BurmaNet News, December 11 - 13, 2010

Editor editor at burmanet.org
Mon Dec 13 13:36:58 EST 2010


December 11 – 13, 2010 Issue #4102


INSIDE BURMA
AFP: Suu Kyi to 'persevere' for dialogue with junta
Irrawaddy: Than Shwe begins year-end tour of Burma
Mizzima: Panglong II can work only if military joins: NLD

ON THE BORDER
DVB: Farmers lose out in Karen conflict

BUSINESS / TRADE
DPA: China loans Myanmar 2.4 billion dollars for gas pipeline project
DPA: Orders for Myanmar garments up

DRUGS
DPA: Myanmar's opium production up 76 per cent
DVB: $2m bounty for Wa druglord

ASEAN
Bangkok Post: Burma not nuclear, says Abhisit

REGIONAL
AP: Myanmar: a pariah nation with lots of friends

INTERNATIONAL
New York Times: Burmese couple build life in the Bronx

OPINION / OTHER
Foreign Policy: What's next for Burma's democrats? – Aung Din
Bangkok Post: Let Rangoon defend itself – Editorial
Irrawaddy: Post-election politics in Burma—glimmers of hope? – Ashley South





____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

December 12, Agence France Presse
Suu Kyi to 'persevere' for dialogue with junta

Tokyo — Myanmar's newly-released democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has
vowed to remain patient in seeking dialogue with military rulers following
last month's controversial poll which has kept them in power.

"I think the credibility of the government does not depend on statistics.
It depends on the will of the people. It depends on the genuine support of
the people," she said in a recent interview with Japan's public network
NHK broadcast on Sunday.

"And we have to wait to find out how genuine that is."

The democracy icon has spent most of the past 20 years locked up but was
freed from her latest seven-year stretch of confinement on November 13.

She was under house arrest during the November 7 election, Myanmar's first
in two decades, that was widely criticised by democracy activists and
Western governments as anything but free and fair.

The junta's political proxy has claimed an overwhelming victory in the poll.

"I would like to say whatever influence I have, if I have influence over
the people, I would use it to bring about national reconciliation," said
the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner.

"The junta has never been very keen on dialogue but we have to persevere,"
she said, adding that one month after her release is "not a long time".

"And we are capable of that much perseverance."

Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party was disbanded for
boycotting the election in response to rules that seemed designed to bar
her from taking part.

____________________________________

December 13, Irrawaddy
Than Shwe begins year-end tour of Burma – Wai Moe

Burma’s junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe began his year-end tour around the
country at a military graduation ceremony in Maymyo with senior officials,
while his deputy, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, played golf with other top
generals in Naypyidaw.

The country's top generals commanded front page space from Saturday until
Monday in state-run newspapers. Saturday's papers reported that Than Shwe
and members of his family members visited the Defense Services Academy
(DSA) in the resort town of Maymyo (also known as Pyin U Lwin) on Friday.

In recent years, Than Shwe started his year-end tour attending the DSA
graduation ceremony as the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw (Burma’s
armed forces). As in previous years, he brought close family members,
including his favorite grandson Nay Shwe Thway Aung.

Members of Than Shwe’s family appeared in the state media alongside the
junta secretary-1 ex-Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo, joint Chief of Staff (Army,
Navy, Air Force) Lt-Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Minister of Science and
Technology U Thaung and other senior military officials.

Than Shwe addressed to graduated cadets inside the DSA’s convocation hall,
not outdoors like last year. Observers said the ceremony was held indoors
because of bad weather and Than Shwe’s recent bout of bad health.

“Maymyo’s weather in December is quite cold,” said a military source.
“Officials of the DSA arranged heaters around Snr-Gen Than Shwe while he
spoke to the cadets for about 30 minutes. Organizers were concerned about
the general’s health.”

Than Shwe is officially 77, but former intelligence officials say he is
actually 80, and suffering from hypertension. Than Shwe’s two family
doctors, Kyaw Myint and Paing Soe are currently minister and deputy
minister of health.

As in previous speeches, Than Shwe enumerated development projects
completed since 1988, when the current military regime took power.

“He [Than Shwe] is good at memorizing details of state projects,” said an
official source in Naypyidaw. “He has often referred to how many bridges
and dams were built during the rule of the military government.”

In his DSA graduation speech, Than Shwe hailed “the milestones in the two
decades of nation-building history where no sector remains without
development” in Burma.

According to official sources, Than Shwe is reportedly scheduled to tour
Mandalay Division and Rangoon Division this week.

Than Shwe's deputy, Maung Aye, and other top junta officials such as Shwe
Mann, Prime Minister Thein Sein and Tin Aye played golf instead of
accompanying their chief to Maymyo. They competed for the State Peace and
Development Council Chairman’s Trophy.

State-run-newspapers carried photos of Maung Aye, who is 73, Shwe Mann,
Thein Sein and Tin Aye playing golf, indicating they are in good health.

The newspaper report on the Naypyidaw golf tournament included the names
of two generals, Lt-Gen Myint Aung and Lt-Gen Ko Ko, who were reported in
August to be in line for the posts of commander in chief and vice
commander in chief if Than Shwe and Maung Aye retire from the army.

Their appearance in the state media was the first mention of them since
the August reshuffle.

A report on the golf tournament on Monday showed Than Shwe’s favored
Industry 1 Minister Aung Thaung, teeing off with the opening shot.

Sources in Naypyidaw and Rangoon said hardliner Aung Thaung expanded his
influence within the ruling hierarchy during the election period, winning
the favor of both Than Shwe and Maung Aye.

