Insein inmate, there were only
three doctors to treat the whole prison population.

Tate Naing said that the use of one syringe on multiple patients by prison
doctors was causing illnesses to spread rapidly.

“When the ICRC [International Committee for the Red Cross] was allowed go
for prison check-ups, the prison doctors did use the one-use syringes,” he
said. “But after the ICRC was barred from entering prisons in 2005, they
barely used them again.”

The friend of the late All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) member,
Bo Ne Aung, said that he had died from AIDS in 2001 shortly after being
released from prison.

“He was a healthy when he went into prison but when he came back out, he
was suffering from a lot of different diseases,” she said.

“Later, he was submitted to hospital and blood tests showed that he was
HIV positive. He died two months after that. He told me he became infected
from a syringe.”

The problem of needle sharing was corroborated by senior National League
for Democracy (NLD) party member, Win Tin, who spent 19 years in prison.
He said that prison medical services normally use one syringe, handled by
prison inmates, on multiple people.

“I was a frequent visitor to the prison hospital,” he said. “When I was in
the hospital, other prisoners next to my bed warned me not to take
injections and I didn’t understand why.

“Later I found out the reason when I saw an inmate show up with a needle
who started injecting different types medicines into a couple of patients
with only that syringe.”

____________________________________

December 3, Deutsche Presse-Agentur
Myanmar suspends doctor for fatal appendectomy

Yangon – Myanmar's medical council on Thursday suspended the license of a
surgeon who who mistakenly performed an appendectomy on a 15-year-old girl
who was in fact suffering from dengue fever.

In a rare show of ethics in a country notorious for its poor health
services, the Myanmar Medical Council suspended the license of a surgeon
for five years for the death of Khaing Shun Lei Yi.

The high school student died during an operation performed on October 27
at Shwegondaing Special Clinic in Yangon.

The girl's parents accused the surgeon of diagnosing their daughter as
suffering from appendicitis when she actually had dengue fever, also known
as haemorrhagic fever because it can induce severe bleeding.

"He made clinical mistakes, lacked pre-operative and post-operative
assessment and lacked responsibility and accountability," the council said
in a statement.

Although it refrained from naming the suspended surgeon, the family of the
deceased identified him as doctor Kyi Soe.

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

December 3, BBC News
Gambari to head Darfur UN mission

Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari is to become the head of the UN-African
Union peacekeeping force in the conflict-hit Darfur region, the UN has
announced.

Mr Gambari is a former Nigerian foreign minister who is currently serving
as UN special envoy to Burma.

He will take up his post on 1 January 2010, a spokeswoman for UN chief Ban
Ki-moon said.

Mr Gambari replaces Congolese diplomat Rodolphe Adada, who stepped down
earlier this year.

Levels of violence have fallen in the region in recent months.

Violence flared in Darfur in 2003 when black African rebel groups took up
arms against the Sudanese government in Khartoum, complaining of
discrimination and neglect.

Pro-government Arab militias then started a campaign of violence,
targeting the black African population.

The UN says some 300,000 people have been killed in the six-year conflict.
Khartoum says about 10,000 have died.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

December 3, Indian Defence Review
Prospects for democratization in Myanmar: Impact on India – David I Steinberg

According to the military junta that rules Myanmar,1 the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) is on the cusp of the completion in 2010 of its
self-ordained “roadmap” to a form of “democracy” in the country - an
election, the inauguration of a bicameral representative national
legislature, local legislatures, and the operational stage of the new
constitution that was approved by a questionable referendum in May 2008.
These series of events will introduce a new “discipline-flourishing
democracy,” as the Senior General (and Head of State) Than Shwe has so
proclaimed.

