BurmaNet News, June 2, 2010

[Editor]

June 2, 2010, Issue #3974


INSIDE BURMA
AP: China's Premier Wen Jiabao visits Myanmar
New Light of Myanmar: Myanmar to host XXVII SEA Games 2013 in Nay Pyi Taw

BUSINESS / TRADE
DVB: 100 houses relocated for airport
China People’s Daily: Envoy: Chinese firms can do more in Myanmar
VOV News (Vietnam): Vietnam, Myanmar mark 35 years of diplomatic ties

INTERNATIONAL
DPA: New Zealand Parliament calls for freedom for Aung San Suu Kyi
Irrawaddy: AI honors Burma's independent journalists

OPINION / OTHER
Irrawaddy: Human rights absent from Wen Jiabao's agenda – Editorial
Nation (Thailand): The international community's naive beliefs on Burma –
Editorial

INTERVIEW
Guernica (US): Sanctioning disaster – Joel Whitney interviews Morten Pedersen



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

June 2, Associated Press
China's Premier Wen Jiabao visits Myanmar

Yangon – Premier Wen Jiabao arrived Wednesday in military-ruled Myanmar
for a two-day official visit, the first by such a high-ranking Chinese
figure in almost a decade.

Wen is scheduled to meet junta chief Senior Gen. Than Shwe, Prime Minister
Thein Sein and other top leaders Thursday in Naypyitaw, the country's
capital. The visit wraps up Wen's four-nation Asia tour after previous
stops in South Korea, Japan and Mongolia.

China is Myanmar's main ally, giving diplomatic and economic support.
Myanmar is shunned by the West because of its poor human rights record and
failure to hand over power to a democratically elected government.

The trip comes at a politically sensitive time as the ruling generals
prepare for elections being boycotted by the party of detained
pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The polls are part of the government's "roadmap to democracy," which
critics have dismissed as a sham. They say the military, which has been in
power since 1962, shows little sign of relinquishing control, and note the
government has made every effort to prevent Suu Kyi from taking part.

Wen will sign a trade package that will strengthen bilateral economic
cooperation, according to China's state Xinhua News Agency, quoting
Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Ye Dabo.

Ye said China wanted to expand cooperation in hydropower, energy, mining,
communications, fisheries, manufacturing and infrastructure.

China is now Myanmar's third largest trading partner and investor after
Thailand and Singapore, with bilateral trade totaling $2.907 billion in
2009. Up to January 2010, China had invested $1.848 billion in Myanmar, or
11.5 percent of Myanmar's total foreign direct investment.

China's then-President Jiang Zemin visited Myanmar in December 2001, and
then-Premier Li Peng came in 1994.

____________________________________

June 2, New Light of Myanmar
Myanmar to host XXVII SEA Games 2013 in Nay Pyi Taw

Nay Pyi Taw – Southeast Asian Games Federation Council has unanimously
agreed to award Myanmar the right to host XXVII SEA Games 2013.

At the Council meeting held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 30 May, the Myanmar
Olympic Committee delegation led by Chairman of Myanmar Olympic Committee
Minister for Sports Thura U Aye Myint submitted a Letter of Intend for
Myanmar to host the XXVII SEA Games 2013 to SEAGF and grasped the right
from the Council. Member of the Council Minister Thura U Aye Myint briefed
the council on preparations for hosting the XXVII SEA Games 2013 in Nay
Pyi Taw.

The four-member delegation presented the letter to Southeast Asian Games
Federation President Mrs Rita Subowo from Indonesia Olympic Committee at
the Council meeting.

Delegates from 11 SEAGF member countries attended the Council meeting
focusing plans for the XXVI SEA Games 2011 in Indonesia and development of
sports in South East Asia.

Myanmar delegation arrived back Yangon yesterday after participating the
meeting from 28 to 31 May.

Members of the delegation are U Thaung Htike, General-Secretary of Myanmar
Olympic Committee Director- General of the Sports and Physical Education
Department, Joint General-Secretary U Khin Maung Lwin and Member of the
committee Prof Dr.

Than Toe, and they also arrived back with the same flight. - MNA

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

June 2, Democratic Voice of Burma
100 houses relocated for airport – Naw Noreen

Around one hundred families in Burma’s northern Sagaing division have been
told to relocate to make way for the extension of a nearby airport.

Residents of Kalay town in Sagaing division told DVB that local
authorities are distributing compensation forms to those set for
relocation. One man said that most residents were unhappy about moving,
and complained that the compensation wouldn’t enable them to build a new
house.

“Some huts [being relocated] will only be compensated 140,000 kyat
[$US140],” he said. He added that families in two-storey houses would be
compensated 1.7 million kyat ($US1,700), “and these days you can’t really
build a two-storey house with that amount of money”.

He said that the residents were also concerned about the monsoon season
and lack of fresh water, while parents didn’t want to move their children
so soon after school opened.

Affected residents are being moved to a 35-acre patch of farmland near
Taungpela village, close to Kalay. The man said that authorities were
preparing the land for housing and roads without acknowledging its owners.

The area of farmland is owned separately by seven people whom the Burmese
government offered compensation of one million kyat ($US1,000). The
landowners however rejected the offer, claiming that one acre is valued at
three million kyat ($US3,000). Despite this, one landowner said that
authorities were going ahead with the preparation.