On behalf of the junta-back Union Solidarity and Development Party, Aung
Thaung recently met two key ethnic parties which participated in the 2010
election, the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party and the Shan
Nationalities Democratic Party. The two separate meetings were said to
have focused on co-operation within parliament.

____________________________________

December 13, Mizzima News
Panglong II can work only if military joins: NLD – Myo Thant

Chiang Mai – Burmese opposition leaders on Friday informed US deputy
assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs Joseph Yun
that a second Panglong conference could only be fruitful if the Burmese
military supported the proceedings, National League for Democracy
spokesman Ohn Kyaing told Mizzima.

“The second Panglong conference is intended to give people a strong sense
of unity. It does not intend to oppose any person or any organisation.
Practically, it will be fruitful only if the military participates in it.
So, we want the military to participate in it. It’s an affair we need to
do in unison,” Ohn Kyaing said.

The comment came on the final day of Yun’s four-day visit to Burma, as the
US diplomat met NLD and Committee Representing the People’s Parliament
(CRPP) representatives at NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi’s home
for more than an hour.

refugees_thai

Refugees who fled fighting late last month between the Burmese Army and a
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army faction near the Thai-Burmese border town
Myawaddy eat at a temporary shelter near Mae Koe Kan village, western
Thailand. Burma’s neighbour already shelters 250,000 ethnic minority
refugees after brutal campaigns by the Burmese Army, part of the decades
of clashes between Burma’s military government and minorities seeking
various forms of autonomy as outlined in the Panglong agreement of 1947.
Photo: Brennan O’Connor/Nomad Photos
CRPP general secretary Aye Tha Aung added that he felt national
reconciliation could be achieved through a second Panglong conference.

“Firstly, we need to reach a basic agreement. Then, the military needs to
make some changes and give the political parties basic rights. After an
all-inclusive dialogue we will achieve national reconciliation. National
reconciliation is the most important thing. The second Panglong conference
can achieve it,” Aye Tha Aung elaborated.

After the meeting with Yun, NLD central executive committee members and
CRPP members held further deliberations. Ohn Kyaing said they discussed
national reconciliation, the NLD’s right to survive as a legal party and
means to obtain the freedom of political prisoners.

CRPP member Htaung Ko Thang, who attended the meetings, said Burman and
ethnic people were also concerned for Suu Kyi’s personal security, seeking
international community assistance in providing her security, according to
the NLD spokesman.

Yun visited Burma’s administrative capital of Naypyidaw on Thursday,
speaking with Burmese authorities including Foreign Minister Nyan Win,
Science and Technology Minister U Thaung and Police Chief Khin Yi.

A statement issued by the US embassy in Rangoon said Washington was
seeking direct talks with the junta on the subjects of human rights,
political prisoners and other important issues.

Although Naypyidaw’s response to Washington’s overture was unknown, the
country’s state-run newspaper, New Light of Myanmar, acknowledged that the
government met the US diplomats to promote bilateral relations and
co-operation.

The Panglong Agreement was reached between the Burmese government under
Aung San, Suu Kyi’s father, and the Shan, Kachin and Chin peoples on
February 12, 1947. Signatories accepted in principle “Full autonomy in
internal administration for the Frontier Areas” and envisioned the
creation of a Kachin State by the Constituent Assembly (the first
post-independence parliament).

The deal came a year after the first Panglong Conference was held in the
town of the same name in the south of Shan State.

U Nu, who took over the reins of Aung San’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom
League party following the latter’s assassination in July 1947, did little
to implement the Panglong compact after Burma received independence in
January 1948. His failure to live up to the promise of Panglong left
ethnic minorities in Burma feeling betrayed.

Since 1948, ethnic minorities have had their rights and self-determination
in traditional areas of control denied, leading many of the groups to
armed struggle against the ruling Burmese military junta. The junta has
responded, the United Nations and human rights groups have detailed, with
killings, rape, torture, forced labour and burning of villages in ethnic
areas as the regime tries to deny the rebels support from the civilian
population.

Thailand already shelters 250,000 ethnic minority refugees after brutal
campaigns by the Burmese Army.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

December 13, Democratic Voice of Burma
Farmers lose out in Karen conflict – Htet Aung Kyaw

Farmers in eastern Karen state’s Myawaddy township are complaining that
heavy fighting over the past month has forced them to abandon crops and
amass debts.

One village close to the border town, Hpalu, has seen regular fighting in
recent weeks. While that appears to have eased over the weekend, the area
remains volatile. One farmer told DVB that he had been unable to harvest
acres of beans, corn and paddy around Hpalu.

As a result, many had been borrowing money from local business people, but
remained reliant on a good harvest to repay the loans.

Thousands of refugees have moved back and forth across the border with
Thailand since 8 November after fighting erupted between the Burmese army
and a breakaway faction of Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).

Many of the refugees returned days after fleeing, despite warnings that
the area was not safe. Numbers of those who returned had said they were
keen to tend to their crops, given that it is harvesting season in eastern
Burma.

Meanwhile, lawyer Aye Myint, who heads the Guiding Star legal advocacy
group in Burma, said that there had been an increase in extortion of
farmers by local officials since the 7 November elections.

Burma already has high rates of illegal land confiscation by authorities,
an issue which is monitored by the UN’s International Labour Organisation.
One of the main catalysts of the recent increase, Aye Myint believes, is
fear among low-level officials that they will lose their positions in a
post-election reshuffle and thus are looking to secure land for financial
stability.

Aye Myint said he had received 15 complaints from farmers over the past
weekend, seven of which were over land disputes.

One Karen woman in Wakhema township complained to him that her land had
been seized by village authorities, but when she refused to leave and
continued to work the land was placed in detention.

