BurmaNet News, September 3, 2010

[Editor]

September 3, 2010 Issue #4034

INSIDE BURMA
Irrawaddy: USDP loses in election survey
Mizzima: Poet holds first exhibition since release
Kaladan: More taxes for Maungdaw fishermen
Khonumthung: Chin Progressive Party nominates 41 candidates in Chin state

ON THE BORDER
KNG: Kachin people told about KIO’s new policies
Kantarawaddy: Community groups oppose 'unfair' polls

ASEAN
AFP: Obama-ASEAN summit on September 24 in New York

REGIONAL
Himal Southasian: Burma's dash for offshore cash
Mizzima: Burmese petition India for release of freedom fighters

OPINION / OTHER
USG Statement: President Obama to host second U.S.-ASEAN leaders meeting
Mizzima: Book Review: The faces and stories of Burma’s refugees



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

September 3, Irrawaddy
USDP Loses in Election Survey

The military regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
has lost in a recent pre-election survey conducted in Shan State and
Rangoon Division, according to an official from the Ministry of Home
Affairs (MOHA).

Speaking to The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity, the MOHA official
said that the survey was conducted in secret, but did not elaborate on how
it was carried out nor how many people were questioned.

Members and senior leaders of the USDP chant "Must win a victory!" while a
pre-election survey has shown they are losers. (Photo: AP)
“In Shan State, voters said they will cast ballots for their ethnic-based
political parties,” he said. “In Rangoon, however, most voters will
abstain.”

He said the pre-election survey result has worried military regime leaders
who may consequently apply various means to ensure an election victory on
Nov. 7.

Led by incumbent Prime Minister Thein Sein, the USDP has claimed that it
has about 16 million members. Observers speculate that the USDP will
contest the election in all constituencies across the country.

A journal in Burma this week quoted Thu Wai, the chairman of the
Democratic Party (Myanmar), as saying that the USDP can and will easily
win more than 500 seats in the coming election since the remaining parties
can contest no more than about 500 out of more than 1,000 constituencies
for all parliaments.

On June 1, the USDP registered at the Union Election Commission (EC) to
compete in the election; the EC approved it on June 8. A total of 47
political parties registered for the election; to date, the EC has
approved 42 parties.

____________________________________

September 3, Mizzima
Poet holds first exhibition since release

Rangoon  – Burmese poet and artist Saw Wai, who spent more than two years
in prison for his 2008 acrostic poem that concealed the message “Power
Crazy Senior General Than Shwe”, is holding his first art show since his
release.

Poet and artist Saw Wai, who spent more than two years in prison for his
acrostic poem that concealed the message ‘Power Crazy Senior General Than
Shwe’, poses with one of his paintings. His exhibition at Rangoon’s
Adipati Hall runs until Sunday (September 5). Photo: Mizzima
The “3 Artists Show” at Rangoon’s Adipati Hall, which includes 33 of his
paintings and works of writer Moe Thu and Saw Wai’s daughter Ei, runs
until Sunday.

Having spent two years and five months in prison, Saw Wai was released in
late May.

“This is my first show since I was released from prison. The inspectors
came to the exhibition. They interrogated us, as is their custom. Then, my
painting April, which I completed in 2003, was not allowed to be
exhibited. In fact, the picture just featured a traditional water-festival
scene,” Saw Wai said.

His installation, Sick World, has drawn great visitor interest. “He put a
globe in a mosquito net. The globe is on an intravenous drip. There are
holes in the globe. It is also in a plaster [cast]. The work could pass on
the message that the world is hurting,” one visitor offered.

Saw Wai’s installation Sick World has drawn great visitor interest at his
exhibition in Rangoon’s Adipati Hall, which runs until Sunday (September
5). The work comprises an obviously wounded world in a mosquito net, on an
intravenous (IV) drip, in a plaster cast. The IV stand appears to be a
hangman’s post. Photo: Mizzima
Other works for sale include oil and acrylic paintings.

Many artists and writers including artist Lun Kywe and writers Paragu and
Khin Swe Oo have visited the show.

In Saw Wai’s acrostic poem, February 14, the first letters of each line of
the poem spelt out “Power Crazy Senior General Than Shwe” in Burmese.

