BurmaNet News, January 29, 2010

[Editor]

January 29, 2010, Issue #3886

INSIDE BURMA
AFP: Myanmar journalist jailed for 13 years
Mizzima News: Plight of political prisoners deteriorates in 2009
Irrawaddy: Despite discomfort, Suu Kyi stays busy
Irrawaddy: Jailed 88 generation activist calls for blanket amnesty

ON THE BORDER
Kachin News Group: Burma junta and KIO meet to resolve standoff over
Border Guard Force

DRUGS
Asia Times: How Myanmar's opium grows

OPINION / OTHER
The Progressive: A ray of hope for Burma? – Amitabh Pal
Irrawaddy: UN best hope for change in Burma – Alberto Turlon
Asian Tribune: Drug politics of Burma – Zin Linn




____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

January 29, Agence France Presse
Myanmar journalist jailed for 13 years

Yangon — A Myanmar court has handed down a 13-year jail term to a
journalist for working for exiled media, his legal counsel said Friday, as
the ruling junta continues its crackdown on dissent.

Ngwe Soe Lin was sentenced Wednesday after being arrested for working for
the Myanmar exile broadcaster Democratic Voice of Burma, based in
Norwegian capital Oslo, lawyer Aung Thein told AFP.

"Ngwe Soe Lin was sentenced to 13 years in prison on Wednesday at a
special court in Insein prison," Aung Thein said.

There was no immediate confirmation of the sentence from authorities in
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, which remains under tight US and EU
sanctions because of its human rights records.

Aung Thein added that Ngwe Soe Lin would appeal the ruling, which
sentenced him to 10 years in jail for violation of the country's
Electronics Act and another three years under the Immigration Emergency
Provisions Act.

Aye Chan Naing, the head of Democratic Voice of Burma, told AFP that he
believed the junta was attempting to seize greater control over media
ahead of national elections planned for later this year.

"It has to be seen in connection with the upcoming election. The regime
wants to impose even stricter rules against the freedom of expression and
information," Aye Chan Naing said.

"They are arresting one journalist after the other. This was not the case
before. They have arrested journalists in the past but not that
frequently," he added.

A Myanmar court in December handed 25-year-old freelance video reporter
Hla Hla Win a 20-year jail term on similar charges after it ruled she had
worked for the Democratic Voice of Burma.

Analysts said convicting journalists of working for exiled media was part
of a continued crackdown on those involved in anti-junta protests led by
Buddhist monks in September 2007.

Myanmar has handed heavy jail terms to scores of activists, monks, student
leaders and journalists for their alleged roles in the protests and for
helping victims of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.

Myanmar has been ruled by the military since 1962, and its tightly
controlled state media often accuses foreign news organisations of
stirring trouble within the country.

An election this year would be the country's first since 1990.
Pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi's party won the last ballot by a
landslide but was never permitted to take office.

The military regime has defied persistent international appeals by keeping
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for most of the past two decades.
____________________________________

January 29, Mizzima News
Plight of political prisoners deteriorates in 2009 – Mungpi

New Delhi – The political prisoners population in military-ruled Burma
increased to 2,177 over the course of 2009, with over 120 are reportedly
suffering from illness due to deplorable prison conditions, claims a new
activist group report.

The Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma
(AAPPB), in its annual report, said while the ruling junta released a few
hundred political prisoners it also arrested several more, resulting in an
overall increase of 15 concerning the number of those imprisoned for their
political beliefs as compared to a year previously.

The report also said that at least 48 political prisoners in 2009 reported
fresh symptoms of illness, bringing the total number of ill health
political prisoners to 129.

Bo Kyi, Joint-Secretary of AAPPB, on Friday said the increase in the
number of political prisoners suffering from ill health is mainly due to
poor prison conditions and a lack of proper medical treatment.

“Like in Kham Htee, most prisoners suffer from malaria, and when the
illness is not given timely and proper treatment, the illness gets severe.
Many political prisoners have now reported having neurological problems as
well as poor eyesight,” Bo Kyi said.

AAPPB said 2009 was a very difficult year for political prisoners, with
torture, prison transfers, and denial of medical treatment continuing
unabated.

The transferring of prisoners to remote areas far from their families
makes it more difficult for prisoners to receive care packages from
families, as it is often too expensive or too far for families to visit
their loved ones.

“As part of the junta’s widespread crackdown on political dissidents,
prison authorities systematically denied numerous political prisoners
their right to family visits,” the report said.

“In many cases authorities denied family members the right to see their
loved ones even after they had travelled hundreds of miles to remote jails
at great expense, leading to psychological hardship for both prisoners and
their families and additional health problems, as political prisoners rely
on family members for supplementary food and medicines,” found AAPPB.

“Healthcare is only done in namesake, political prisoners are not given
timely medical care. For example, those requiring an operation would only
be granted such a procedure after the illness has well passed the
operation stage,” one family member of a political prisoner told Mizzima.

The AAPPB said comedian and activist Zarganar was perhaps the most high
profile of prisoners denied regular access to their family in 2009.