Two monks that had assisted the lady were also put in jail, he added,
while the village-level officials moved in on the land and harvested some
of the crops.

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

December 12, Deustche Presse Agentur
China loans Myanmar 2.4 billion dollars for gas pipeline project

Yangon – China has signed a 2.4-billion-dollar loan agreement with Myanmar
to finance the construction of a natural gas pipeline between the
countries, media reports said Sunday.

The loan was inked between the China Develoment Bank Cooperation and
Myanmar Foreign Investment Bank on November 30 in Napyitaw, the new
capital, the Myanmar Times reported.

The pipeline is to run from Rakhine State on the Myanmar coast, site of
the Kyauk Phyu national gas project, to Yunnan province in southern China.

'The loan will be mainly for the natural gas project in Kyauk Phyu, which
involves Myanmar, China, Korea and India, where Myanmar has 7.3 per cent
of the shares,' said Jin Honggen, economic and commercial counselor of the
Chinese embassy in Yangon.

He said the loan would help bring speed up construction of the project.
Under the Myanmar-China gas scheme, India is to help build a new port in
Sithwe, Rakhine, to handle gas from offshore reserves and China will
construct a 1,000-kilometre pipeline to deliver the gas overland to
Yunnan.

'The natural gas from Myanmar will be used for Yunnan province's
industrial requirements and for residential use,' Jin told the Myanmar
Times.

Military-run Myanmar currently exports more than 1 billion cubic feet of
gas (28 million cubic metres) a day of natural gas from its two offshore
projects in the Gulf of Marthaban to neighbouring Thailand via an
underwater and overland pipeline network.

Thailand pays a estimated 2 billion dollars a year for the gas imports.

____________________________________

December 11, Deustche Presse Agentur
Orders for Myanmar garments up

Yangon – Orders for Myanmar-made garments from Germany, Japan and South
Korea have surged this year due to the country's low labour costs, media
reports said Sunday.

Competing demand for Myanmar-made garments this year has prompted German
buyers to increase their paying price, Latwar Company managing director
Khin Maung Aye told the Myanmar Times.

'Germany is increasing payment for its order, otherwise all the factories
will switch over to South Korean orders only,' he said. 'Half my factory's
orders come from South Korea, and half from Germany,' Khin Maung Aye told
the English-language weekly.

Germany has been a leading importer of Myanmar-made clothes for years.

'South Korea used to order garments from North Korea, but the tension
between the two countries has created a big opportunity for Myanmar,' Khin
Maung Aye said.

Ba Myaing, another factory owner, said his business had gone up by 70 per
cent this year thanks to increased orders from South Korea.

One of Myanmar's advantages over its neighbours is the abundant
availability of cheap labour. Minimum wage in Yangon garment factories is
less than 100 dollars a month, one of the lowest in the region.

But a major challenge to industry is the country's poor and erratic
electricity supply, sources said.

____________________________________
DRUGS

December 13, Deustche Presse Agentur
Myanmar's opium production up 76 per cent

Bangkok – Myanmar's opium production increased 76 per cent this year,
accounting for 16 per cent of the world's current supply of the illicit
crop, the United Nations revealed Monday.

'This represents a significant increase in light of last year when
Myanmar's share was only 5 per cent,' said the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC)'s South-East Asia opium survey for 2010.

The report estimated Myanmar's opium production this year at 580 tons.

Neighbouring Laos also saw a 58-per-cent rise in opium production this
year, although its overall production at at 18 metric tons was still
insignificant compared with Afghanistan and Myanmar, the world's two
leaders in production of opium and the drug derived from it, heroin.

Afghanistan, which has been the world's leading opium and heroin producer
for more than a decade, witnessed a decline in production this year due to
a fungus epidemic.

The UNODC has been conducting crop substitution programmes in
north-eastern Myanmar and northern Laos since 1996, with the main funding
coming from the European Union and governments of Australia and Germany.

Although the programme has succeeded in reducing opium production in
South-East Asia from a peak of 1,760 tons in 1996 to 312 tons in 2006,
production has been on the rise ever since.

One factor may be weather patterns and declining food supply in the areas,
forcing more families into growing opium as a cash crop to buy food.

'Food security has deteriorated in almost all regions where the survey
took place,' the UNODC report said. 'The erosion of food security is of
particular concern because it could trigger a further increase in opium
cultivation.'

Deforestation in these remote areas of Myanmar and Laos may be another
reason for the decline in food production.

'Certainly the removal of forest cover has had an impact on the soil,
erosion and water retention,' said Gary Lewis, UNODC representative for
the Asia-Pacific region.

'There has been massive depletion of forest coverage, and with that comes
problems of retaining your top soil, and water retention,'

Opium is a notoriously hardy plant, capable of growing in mountainous
terrain with arid soil.

Ongoing conflicts between the Myanmar military regime and various
insurgencies based in the Shan States in the east of the country, where
the majority of Myanmar's opium is grown, are another reason for a lack of
progress in the area.

Myanmar's general elections on November 7 are unlikely to resolve the
security threats, observers say.

'I think in terms of the post-election environment, the issues remain,'
said Jason Eligh, UNODC's representative in Myanmar. 'We need a resolution
in terms of the conflict in those areas,' he said.

The UNODC crop-substitution programme is one of the only international aid
programmes in the Shan States.

'I would like to think that our partners in the donor community do not
wait for a perfect environment to be in place before they engage, because
a lot of this can happen even while there is a lot of insecurity,' Lewis
said.

____________________________________

December 13, Democratic Voice of Burma
$2m bounty for Wa druglord – Peter Aung

Wanted posters are being placed in Bangkok bars and nightclubs advertising
a $US2 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Wa druglord
Wei Hsueh-kang.