____________________________________

September 3, Kaladan Press
More taxes for Maungdaw fishermen

Fishermen are being forced to pay more taxes in Maungdaw, a fisherman in
the district said.

The new taxes are being collected by the Burmese border security force,
Nasaka, from the last week of August on the orders of the area commander,
Major Kyaw Aung of area number 6, the fisherman said.

“We paid 10,000 Kyats for licenses to the authorities for one year and
70,000 Kyat for operating on Naff River to an agent. Now, we are giving
one gallon of petrol worth 6000 Kyats a month,” the fisherman added.

The fishermen operating on the Naff River are using tiger month (Kyapazat
in Burmese). The outpost camp of Nasaka located on the bank of the river
always ask them to supply fish whenever they go out to sea. If the
fishermen fail to supply fish they are beaten up by the Nasaka, said a
fish broker in Maungdaw.

“The fishermen don't get fish every day, so it is difficult for them to
pay taxes imposed recently,” he added

Beside these taxes, the fishermen have to pay a further 2000 Kyats to the
village authorities for recommendation letters, the fish broker said.

All the fishermen are Arakanese Rohingyas, and most of them are victimized
by the authorities and their agents.

____________________________________

September 3, Khonumthung News
Chin Progressive Party nominates 41 candidates in Chin state

The Chin Progressive Party (CPP) is nominating 41 parliamentary candidates
for the forthcoming 2010 general elections in Chin state on November 7.

The party had wanted to nominate 50 candidates but given the financial
constraints it can put up 41 candidates in the election fray.

“We could not arrange for Kyat 5 lakhs for each candidate in time, so we
reduced the number of nominees,” Pu Nothankap, party president told
Khonumthung News.

The CPP will not have candidates in Makui division and Rakhai state where
many Chin people live. It will not contest in Thantlang and Hakha
townships in Chin state either.

The party president said that CPP will contest in Chin state and Sagaing
division for seats in the National Parliament (upper house), People’s
Parliament (lower house) and State Parliament. The party expects to garner
support from people in all the constituencies it will contest in.

Meanwhile, the Ethnic National Development Party (ENDP), which is also one
of the Chin parties has already sent a list of three candidates to the
Election Commission.

Khonumthung News could not contact leaders of the Chin National Party
(CNP) for details of the party’s candidature.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

September, Kachin News Group
Kachin people told about KIO’s new policies

The new policies of Burma’s ethnic Kachin Independence Organization (KIO),
announced on August 30 after its Party Congress, was explained at length
to the Kachin public today in its capital Laiza on the China-Burma border
by a senior official.

Lt-Gen N’ban La Awng, Vice-Chairman of KIO imparted a fair understanding
of the new KIO policies to participants. He made it clear that it will not
lead to a fresh civil war immediately. However, he cautioned the civilian
population that they should be alert to the possibilities of war,
participants said.

The KIO Vice-Chairman sounded a warning note and said civil war may start
anew, any time, should the Burmese junta begin a military offensive on the
KIO, participants said.

He also drew the attention of participants to next week’s China visit of
Burmese junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe. He pointed out that Burmese
military leaders were in principle not believable, untrustworthy, who do
not bother to abide by the law, participants added.

Lt-Gen N’ban La Awng is believed to be the most powerful man in the KIO.
He came back to the Laiza capital recently following a gall bladder
surgery in Singapore.

The interaction with the public was held at the public Hall, the Myu Lawt
Wunli Lu Gawknu, where over 1,000 residents of Laiza took part.

Yesterday, the new policies of the KIO vis a vis the junta were detailed
to only the men and women in KIO and its armed-wing the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) in the KIA military base in Laiza, KIO officials
in Laiza said.

The KIO’s new stand outlined in the August 30 statement deals with six
factors but primarily the KIO has rejected transforming KIA and other
departments before a genuine federal democracy based on the 1947 Panglong
Agreement is established in the country.
In passing the statement also informed the Burmese military leaders that
the KIO would like the junta-conducted November 7 elections to be free and
fair.