Meanwhile, 88-generation student leader Min Ko Naing, detained in northern
Burma’s Putao jail, is suffering from high blood pressure and Ko Ko Gyi,
imprisoned at Mai Sat prison in Shan state, is suffering from Hepatitis B.

In January 2009, as a result of inadequate medical treatment, 23-year old
Kay Thi Aung suffered a miscarriage in prison, according to the political
prisoner watchdog group.

Similarly, U Gambira, leader of the All Burma Monk’s Association during
the September 2007 protests, suffered from various illnesses during 2009
as a result of torture and two prison transfers, the group said.

The venerable monk, after staging a hunger strike, contracted malaria in
November 2009, further adding to his health woes.

The AAPPB reports that ethnic Shan leader Khun Htun Oo, detained at Putao
prison in northern Burma’s Kachin state, suffered from hypertension,
complications stemming from diabetes, bladder distention and a peptic
ulcer throughout the year, but was still denied medical attention outside
the prison.

“A majority of prisoners in remote prisons are suffering from malaria, and
the overall conditions of the prisons have contributed to the further
health deterioration for many detainees,” concludes the AAPPB.

Reporting by Myint Maung, writing by Mungpi
____________________________________

January 29, Irrawaddy
Despite discomfort, Suu Kyi stays busy – Ba Kaung

Aung San Suu Kyi welcomed her lawyer Nyan Win with an ice-cream. “I made
it myself,” she said. “Eat it up quickly before it melts.”

Making ice-cream and baking cakes is one of the ways Suu Kyi fills the
long hours of her enforced detention in her dilapidated home on Rangoon's
Inya Lake.
Aung San Suu Kyi looks on following a meeting with a delegation led by
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt
Campbell at a hotel in Rangoon Nov. 4, 2009.

“She spends a good deal of time working out how to strengthen the party
[the National League for Democracy],” said Nyan Win after a visit to Suu
Kyi's home on Thursday.

Reporting on the visit, Nyan Win said he found the 64-year-old NLD leader
in good health and “vigorous.”

The lawyer told The Irrawaddy he and Suu Kyi had discussed how to pursue a
final appeal against her current term of house arrest, the expansion of
the NLD and her frustrated efforts to repair her house.

Suu Kyi also spends her time reading Buddhist religious texts, travel and
history books, including ones written in French, listening to the radio
and watching television which can only receive state-run channels, Nyan
Win said.

The lawyer said he is allowed to give Suu Kyi censored copies of the
magazines Time and Newsweek. He also gave her 20 French books she had
requested.

“She asked me for many 'international' books,” Nyan Win said. “But I am
not always allowed to give them to her.” However, on Thursday, he managed
to present to her a book as a gift from Nobel Economics laureate Joseph
Stiglitz who visited Burma in December. During the trip, Stiglitz asked
Nyan Win to give his book Globalization and Its Discontent to Suu Kyi.

Suu Kyi is serving an 18-month term of house arrest, reduced from an
original sentence of three years' hard labor pronounced by a court in
Insein Prison last August. At the end of the farcical trial, Home Affairs
Minister Maj-Gen Maung Oo appeared in court with a special order from
junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe stating that as Suu Kyi is the daughter of
national hero Gen Aung San, her sentence should be halved and the rest
suspended.

Maung Oo also read out a puzzling clause stating that if she behaved
“well” at her Inya Lake home under the restrictions imposed on her, Suu
Kyi would be granted amnesty before her suspended sentence expired.

Suu Kyi has been detained for nearly 14 of the last 20 years, mostly under
house arrest. Analysts generally concur that the trial was a political
showcase and that the military junta want to keep her under arrest ahead
of the elections in 2010.

Suu Kyi has already served almost half of her 18-month house arrest period
which began in May, 2009. In view of Maung Oo's hint of her release in
November, the regime's message to Suu Kyi appears to be that she is not
behaving well and needs to serve the full sentence.

Suu Kyi has described Maung Oo's indication that she will be released in
November as totally “unfair.” According to Nyan Win, Suu Kyi believes the
comment is obstructing the awaited court ruling over her final appeal.

Asked if Suu Kyi could expect to be released in November when her 18-month
house arrest expires, Nyan Win said: “It would not be unusual if a person
is released at the end of his or her punishment.”

Using a Burmese proverb, Nyan Win added: “But, if she is not really
released at that time, then they [the Burmese rulers] would look like
swallowing their own vomit.”

“What is good behavior after all?” Nyan Win asked. “We assume that she has
been behaving well because she does not break the terms of the
restrictions on her.”

Suu Kyi and the NLD were reprimanded by the state-run media last month,
however, for making public the text of letters she wrote to Than Shwe.

“The leak of Aung San Suu Kyi's letters to the media before they were
received by the leader of the government is intended to damage the image
of the ruling government, and this might delay the processes of the other
side [the military government],” said an article carried by state-run
newspapers.

Suu Kyi's life in detention has been made even more uncomfortable by the
official obstruction of her attempts to repair her home, which has fallen
in disrepair. Her piano also needs to be repaired. Work on repairing the
house was halted after objections were lodged by her brother and other
relatives. The building is now in an unsafe condition, according to Nyan
Win.