Thai anti-narcotics authorities have launched the joint ‘Operation Hot
Spot’ with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to track Wei Hsueh-kang,
also a senior commander in the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA), once
the world’s biggest heroin producer.

Their eagerness to catch the ethnic Chinese kingpin, thought to be in his
early 60s, has prompted the use of unorthodox tactics, such as printing
his face on beer mats and on the sides of bottles in popular Thai
nightspots.

He had been sentenced to death in absentia by the Thai government for his
involvement in the 1987 trafficking of 860 kilograms of heroin into
Thailand, but has evaded arrest and remains in Burma, reportedly moving
between Rangoon, Mandalay and Shan state. His Thai citizenship was revoked
in 2001.

The Thai government has also put out arrest warrants for 20 other top UWSA
officials with close ties to Southeast Asia’s sizeable drugs trade.

The DEA also want him on charges of smuggling more than 400 kilograms of
heroin into the US in the 1980s. The agency describes its attempt to
capture Wei Hsueh-kang as an “aggressive community outreach initiative”
that draws on information provided by the public, and also targets the
UWSA and “other high level drug trafficking organisations within
Asia”.­­­­­­­

Information about Wei Hsueh-kang has been translated into 10 languages and
is being “distributed in areas with a high propensity for drug
trafficking”, the DEA said. “These Hot Spots include known trafficking
routes, border crossing points, entertainment venues, shipping ports,
transportation stations, and other locations used by drug traffickers.”

While the US now appears to be hot on the trail of the druglord, historian
Alfred McCoy claims in his landmark 1972 book, The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia, that Wei Hsueh-kang had previously worked as a CIA
operative when the Agency was backing the anti-Mao Kuomintang (KMT) forces
in Burma in the 1950s and 1960s.

He had fled to Wa state after the communist takeover in China and lived
with his two brothers in the Wa Hills, all of whom worked for the KMT-CIA
network along the Shan-Yunnan border. He then began to work as treasurer
for the notorious Khun Sa, who led the Mong Tai Army and in his heyday
from the 1970s to the mid-1990s was known as the ‘Opium King’, at one
point heading the FBI’s most wanted list.

In recent years Wei Hsueh-kang has moved into Burma’s booming
methamphetamine trade, for which Thailand has become a key market.
Tolerance of the drug in Thailand is zero, and drug enforcement officials
launch regular crackdowns on suspected traffickers.

____________________________________
ASEAN

December 12, Bangkok Post
Burma not nuclear, says Abhisit

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has dismissed claims in a leaked US cable
that Burma is building a nuclear programme with help from North Korea.

Mr Abhisit said yesterday there was no evidence to support the accusation
that Burma possesses or is producing a nuclear weapon.

He said none of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members has any
intention to possess nuclear weapons.

"I can remember that Burma confirmed in an Asean-US summit that it wanted
to see Asean as a nuclear-free region," Mr Abhisit said.

Still, he said Thailand had been monitoring movements in neighbouring
countries for the sake of national security.

A cable from the US embassy in Rangoon, released on Thursday by the
anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks, quoted a Burmese officer as saying he had
witnessed North Korean technicians helping build a nuclear facility.

One foreign businessman told the embassy he had seen reinforced steel
bars, larger than for a factory project, being shipped on a barge.

Dockworkers also told of seeing suspicious cargo. A cable dating from
August 2004 revealed information from a Burmese officer in an engineering
unit who said surface-to-air missiles were being built at a site in Minbu
town in west-central Burma.

He said about 300 North Koreans were working at the site, although the US
cable noted this was improbably high, The Guardian newspaper in Britain
reported.

Burma has dismissed reports of its nuclear intentions and brushed aside
Western concerns about its possible cooperation with North Korea.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

December 13, The Associated Press
Myanmar: a pariah nation with lots of friends

Yangon, Myanmar -- Aung San Suu Kyi has long proclaimed her love for India.

Myanmar's pro-democracy icon went to college in New Delhi, her mother was
the ambassador there and she spent some of her happiest times with her
late husband and two sons in the Himalayan foothills of northern India.

But India's government, she says, has been a disappointment.

"It saddens me," she said of New Delhi's ties to the army generals who run
her country, also known as Burma. "It saddens my heart that the peoples of
India and Burma, who went through the battles of independence as comrades
to fight and get out from under the British empire, that the old ties have
given way to the new ties of commercialism."

Things have changed since Suu Kyi rose to prominence in the late 1980s,
and India joined the clamorous international outcry against the military
crackdown on the democracy movement.

Today, security and commerce are New Delhi's foremost concerns in Myanmar
- echoing how realpolitik governs Yangon's relations with a string of
powerful regional allies.

Myanmar's repressive government is cut off from much of the international
community by travel restrictions on the elite and trade sanctions from
many western countries. But the nation wedged between India, China and
Thailand also has enormous energy reserves, thousands of miles of
coastline and long borders that make it strategically important.

As a result: in its own neighborhood, the pariah is pretty popular.

"Thailand, China, Singapore, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia,"
said Maung Zarni, an exiled dissident and research fellow at the London
School of Economics, listing Yangon's regional allies. "All treat Burma as
nothing more than a resource brothel and a strategic location for their
national interests."

It is India, though, that Suu Kyi has singled out - in her own quiet way -
for criticism. "I would like to have thought India would be standing
behind us," she told the Indian Express newspaper in late November.

New Delhi is neither the largest investor in Myanmar, nor has the deepest
ties to the junta - China is widely thought to hold both positions. But
India's political system - it is the world's largest democracy - and its
one-time support for the pro-democracy movement has sparked a backlash.