How “democratic” will this new discipline-flourishing democracy be, and
what are its prospects for changing the orientation of Myanmar’s domestic
and foreign policy in both the near term and into the future? In spite of
protestations to the contrary by the Burmese expatriate community, human
rights advocates, and the United States (among other nations), Myanmar is
at present a strong state both in its exclusive monopoly on coercive
power, and in its capacity to limit any significant element of political
pluralism that could alter state control or even effect, in any major
sense, a reorientation of foreign policy. Over its score of years in
command, its power, capacity, and resources have grown. The foreign and
domestic policies of Myanmar are solely in the hands of the SPDC, and the
new constitution will ensure the autonomy of the tatmadaw (Burmese armed
forces) not only in its internal operations but also in its international
activities. Its multiple roles will not be compromised by the new
multi-party elected legislature at least over the next half-decade. As the
Senior General, quoting a Burmese proverb, indicated in an Armed Forces
Day speech on March 27, 2009, democracy is like a newly dug well - it does
not yield clear water for some time. The military will filter that water
for the foreseeable future.

It is ironic that the strengths of the regime are also its
vulnerabilities. Concepts of finite power and authority lead to its
personalization, and thus entourage politics that are complicated by
factionalism, and is further supported by a hierarchical society
strengthened by a military command system that brooks no dissent. Loyalty
is valued over competence, and orthodoxy is required not only among the
tatmadaw, but in other institutions, such as opposition political parties.
These reinforcements of the strong state are also its weaknesses.
Hierarchy leads to a Potemkin-village-like shielding of some of the top
leadership from the realities of current multiple crises, and thus timely
responses. Rigidity discourages innovative solutions to problems.
Entourage systems virtually require corruption to grease social and
economic skids. Strident responses to perceived foreign insults or threats
prevent arbitration and discourage compromise. Dirigiste policies inhibit
economic growth. Stifling of managed dissent forces it into the streets.
Yet in the near term the strong state will prevail. Although
discipline-flourishing democracy may be internationally challenged, the
prospects for successful internal challenges seem remote.

Although the human rights abuses of the military regimes in all of their
incarnations under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962-88), under
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC-1988-97), and now under
the present SPDC (1997 onwards), are all internationally well known and
deplored, and an embarrassment to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the United Nations, and other groups, this international
lack of legitimacy penetrates only partly into that semi-obscured state,
in which legitimacy is defined by the regime in alternative, indigenous
terms.

These terms, stridently repeated and the basis of a military ideology that
is required to be printed in all locally published volumes, which are
subject to censorship, and are taught in all schools, form the core, both
of its internal concept of power and its international relations. These
evolve around the ideology of national sovereignty and the unity of the
state, both of which the tatmadaw believes can only be maintained by the
military in its predominant role. The military has moved from legitimation
previously defined (1962-88) in now defunct socialist terms (although the
administration is still highly dirigiste) to one related to Buddhism but
more focused on the historic, inevitable, and paramount role of the
military in Burma/Myanmar’s past, present, and future, to which end
history has been rewritten. The military explicitly will guide the state,
as the new constitution expressly stipulates.

The policy implications of these attitudes, which predate military rule,
are that Burma/ Myanmar has and will continue to be guided by a strong
sense of nationalism that is too little appreciated abroad. Attempts at
external pressure, calls for “regime change,” characterization as an
“outpost of tyranny” or a “rogue” or “pariah” state, introduction and
strengthening of various forms of sanctions (four US tranches from 1988 to
2008), all are denigrated as efforts by imperialists or neo-imperialists
and their lackeys and minions as demeaning to national sovereignty.2

Under the Burmese concept of the discipline-flourishing democracy, the
tatmadaw will retain effective power through two forces: legislatures at
both the national and at all local levels that will have 25 percent
active-duty military personnel appointed by the Minister of Defense, plus
an unknown but likely to be significant number of pro-military civilian or
retired military who will win elections under the auspices of either the
military-mandated Union Solidarity and Development Association (some 24.6
million members) or one or more of the parties it will foster. The Burmese
authorities will maintain that a representative, multi-party political
system is in force, as it promised years ago, and thus that government
should be considered both as legitimate by the Burmese peoples, but also
by the international community. They are likely to cite the lack of
opposition parties in internationally accepted regimes such as China,
Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei, and claim unfair discrimination by the
industrialized world.