The author Alan Clements, who wrote the book Voice of Hope, based mainly
on interviews with her after she was released her first house arrest in
1995, told The Irrawaddy her life in detention had become progressively
more difficult.

“The most prominent features I remember were her serenity and sincerity,”
Clements said. “I did not detect a moment of ill will or vindictiveness
towards anyone, including her oppressors.

“To the contrary, she would often remark how she genuinely wishes for the
day that we can all be friends, how much better it would be for the entire
country.”

____________________________________

January 29, Irrawaddy
Jailed 88 generation activist calls for blanket amnesty – Wai Moe

An imprisoned leader of the dissident 88 Generation Students group has
called for a blanket amnesty for Burma's political prisoners before this
year's election and an inclusive political process as two of the
cornerstones of the group's election policy.

In a letter written by Hla Myo Naung from Mandalay Prison in October, he
said that he had discussed the policies with other detained activists from
the 88 Generation group in prison during their trial in 2008. He said in
his letter that the activists had decided upon the two provisions after
much discussion and heated argument.

Hla Myo Naung said that the issue of ethnic minorities was the main
obstacle to the ruling junta announcing an electoral law.

“Unless the issue of the armed ethnic groups is resolved, there cannot be
any party registration law [for the election],” he said in the letter,
adding that, for the ruling generals, the ethnic issue is more critical
than the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD)’s role in the
election.

Hla Myo Naung’s wife, Aye Mar, told The Irrawaddy on Friday that she got
the letter from her husband in October during a regular visit and that the
letter was originally meant for his friend Thein Tin Aung, a pro-election
campaigner in Rangoon, who had apparently requested Hla Myo Naung's
opinion on the 88 Generation group's policy for the upcoming election.

“A few days after I delivered the letter to Ko Thein Tin Aung, two
officials from the SB [special branch police] came to me and asked about
the letter,” said Aye Mar. “They told me that their senior officials were
considering the topics discussed in the letter.”

Commenting on the letter, a former colleague of the 88 activists, Bo Kyi,
who is now joint-secretary of the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners-Burma (AAPP), a human rights group based in Thailand, said that
the letter was essentially Hla Myo Naung’s own opinion.

But he confirmed that calling for the release of political prisoners and
an inclusive political process in the election is the policy of the 88
Generation Students group. “They agreed on those two demands while they
were in Insein Prison,” he said.

There are currently at least 2,177 political prisoners in Burma’s prisons,
according to AAPP’s latest report.

Prominent activists from the group who had been convicted for
participating in the 1988 uprising, such as Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi,
were released from prison in 2005. During their short period of relative
freedom, the group's leaders reformed the strategy and policy of their
movement.

Most of the 88 Generation leaders were then re-arrested on Aug.21, 2007,
after they had led peaceful demonstrations two days earlier to protest the
military government's unannounced fuel price hike that sparked mass
demonstrations in September 2007.

Fourteen leading activists, including Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi, Phyoe Cho,
Htay Kywe, Jimmy, Ant Bwe Kyaw and Hla Myo Naung, of the 88 Generation
Students group were sentenced to 65-year jail terms for their
participation in the non-violent protests. Four days after the verdict, in
November that year, most of the detained activists were transferred to
remote prisons hundreds of miles from their hometowns.

Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi were moved to two prisons in southern Shan
State; Phyoe Cho was sent to Kaw Thaung Prison in southern Burma; and Htay
Kywe was transferred to Buthidaung Prison in western Burma.

Hla Myo Naung was transferred Myitkyina Prison in Kachin State. However,
he was transferred back to Mandalay Prison to get medical treatment for
his eyes in 2009. Although the NLD is yet to say whether it would join the
election, Hla Myo Naung said in his letter that Aung San Suu Kyi's party
will take part.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

January 29, Kachin News Group
Burma junta and KIO meet to resolve standoff over Border Guard Force

For the first time this year, senior leaders of the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO) and the Burmese junta met in Myitkyina, the capital of
Burma’s northern Kachin State today to resolve the standoff on
transforming the Kachin Independence Army, said sources close to Kachin
delegates.

KIO leaders from its headquarters in Laiza in Kachin State, near the
Sino–Burma border met two senior Burmese military officials in
Myitkyina--- Lt-Gen Ye Myint, chief of Military Affairs Security (MAS) and
Naypyitaw-appointed negotiator on transforming ethnic armed groups to the
Burmese Army-controlled Border Guard Force (BGF) and Maj-Gen Soe Win
commander of Northern Regional Command, said KIO officials.

This is the tenth meeting since April last year and it was held at Mali
Hka house in the headquarters of the Northern Regional Command in
Myitkyina, between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. local time, according to KIO officers
in Myitkyina.

KIO delegates included Chairman Lanyaw Zawng Hra, Vice-president No. 1
Lt-Gen Gauri Zau Seng, Vice Chief of Staff Brig-Gen Sumlut Gun Maw and
other senior officials. However, the KIO general secretary Dr. Lahkyen La
Ja was absent because he took leave, said KIO officials in Laiza.