"India has not only abandoned its supposed democratic values but also
discarded any pretensions to ethics," Zarni said.

For years, New Delhi had been a champion of Myanmar's pro-democracy
movement. Dozens of dissidents fled to India, and a number of anti-junta
media organizations set up offices there.

But the policy began to change in the early 1990s, as a bloody insurgency
took hold in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The outbreak of violence forced
India to shift soldiers from its troubled northeast, where it had long
fought a series of small ethnic militant groups. Many of those groups had
bases across the little-guarded 1,000-mile (1,600-kilometer) border with
Myanmar.

At the same time India's long-dormant economy began to blossom, leaving
the energy-hungry nation searching for new supplies.

Finally, there was the rise of China - which India increasingly sees as
its major economic and political rival - which had allied itself closely
to the junta.

For India, all that made reaching out to Myanmar impossible to resist.
Deals were made for trade, for natural gas, for Myanmar to expel the
Indian militants.

"It's the way of the world," Suu Kyi said in a November interview with The
Associated Press, days after she was released from house arrest.

For India, the decision did not come lightly.

Shyam Saran was India's ambassador in Yangon in 1999 when Suu Kyi's
husband, the British scholar Michael Aris, died of cancer in England. The
couple had been unable to see one another in the months before his death.
She feared that if she left Myanmar, she would not be allowed to return.

Saran, who later became India's foreign secretary, paid a condolence call
on her in Yangon after Aris died. She greeted him graciously, then became
overcome by grief as she described how Aris and their two sons had been
unable to get visas to see her in Yangon.

"Here was an individual of extraordinary fortitude and strength of
character," Saran wrote in the Indian Express after Suu Kyi's November
release, admitting that he felt some guilt after that meeting because of
his government's policy shift.

Still, he knew India had made the right decision: "Our overriding national
interest necessitated working together with the military government."

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

December 12, New York Times
Burmese couple build life in the Bronx – Jennifer Mascia

Bae Reh and his wife, Moo Pro, were raised on a five-mile-long patch of
land they were not permitted to leave, except to gather leaves to fortify
the bamboo huts in which they slept. The couple had no knowledge of the
outside world. They had never heard of America and certainly could not
find it on a map. There were no newspapers, just a magazine and a
television station, both operating under strict political control.

It sounds a little like a scene from North Korea. But Mr. Bae Reh and Ms.
Moo Pro, both 27, did not grow up there. They are refugees from Myanmar
whose parents fled to a camp in Thailand to escape a government that
drafted citizens at random and forced them to commit atrocities against
their own ethnic tribes.

“We were told to fight, or to pay not to fight,” Mr. Bae Reh said through
an interpreter.

He does not remember life before Mae La, the largest of nine camps along
the border in Myanmar, formerly Burma. Ms. Moo Pro arrived with her family
when she was 12.

Although they were out of reach of the oppressive military regime, their
life was not ideal. The Thai government did not allow refugees to work
outside the camps. The United Nations provided sugar, beans, rice noodles,
charcoal for cooking — and, once a month, a protein, usually chicken.

Unable to study beyond high school or to work in any other capacity, Mr.
Bae Reh and Ms. Moo Pro were drawn to teaching and lead a United Nations
classroom housed in a tent. Ms. Moo Pro taught kindergarten, and it was
there, presiding over 20 5-year-olds, that her future husband fell in love
with her.

“She was so patient,” he said, stealing a glance at his wife. They both
giggled. They had two children at Mae La: Khem, 1, and Sukanya, 5.

In 2007, the American government began admitting some of the refugees.
After a two-year investigation ensured that Mr. Bae Reh and Ms. Moo Pro
had no health problems or messy political entanglements, they arrived in
New York in March.

Freedom brought its challenges. They had never paid a bill or made a bed.

“They didn’t even know where to put stuff,” said Onita Misa , the family’s
case manager at Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York, one of
the seven beneficiaries of The New York Times Neediest Cases Fund. “They
put food in the cabinet with detergent,” she said. “I had to start with
the A B C’s: ‘Here is the toothbrush, here is the toothpaste.’ ”

The organization was enlisted to help after being alerted to the family’s
plight by the State Department’s Reception and Placement Program. Ms. Misa
found an apartment for them in the West Farms section of the Bronx; it is
below street level at the end of a dank outdoor hallway. The Neediest
Cases Fund provided $900, which paid for their first month’s rent. Ms.
Misa filled out the rental paperwork and bought the essentials.

“It was amazing for them, compared to the camps,” she said of the modest
apartment, where the two children sleep in the only bedroom and their
parents sleep on the couch. The couple’s wedding photo dominates a wall in
the living room: In it, Mr. Bae Reh is wearing blue jeans and a sports
jacket over an untucked shirt, and Ms. Moo Pro has a youthful smile.

The only clothes they wear now are donated or bought for them from thrift
stores. They have never been to Manhattan.

Ms. Moo Pro said she wanted to see the Statue of Liberty. “But how can I
go there?” she said through an interpreter. “I don’t even know how to get
there.”

Until she learns English, she is essentially unemployable. Mr. Bae Reh
travels only to his job in Brooklyn — he makes $7.25 an hour as a packer
at the 4C Foods Corporation in East New York.

Money is extremely tight, but they are happy to be here. “If they go back
home, they will go to jail,” their interpreter, the Rev. Anastasio Tarsio,
said. A refugee himself, Father Tarsio said that though they were better
off in New York, they yearn for Myanmar. “All the refugees, they want to
go back if Burma gets democracy,” he said.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

December 12, Foreign Policy
What's next for Burma's democrats? – Aung Din

Aung San Suu Kyi is no longer under house arrest, but the Burmese junta's
insidious co-option of "democracy" highlights that real change is still a
long way off.