“We can’t buy new land with the amount of compensation they offered; it is
2.5 million kyat [$US2,500] for land suitable to grow crops,” she said.
“We have submitted an appeal [to the government] to let us stay and work
on this land. It is rainy season now and we should be scattering seeds.”

She added that there would be swathes of extra space on the land given
that 116 houses would not fill 35 acres. “One acre of land can provide
space for about 10 houses, so 35 acres will make about 350. [The
authorities] will take the extra spaces,” she said.

The government first approached the Kalay locals over the relocation in
2007 but were continually rejected. But in April this year authorities
began laying out red flags on the land to signify the area they would
appropriate.

____________________________________

June 2, China People’s Daily
Envoy: Chinese firms can do more in Myanmar

Chinese investors can do more in Myanmar to match their country's economic
clout, Myanmar's top envoy in Beijing has said.

"China can do more for economic cooperation and infrastructure development
(in Myanmar)," Ambassador Thein Lwin said in an e-mail interview with
China Daily.

The ambassador listed energy, transport and telecommunications as major
sectors for Chinese companies to invest in, as resource-rich Myanmar is
keen to improve its infrastructure.

China is the second-largest trading partner and the fourth-largest foreign
investor of Myanmar. Two-way trade hit $1.73 billion from January to
August last year, while Chinese investment totaled $330 million, figures
from the Chinese Foreign Ministry showed.

Thein cited a China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, one of the
largest foreign investments in Myanmar, as one that would benefit both
countries.

Many factors - regional development, infrastructure construction, local
employment and environment - should be considered, he said.

In November 2008, the two countries agreed to build a $1.5-billion oil
pipeline and $1.04-billion natural gas pipeline, which will reportedly be
able to deliver 240,000 barrels of oil a day and 12 billion cubic meters
of gas a year to China.

"I hope the project would bring in more Chinese business people to
Myanmar," the ambassador said.

Thein also said the free trade agreement (FTA) between China and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Myanmar is a member, will
help promote economic ties.

"Most of the business people welcome the arrangement," he said, referring
to the world's largest free trade area in terms of population. The FTA was
implemented on January 1.

Calling China a good neighbor and true friend, Thein said Beijing always
stands ready to help his country's peace and stability.

In April, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said Beijing
wishes to see parties in Myanmar achieve national reconciliation through
consultation and realize stability, democracy and development.

Thein said the two nations have enjoyed good, long-term ties. Myanmar is
one of the few Asian countries that established diplomatic relations in
the early days of the People's Republic of China. The two countries also
maintained frequent high-level official exchanges in the past decades.

Similarly, the ambassador emphasized the significance of promoting
people-to-people exchanges.

He said he was glad to see that China has become a new destination for
Myanmar students in recent years. They used to regard countries such as
Singapore and the United States as their first choice.

Wang Chenyan contributed to this story.

____________________________________

June 2, VOV News (Vietnam)
Vietnam, Myanmar mark 35 years of diplomatic ties

The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO) held a meeting in
Hanoi on June 2 to mark the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the
diplomatic ties between Vietnam and Myanmar.

VUFO vice chairman Nguyen Van Kien and Myanmar ambassador to Vietnam Khin
Maung Soe recalled traditional relations between Vietnam and Myanmar.
Since establishing diplomatic ties in 1975, bilateral relations have been
strengthened and developed in many fields. Leaders from the two countries
often exchange visits.

With great efforts both sides have achieved significant results in
economic and trade co-operation. Despite the global economic crisis,
two-way trade value reached US$108.2 million in 2008 and US$99 million in
2009.

In recent years, many Vietnamese businesses have implemented big projects
in Myanmar, including the Vietnam Army Telecommunications Group (Viettel),
the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group and the Bank for Investment and Development
of Vietnam.

Furthermore, the two countries have discussed a number of measures to
boost co-operation in agriculture, forestry, seafood, transport, electric
equipment manufacturing, automobile assembly, tourism, construction, and
civil aviation. They have fostered co-operation in multilateral forums,
such as ASEAN, Greater Mekong sub-region (GMS) and the Ayeyawady - Chao
Phraya - Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS).

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

June 2, Deutsche Presse-Agentur
New Zealand Parliament calls for freedom for Aung San Suu Kyi

Wellington – The New Zealand Parliament voted unanimously Wednesday to
urge Myanmar's military rulers to reinstate full civil rights for Aung San
Suu Kyi and allow her to contest the forthcoming general election.

Maryan Street, an opposition Labour member and chairwoman of
theCross-Party Parliamentary Group on Burma, said elections planned for
this year would be a sham if the democracy activist and Nobel peace
laureate was not permitted to stand.

Suu Kyi led the National League for Democracy to victory in the 1990
elections, but the ruling junta never allowed the party to take office.

"Her release from house arrest and the reinstatement of her democratic
rights, together with the release of the estimated 2,200 other political
prisoners held by the junta , are the only things which will make these
elections credible in the eyes of the world," Street said.

____________________________________

June 2, Irrawaddy
AI honors Burma's independent journalists – Saw Yan Naing

Amnesty International presented its “Journalism under Threat” award to
Burma's community of independent journalists at a London ceremony on
Tuesday, paying tribute to their bravery in tackling dangerous and
difficult work.