The fallout of the meeting is not yet known as KIO delegates had not come
back to Laiza headquarters till the evening, said sources close to the
delegates.

Kachin politicians are terribly pessimistic about the fruitless
negotiations over transforming the KIA to the BGF proposed by the ruling
junta.

Laiza sources said, the KIO will try to submit its demands afresh,
redrafted from the previous demands including transforming to the Kachin
Regional Guard Force with the current military status and the demands
related to the Panglong Agreement, the charter which created the Union of
Burma with multiethnic nationalities in February 12, 1947, to the junta.

At the 29 December, 2009 meeting, the junta’s Northern commander Maj-Gen
Soe Win responded to the KIO’s demands related to the Panglong Agreement
saying  “The age of Panglong has been canceled and it is gone now”,
according to KIO delegates.

Now, the junta supremo Senior General Than Shwe is keen on holding
countrywide elections this year. Meanwhile the country’s pro-democracy
leader Aung San Suu Kyi continues to be under house-arrest at her home in
Rangoon.

Meanwhile, all ethnic armed groups are being pressurized to disarm for
transforming into the Border Guard Force since April, last year by the
junta.

____________________________________
DRUGS

January 29, Asia Times
How Myanmar's opium grows – Brian McCartan

BANGKOK - The controversy over the scale of Myanmar's opium production
took another turn with the release of a new report that claims cultivation
has surged in territories where the military government has recently taken
control. The report draws more extreme conclusions than recent research
released by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), whose
Bangkok-based representatives declined an invitation to attend the new
report's release.

Entitled "Poisoned Hills: Opium cultivation surges under government
control in Burma", the report was released by the Palaung Women's
Organization (PWO), a non-governmental organization based in Mae Sot,
Thailand. The new research corroborates the findings of previous reports
about the drug trade in Myanmar, also known as Burma, published by the
Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), which unlike the UNODC relies on an
extensive network of sources inside the Shan state for its data.

The PWO report said that "amounts [of opium grown] are far higher than
reported in the annual surveys of the [UNODC], and are flourishing not in
'insurgent and ceasefire areas,' as claimed by the UN, but in areas
controlled by Burma's military government". The report described how
Myanmar authorities systematically extort fees from opium poppy farmers
and file false eradication reports. The group concluded that "unless the
regime's militarization strategies are challenged, international funding
will make little difference to the drug problem in Burma".

Those findings contrast sharply with the UNODC's own survey of opium
production in Southeast Asia, which was released on December 14 to a large
crowd of UN representatives, embassy officials and Thai and Western
counter-narcotics officials, none of whom were present for the PWO's
report's release. That's potentially because the UNODC relies on exclusive
cooperation with Myanmar's military and government ministries and
departments for its information and ground surveys, some analysts
suggested at the PWO's report release.

The PWO report's findings are consistent with SHAN claims that the spread
of opium poppy cultivation is directly related to the spread of
government-backed and -trained militias in the area. According to SHAN
editor Sai Khuensai Jaiyen, a long-time observer of the narcotics trade in
Myanmar, Shan State areas that have fallen from insurgent to government
control have seen a marked increase in the opium production.

At a press conference on Tuesday, he characterized that surge as a
"balloon effect", wherein ceasefire groups that have banned cultivation in
their own territories have seen it spread to new adjacent areas - all of
which is under government control. By 2006, all known major drug-producing
groups in Shan State had declared their areas free of poppy cultivation.

The National Democratic Alliance Army in northeastern Shan State made the
claim in 1997; the Kokang in northern Shan State in 2002; the United Wa
State Army, which is known to have diversified into methamphetamine
production, in 2005; and the Loi Maw area in northern Shan State, the
birthplace and one of the former operating areas of notorious drug lord
Khun Sa, in 2006.

Although opium is no longer grown in these groups' controlled areas, Sai
Kheunsai and sources close to Thai counter-narcotics officials say they
are still involved in purchasing raw opium from growers and refining it
into heroin. Much of the opium and heroin is then sold in the Golden
Triangle region of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand to buyers from Hong Kong,
from where it is often trafficked into China.

Drug-dealing militias
Since 2004, the junta has encouraged the formation of militias as an armed
hedge against increasingly recalcitrant ceasefire armies. The trade-off is
that the militias are allowed to engage in business activities, both legal
and illegal, to support their operations. Members of community
organizations representing ethnic Shan, Palaung, Kachin, Lahu and other
groups in Shan State have claimed in interviews with this correspondent
that government-backed militia commanders are involved in the cultivation,
purchase and processing of opium in their controlled areas.

"The situation now is not unlike the Ka Kwe Yay time," said Sai Khuensai,
referring to the historical period between 1963 and 1972 when
government-recognized militia groups were allowed to trade in opium in
exchange for fighting against various rebel groups then active in the Shan
State.