Burma's rigged elections on Nov. 7 did little more than affirm the ruling
military junta's willingness to subvert the popular will in order to
maintain its grip on power. However, one positive development did come
from the tightly controlled election: Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's most
prominent democracy advocate, was released from house arrest on Nov. 13,
after seven-and-a-half-years. Since her release, she has been busy:
meeting with her party members, supporters, diplomats, ethnic leaders,
civil society actors, and families of political prisoners; speaking with
foreign dignitaries and leaders; and answering questions from
international media. She has consistently said that she will continue to
work for national reconciliation in Burma through a meaningful political
dialogue, though she's well aware that her newfound freedom might not last
long.

The fraudulent election results were not a surprise for Aung San Suu Kyi
or her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which boycotted the
campaign. From its onset, many loyalists to the party and the movement,
including myself, advised the NLD to disassociate itself from this fake
election. There were some individuals who were more optimistic, arguing
that the election marked the beginning of a transition to civilian
democratic rule. But no longer is this the case -- the military junta's
brazen theft of the election should have dispelled any remaining doubts
about its intentions. The only question is: What's the next step for
Burma's pro-democracy movement?

The phony democratic institutions established by the junta offer some
hints about the pace of political developments in Burma. According to the
2008 Constitution, the junta must convene the lower house of parliament
within 90 days after the election. Parliament's upper house will assemble
a week later, followed by the Union Hluttaw -- a joint session of the
lower and upper houses -- summoned 15 days later to elect the president.
This will likely be completed by early March 2011.

Needless to say, both retired and active military generals will control
the new parliament, together with their business cronies and drug lords
who hold significant positions and powers within the military junta's
political wing, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). There
is little to no chance for the opposition members of parliament (who hold,
at the whim of the junta, 15 percent of seats in the lower house and 17
percent of seats in the upper house) to address their concerns
effectively. Than Shwe, the paramount leader in this criminal ring, is
expected to become the president and chairman of the National Defense and
Security Council, the most powerful institution in Burma -- equivalent to
China's Central Military Commission.

The structure of the Burmese government will change, but the political
game will continue to be monopolized by the same old figures and played
with the same destructive attitude. Than Shwe will still maintain his
supreme authority over the government and the military at least for the
next five years, the duration of one term in office. And the military's
regular offensives against ethnic minorities will continue, if not
escalate, in an attempt to place all armed groups under the direct command
of the Burmese Army, a policy known as "Tatmadaw" in Burmese.

The ruling clique will also continue to enrich itself at the expense of
the Burmese people. A group of business cronies and family members of
military generals monopolize the country's economy and control all access
to the country's natural reserves and resources. The well-known tycoons
Khin Shwe (of the firm Zay Gabar) and U Htay Myint (of Yuzana), both of
whom are currently targeted by U.S. financial and banking sanctions, are
now elected members of parliament with USDP tickets. Another junta crony
under U.S. sanctions, Zaw Zaw, was recently granted a major contract to
build the Dawei deep-sea port project, an $8.6 billion project mainly
financed by Thailand, with the blessing of Than Shwe. Another of Than
Shwe's favorites, Tay Za, (also under U.S. sanctions) operates several
jade and ruby mines in Kachin state.

Despite these obvious obstacles, there is still hope that tangible
positive change will come to Burma. The recent release of Aung San Suu Kyi
has effectively re-energized the democracy movement inside and outside the
country. People from all walks of life -- including NLD members,
independent democracy activists, Buddhist monks, students, ethnic
minorities, citizen journalists, farmers, laborers, and even the military
and ethnic armed resistance groups -- have joined her network to press for
a democratic and peaceful transfer of civilian power in Burma.

In the following months and years, Burma will witness the growth of a new
civil society movement that exists in parallel with the ruling government
and aggressively challenges it for popular support and legitimacy. There
is no doubt that the new regime will launch propaganda attacks and
restrictions against this newfound movement to undermine its efforts to
expand its capabilities.

This civil society movement has believed that political dialogue is the
only desirable and plausible way to achieve its aim of national
reconciliation and democratization. However, the military junta's attitude
for the past 22 years has demonstrated complete apathy -- if not outright
antagonism -- toward Burma's pro-democracy movement and its demands.
Unless this movement gathers more strength to exert further pressure on
the regime, there is no doubt that the junta will continue to ignore our
repeated calls for dialogue and national reconciliation.

The international community, and especially the United States and Western
democratic countries, must do everything in its power to bring about these
reforms. It is imperative to keep existing sanctions on Burma in place,
while expanding targeted financial and banking sanctions against the
military regime's cronies in the business world.

The escalation of the civil war between the Burmese Army and ethnic
minority forces also looms on the horizon. The cease-fire between the
junta and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, an ethnic rebel group, broke
apart on election day, and conflict on the Thailand-Burma border will
likely escalate. Another ethnic group, the Karen Peace Council, recently
found the bodies of six of its members who had been arrested on Nov. 30 by
the military. Meanwhile, the junta has been increasing troop numbers and
deploying heavy artillery in the ethnically dominated Karen, Karenni, Mon,
Shan, and Kachin states. Ethnic resistance groups, including the Kachin
Independence Army, Shan State Army, New Mon State Party, United Wa State
Army, and Karen National Union are preparing for renewed conflict. This
development will no doubt worsen the horrific human rights violations and
crimes against humanity in ethnic-minority areas.