Several of those journalists contacted by The Irrawaddy said they were
still active in conveying the true picture of events in Burma to the
outside world.

Illustration: Harn Lay / The Irrawaddy
One video journalist, identifying himself solely as Z Filmmaker, said an
urge to “serve the people” had led him to cover the aftermath of Cyclone
Nargis in May 2008, despite the risks he ran.

“Actually, I was very scared to do such adventurous work because if I got
arrested, all my whole life could end up in prison,” he said. “But, I must
do it to serve the people.”

He visited the worst-hit areas of Laputta and Bogalay Townships in the
Irrawaddy delta, interviewing and filming local villagers. He and a
foreign journalist friend were briefly arrested.

The video journalist said the experience had left its mark on him.

“I feel that I can get arrested and jailed at anytime,” he said. “It
affected me psychologically. If I hear knocking on my door, I feel
scared.”

Another video journalist, who uses the pseudonym Aung Win, said: “I was
caught by police when I was shooting video footage of Nargis Cyclone
victims.  I thought I was going to be jailed.

“But when the police were checking my camera, I fled and escaped. It felt
risky and very adventurous at the same time. It is obviously dangerous to
work inside as a journalist.”

Burma was ranked 171st out of 175 countries in the 2009 Reporters Without
Borders press freedom index while junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe is on the
Reporters Without Borders list of 40 “Predators of Press Freedom.”

At least 12 Burmese journalists are currently imprisoned in Burma,
according to Reporters Without Borders.

Some are serving jail terms of more than 20 years. The blogger Nay Phone
Latte is serving 20 years and six months, the satirist Zarganar 45 years,
Hla Hla Win 27 years and Win Maw (16 years).

Haider Kikabhoy, Amnesty International’s Burma campaigner said in a
statement released on Tuesday: “Journalists in Myanmar [Burma] work in a
very difficult and often dangerous environment. Those who attempt to
report news and views independently of the government do so at great
personal risk.”

“Many of these individuals are forced to carry out their legitimate work
in secrecy or exile. Some of them have been threatened, harassed,
imprisoned and even tortured.”

Some Burmese reporters in Burma say they have to use subterfuge in order
to cover sensitive issues, posing as relief workers, donors or tourists
instead of identifying themselves as journalists.

“We need to approach the authorities cleverly,” said Khin Thwe, a Rangoon
journalist. “If we want to get the official statistics for our story, we
can't approach them as  journalists.”

Another woman journalist who worked for The Myanmar Times said: “Being an
independent journalists in Burma is very risky job. We have to keep
everything secret. Otherwise, you can get arrested anytime.”

One editor who works for a Rangoon journal said: “Your words can put you
in jail. So, you have to be careful about every single word.”

Recognizing the difficulties of journalists working under such conditions
in Burma, Amnesty International's Kikabhoy said: “These journalists
persevere because they want the people of Myanmar— and the world—to
receive other news besides state propaganda. This award recognizes their
commitment and bravery as well as the contribution they make to the
ongoing struggle for human rights in the country.”

The award for Burmese journalists was accepted on their behalf by Nita
May, who works for the BBC Burmese Service. She said: “I am indeed very
much honored to take part in the Amnesty International Media Awards
Ceremony and to collect this award on behalf of all of my colleagues.

“I think it is brilliant that Amnesty is highlighting the perils facing
journalists in Burma and hope that it gives courage and much needed
support to media workers who risk so much in carrying out their valuable
work of exploration and exposition.

“Without the information they are able to get from independent
journalists, people in Burma would not know the real state of affairs,”
said Nita May.

Kikabhoy said, “Independent journalism is very important for people in
Myanmar [Burma], because in order to be able to exercise their human
rights, people need to have the ability to not only express their
opinions, but also to receive information.”

Despite the risks and difficulties they face, reporters in Burma earn only
between 35,000 and 70,000 kyat (US $30—$60) per month. Editors generally
make about 80,000 kyat ($70), and a chief editor can expect to take home a
monthly salary of 200,000 to 300,000 kyat ($170—$260).

Many journalists were arrested along with activists and monks in the wake
of the mass demonstrations in September 2007 and in the aftermath of
Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.

“Burma is still poor in respecting the rights of professional
journalists,” said a Burmese journalist in Rangoon who works for a foreign
news agency.

Despite working for a foreign concern, the journalist said he still faces
intimidation and threats by phone and email. His sources  were also
threatened by the authorities, he said.

Risks are particularly high for reporters who work for foreign-based media
such as the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and the Democratic
Voice of Burma, he said.

In September 2008, several Web sites run by Burmese media groups in
exile—The Irrawaddy, Mizzima, the Democratic Voice of Burma and
Khitpyaing—came under repeated cyber attacks. Three of the agencies were
bombarded by so-called “distributed denial-of-service” (DDoS) attacks,
which overload Web sites with an unmanageable volume of traffic.

Z Filmmaker said journalists inside Burma have to think about how to work
with the exile journalists. They need to establish a network and send the
information that they can't report inside Burma to the exile media.