A major policy change of the KIO maintains that it will cooperate with any
force which is for a multiethnic federal union of Burma.

Kachin people as well as all ethnic armed groups in military-ruled Burma
have welcomed and applauded the new Kachin policy.

Lt-Gen Yen Myint, former Chief of Military Affairs Security of the junta
on August 22 warned the KIO that it will be outlawed and termed an illegal
outfit if it does not surrender its weapons to the Burmese Army starting
September 1.

The junta brass till now has not responded to the KIO statement. No
renewed military movement by the Burmese Army is in evidence either, near
KIO territories in Kachin State and Northeast Shan State, KIA officials
said.

____________________________________

September 3, Kantarawaddy Times
Community groups oppose 'unfair' polls

Karenni State civil society networks, including women and student groups,
have alleged that the 2008 Constitution provides an unfair advantage to
the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP).

A spokesperson for the network, Mee Reh Eddie said the Constitution
unfairly reserves 25 per cent of seats in the lower house for the ruling
military regime.

"The military gets 110 seats without anyone voting for them. That's
unfair. The USDP are now telling villagers to vote for them and the USDP
will reward each village with a donation of a 'Tologyi truck' (a motorized
ploughing and crop carrying vehicle)."

Mee Reh Eddie said the USDP has stopped other smaller ethnic parties from
fund raising or campaigning in villages.

"The Karenni ceasefire group tried to register with the Electoral
Commission but after pressure and threats from the USDP they withdrew
their application."

Mee Reh Eddie said people in Karenni State are scared to express their
opinion about the elections.

"People have received death threats and are frightened of the USDP. People
are interested in an election that is free and fair, but they don't think
this regime will hold honest elections."

Toe Meh, secretary of the Karenni Women's Organisation said."Our group
plans to oppose the election. We don't support or want the 2008
Constitution. We don't want people to vote for the wrong party – the
USDP."

Toe Meh predicted that if the USDP wins the election the impact on the
future of Burma will be devastating.

The chairperson of the Karenni National Youth Organisation, Sun Shine said
"The Constitution does not give any guarantee to the people, it favours
the regime. We don't trust the motives for the election. The political
parties that will compete in the coming election do not represent the
desires of the people. The party backgrounds show they are mainly regime
sponsored alliances."

Sun Shine said KNYO will not vote for any party that supports the regime's
2008 Constitution.

The Director of the Karenni Documentation Research Group, Taw Reh said.
"People in remote areas did not vote for the constitution, the army took
signed bloc votes for each village from the village heads. The used this
as proof that the villagers approved their constitution."

The KDRG documents environment issues and human rights abuses in Karenni
state.

"I witnessed people who voted against the constitution being harassed and
threatened by referendum officials. The authorities told villagers, if
they voted against the USDP the villagers will be punished by having to do
forced labour."

Taw Reh said Burmese people do not have a choice."They are afraid; they
know a vote for the USDP is a vote for the regime. They will vote for the
government even if they don't support them. They have been threatened and
they are scared."

M's Mu Jenny, a central committee member of the Karenni Student Union
joined the call for people to oppose the election on 7 November.

"There are still 2,100 political prisoners in jail. The USDP has already
collected names of villagers to use as a 'yes' vote for them. People do
not a have a choice they can only say 'yes'. The elections are not a
priority for our people it has been forced on them."

M's Mu Jenny said the USDP has spread rumours among remote villages that
if they win, each Karenni will receive 500,000 kyat (about $500).

"It's a lie, but I'm afraid some people will dream, follow the rumour and
vote for the USDP and their money. If that happens, it will not be good
for the other parties in Karenni State," he said.

Peh Bu, Director of the Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre said
in displaced people’s areas the Burmese Army has already collected names.

"The army has taken the names of displaced people and will use them as a
'yes' vote for the USDP.  They forced these people to vote their way. Some
of these people don't even have a national identity card yet."

Peh Bu said the government is using the ID cards as an incentive for
ethnic people to vote for the USDP.

"The people put on the list for IDs will also automatically become members
of the USDP. They have been collecting names since April. The Maw Chi and
Shar Daw townships have been specifically targeted. This is forced party
conscription. How can the election be fair if people have no choice," he
added.