In addressing this situation, the international community must recognize
that an ounce of prevention is superior to a pound of cure. The United
States and its allies should press for the creation of a U.N.-led
commission to investigate crimes against humanity in Burma. Toothless
resolutions and statements just won't do. A credible international inquiry
of this kind could prevent future human rights violations and also
pressure the regime to engage in a dialogue with its critics.

The United States should continue to engage with the regime, but it should
not be a unilateral effort. Washington should work together with Asian
governments, including those of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the
Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan, which have expressed
interest and seriousness in restoring stability and democracy to Burma.
This multilateral approach will bolster the U.S. message to Burma's
leaders, while also serving to balance against China's growing influence.
U.S. President Barack Obama can begin these initiatives by appointing a
U.S. special policy coordinator for Burma, as mandated by Congress, to
coordinate sanctions and diplomacy within the U.S. government and with
other countries, without further delay.

Aung San Suu Kyi cannot work alone; she needs help from the international
community. And the Burmese people are expecting the international
community to listen to their voices and concerns. They need both moral and
practical support to strengthen the democracy movement. It would be
irrational and irresponsible for the international community to consider
lifting the current sanctions and allowing foreign investments return to
Burma; doing so will only enrich the top tiers of the military regime and
their business associates while enslaving millions of people under their
oppression.

Instead, the United States should direct its energies to solidifying this
grassroots civil society movement, which is Burma's best hope for lasting
and effective political change in a country that for too long has been
oppressed at the point of a gun.
____________________________________

December 13, Bangkok Post
Let Rangoon defend itself – Editorial

It was good of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to defend the Burmese
government against yet another charge of secret nuclear projects. But Mr
Abhisit's attempt at rebutting the latest WikiLeaks memo on the subject
was weak. He quoted statements by Burmese leaders, who hardly are good
examples of openness and virtue. The six-year-old document from the US
embassy in Rangoon certainly provided no proof that Burma has lied to the
world about its nuclear ambitions. Neither did Mr Abhisit's good-natured
trust of propaganda statements from the military junta.

The once confidential document was found in the WikiLeaks trove of
purloined diplomatic cables. It may have been the first such clue that
Burma had entered into secret negotiations and trade deals with North
Korea _ which it has done since that August 2004 cable was sent to
Washington. It is scant on details and heavy on unverified reports from a
foreign businessman. He told US diplomats in Rangoon that he had seen
suspicious cargo on a barge, and heard that up to 300 North Koreans were
working on a site near Minbu (also known as Sagu), some 350km northwest of
Rangoon. Diplomats said the report might be exaggerated.

But since that cable published by WikiLeaks, events have become more
interesting. After deeply secret negotiations, Burma and North Korea
agreed to restore diplomatic relations in 2007. They had been severed in
1983 after a North Korean terrorist attack in Rangoon. In the more than
three years since relations were resumed, the two countries have grown
friendly _ quickly. Their cooperation in trade, military and other matters
is opaque.

The two rogue hermits, at opposite corners of East Asia, have caused great
concern _ singly and jointly. In 2008, North Korea published photos of a
visit by the Burmese junta's No.3, Gen Shwe Mann. According to the
official media, he toured secret tunnel complexes built to protect North
Korea's military firepower including warplanes and missiles _ and the
regime's nuclear weapons.

Within months, an unknown number of North Koreans were seen by many
witnesses working on massive tunnel complexes in Burma. They have been
photographed by satellites, seen by local people. The Burmese government
has refused to acknowledge the presence of the huge tunnels, let alone
state their use. This, despite Mr Abhisit's apparent readiness to credit
the dictators as transparent in their private denials of nuclear projects.

But it is no secret that Burma has nuclear ambitions _ although for
peaceful purposes on the surface. Russia has often confirmed approaches by
the military junta to build a reactor. Whether it is for medical purposes
like the Bangkok nuclear reactor, or for power generation is unclear.

In fact, almost everything about Burma and nuclear power is unclear. Does
the tunnel complex store North Korean weapons or equipment? That is a good
question, and one that the regime never has answered. Mr Abhisit and all
of us do not know the answer.

What is needed from Burma, as from North Korea and Iran, is a clear
accounting of the nuclear questions. By international law, Burma and all
countries must declare their nuclear ambitions, including research and
electricity generation. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the
clearing house. No nation including Thailand would protest if Burma
planned to use nuclear power in peaceful ways. As it stands, Mr Abhisit
cannot deflect the suspicion, when Burma itself refuses to be clear about
what it is doing.
____________________________________

December 13, Irrawaddy
Post-election politics in Burma—glimmers of hope? – Ashley South

On Nov. 7, Burma went to the polls for the first time since May 1990. The
previous elections were won by a landslide by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National
League for Democracy (NLD). However, the military regime, which has ruled
the country in one form or another since 1962, refused to hand over power.
The generals chose instead to initiate a drawn-out constitution-drafting
process, which culminated in a charter consolidating the military’s
leading role in politics, and guaranteeing the army 25 percent of seats in
parliament.

Unsurprisingly, many independent parties refused to contest the polls—a
boycott which was led by the NLD and overseas-based activists.
Nevertheless, 37 political parties did compete, including a handful of
independent candidates and some two dozen non-government-aligned parties.
These opposition parties were not so naive as to believe the polls would
be free and fair, but they did hope that the military regime would be
confident enough in controlling the overall outcome to allow some
independent voices to be elected.

Non-government parties contesting the elections have a long-term strategy
of slowly expanding the amount of space available to civilian political
networks in order to incrementally change the balance of power in Burma.
Many regarded the 2010 election as a 'dry run', in order to build
capacities, and prepare for the next polls, due to be held sometime in
2015.