“It is important for journalists inside and outside Burma to join hands
and work together to bring true information in the future . They have to
respect, understand each other and work together to cover the upcoming
election,” he said.

There are severe restrictions on what journalists can report about the
election, Amnesty International pointed out. It said there were vaguely
worded provisions in election laws stating that anyone who tries to
“disrupt” the elections through speech or publication will be prosecuted.

“Independent news on the upcoming elections process is vital in keeping
the world’s attention focused on Myanmar [Burma] in what is going to be a
critical year in the country’s future,” said Kikabhoy.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

June 2, Irrawaddy
Human rights absent from Wen Jiabao's agenda – Editorial

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is expected to deal with a wide range of
issues during his two-day visit to Burma, which began on Wednesday. But
human rights will not be among them.

China's ambassador to Burma, Ye Dabo, told the official Chinese news
agency Xinhua that Wen will meet Burmese junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe,
Prime Minister Thein Sein and other Burmese officials in Naypyidaw.

“The two countries will sign a number of cooperation documents covering
trade, finance, energy, science and technology,” the Beijing Today
newspaper quoted Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun as saying.

Human rights issues will certainly not be raised in the talks in view of
Beijing's traditional policy of “non-interference” in the domestic affairs
of  military-ruled Burma.

Nevertheless, China wants stability to reign along its 1,370-mile
(2,190-kilometer) border with Burma, particularly now that the junta is
preparing to confront the 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), which
is ethnically Chinese, and its allies.

Last August, regime troops tried to seize control of the Kokang region,
made up mostly of ethnic Chinese and where a two-decade-long ceasefire had
been in place. The attack triggered an exodus of more than 37,000 refugees
into China’s Yunnan province.

China is well aware that the ethnic armed groups based on the Sino-Burmese
border are united in opposition to Napyidaw's demand for them to transform
their armies into a border guard force under the regime's command.

China seems ready to use its influence to make sure that the boom years
that began with the signing of a ceasefire agreement don't end again on
the  battlefield.

Moreover, China seems to be concerned about the management of the election
set for later this year, recently expressing its concern about the
exclusion of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners from the poll.

In China's last high-level visit to Burma, in December 2009, Vice
President Xi Jinping relayed to Than Shwe that Beijing wanted to see
"political stability, economic development and national reconciliation."

China must also make clear to the Burmese generals that Naypyidaw's
relationship with North Korea is causing increasing concern in the region.

The growing trade in conventional weapons—including reports of Burmese
purchases of North Korean-made short-range ballistic missiles—and
increasing evidence of nuclear cooperation are deeply troubling, as well
as being in clear violation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.

China, however, appears unable or unwilling to support any action against
its neighbor—or against such other rogue governments as Sudan and Iran. It
has distanced itself from any effort to hold North Korea to account for
the recent sinking of a South Korean warship.

China has emerged as a world economic power far quicker than most
observers thought possible. But the politicians who run China must do far
more to demonstrate their bona fides as responsible global leaders who
recognize the universal values of human rights.

____________________________________

May 30, Nation (Thailand)
The international community's naive beliefs on Burma – Editorial

Global think-tanks are ignoring the fact that nothing is free or fair in
the junta-ruled country, least of all ballots.

Most people are saying "at least it's better than nothing", in reference
to the upcoming elections in Burma. This is especially true for those who
are desperate to see some progress in the junta-ruled country.

The latest briefing from the International Crisis Group gave the
impression that the election, despite the international community pointing
out all the faults with it, would serve as "the best opportunity in a
generation to influence the future direction of the country".

With such an endorsement, even though a mild one by international
standards, the junta leaders in Rangoon will end up having the last laugh.
Persistence and complete control is a virtue these days because stability
and the status quo are easy to deal with.

Political turmoil in Thailand has added fuel to the international
community's growing anxiety about democratic development in the region.
Many scholars tend to view countries with continuous political stability
as preferred models of development and investment.

The Thai situation was repeatedly used to demonstrate one salient point -
stability is linked to prosperity. If one wants prosperity then one must
forget about freedom and democracy. Thailand wants both, so the experiment
and healing continues.

What is sad about the the international community and most independent
think-tanks is that they are not really serious about the suffering of the
Burmese people.

For 20 years, the Burmese people have been living under the military
junta, tightly monitored and suppressed. And yet, the international
community is slow in taking collective action. Investments from the West,
dubious positions and awkward neighbourly policies by China, India, as
well as Asean, have only strengthened the regime.

Why should the junta accommodate calls for fairness and justice?

The Burmese generals know full well that international focus is
short-lived, as there are a myriad global issues to pay attention to. The
current Korean Peninsula crisis will continue to dominate the headlines.
It would not be a surprise if the junta suddenly declared the date of
polls now that global attention has shifted away to the northeast of Asia.

The ICG's claim that the voting in Burma could be "relatively fair" is
preposterous. Yet, such belief is proliferating. That is exactly what the
junta wants to see, and that explains why dictatorial governments around
the world no longer succumb to any international pressure.

The ICG has not asked if the voters are free to cast their ballots with
free will.

How can voters cast their ballots freely if they are being controlled and
watched by plain-clothes police officers and thousands of spies in the
neighbourhood? They are scared to hell. Every name and household has been
scrutinised and put in the records.