Peh Bu said displaced people do not have stable living conditions.

"Ceasefire groups and the Burmese Army are in conflict over the Border
Guard Force proposal. The BGF requires more recruitment and many IDP's
have fled to avoid being force to join the BGF," he added.

Nye Reh from the Karenni Evergreen environment group said ceasefire groups
will not be able to log since the formation of the BGF.

"The logging will not stop, but will increase after the election. Many
businesses are waiting for the government to give the green signal," he
added.


____________________________________
ASEAN

September 3, Agence France Presse
Obama-ASEAN summit on September 24 in New York

Washington— US President Barack Obama will meet Southeast Asian leaders on
September 24 in New York and seek broader cooperation on issues including
regional security, the White House said Friday.

The summit, whose date was earlier confirmed to AFP by a senior official,
will mark Obama's latest attempt to reinvigorate US policy towards the
dynamic region that he said was neglected by ex-president George W. Bush's
team.

The White House said that Obama would meet with the Southeast Asian
leaders in New York on September 24, the time of the annual United Nations
General Assembly.

The New York meeting will follow the inaugural summit that Obama held last
year in Singapore with his counterparts from the 10-member Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In Singapore, "the president and the ASEAN leaders pledged to deepen
cooperation in a number of areas of common concern including trade and
investment, regional security, disaster management, food and energy
security, and climate change," a White House statement said.

"The president looks forward to working with the leaders to assess the
progress on these issues, identify future efforts to strengthen US-ASEAN
relations, and discuss multilateral approaches for greater regional
cooperation," it said.

But the upcoming meeting -- like many at ASEAN -- may risk being
overshadowed by controversy over Myanmar, whose military regime is going
ahead with November 7 elections despite wide concern over their
credibility.

Washington-based diplomats said that the White House was in prolonged
negotiations with ASEAN leaders on where to hold the summit.

Some Southeast Asian officials preferred a summit in Washington, believing
it would carry greater weight and not be seen as one of the myriad
"sideline" meetings held each year on the edges of the UN General
Assembly.

But the diplomats said that the White House found it was logistically more
practical to meet in New York -- and worried about giving too much
legitimacy to Myanmar just ahead of the military regime's controversial
polls.

At the inaugural summit in Singapore, Obama urged Myanmar's Prime Minister
Thein Sein to free all political prisoners including the Nobel laureate
Aung San Suu Kyi, but to no avail.

The Obama administration last year launched an engagement effort aimed at
bringing Myanmar, also known as Burma, out of its isolation. But US
officials have been increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress.

The administration has also moved to build relations with Indonesia, the
world's largest Muslim-majority nation, and sought to forge ahead in
historically fraught relationships with communist Vietnam and Laos.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced plans for a second summit
when she visited Vietnam in July, saying that ASEAN and the related ASEAN
Regional Forum were "strong, effective architecture for security and
prosperity in Asia."

ASEAN groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

September 2010, Himal Southasian
Burma's dash for offshore cash, Jared Bissinger

Burma’s junta is pushing for a quick settlement to its maritime boundary
dispute with Bangladesh, much to the delight of Dhaka.

In early July, Bangladesh took a major step towards settling its maritime
boundary dispute with Burma by filing its first claim with the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), a maritime judicial
body established by the United Nations in 1982. Bangladesh and Burma have
agreed to use the ITLOS to help resolve their unsettled boundary, which is
currently a major point of contention between the governments in Dhaka and
Naypyidaw. The controversy is blocking natural gas development in a large
part of the Bay of Bengal. But despite its seemingly better negotiating
position, Burma has taken a number of steps that, while probably hastening
a boundary solution, have forfeited much of the country’s negotiating
leverage.

Burma’s leverage results from the country’s relative abundance of natural
gas, especially in comparison with its energy-starved neighbor Bangladesh.
Once the current disagreement is cleared up, Burma’s ruling junta will
likely export most of the natural gas that it finds in the disputed area,
just as it has done with the country’s other major offshore natural gas
finds. This is despite Burma’s low levels of electricity production.