In the absence of the NLD, two main urban-based, national-level opposition
parties sought to gain support among citizens opposed to continued
military rule. In addition, some two dozen parties ran on behalf of the
country’s diverse ethnic minority communities, who make up about 30
percent of the population. Some of these parties sought to position
themselves as members of a “third force,” between the government and
existing opposition groups, such as the NLD. They received a great deal of
criticism for participating in the elections.

The turnout on Nov. 7 seems to have been somewhere between half and
two-thirds of registered voters. It seemed by late that evening that many
non-government parties had done remarkably well. However, in numerous
instances, vote counting was interrupted once it became apparent that
pro-government candidates were losing.

When the official results were announced over the following days, it
became apparent that many non-government candidates had been beaten to the
finish line by their pro-government opponents, largely due to a massive
influx of “advanced votes” which were introduced late in the day. In some
cases, the number of recorded votes exceeded the total population of
registered voters, indicating that election officials panicked when they
realized that pro-military candidates were not about to win, and stuffed
the ballot boxes.

In the week after the elections, many non-government candidates and their
supporters were deeply frustrated. However, the post-election scenario is
not entirely gloomy.

The pro-government Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) won 874 of
the 1,140 seats declared by the end of November, giving them firm control
of the two national-level assemblies. However, even after taking into
account the 25 percent of seats reserved for the military, pro-government
parties will not have a stranglehold on all of the ethnic State
assemblies. In fact, a number of ethnic nationality parties did rather
well in the elections. The party with the third-largest number of seats
(57) is the Shan Nationalities Democracy Party, with Rakhine, Mon, Chin,
Pa-O and Karen parties also doing well. In many cases, these small parties
gained clusters of seats in their ethnic homelands, providing them with
regional power bases.

It is yet to be seen how the dynamics of electoral power will be played
out. Under the 2008 constitution, the two national and 14 State/ Regional
assemblies elected in November will be convened in February, to choose a
president under an electoral college system. Between now and then, those
few independent candidates elected will have to choose their positions.
Differences may yet emerge between semi-civilian USDP candidates, and the
military blocs in each of the assemblies. In particular, there is likely
to be jockeying for power among a number of recently retired senior
military officers, not all of whom are comfortable with relinquishing
their uniforms for the uncertainties of electoral politics.

The government has recently announced measures restricting certain
freedoms of speech in parliament. Nevertheless, ethnic nationality parties
in several of the State assemblies should be able to scrutinize, and
sometimes even block, some legislation. Furthermore, in the ethnic States,
many USDP candidates come from minority communities, and enjoy
long-standing relationships with members of ethnic nationality parties.
Therefore, some interesting cross-party alliances may emerge. Furthermore,
the creation of greater political “space,” at least at the local level, is
likely to facilitate the further development of civil society networks
within and between ethnic nationality communities, the emergence of which
over the past decade-plus has been one of the few positive stories in an
otherwise bleak political scene in Burma.

An important indicator will be whether, and to what degree, ethnic
nationality candidates will be pressured or co-opted into following the
USDP/ military line, or whether in some cases they will use the space
created by their election to give voice for their communities and to gain
access to improved services for their electorates. Of course, such
opportunities are not without their potential pitfalls: successful
candidates are likely to be tempted by the fruits of office.

With the military continuing to dominate national-level politics,
observers should therefore look to the ethnic nationality parties as
agents of progressive—albeit, modest—change in Burma. Whether they can
succeed in this incremental approach will depend in large part on whether
junta supremo Than Shwe feels confident enough in his control of the
political process to allow some concessions.

The military's position will depend in large part on its success in
dealing with Aung San Suu Kyi who was released from her most recent bout
of house arrest just a few days after the elections. Although the NLD is a
shadow of its former self, “The Lady” still enjoys enormous support and
respect throughout Burma and beyond. It is yet to be seen whether she will
make common cause with non-government candidates elected on Nov. 7. Also
unsure is the degree of cooperation, if any, that can be expected between
Suu Kyi and the military authorities.

Relationships between Suu Kyi and the government could become quite
confrontational, quite quickly. In this case, the military is unlikely to
allow even semi-independent voices in the elected assemblies to have much
autonomy. Members of some ethnic nationality parties have already
indicated their willingness to work with Suu Kyi. If such alliances
coalesce, this could lead to a new phase of zero-sum political conflict in
Burma.

Another key factor is how relationships will play out between the
government and Burma's several dozen armed ethnic groups. The Karen and
other armed ethnic groups still have the capacity to undermie stability in
the border areas. Their continued insurgency is testimony to widespread
frustration regarding the lack of political progress in Burma, among (but
not limited to) ethnic minority communities.

Border-based insurgency has been in decline for some years, with most
armed ethnic groups being marginalized in relation to major developments
in Burma over the past decade. Nevertheless, insurgency may be prolonged a
while longer if some of those armed ethnic groups which agreed cease-fires
with the government in the 1990s join forces with the remaining
non-cease-fire groups. A recently announced military alliance between
several of the main cease-fire and non-cease-fire groups sent an
aggressive signal to the government. The situation is very tense, and the
current tense stand-off could escalate into all-out conflict at any time.
Nevertheless, few of the cease-fire groups want to return to war, if they
can avoid it—and the government is only likely to launch a direct attack
on these militias if Snr-Gen Than Shwe feels he is losing control of the
political process.

The multi-faceted political situation in Burma is at a particularly
interesting and important juncture. However, that makes it awfully
difficult to call the shots.

Ashley South is an independent writer and consultant specializing in
humanitarian and political issues in Burma and Southeast Asia.




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