The people know that what they do at the polling stations will come back
to haunt them. The atmosphere of fear is rising every day.

It is naïve to think that the 1990 poll victory by the opposition party
may take place once again because the Burmese voters will be prepared to
reject the junta en masse. Similarly, the junta leaders are prepared to
make sure they win the polls, now that they've learned from past mistakes.

Indeed, if the ICG continues believing what it does, the regime has
already won the election!

____________________________________
INTERVIEW

June 2, Guernica (US)
Sanctioning disaster – Joel Whitney interviews Morten Pedersen

The Burma expert defends aid, diplomacy, and “understanding” Burma’s
dictators in order to improve human rights, sway softliners, and save
lives.

Early last month, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with
Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi and offered a battery of human rights demands to
her wardens in the military government. The dictators have been gearing up
for elections later this year. Yet, unfazed by Campbell’s demands, they
yawned and pressed on with elections from which Suu Kyi, who won in 1990,
and her opposition party, the National League for Democracy, are banned.
International election monitors? Also banned. And don’t expect
election-day scoops from a country where a foreign journalist was shot
point-blank for covering monks’ protests in 2007. “I think they learned
their lesson from 1990 when they actually allowed for a free and fair
election and lost in a landslide,” said Jared Genser, Suu Kyi’s
international counsel.

Days after his visit, Campbell admitted “profound disappointment” that
more had not come from the talks. Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK,
noted judiciously: “... Clearly after two visits [by Campbell] since last
September, engagement with the regime has produced no results at all.”
[Emphasis added] On May 15, the president renewed economic sanctions
against the regime. But members of Congress sought to make those sanctions
even tougher. “In a further sign of fraying American patience,” the
Guardian reported, “a bipartisan coalition in the U.S. House of
Representatives called this week for a ‘tougher and more robust
application of sanctions on Burma’ and urged the Obama administration to
back an international war crimes inquiry.”

President Obama’s policy on Burma has something for everyone. It’s a
hodgepodge of baby-step diplomacy, self-righteous threats, and crippling
economic sanctions. The sanctions condemn the dictators for rights
violations by blocking U.S. investments (except for Chevron, which is
somehow allowed to stay), including all non-humanitarian aid. Morten
Pedersen, a Burma scholar lurking in the bibliography of a lot of Burma
policy books, insists that the sanctions, especially the ban on aid, are
undermining the president’s diplomacy. Oh, and starving the Burmese.

During his six-year stay in Burma, where he was able to use his conversant
Burmese to interview experts and ordinary people, Pedersen says the most
dire rights violation he found was crushing poverty. Alongside political
rights, he argues that socioeconomic rights must be seen as part of the
array of human rights. But such an approach would seem anathema to a
Congress that prioritizes condemnation and punishment of the generals over
the well being of the people of Burma.

Advocating an approach he calls principle engagement, Pedersen writes in
an op-ed in the Canberra Times, “pressure can be exercised without
mindlessly ratcheting up sanctions, which have little practical impact
other than limiting our ability to influence broader social, political and
economic processes. Quiet, but persistent, pressure and support for
incremental gains is likely over time to shape the political behaviour of
the military more effectively than public condemnation and sanctions.”

Calling the generals’ outlook Hobbesian, Pedersen argues in Promoting
Human Rights in Burma, “We may feel that the military leaders hold
socially deviant values, or that their fears regarding political reform
are unjustified. Yet, like many leaders who believe they have a higher
purpose, they are largely impervious to criticism, and do not expect
nonbelievers—foreigners in particular—to understand.” So what’s the point
of talking to them? Well, like all regimes, Burma’s has hardliners and
softliners. As distasteful as it may sound, can “understanding” the
generals, even speaking in their terms, bring about human rights
improvements, bolster military softliners, and save lives? And if so, is
it politically viable?

Pedersen is a research fellow at the Australian National University’s
Centre for International Governance and Justice. Burmese historian Thant
Myint-U calls him “one of the foremost students and scholars of Burmese
politics anywhere outside the country.” Pedersen previously worked as
senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Burma and consultant
on Burmese politics and development affairs with the UN, the World Bank,
and the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. I spoke with him at the
Algonquin Hotel in New York City in late March, while he was in town for a
conference. We sat amidst a throng of tourists who drank high-priced
martinis and ate complimentary nuts.

—Joel Whitney for Guernica

Guernica: You lived in Burma for six years. The generals are killing and
imprisoning and torturing a lot of their people. Some say they are
committing genocide against groups like the Karen. Liberals and
conservatives in the U.S. and Europe seem to have converged on this idea
that if there is ‘evil’ there, we certainly shouldn’t fund it. It’s not
moral for us to deal with them. Do you disagree?

Morten Pedersen: There’s two ways of looking at morality. One would be
when you look at the act itself, [asking] is that moral or immoral? Many
people would define it as immoral, because it funds a bad regime. To me,
morality is better looked at in terms of its consequences. I look at how
our acts impact the Burmese people. If there is a net benefit from our
acts for the Burmese people, I see it as moral. You often are accused of
being immoral when you argue for engagement. I think it’s important to
make that point up front that that’s not the issue. We can disagree on
things, but it’s not about morality. And of course it all depends on what
type of engagement we’re talking about.