Bangladesh, on the other hand, will probably use gas found in the disputed
area to address the country’s ever-worsening electricity crisis, which is
a direct result of insufficient natural gas supplies. Electricity in the
country is in such short supply that the government recently issued
directives to factories in Bangladesh to cut production during the World
Cup, so that blackouts would not prevent Bangladeshis from watching the
football matches.

The dire need for energy means that officials in Dhaka should have had
little leeway in the boundary dispute, especially because they are facing
increasing public pressure to solve the crisis. Burma’s junta, however,
faces no such pressures. This disparity gives Burma significant leverage
in the ongoing negotiations over maritime boundaries. Because it is
already a gas exporter and faces seemingly manageable repercussions for
its ongoing electricity problems, the junta should have had the
flexibility to prolong negotiations and extract concessions from a more
desperate Bangladesh.

Yet the junta has failed to exploit this advantage, instead taking steps
that have levelled the playing field and likely hastened a solution to the
dispute. Since the restarting of negotiations in 2007, Naypyidaw has
appeared available and eager to discuss the maritime boundary; the
countries have subsequently held about a dozen meetings on the matter –
certainly not a lethargic pace. These discussions have even involved top
officials, including Burma’s foreign minister, Nyan Win.

Equidistance and equity

After almost two years, negotiations stalled. Dhaka, under growing public
pressure to address the power crisis, submitted the dispute to arbitration
proceedings in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). While the convention provides a compulsory settlement
procedure for most maritime disputes, it makes special exemption for
disagreements involving interpretations of the principle of ‘equity’ – a
key issue in the row between Bangladesh and Burma, explained below. The
convention goes on to state that the only way such a dispute can enter
compulsory proceedings is with the agreement of all parties. It also
allows countries to object to some or all of the avenues of settlement by
issuing a written declaration, which could effectively preclude any
binding procedure. Yet, instead of objecting to a binding resolution or
issuing a pre-emptive written declaration to prevent this possibility,
Naypyidaw has been in lockstep with Dhaka in the latter’s drive to settle
the dispute.

Not only did Burma voluntarily agree to binding proceedings, but it also
proposed that the case be settled through the ITLOS, which appears to be
the most expedient of the available legal venues. The case is currently
one of only two cases on the underutilised court’s docket, along with a
case regarding seabeds, and will therefore garner far more attention than
it would have in the other judicial option, the much busier International
Court of Justice in The Hague. Both countries have also agreed to dates
for written filings and oral hearings that are quick by international
standards, and could conclude proceedings in just three to four years
according to the International Boundaries Research Unit. This unsolicited
push for the ITLOS from Burma came in response to Bangladesh’s suggestion
of binding arbitration, which could potentially face delays due to the
requirement that both sides agree on a majority of the arbitrators.

Even though court proceedings have begun, the two countries continue to
hold voluntary bilateral negotiations, which produced the first
breakthrough in January. This was an agreement to settle the boundary
using the legal principles of ‘equidistance’, which Burma advocates, and
‘equity’, which Bangladesh advocates. The principle of equidistance
constructs a line that is midway between the nearest points along the
coast of each country, a method that would, because of the bay’s
geography, maximise Burma’s maritime claims. The principle of equity comes
from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
which tasks countries with finding an ‘equitable solution’, though this is
vaguely defined. In this compromise, Burma sacrificed its formerly
steadfast legal position ostensibly to obtain a quicker settlement.

There is certainly no shortage of evidence that demonstrates that both
Naypyidaw and Dhaka are eager for a quick settlement. But by pushing for
expedience, the former has forfeited much of the leverage that it held
earlier in the maritime boundary negotiations. Why would the junta act in
a way that appears to be against the country’s long-term interests? If the
country’s current use of gas as well as the nature of the State Peace and
Development Council regime is any indication, the junta’s eagerness to
settle the boundary is guided far more by its short-term interest, in
cashing in on gas resources from the disputed area.