Because many of the militia groups were more interested in the narcotics
trade than fighting and eventually struck their own deals with rebels, the
program was disbanded. By then, the program had spawned several now
notorious druglords, including former Mong Tai Army leader Khun Sa and
narcotics trafficker-turned-businessman and regime confidante Lo Hsing
Han.

Curiously, the UNODC's 2009 opium survey for Myanmar makes no mention of
these militia groups or their possible role in opium production. It does,
however, note "indications that ceasefire groups are selling drugs to buy
weapons and moving stocks to avoid detection". The leaders of those same
groups, including Peng Jiasheng of the Kokang, Bao Youxiang of the UWSA
and Lin Minxiang of the NDAA, were until recently lauded by the military
government as "national race leaders" (ethnic group representatives) and
their opium eradication efforts were praised by the generals as well as
some counter-narcotics experts.

The UNODC has maintained a presence in Wa areas since 1998 and has
facilitated other UN agencies and development organizations to establish
programs in Wa and Kokang areas. The UN agency has also promoted programs
in crop substitution and rural development. While the regime praised
leaders such as Peng and Bao and the UNODC worked with them on development
and opium eradication projects, little was said about their continued
purchase of raw opium and its refinement into heroin.

Nor did the UNODC acknowledge some groups' switch to large-scale
amphetamine production, which has helped to cover profits lost from opium
eradication. The UNODC's 2009 opium survey says, "In 1996, the surrender
of the notorious drug trafficker Khun Sa, leader of the Mong Tai Army,
resulted in the collapse of armed resistance movements and led to the
negotiation of a series of truce agreements with most breakaway factions."

Analysts note that the end of large-scale warfare in the Shan State
occurred seven years earlier, when the factions of the former Burmese
Communist Party that mutinied in 1989 agreed to ceasefires with the
government. All of these groups were given tacit approval to continue
their activities in the narcotics trade in exchange for ceasefire
agreements.

In order to pressure ceasefire groups to transform their armed wings into
military-controlled border guard forces, ahead of general elections
planned for this year, the junta has recently condemned certain ceasefire
group leaders. That includes the junta's publicizing of UWSA involvement
in producing amphetamine shipments that have recently been seized along
the Thai-Myanmar border.

A search for drugs sparked the crisis that culminated in last August's
offensive against former national race leader Peng Jiasheng and his Kokang
ceasefire army. (See Border war rattles China-Myanmar ties, Asia Times
Online, September 1, 2009)

Since the late 1980s, the military regime has increased the number of
battalions stationed in northern Myanmar. Currently over 150 battalions
are based in Shan State alone. Rather than improve the security situation
and end opium production, the increased military presence has resulted in
rampant corruption.

The PWO report describes in detail the extortion money - which authorities
refer to as "taxes" - demanded by the government and military on opium
farmers. The unofficial levies are similar to those human-rights groups
such as the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), Chin Human Rights
Organization (CHRO) and others claim are imposed on farmers for both legal
and illegal crops across the country.

Corruption-riddled statistics
Corruption also makes official eradication figures, frequently quoted by
the UNODC, suspect. The PWO found in its research that only 11% of poppy
fields in two townships they investigated were destroyed during the
2008-2009 growing season - and most of this was only in areas that were
easily visible. It also noted that while the police claimed in their
reports - which the PWO obtained - that 25% of fields were destroyed in
the 2008-9 growing period, the actual figure was closer to 11%. Many of
the fields that were reported as destroyed were actually left intact after
the unofficial fees were paid and collected.

Despite the many reports detailing official corruption in Myanmar, the
UNODC has relied heavily on government eradication reports, as well as
ground surveys carried out by authorities, to verify its satellite
imagery-produced data used to produce its yearly survey. In one telling
contradiction, the PWO found that in the two townships of Mantong and
Namkham 963 hectares were under opium cultivation during the 2006-2007
growing season, 1,458 ha in 2007-2008 and 4,545 ha in 2008-2009.

In contrast, the UNODC's survey claimed that 390 ha, 800 ha and 1,600 ha
were under opium cultivation for those same years in all 23 townships in
northern Shan State. The discrepancy in data raises questions about how a
group of local women using researchers based in their own areas and on a
limited budget where able to derive seemingly more comprehensive figures
than the UNODC.

Part of the reason for the increase in opium production can be blamed on
economic mismanagement and poorly planned crop substitution programs.
Farmers across the country have been hard hit by rising prices. In
addition, traditional crops such as tea for the Palaung and the growing of
leaves for cheroots by the Pa-O have seen drastic drops in price. At the
same time, money must be found to pay the legal taxes and extortion fees
by military units, police and government officials.

Failures of substitution crops such as rubber and sugar have also impacted
farmers. As the UNODC's opium survey noted, many farmers who had stopped
opium cultivation for more than two years could not land upon adequate
means of substituting for their lost income. Other farmers have been hit
by the high costs of fertilizers and seeds for crops meant as opium poppy
substitutes, such as maize and improved rice varieties from China. To pay
for these inputs, many farmers have been forced into debt. The result, say
researchers in Shan State, is many would rather risk farming opium and
paying the unofficial "taxes".