People especially in the U.S., are quick to say, “If you’re not
sanctioning then you are doing ASEAN-style engagement, which is commercial
engagement.” The kind of engagement I’m talking about is what I term
“principle engagement,” whose up-front objective is to bring improvements
in human rights for the Burmese people. By that I mean the entire range of
human rights, not just political and civil rights, but also socioeconomic
rights, which, as far as I’m concerned, are of equal value. That’s
certainly something that [was clear from] my six years in Burma, that
socioeconomic issues are uppermost in people’s minds.

Guernica: So just to define principle engagement


Morten Pedersen: So if there’s a net benefit flowing from the engagement
in human rights terms, then I see it as being the way to go. And that then
gets into these rather difficult calculations of what is the relative
benefit of one approach versus the other. A lot of the discussion is about
aid, because that really is where the door is in Burma. The reality is
that there wouldn’t be a lot of trade and investment flowing into Burma
even if sanctions were lifted, because of the economic environment. (You
would get more of it than now, but not a lot.) So I’ve spent a lot of my
time looking at aid as a way of having a dialog or a conversation both
with the regime but also with society. Of course [that means] a financial
relationship that can improve living conditions of people on the ground.

Guernica: Because right now the U.S., for one, doesn’t give significant
amounts of aid?

Morten Pedersen: The U.S., as part of this new diplomatic engagement
policy has also for the first time committed to openly giving aid inside
the country. For many years, it was all outside. But that has kind of been
shifting over the last seven years. They have begun to do little things
inside.

Guernica: And the E.U.?

Morten Pedersen: The E.U. made a decisive shift seven or eight years ago
where they said we’re going to separate politics and humanitarian issues.
My argument is that you’re dealing with a long-term crisis. Humanitarian
aid by definition is aid that saves lives in a crisis. Burma is an
extended crisis; therefore going in and saving lives of course has value.
But it doesn’t make sense to only do that. Because you save a life today
but then tomorrow the crisis will come back and threaten it again. There
has to be more ambition than that.
Guernica: How?

Morten Pedersen: Principle engagement is changing governance to the extent
that you can so that human rights improve. But [you’re] also helping
people cope with whatever situation exists. So in the short term, it’s
about helping people cope. And in the medium term, I think it is also a
strategy for beginning to effect changes that over time can lead to bigger
things. But it will be domestically driven change and you [see] at best
international aid or engagement, or whatever it is, as possibly being a
catalyst for that.

The idea that aid props up the regime is ludicrous. In power terms, it is
irrelevant. If you stick to the concept of morality where we shouldn’t be
doing anything that benefits a corrupt regime, yes, then you’ve got a
problem. But if you look at morality in utilitarian terms, I don’t believe
that you do, because there’s not significant power consequences of the aid
going in. Or at least you can make sure that there isn’t. Of course, I am
assuming here that aid agencies are being principled themselves and that
they look after their money and that there is proper monitoring and so
forth. There’s been an easy argument out there for years, you know, ‘Aid
won’t make a difference, you’re not allowed to do anything that’s
meaningful and they will steal all of it.’ But it has been proven by the
agencies that have engaged that this is not the case.

Guernica: So in its limited way, aid works?

Morten Pedersen: Aid works to the extent that aid works in any country.
Usually it doesn’t change a country, right? But it can do things at the
individual level.

Guernica: Your book strongly argues for more understanding not just of
Burmese history but of the specific perspective of this murderous military
junta. Many would criticize this argument that we need to understand bad
guys. Dick Cheney offered extreme contempt for American liberals by saying
something like, “Liberals want to put terrorists on the couch and
psychoanalyze them.” In a way, you take a step in that direction. Tell me
what the benefits of understanding the generals are.

Morten Pedersen: I think to address Cheney’s point, there are definitely
people who cannot be reformed. But accepting that is not to accept that
you can’t make a difference. Of course, if there are people who can’t be
reformed then the difference that you can make is with other people,
including other people in the regime. Some people say hardliners and
softliners; it’s a useful way of distinguishing [how] the Burmese regime
has softliners just as any other regime. And to the extent that engagement
can change minds, can change policies, those are the people we’re looking
at. So engagement at best can reinforce or empower people within the
regime who are interested in [change].

Guernica: Of course now the Obama administration is engaging
“pragmatically” with the regime. To make this engagement more productive,
you argue that Burmese history ought to be better understood. What does
that history look like?

Morten Pedersen: I think we have to accept that this is a military that
genuinely believes that Burma without its military in control (not
necessarily as rulers, but certainly in a key role) would not have
survived and even today would not survive.
Guernica: Besides the Buddhist clergy, the military is the only viable
institution with any longevity in Burma. And that goes back to just after
World War II when independence came; Aung San Suu Kyi’s dad, feeling angry
and humiliated by decades and decades of colonial rule, impatiently but
understandably told the British to beat it before the Brits could rebuild
the country. With the chaos that ensued, the military was the only
feasible institution. This was the view that developed, in part as a
justification for the generals’ curtailing democracy. Many have argued,
including Burmese historian Thant Myint-U, that the military remains the
only viable institution in Burma.