Presently, natural-gas exports are the largest source of foreign-currency
reserves for the regime. The massive proceeds from these sales, in the
neighbourhood of USD 2-3 billion per year, are spent largely at the
junta’s discretion. Speculation is that these proceeds have funded a
number of the regime’s projects, including construction of the new capital
at Naypyidaw, weapons purchases and even the alleged acquisition of
nuclear technologies. Gas revenues have also personally enriched powerful
members of the junta, though there is uncertainty about how much longer
current junta members will have access to these revenue streams. There is
already competition for power (and its monetary benefits) among the junta
strongmen, which includes current and retired military officers,
bureaucrats and the business class, and this has only intensified with the
upcoming elections and the likely retirement of some senior junta members.
The regime, therefore, has incentives to fast-track projects that secure
revenue, and few initiatives have the potential to secure as much money as
developing gas reserves in the disputed area.

Leverage foregone

For Burma, the most evident implication of the lost leverage in the
maritime boundary negotiations will likely be a less favourable settlement
for the junta. Gone are many of the avenues through which Naypyidaw could
have stalled negotiations in hopes of exacting concessions and a more
favourable agreement. Forfeiting this leverage has left Burma with fewer
tools to pressure its energy-hungry neighbour. These developments have
unsurprisingly been welcomed in Bangladesh, as they will help Dhaka to
more quickly address the country’s energy problems.

For Burma, gas discoveries in the disputed area could funnel more foreign
reserves to the junta and its cronies, who will probably keep almost all
of the revenues from post-settlement gas development. If it fails to
invest the proceeds of gas development back into the economy, it could
inhibit economic development while enriching a regime guilty of economic
policies that have contributed significantly to the country’s current
state. It could also engender greater competition within Burma for access
to the profits of gas exports, as there could be significantly more to
compete over. The fallout – good for Bangladesh, bad for Burma, could be
especially significant if the disputed area holds a massive gas deposit
the size of recent major finds off India’s east coast, now supplying
almost half of New Delhi’s natural gas requirements. Such a gas field, if
it exists, could net USD 6-7 billion annually, if sold at the same price
as gas from Burma’s Shwe fields.

A maritime boundary settlement could also have an impact on people living
in northwestern Burma, especially the Rohingya. Natural gas projects
undertaken by Burma could be accompanied by restrictions that prohibit
fishing within 50 km of natural gas rigs, a restriction already in place
around the Shwe fields. This, along with the new maritime boundary, could
significantly restrict fishing areas available to the Rohingya, many of
whom have fled in large numbers to Bangladesh because they face severe
discrimination in Burma. The development of onshore energy infrastructure
related to the offshore gas finds could further challenge the livelihoods
of people in northwestern Burma, as land confiscations, forced labour, and
increased militarisation have been reported to accompany previous energy
projects in the country.

For Bangladesh, offshore gas discoveries would be a boon in the long term
but will not be as helpful in solving short-term energy needs. Any new
discoveries probably would not convert to production until around 2020. To
address the short-term problems, Bangladesh will instead be forced to turn
to alternate fuel sources such as domestic coal production or imported
natural gas. New offshore gas finds could replace these in the longer run,
benefiting both the country’s environment and current accounts balance.

Because of the concave curvature of the Bay of Bengal, India’s involvement
will also be necessary in finalising boundaries south of the point where
all three countries’ claims intersect, about 167 nautical miles south of
Bangladesh. Yet despite the necessity of trilateral agreement, the
countries have yet to discuss the boundary in a formal trilateral setting.
However, if India and Burma do begin discussions over the boundary, India
could also be the beneficiary of latter’s desire for a quick settlement.
By putting its own short-term desire for gas revenues above the country’s
long-term interests, Burma could well be stuck with a maritime boundary
that is significantly worse than it otherwise could have achieved. And
once the boundary is agreed, it will be very difficult to change.

Jared Bissinger is an independent writer based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
____________________________________

September 3, Mizzima News
Burmese petition India for release of freedom fighters -  Khaing Kyaw Mya

The Burmese community in New Delhi in a fervent appeal letter has urged
India's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and Chief Minister of West
Bengal to immediately release 34 Burmese freedom fighters languishing in a
Kolkata jail.

Burmese and Indians in Kolkata come together to protest the continued
detention of 34 Burmese freedom fighters.

Those detained have been incarcerated in jails in India since February
1998. And though their trial drew to a conclusion in July of this year,
the execution of justice remains elusive.