On The Foreign Equation

As the military fear for the unity and vitality of the country under
civilian control, they also fear foreign interventions. Although history
may not repeat itself, past patterns affect present attitudes, often
profoundly if inaccurately. Various Burmese regimes in past years have
been justified in fearing their neighbors and the major powers. Yet the
present junta is caught in a time warp; they do not recognize that
relations have changed in half a century, and no state wants the
balkanization of Burma/Myanmar.

All of Burma/Myanmar’s neighbors have directly or indirectly supported
rebellions or insurrections and have called for either the overthrow of
the national government or autonomy for peripheral regions. Some, such as
India and Thailand, have shielded dissidents and refugees of various
ethnicities. If the People’s Republic of China supported the Burma
Communist Party (Deng Xiao Ping claiming that relations among states were
different from relations among political parties) as well as some northern
minorities and trained rebels, the United States supported the Kuomintang
(Chinese Nationalist) troops that fled into Burma following the
establishment of the Communist state, and has supplied assistance to
dissident groups on the Thai side of the border. The unarticulated Thai
policy until 1988 was to create buffer zones by supporting rebellious
groups along the border between the conservative regime in Bangkok and
what was viewed as radical governments in Rangoon. Bangladesh (and before
it, East Pakistan) harboured Muslim rebels. The multi-ethnic tribal
societies that straddle the Burma/Myanmar-Indian border in India’s
Northeast and Manipur have protected rebels and refugees from Myanmar.
They have moved back and forth and created sanctuaries in the uncontrolled
areas on both sides of the border. Burman isolation was further
exacerbated by minority Christian and Muslim external contacts with
co-religionist organizations. However misguided and incongruous, there is
a real fear of a US invasion, dramatically illustrated in the response to
Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 by preventing the US Navy from delivering
supplies directly to the stricken area. These fears are ever present. All
these factors have reinforced the garrison state concept - the tatmadaw
claiming that only it can protect the state from its predatory neighbors
and the imperialist powers.

This sense of nationalism is reinforced by the isolation of the socialist
period (1962-1988), and policy level officials have maintained that they
can withstand the isolation imposed by sanctions, which are, in any case,
incomplete because of the wealth of Burma/Myanmar’s natural resources,
which are coveted by many states and not only those within the region.

Nationalism is not only the driving force of Burmese international
relations, it is the basis of internal policy and even administrative
structure - the two are wedded with the primacy of internal control taking
precedence over external relations. The tatmadaw may justify its expanded
size (approximately 186,000 in 1988 to perhaps 400,000 in 2009) and power
because of foreign threats, noting regime claims of occasional Thai
incursions and provocations and the palpable but misguided fear of a US
invasion, but its real requirement is because of its need for internal
control of potential strife, and its ideology and image of its central
role in the society.

But external relations have been important, and so the move towards China.
There has been a mutuality of interests. Chinese access to the Bay of
Bengal has been one motivation, but there are others. Myanmar’s natural
resources (especially gas and hydro-electric power), a potential market of
over 50 million people especially for businesses in southwest China that
cannot compete with east coast Chinese firms in Western markets. It is a
means to ensure a strategic advantage over India (and part of the
China-India border in the Northeast remains unresolved), and mitigating
Chinese dependence on transporting energy through the Straits of Malacca.
All these contributed to Chinese penetration of Myanmar, beginning in
1988, but which older PRC, Nationalist, and even imperial maps regarded as
either Chinese territory or within China’s hegemonic influence. China has
supplied some US$3 billion in arms and equipment, has or is building 30
hydro-electric dams, has provided major economic assistance, and is the
site of much of Myanmar’s overseas training.3 Yet Myanmar is not a Chinese
client state, as witness its opening to India, and India’s supply of naval
vessels, aircraft, military hardware, and economic aid, and indeed to
Russia as well (MIG-29 sales, extensive training, and an experimental,
small nuclear reactor).