Morten Pedersen: Yeah, I mean I’m not personally prepared to accept the
argument that a depoliticized military would be the end of Burma.

Guernica: Which is what military hardliners argue.

Morten Pedersen: My point is that I do accept that there are a lot of
people in the military who believe that. So we’re not dealing with a
regime that is solely interested in personal power and privilege, although
that is obviously an element, as it is everywhere. It is a regime that
also has a founding ideology, a self-image as having a critical national
role, and which does, in fact, act on that. Not just running the country
as their own kind of bank or business, although some of them seem to;
there are others who are concerned with much more. But I should clarify
that the distinction between aid and diplomatic engagement is actually not
that big. A lot of the most effective conversations with the regime are
conversations that are being had on the ground by agencies that are
engaged there on practical projects.

So it’s not Kurt Campbell flying into the capital, talking about how they
should conduct the elections. I don’t think that’s gonna lead anywhere. I
don’t think that conversation is wrong. But the idea that you can
negotiate significant changes at the political level in a short timespan,
I don’t believe that’s gonna work. But we do know that conversations about
economic policy, for example, do from time to time have an impact and lead
to changes in governance. When engaging in these conversations, a good
place to start in a country like Burma is to accept that we’re not gonna
be able to change Burma. We simply don’t have the means, the leverage, to
change a country like that in the dramatic ways that we tend to focus on.

Guernica: China’s stance seems to further undermine any influence that
sanctions could once have had.

Morten Pedersen: I think pressure is important. But where I want the
sanctions to stop is
 you need just enough to have that possible effect.
But if you take them too far, as I believe we have done in Burma, then you
start blocking other things that I think would be more effective in
helping the Burmese people and bringing about improvements in their human
rights.

Guernica: Specifically, what parts of sanctions should be kept?

Morten Pedersen: If you’re gonna use sanctions on Burma they have to be
strictly targeted. It should be the kind of sanctions that don’t really
have an impact on the broader economy or the broader population. Things
like the visa ban and freezing the generals’ accounts. None of this really
bites that much. And I’m not saying it’s gonna usher in change. But it
sends the message that we are unhappy with the way you are doing things,
and says this is not according to international standards.

Guernica: But it isn’t counterproductive, in your view?

Morten Pedersen: In comparing the different types of sanctions, those are
at the end of the continuum where it’s something we can look at. But there
may be counterproductive effects. When you move into broader economic
sanctions, then we’re in the middle now. Then it starts to become
problematic. It is not possible to target sanctions; because if you target
them to hurt the generals, they can pass it on. They can deflect it.

Guernica: It could even end up increasing their corruption over things
like aid.

Morten Pedersen: It could, yeah. So once you move into economic sanctions,
we’re already beyond what I think is strategically smart to do. But where
it becomes really problematic is where you have aid sanctions. Because aid
is the wench in the door that we have. You get people in there on the
ground who have conversations, build capacity, change minds all across the
state and society. No, they don’t engage with Senior General Than Shwe.
But they engage at the ministerial level and then all the way down to
people living in the villages. And with the amount of aid, we aren’t
talking about dramatic changes. But we are talking about positive changes,
both in terms of immediate outcomes and I believe also in terms of
beginning to create conditions for bigger change, which will have to be
primarily domestically driven. But if you can get the people in the regime
to loosen up a little bit. I mean they are so paranoid; they have been
paranoid for many years. Well, paranoid, but it started out not being
paranoia. I mean, it was real.

Guernica: You mean in the period around 1950?

Morten Pedersen: The whole country was at war in the early nineteen
fifties. Back then it wasn’t paranoid to believe you needed to control
things.

Guernica: Everything was fragmenting.

Morten Pedersen: Yeah.

Guernica: There were something like a dozen ethnic groups that rebelled.
There was a communist faction. The U.S. had supported Chinese nationalists
within Burmese borders, arming them to the teeth. So the country was total
chaos, falling apart


Morten Pedersen: Yeah. You had other countries in the region, Vietnam,
Korea, at different times or a bit later, that were split in two. This is
the nightmare scenario.

Guernica: Some of the U.S. and Europe’s policy is a result of a fixation
on Aung San Suu Kyi as the main entry point into Burmese history, which is
certainly compelling. It hooked me. As did conversations with Karen and
other Burmese exiles. But you seem to argue that we don’t see Burma enough
through the filter of the history of the people we have to deal with.

Morten Pedersen: What I would say is [these Burma watchers] see Burma
through the last twenty years, which is equivalent to the Suu Kyi period.
The reason it’s twenty years is because that period has not changed.
That’s exactly the point. It’s exactly the same issues we’re dealing with
now that were the issues in 1988. And this of course is why everybody
should start having a look at existing policies. When, twenty years down
the road, absolutely nothing has changed [in what] you have stated as your
goals, then certainly you have a very good reason for a revision of what
you’re doing.

Guernica: Critics of sanctions equate them with sanctions on Cuba, Iran,
or Iraq, where they have failed to change governments, except perhaps to
entrench them, in ways that seem counterproductive and certainly hurt the
public. Yet proponents of sanctions cite South Africa, where sanctions
helped bring down a regime built around institutionalized racism. Which
scenario is more pertinent to Burma?