With the money being made from opium "taxes", the spread of opium-peddling
government-backed militias and the tacit allowance of ceasefire groups to
process opium in their areas, it is no wonder that the ruling State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) is behind on its 15-year eradication plan.
According to Sai Khuensai, only 13 of 51 townships in Shan, Kachin, China
and Kayah States targeted by the government have after 11 years become
opium-free.

He and other observers claim that in the meanwhile, opium cultivation has
spread into areas of the country that had never previously grown poppies,
including in Mandalay, Magwe and Sagaing divisions, as well as Arakan,
Kayah and Chin States. Notably, none of those areas of the country was
surveyed in the UNODC's 2009 survey report.

At the root of the problem, say local groups such as PWO and SHAN as well
as independent drug trade observers, is a dire need for political reform.
Instead of taking the government's figures at face value and calling for
an increase in international development assistance for the junta's flawed
eradication efforts, the UNODC should push for more input from
community-based organizations to improve the accuracy of its surveys.

That would be a tough sell as curtailing the drug trade would cancel many
of the incentives for ethnic leaders to form and lead militias loyal to
the regime. It would also require vast new outlays from the central
treasury to supply and equip much of the army which currently survives on
revenues it collects from extortion fees. And more local-level
collaboration with the UN agency would ultimately expose the regime's
relations with drug trafficking organizations and the role the drug trade
plays in perpetuating military rule.

Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached
at brianpm at comcast.net.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

January 29, The Progressive
A ray of hope for Burma? – Amitabh Pal

The New Year brings a slender ray of hope for a benighted part of the
world. But in Burma, every silver lining has alongside it a dark cloud.

The ultrarepressive military junta that has ruled the country since 1962
(and has unilaterally renamed it Myanmar) recently announced that it will
free in November that global symbol of nonviolent resistance, Nobel
laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. But there’s a catch here: The release will take
place a month after a sham election will probably be held, barring Suu Kyi
from participating.

Suu Kyi was sentenced to a further eighteen months of house arrest in
August after a bizarre episode in which the Burmese military accused her
of conspiring with an American who swam to her home. Suu Kyi has been kept
in custody for fourteen of the past twenty years.

Interestingly, the announcement comes in the wake of a reorientation of
U.S.-Burma policy over the past year. After a nine-month review, the Obama
Administration said that it would engage with the junta while
simultaneously maintaining the sanctions regime put into place by
President Clinton. To this end, it has held two round of talks with the
dictatorship.

But is the Obama approach working? Depends on whom you ask. Nehginpao
Kipgen, a U.S.-based Burmese activist, commends the change in policy and
asks that the Obama Administration go further down that path.

“Though there is still much uncertainty surrounding Burma's political
future, it is important that the U.S. government continues to engage,”
Kipgen writes. “A meaningful dialogue between the military leader, Senior
General Than Shwe, and the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, must be
encouraged, with the ultimate goal of paving the way to national
reconciliation.”

On the other side, Nick Cohen of the London Observer condemns the Obama
Administration’s silence about the solitary confinement of
Burmese-American Nyi Nyi Aung as capitulation to a pathetic regime in the
name of engagement.

“As Mark Farmaner from the Burma Campaign UK group says, European and
Asian countries which don't give a damn about human rights and just want
to make money aren't feeling any pressure from Washington to blacklist the
[Burmese] regime,” Cohen writes. “The hope that Burmese democracy
campaigners felt at Obama's election has long gone.”

In some sense, this is a continuation of a debate that has raged within
the Burmese democracy movement for ages. Suu Kyi, the global symbol of the
democracy struggle in Burma, has called for international isolation of
Burma. Her position has been contested by the grandson of another Burmese
icon, Burmese-American Thant Myint-U, whose grandfather was U Thant, the
U.N. Secretary-General from 1961 to 1971.

The true test of the Obama Administration’s new Burma policy will be if
anything does indeed change for the better in that nation by the end of
the year. For the moment, one can only be bleakly optimistic.

____________________________________

January 29, Irrawaddy
UN best hope for change in Burma – Alberto Turlon

If the rumors are right, in about 10 months the people of Burma will be
called to vote for the first time in 20 years. A new parliament and a new
political class will be put side by side with the ruling junta. The
elections will be held under the 2008 Constitution, which is one of the
most undemocratic in the world. Inalienable rights could be restricted at
any time “for national security” and the army will enjoy a large
discretionary immunity.

Is there room for diplomacy to improve the political framework before the
elections? Many key-players have tried to deal bilaterally with the ruling
junta, the State Peace and development Council (SPDC), and the role of the
United Nations is downsized at the moment.

An international mediation performed by a neutral and super partes actor
like the UN could help to improve the situation. Both the SPDC and the
democratic opposition are proceeding with their own agendas. The SPDC is
looking for a military stabilization on the borders and in the conflict
areas.

Nevertheless, stabilization will never come by the simple use of force;
this is proved by the rising tension among the ceasefire groups. The
National League for Democracy (NLD) and the other independent parties are
looking for opportunities to revitalize political life and to keep the
connection especially with the large portion of population which is
confronted with an electoral contest for the first time.