Myanmar, however, is not insensitive to Chinese penetration. It regards
the control or even the extensive Chinese presence, or that of any other
state, in the Burmese economy as subversive of its interests
internationally and its internal control over the economy. It was, after
all, this foreign economic exploitation that prompted the Burmese to
introduce the socialist system. Anti-Chinese riots took place in 1967
reflecting this antagonism and the export of the Chinese cultural
revolution to Rangoon; many were killed and Chinese shops looted.

On Indian Relations

India’s response to the Burmese coup of 1988 was virulently negative.
India was probably the most vociferous critic of the SLORC until the early
1990s. India even employed U Nu’s daughter as the head of all India
Radio’s Burma service. This changed in the early 1990s when the Indians
recognized the strategic role that China was beginning to play in Myanmar,
and India’s policy was reversed to attempt to compete with China’s growing
influence that extends to even illegal immigration, now informally said to
approximate two million people.4 Although there were rumors that India was
providing support to Kachin and Karen insurgents after 1988, this was
never confirmed. India has, however, provided a refuge for Burmese
dissidents and refugees, supposedly some 50,000, not including Rohingyas.5
Dissident Burmese organizations still operate from Indian territory.

Burmese domestic policy and its ideology of not being dependent on any one
foreign influence also prompted the Burmese to encourage Indian assistance
and support. There has been an array of higher level military delegations
in both directions. The first visit by a Burmese head of state since
independence in 1948 occurred in October 2004. Transportation road links
between India and Myanmar have been upgraded and supported by an Indian
aid program, and increased trade has been on both states’ agendas,
although the target of US$ one billion in two-way trade has yet to be
realized. India has bid for access to the off-shore gas reserves in
western Myanmar off the Rakhine coast near the Bangladesh border, but
China has succeeded in obtaining the rights to much of that area and will
construct a gas pipeline across Myanmar to Yunnan Province, as well as a
separate pipeline to bring in crude oil from the Middle East, thus easing
its strategic dependence on the Straits of Malacca.

The insurgencies that have plagued India in its remote Northeast Region,
together with the Burmese rebellions on its side of the border, and the
movement of all groups back and forth to effective sanctuaries has also
prompted agreements for the development of those regions. Both India and
Myanmar are using each other for their own national interests. India has
developed a Kaladan River Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that would
begin at the port of Sittwe (Akyab-modernized with Indian support) through
the Chin State of Myanmar, and allow more intensive economic development
of the Northeast, and help mitigate ethnic revolts there. Myanmar wants to
control Naga and Chin unrest in the region as well.

At present, there is considerable smuggling taking place between India and
Myanmar. Chemicals used in the preparation of heroin and metamphetamines
are said to be imported from India, and heroin exported to India, some of
which has been confiscated by the Indian government. Intravenous drug use
has produced 70 percent HIV rate among users in the region. All the
borders of Myanmar are smugglers’ havens, for local officials also
benefit. Under the military government, and even with borders porous to
smuggling, Myanmar is able militarily to manage its border areas. It has
increased the size of its military forces in these regions.

Administrative changes in Myanmar are planned. Under the disciplined
system of the new constitution that is to come into effect following the
elections of 2010, a special self-governing Naga area will be created out
of the present Sagaing Division (to be known as a “Region” under the new
constitution) on the Indian border that will give a modest degree of local
government to those peoples. The Chin (Mizo) people just to the south of
the Naga area now have, and will have, a special State. All these will
have local legislatures. Because active duty Burmese military will occupy
25 percent of the Naga local legislature and the local Chin legislature,
these administrative changes should not greatly affect the capacity of the
tatmadaw to control its borders. Antagonisms among the Chin against the
Burmans run high because about 90 percent of the Chin are Christians, and
many feel discriminated against by the Buddhist Burman military.