Morten Pedersen: South Africa was actually a partial democracy. Blacks
were not involved in that democracy. But there was a white constituency
that had influence on government decisions. In Burma, there is no such
constituency. There’s no one outside the army that has influence on policy
decisions. There’s a close business community. But while they’re close to
the generals, they have no political influence. In South Africa, there was
a large business community that had direct influence through electoral
processes and beyond that. And South Africa was also heavily integrated
into the global economy, and the global cultural community. The whites
were really hurt by being shunned by what was in fact their peer group in
Europe. So they were hurt, culturally they felt isolated, the shaming
worked, and the economic pressure worked. And they then put pressure on
the government. That may not have changed otherwise.

Guernica: In Burma, those elements are not there?

Morten Pedersen: The Burmese generals have no affinity at all with the
people who are sanctioning them. Culturally, there’s no link whatsoever.

Guernica: In fact, there’s still resentment against the U.S. for backing
Chinese nationalists, Great Britain for backing the


Morten Pedersen: And for what the Americans have been doing for the last
twenty years. And economically they just aren’t integrated. So the
economic pain that you can impose is very limited. And even if you could
impose pain on the cronies, they don’t have the political influence to
change anything. So the generals, as far as I’m concerned, are isolated in
terms of political effects of sanctions. If you do something and the
Burmese generals gain a little from it but the Burmese people gain a lot,
then by my calculation that’s the moral thing to do.

Guernica: For instance, regarding aid.

Morten Pedersen: Diplomacy too. If you go and talk to the generals, then
maybe they feel a little good that the ‘Americans come and talk to us,
we’re somebody.’ You can make the argument at any level, really. And,
ideally, I would not want them to feel good. But if that conversation can
help open space for something that benefits the people, or can begin to
change their mind so they do govern in a way that is less abusive, then to
me it’s the right thing to do.

Guernica: Reading your book is confusing to me. I have read many others
that make the story of the Karen, for instance, very compelling. But your
book seems to point back at the generals to remind us of their story, in
order to better engage them. Aren’t these two arguments contradictory, or
can they be complimentary?

Morten Pedersen: That’s a tricky one to answer. Because I don’t think
there’s anything wrong with the narrative we’re being told about the
suffering [of groups like the Karen] in the border areas. I don’t have any
doubt that it is extreme and has been ongoing for a very long time.
There’s nothing good to say about what is going on out there. I think the
implicit argument in the book is that there is more to Burma than the
eastern border areas. So that doesn’t mean less attention to the eastern
border areas, but it means more attention to the rest of Burma.

Guernica: The argument of these books, books like Mac McClelland’s For Us
Surrender Is Out of the Question, and Edith Mirante’s books, is that the
eastern and other border areas have been most neglected, because these
people live far out on the border and have marginal influence inside
Burma, let alone in the broader world of international policy. If we want
to understand the morality of this regime, look to the eastern border area
where we have something tantamount to genocide. You say, essentially, it’s
the generals we should be looking at. Why?

Morten Pedersen: Well, I guess because I’m coming at it from a policy
angle. In order to analyze the impact of sanctions policy, the key thing
that we need to understand is why the generals do what they do, so that we
can have a more effective conversation.
Guernica: In a way, I keep trying to ask you this: why do the generals do
what they do?

Morten Pedersen: You need to accept that national security, as the
generals define it, is their key concern; you can argue about whether
that’s the right way of defining it. And I would disagree with that way
[as well]. But that is how they define it. That is a significant objective
and a significant motivating factor in everything they do. So when you
engage with them you need to recognize and acknowledge that. And you need
maybe even to go a bit further and frame your conversations in a way that
kind of accepts that there are security concerns that are legitimate. But
maybe there are other ways of addressing those security concerns. I mean
other countries in Southeast Asia have also faced risks of their country,
if not splitting apart, then fragmenting in some significant way. Rather
than addressing that problem militarily like the Burmese have done, they
have addressed it economically by pushing economic growth and spreading it
to provinces.

Guernica: So to get the Burmese generals to think of a new story about how
to hold the country together, it’s productive and helpful for those
dealing with them to understand how the generals see the country’s
national security problems now, and show some acknowledgment of that in
dealing with them?

Morten Pedersen: If the purpose is changing their mind, which is hard
anyway, then coming in and saying, ‘You are evil, you need to go away,’
will get you nowhere. But if you come in and you recognize some of what I
believe are real concerns of the military, however misunderstood they may
be, then you have the start of a conversation which can possibly lead to
suggesting [policies] that are more acceptable to the international
community, but, more importantly, are better for the Burmese people.

Guernica: Zoya Phan suggests an arms embargo. What’s your take on that?

Morten Pedersen: I think that looking at an arms embargo is where we
should have started. But an arms embargo wouldn’t be very effective
because you probably wouldn’t get cooperation of the neighboring countries
and even if you did we all know how the arms trade works. I mean the arms
trade breaks through sanctions everywhere. You can make it more expensive
but you can’t stop it. So it would be a symbolic sanction more than an
instrumental or effective one but that is definitely on the side that I
would call good, or better sanctions.

Guernica: There’s a reasonable debate on that?
Morten Pedersen: Yeah, reasonable sanctions. But one that would be very
hard to get.