The NLD's decision to expand its central committee is a new step to
consolidate relations with the civil society grass roots. The widespread
human rights abuses have already been unanimously condemned by
non-governmental organizations, the international community and the UN.

Human rights abuses and the large issue of economic underdevelopment will
always be part of the international agenda and the SPDC cannot alone deal
with the underdevelopment and the stability at the borders. Long term
solutions on these problems can be reached only by fair discussions
between the SPDC and the civil parties.

The US has been engaging the SPDC in recent months, but the new approach
has not yet achieved an improvement on the ground. The political
repression is still there and Su Kyi is under arrest.

China is the SPDC’s main ally in the UN Security Council; nonetheless the
two countries cannot hide any more their divergences regarding the
treatment and the status of the ceasefire groups.

Burma is also causing major concerns for China regarding drug trafficking
and the cross-border spread of HIV/AIDS in the region of Yunnan.

The traditional Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) policy of
non-interference has become a disadvantage for the organization itself.
Asean should find common standards in the decision-making process if it
aims at becoming a strong and competitive economic region that requires
high interdependence among its partners.

Burma is one of Asean's key members in terms of economic potential and
natural resources but it will never be a full credible partner in the
global arena while large scale human rights abuses continue. If the
situation remains unchanged, Burma will become a serious obstacle to the
strengthening of Asean.

At the same time, countries like China, India and Thailand prefer to deal
bilaterally with the junta and ambitious pipeline, hydro power and natural
resources exploitation programs have been planned. One might ask how it
can be possible to invest large amounts of capital in projects in areas
affected by conflict or under the control of ceasefire groups, where the
SPDC cannot guarantee a stable and sustainable control. All the bilateral
initiatives with the SPDC are subjected to strong limitations and do not
offer a self-sustainable long lasting stabilization.

The UN now gains the chance to gain more confidence and to see the good
offices mandate as a tool of neutral mediation between the parties. A
multilateral round led by the UN and involving the main international
actors and the parties inside is necessary to assess the stability of the
country, the human rights violations and the poor living conditions of the
Burmese people.

The UN has achieved a broad experience in conflict management, capacity
building and transition. The organization has worked for more than 60
years on situations of ethnic tension and has assisted several military
regimes in their transition to democracy. Its role is crucial not only in
mediation but also in creating a comprehensive peace-building process.

In December, the UN General Assembly approved  a resolution supporting the
Secretary-General’s good offices mandate and expressing concern at the
critical situation in Burma. Although non-mandatory, the resolution was
approved by a large majority of the UN members. All the key
actors—including China, the EU, the US, the “Group of Friends” and the
SPDC itself—have reiterated their support of the mandate.

The Secretary-General suggested that the mandate should focus on five
points. The UN must start from the regularization of the diplomatic
negotiations through a UN political liaison office in Naypidaw and
Rangoon. From there, the UN can work on easing the conditions of political
prisoners and on removing further obstacles to the activity of the
independent parties—for instance, refraining from new arrests and allowing
party gatherings throughout the country.

Furthermore, the UN has an important role to play in tackling Burma's
economic underdevelopment and the large poverty affecting the population.
The Secretary-General has reiterated several times the offer to assess the
economic situation of Burma.

The Secretary-General still has to appoint a successor to Ibrahim Gambari
as his special advisor on Burma. It is important for him to be assisted by
a competent diplomat.

We should also learn lessons from the countries having a close
relationship with the regime. They very often deal with the SPDC through
their high military officials. A negotiator with a military background
could command respect and reliability from the SPDC. No political class
has arisen in Burma in nearly 48 years, and the diplomatic corps is almost
entirely made up of army officials.

During the coming months, the UN is expected to devote much effort to the
Burma question. This is the time to move the discussions in the direction
of the Secretary-General’s five points and elaborate a strategy involving
the democratic political forces and the representatives of the ethnic
groups.

After the modest results achieved by those who believed that a smooth
engagement with the regime was the only possible alternative, a UN-
sponsored attempt is the best hope for change in Burma.

Alberto Turlon is a Research Associate of the Washington DC-based The
Burma Fund.

____________________________________

January 29, Asian Tribune
Drug politics of Burma – Zin Linn

Opium poppy cultivation in Burma is swelling all over again in areas
controlled by the military regime or the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), according to a report just published by the Paluang
Women's Organization (PWO). Shockingly, number of drug addicts is
increasing rapidly in Shan state where opium is now being grown. At the
same time as the rising of poppy growing is also killing the traditional
tea cultivation in northern parts of the country.

PWO says opium cultivation in Burma's northern Shan State has increased
five-fold in recent years. The actual areas of opium cultivation in
Northern Shan State documented by PWO is much higher than the areas given
by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).During 2008-9
season, the acreage of 2 out of 23 townships in Northern Shan State found
by PWO was nearly 3 times the total estimation recorded by UNODC for the
23 townships.

UNODC’s assessment for 2008-9 acreage of opium in 23 townships is 1,600
while PWO’s survey on 2 townships alone shows 4,545 acres. In the township
of Man Tong, the group says, about 85 percent of males over the age of 15
are addicted to opium or heroin.