The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it
is possible that during that period some space may develop between the
state and its citizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation
of the stringent rules of enforcement and censorship that are an aspect of
life in contemporary Myanmar. Over the medium term, it may be possible to
see a more balanced approach to foreign policy as the internal tensions
between the military and civilian Burmese are assuaged, and perhaps even
the constitution amended. This might allow more civilian influence on
foreign policy. This is a slight and somewhat distant ray of hope for
positive change.

One must note, however, that amending the constitution requires a 75
percent approval of the legislature, which means that the military would
have to agree to any limitations of its powers, which seems unlikely
during the first term, and slightly less unlikely later.6 ASEAN, the UN,
and the Japanese are likely to maintain that progress has been apparent
after the 2010 elections, but more needs to be done to implement to human
rights provisions of the new constitution. India will accept the new
government, and will continue to work with it to counter Chinese
influence. The US and the EU are unlikely to accept unambiguously the
results of the elections even though they may begin the process of dealing
with the new government with a certain degree of skepticism, and in part
motivated and justified by humanitarian concerns.

A possible but highly unlikely alternative result before the elections of
2010, could be a revolution in the streets that could bring the National
League for Democracy (NLD), an emasculated but existing opposition group
whose most famous figure is Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, to some sort
of power-sharing with elements of the military. Such a scenario is as
unlikely as it would be unstable, for the NLD is held together by its
essential criterion of getting the military out of power, rather than by
an accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are
exceedingly fragile because of the personalization of power. Aung San Suu
Kyi, who was partly brought up in India when her mother was Burmese
ambassador there, would in all likelihood have a more favorable attitude
towards India, but this may not result in any profound shift of policy.
The NLD is effectively a Burman party, and claims it would deal with
minority issues after achieving political control. It has called for some
sort of federalism for the state.

Should, however, real representative government take place under a
democratic system, and the military retire to the barracks (although one
must stress this scenario is highly unlikely), there could be significant
developments that could affect Indian security in its Northeast. No such
democratic Burmese government would be able to exist without some form of
federal system, a system that has been anathema to the military since at
least 1962. But in the unlikely event of it happening, it is instructive
to examine what the Chin have wanted in a draft constitution they prepared
illegally outside of Myanmar. It is the most autonomous and radical of
such drafts that various minorities have formulated.7 Among other
provisions, Union troops could not be stationed on Chin territory without
the expressed approval of a Chin legislature, which would have extensive
powers. Although the central government would make foreign policy, the
Chin would have jurisdiction over the stationing of foreign troops on its
soil, and all powers not expressly designated to the center would be the
province of the periphery. Under such an extreme version of federalism,
one could easily imagine Myanmar Chin and Naga support for their co-ethnic
brethren on the India side of the border (and the reverse as well), and
even for the possibility of a pan-Mizo (Chin) and pan-Naga homeland that
could create extensive instability in the area. The 2010 Burmese
constitution expressly prohibits any and all secessions from the Union of
Myanmar. However, the lessons of previous irredentist movements and the
past possibility of a Pashtunistan model (Afghan-Pakistan Pashtun tribal
homeland) should not be completely dismissed. This might have
repercussions for other parts of India as well.

Domestic factors would also affect how any democratization in Myanmar
would alter policies towards India. It should not be assumed that a
democratic or civilian Burma/Myanmar would be any the less nationalistic
(although perhaps less strident) than the military, for a review of the
civilian period (1948-58, 1960-62) would indicate the opposite.

First, are the residual attitudes toward Indians (all those from the
subcontinent) in Myanmar. Having been ruled until 1937 in the colonial era
as a province of India, Burma was subject to massive Indian migration.
Indian control of credit, and following the great depression of 1929-32,
the foreclosure of land to the Indian Chettyar money-lending caste
produced strong antipathies towards Indians that is still part of the
residual memory of the Burmese. Rangoon was an Indian city before World
War II, and the movement of the capital to Naypyidaw is in part an attempt
to eliminate this shameful heritage. Some 200,000 people from the
subcontinent were expelled from the country following the coup of 1962.
Under the Citizenship Act of 1982, which was directed against the Indians
and Chinese, all those not a member of one of Burma/Myanmar’s indigenous
“races” (ethno-linguistic groups), and who cannot prove that their
ancestors resided in Burma before 1823 (the first Anglo-Burmese War was
1824-26) are “associate citizens” and have significantly truncated
rights.8 These negative attitudes, possibly reinforced by an increasingly
politicized sangha, could become more manifest if there were political
space for debate in Myanmar. Now, they are held in check by authoritarian
rule.