More than 1,000 Burmese refugees in New Delhi, Burmese NGOs and the
Burmese Community Resource Centre (BCRC) signed the letter, a copy of
which is in Mizzima’s possession.

“We will hand over the letter by hand during the three parties meeting
(UNHCR, Burmese representatives and NHRC). The meeting will be held very
soon, we are waiting for their  [NHRC’s] response,” said Dr. Tint Swe, a
representative of the Burmese Community in New Delhi and elected Member of
Parliament in Burma’s 1990 general election.

Burmese are requesting Indian authorities to allow the 34 Burmese
detainees to travel to the Indian capital for further formalities with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to allow them to live
with Burmese refugees in New Delhi.

Burmese and Indians in Kolkata come together to protest the continued
detention of 34 Burmese freedom fighters.

"We want National Human Rights Commission intervention because we see that
the NHRC is really powerful and very effective because of their
intervention in the early years [of the case] preventing the 34 from being
deported to Burma,” elaborated Dr. Tint Swe.

The call for their release comes after the case was settled in July of
this year, with those accused agreeing to enter into plea bargaining with
the prosecuting agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

After a series of hearings from May to July, judge Uday Chandra Nag of the
City Sessions Court in Kolkata on July 12 pronounced a judgment of a fine
of 6,000 rupees (US$1 = 46.5 rupees) each.

The 34 Burmese then moved the court for the return of their bail money,
340,000 rupees in total, deposited in early 1999. However, the motion was
denied.

“We applied for the bail money which the 34 had deposited as security bond
in the nineties, but the court rejected it. We are filing the petition
again with the High Court,” said lawyer Anil Sharma, who is handling the
case.

Khyrul Anam, the Superintendent of Presidency Jail in Kolkata where the 34
are presently lodged, told Mizzima that the Burmese would be released once
the fine money is paid.

“After completion of the procedure of fine payment they will be released.
This is the rule. As they have not deposited the fine money, they should
stay in jail,” said the Superintendent.

However, when further pressed by Mizzima, he said he also requires an
order from the government as to where to send the Burmese before they can
be released.

He said that as foreigners who do not want to be deported to their own
country (Burma), prison authorities have to receive orders from New Delhi
as to where they will go.

The 34 Burmese, members of the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA) and
the Karen National Union (KNU), received consideration certificates by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in November 2009.

The India-based Arakan National Council (ANC) says it wants the matter to
be brought before the Indian Parliament and other organizations, including
the United Nations.

“They have suffered the maximum punishment and I want strong action as
soon as possible to release them. I am disappointed with the largest
democracy (India) in the world regarding the actions against patriotic
freedom fighters,” ANC President Ashin Ariyavansha argued.

A Burma-born former Indian military intelligence officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Grewal, betrayed the Burmese in 1998. Having offered the Burmese
shelter on Landfall Island in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, he instead
shot dead six of their leaders.

The remaining freedom fighters spent the first six years of their
imprisonment without trial. It was only in 2004, after Indian human rights
lawyer Nandita Haksar petitioned the Supreme Court of India, that an order
eventually arrived in September 2006 stipulating a trial be conducted in
Kolkata on a day-to-day basis. The subsequent trial began in January 2007
and ended in July of this year.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

September 3, The White House - Office of the Press Secretary
President Obama to host second U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting

The President will host a meeting with leaders of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in New York City on September 24, 2010.  The
President has invited the leaders of the ten ASEAN member states as well
as ASEAN’s Secretary General to join him for the second ever U.S.-ASEAN 
leaders meeting.   At the first such meeting, held in Singapore in
November 2009, the President and the ASEAN leaders pledged to deepen
cooperation in a number of areas of common concern including trade and
investment, regional security, disaster management, food and energy
security, and climate change.  The President looks forward to working with
the leaders to assess the progress on these issues, identify future
efforts to strengthen U.S.-ASEAN relations, and discuss multilateral
approaches for greater regional cooperation.