In the report - Poisoned Hills - issued on 26 January 2010, the
organization accuses Burmese authorities, army leaders and pro-government
militia of profiting by extorting funds from opium farmers. Luway Daug
Jar, a coordinator with the organization, says the increased opium
production hurts the local economy, by reducing tea crops and a growing
number of drug addicts.

Luway Daug Jar said that Paluang people are growing opium in order to pay
enough tax, in order to feed those militias and those soldiers who are in
command of exploiting the local economy. At the same time those drugs are
destroying the young generation and the region’s future. So the drug
question in the Paluang areas is just like a vicious cycle.

In the “Poisoned Hills”, field assessments were conducted of opium growing
over three seasons in two main areas: Mantong and Namkham. The Report
says, “It was found that the number of villages growing opium in the
targeted survey area of Mantong Township has tripled from 2006 to 2009.
PWO surveyed 75 villages in Mantong. During the 2006-7 season only 24 of
these villages grew opium. This increased to 35 villages in the following
season. By the 2008-9 seasons all of the villages were growing opium.”

It continued that poppy cultivation has increased six fold from 2006 to
2009, from 1,568 acres (635 hectares) to 9,707 acres (3,928 hectares).

Moreover, the Golden Triangle is the still partially unexplored and
unhandled region that unites the very Southern tip of China with northern
Burma and Laos. The impenetrability of that topography and the
restrictions on state power, especially in Laos and Burma, made it easier
said than done for state or trans-state agencies to make a way into the
region and monitor the growth of opium. Particularly in Burma, the
government has been quite incapable to be in charge of those border
regions which are dominated by dissenter ethnic minorities and, in some
cases, by criminal warlords.

Debbie Stothardt, the spokeswoman for the Burma rights group the
Alternative ASEAN Network, says UNODC officials did not rely on the
proficiency of local organizations in Burma.

"UNODC and international agencies do not even have the guts using the
information collected by these brave natives, because they do not want to
criticize the military authorities of Burma who have shaped this situation
that make communities to grow opium and perpetuate the situation of
economic deficiency and the dawdling of those areas," she said.

Most analysts on drug issue pointed out poverty as a major reason for Shan
State’s continuing drug problem. Opium crops only need a short time to
grow and promptly generate income for impoverished farmers. To stop
growing poppy, an alternative through cash crop substitution programs must
be provided. According to some political analysts, poppy growing and opium
production in Shan State have increased over the past two years due to
political volatility in Burma and growing economic despondency caused by
cronyism, corruption and unprofessional conduct of the junta.

The Paluang Women's Organization says that political reforms, improved
security and stronger economic growth are needed to shift farmers away
from growing opium and to cut drug addiction.

The making of illicit drugs in Burma has considerable international,
regional and national end results. At the international level, the opium
and heroin produced in the country are consumed in Asia distributed
through China and Thailand as well as the rest of Asia, reaching
destinations as far away as Australia, North America and Europe.

At the regional level, drugs are at the root of many problems facing the
countries of the Golden Triangle today, including the spread of HIV/AIDS
fuelled by injecting drug use, corruption of border officials and the
large influence of criminal elements seeking on undermining the rule of
law and further instability in the border areas. Many of these effects are
also felt at the national level, particularly the spread of HIV/AIDS due
to injecting drug use.

Likewise, the continuation of wide-ranging crime and its resultant network
of lawlessness and insecurity, both locally and regionally, enrich
criminals and their cronies. In contrast, those with the potential and
desire to change the country’s political path towards transparency and
accountability are further marginalized.

Beyond this, the drug trade supports the country’s informal economies,
which conform to a political status quo.

Burma is the second largest opium producing nation after Afghanistan, as
said by the United Nation. Burma’s Minister for Home Affairs and Chairman
of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, Maj-Gen Maung Oo said the
drug eradication program had effectively brought down the cultivation of
opium in the country. But observers of the drug issue in Burma speak out
that there is very little progress.

PWO’s document says that the SPDC is allowing poppy to be grown in areas
under its control. In addition, the military regime has been allowing
local authorities to extort tariff from growers, traffickers and addicts.
It is also in the process of expanding militia security units which
actually are engaged in the drugs trade. Thus, the junta is pursuing a
strategy of military buildup in the Shan state to keep up control and
crack down the ethnic resistance movements instead of entering into
political dialogue.

It seems that unless the strategies of militarization of SPDC are
challenged, drugs trade will take place ad infinitum, as if the drug is a
kind of weapon for SPDC to grab hold of the sovereign power. Thus, a
negotiated resolution of the root cause of civil war in Burma is
immediately needed so as to tackle the drug question which intertwined
with the country’s long-lasting political conundrum.

The Burmese public feels it is time for the world body to raise this
half-century-long political conflict in the U.N. Security Council. They
hope for a global arms embargo against Burma's military junta, and an
investigation into crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the
military regime.

Several of such crimes were deeply connected with drugs businesses
manipulated by the SPDC.