Conclusion

The prospects for a functioning and deepened democracy through attrition
rather than through revolution, by any internationally acceptable standard
in Myanmar over the near term, are remote. Even should that happen,
changes in Burmese policy toward the Indian Northeast, access to gas
reserves, or improved transportation links are unlikely to alter
significantly should that eventuality come about. Although there have been
cries among expatriate Burmese for blacklisting of those firms that have
collaborated with the military junta, economic and foreign policy issues
are likely to prevail. Both India and China will continue to view Myanmar
as an important, although not pivotal, factor in each’s strategic
equation. Under these circumstances, democracy by any definition is likely
to play a minor role.

India, on the one hand, might wish to see a democratic Burma/Myanmar as
Aung San Suu Kyi might be closer emotionally to India, having grown up
there, written on India, and been strongly influenced by Gandhi’s
philosophy; thus, she might be less influenced by China. On the other
hand, such a desire could easily backfire. It is difficult to envision a
democratic Burma/Myanmar by any international standard without some form
of greater ethnic autonomy or federalism. Under the 2008 constitution, the
Chin and Naga have areas with a degree of local governance. Under a
democratic system, local governance (such as it is) would be most unlikely
to recede from that high water mark. Probably greater autonomy would
occur, and this would put local pressures on these groups to deal with
their ethnic cousins across the border in India, and could prompt
reactions from these India-based groups for greater autonomy from
centralized Indian control.

In summary, the international globalized economic system will play little
role in influencing Myanmar’s internal politics. Although the state’s
natural resources are attractive to multinational corporations, Myanmar’s
decentralized economy would allow the state to continue even if these
resources were to erode. Myanmar’s orientation is not a product of its
participation in the international economy, but rather is a product of its
history - its colonial past and the perceived dangers and insults of that
period, the past predatory roles of its neighbors, ethnic strife, and the
glorification of the Burmese military tradition to which the present
tatmadaw lays claim. The regime is able to force compliance while
titularly espousing a particularistic brand of “democracy” (akin to
Suharto’s Indonesia) in which multiple political parties affect only the
periphery of power and policy, but under strong, iron bands formed by the
Burmese military.

Notes

Although the United Nations and most of the world has accepted the Burmese
military’s change of name from Burma to Myanmar, an old written form, in
July 1989 , the opposition in that country has not done so because they
consider that government illegitimate. The United States has followed the
opposition, thus making the use of either a political statement. In this
essay, Burma is used for the period before 1989. Myanmar thereafter, and
both to indicate continuity. No political connotations should be attached
to the use of either term.

As the designated Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, said to the author,
while shaking in his hand a picture of President Bush signing the
sanctions bill of 2003, “We will stand up to you Americans.”

Although there were early reports of Chinese “bases” in Myanmar, these
have been discredited. The new Burmese constitution prohibits foreign
troops quartered on Burmese territory. Two-thirds of the officers sent
overseas for training in the 1990-99 period went to China. David I.
Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009 (forthcoming).

In the early 1990s, India approached the U.S. Embassy in Delhi to discuss
Burma/Myanmar policies, but was rebuffed.

Personal communication, Andrew Selth, 5-2009.

National League for Democracy calls for reconsideration of the
constitution before the elections of 2010, a factor in whether it might
participate in those elections, will be ignored by the junta.

Whether the NLD would be allowed to participate, and if allowed whether it
would, is still unclear in May 2009. Personal interview, NLD Executive
Committee members, Yangon, March 2009. The most careful review of the
constitution of 2008 is the International Crisis Group Report, ‘Myanmar:
Towards the Election.” Forthcoming 2009.