###
____________________________________


September 3, Mizzima
(Book review):The faces and stories of Burma’s refugees
Reviewed by: Joseph Ball

Title: Nine Thousand Nights – Refugees From Burma: A People’s Scrapbook
Publisher: Thailand Burma Border Consortium

For two days we walked, crossing in and out of Thailand and Burma. The
little dirt path we traversed was a low-volume highway of people on the
move – farmers, traders, soldiers and refugees. We ate a mix of what the
jungle’s foliage offered and what we were able to kill with our
slingshots.

Having finally reached the refugee camp nestled in the hills of Thailand’s
Mae Hong Son province, nights were occupied taking turns minding the
tripwire to alert the camp of any intrusion by Burmese soldiers. As it
was, the Thai army had entered the camp only weeks previously and
confiscated the settlement’s minimal arsenal. Nonetheless, it was the
mid-1990s, there was talk of returning to a changed Burma, and it was
exciting.

In Nine Thousand Nights, the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has
compiled a rich 184-page compilation of memories, experiences and desires
related to Burma’s refugee population. The collection includes brief
biographies, short stories, artwork, poems, a treasure trove of
photographs and the reflections of both refugees and those who have worked
with Burma’s refugee population.

Unfortunately, the title to the volume is all too indicative of the
prevailing situation for many in the camps. Nine Thousand Nights denotes
the 25th anniversary of the first large-scale infusion of refugees from
Burma into Thailand, in 1984, when some 10,000 fled an attack by Burma’s
armed forces in Karen State. And while there are happy stories to tell as
well, too often the tales are ones of dreams lost and lives either
destroyed or put on indefinite hold.

tbbc-logoEvoking an eerily matter-of-fact type account of the situation –
similar to the Rwandan genocide victim’s simple missive, “We wish to
inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families” – an excerpt
from a letter authored by the Mon National Relief Committee reads, “We
want to report that there is a camp of victim and poverty. It is large
enough. But on account of several reasons, it is unknown to the world.”

As Nine Thousand Nights chronicles, each apparent misfortune in the annals
of modern Burma’s history produces yet another injection into the refugee
population.

There are the pictures and stories of the students post-1988 and 1990 that
fled to the border to take up armed struggle against the junta; smiling
young girls receiving training in automatic weaponry evoking thought
provoking musings as to the evolution and efficacy of non-violent versus
violent resistance to the state.

Then there are the fading images of Manerplaw, the former stronghold of
the Karen armed struggle and long a center of opposition intrigue that was
overrun in 1995. The pictures tell of a vastly different time, when many
that are now refugees were still masters of their own domain inside Burma.

The bulk of the book, however, is directed at the lives of civilians,
innocent bystanders, forced to flee in the absence of human security and
longing to return home. The volume abounds in textual and visual
representations of lives lived in the confines of rolling bamboo and
thatch camps scattered in the hills along the border region.

Ever since the mid-1990s, a steady stream of refugees has poured into the
camps as the Burmese military looks to ever tighten its noose around
ethnic opposition. The net result is an estimated 150,000 Burmese refugees
today living in the camps that dot the Thai-Burma border.

The story of Daniel Zu is told in some detail, a Karen who attended
Rangoon University in the 1980s and whose hopes were dashed by events
inside Burma proper. Daniel went on to become a leading figure in the Tham
Hin camp before finally being resettled in Australia in 2007.

Daniel Zu’s experience epitomizes a growing trend. Since 2005, the UN’s
refugee agency has resettled some 60,000 Burmese refugees, with another
45,000 under consideration for future resettlement.

Putting a positive face on what has to be a conflicting experience, Daniel
postulates as to the significance of resettlement, “Some leaders saw it as
a brain drain. I saw it as an opportunity to develop people’s life
quality, profession, and skills. It will surely be a brain gain in the
future.”

Still, with Burma’s first general election since the ill-fated endeavor of
1990 set to take place on November 7th, reading through Nine Thousand
Nights one comes to wonder just how many more people will flee for the
camps in Thailand (and eventually further abroad?) as a result of new
hostilities and exclusion in the making of modern Burma.

TBBC is a consortium of 12 international non-governmental organizations
from ten countries providing food, shelter and non-food items to refugees
and displaced people from Burma. The organization prides itself in
implementing projects through refugees and local partners.