See David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in
Myanmar (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006, pp. 229-231. Questioning the proposed
constitution or preparing alternative versions was declared illegal in
Myanmar.

An inquiry in May 2009 to the Ministry of Information in Naypyidaw as to
whether associate citizens could run for office or even vote in the 2010
elections was unanswered, as even higher level officials were unclear in
the lack of the election law.

David I. Steinberg is Distinguished professor of Asian Studies, School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University and Author of “Burma/Myanmar: What
Everyone Needs to Know”.

____________________________________

December 3, Irrawaddy
One-sided engagement won't work – Aung Zaw

During his visit to Asia, US President Barack Obama told Burmese military
leaders to free pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and urged the regime
to ensure that the 2010 elections are held in a “free, fair and
transparent manner.”

Officials traveling with Obama also reiterated calls for a national
dialogue involving all political stakeholders in Burma, especially the
opposition led by Suu Kyi and ethnic groups.

A statement released after a summit meeting between the US delegation and
leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Singapore called
on the junta to begin “a dialogue with all stakeholders to ensure that the
process is fully inclusive.”

The joint statement and Obama’s appeal to the recalcitrant regime to open
up Burma and free political prisoners were just symbolic gestures. They
all know that the regime won’t budge.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted that there is a lot of work
to do on Burma, saying: “We have no illusions that any of this will be
easy or quick.”

Let’s be clear: the new US policy on Burma is comprehensive and it has
received some positive feedback.

More importantly, the US remains a supporter of the democracy movement.
The Burmese opposition inside and outside the country continues to count
on the US and many believe Washington has a negotiating role to play in
Burma’s political deadlock.

In spite of the initial favorable response to the new US policy of
engagement outlined by US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell,
deep-seated skepticism remains.

Recent history has indeed shown that engagement with the regime in Burma
has totally failed. An endless succession of visits have been made to
Burma by UN special envoys and regional leaders  hoping to find a
political solution. All left empty-handed, expressing deep frustration.

Burma’s paramount leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe rarely makes any concessions
because he feels he doesn’t have to. There is no reason for him to act
differently this time.

After learning of the new US policy, Than Shwe is said to have told his
subordinates that the US and the international community now want to
engage Naypyidaw because they have finally realized the positive
achievements of his regime.

It should come as no surprise that Than Shwe thinks this way. The world
has changed its approach to the regime, but it hasn’t changed its ways at
all. No wonder Than Shwe feels vindicated.

Nevertheless, after sending its first high-level mission to Burma in
November, the US expects to see some meaningful gesture in return.

If Than Shwe doesn’t heed Obama’s call to free Suu Kyi and hold a free and
fair election, the new US   administration’s engagement policy will look
weak and supplicatory.

Than Shwe should not be deluded into thinking that the US has unlimited
patience and that it will accept this one-sided relationship.

The plain fact is that Burma is no North Korea, where the US has a
strategic interest in containing the threat posed by the rogue regime in
Pyongyang. The US will continue its engagement with North Korea and even
support the revival of the six-party talks.

In the case of Burma, the new US administration has adopted a carrot and
stick approach and has offered a small window of opportunity that Than
Shwe should not ignore. It is highly unlikely, however, that Than Shwe
will respond—he simply lacks the political will to take Washington’s offer
of engagement seriously.

Hostage takers rarely makes concessions, and Than Shwe is no exception.

At the end of the day, the US doesn’t want to be embarrassed before the
international community should the regime reject  meaningful progress
toward an improvement in relations. At some point, if talks grind to a
halt—perhaps within the next six months—the US may just turn its back on
engagement.

Engagement could thus be rather short-lived. Washington could lose its
patience and even tighten sanctions against the regime.

In the meantime, nothing changes for the oppressed people of Burma, who
must be asking themselves why the world has altered its tone and approach
towards Burma while the regime hasn’t changed at all.