[StBernard] Ruling scapegoats corps for flooding: A guest column by Rob Young and Andrew Coburn

[Westley Annis]

Ruling scapegoats corps for flooding: A guest column by Rob Young and Andrew
Coburn
By Contributing Op-Ed columnist 
November 25, 2009, 5:51AM
Last week, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was found guilty of gross
negligence in its failure to protect Chalmette and the Lower 9th Ward of New
Orleans from floodwaters during Hurricane Katrina. Although only a handful
of homeowners shared in about $700,000 in damages, this decision may expose
the federal government to billions of dollars in claims.

The court concluded that the corps' failure to properly maintain a shipping
channel, the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet linking New Orleans to the Gulf
of Mexico led to catastrophic flooding during Hurricane Katrina. 

While many aspects of the complaint certainly have merit (we agree that the
corps' engineering oversight was shoddy), we are concerned that this will
open the door to unending liability for federal taxpayers to cover private
property losses behind failed corps projects. 

The corps maintains navigational inlets all around U.S. Atlantic and Gulf
coasts. These inlets unquestionably increase the storm surge behind them. Is
the corps liable? Levees on the upper Mississippi increase the magnitude of
flooding on the lower Mississippi.
A wise citizen has to understand that all corps projects have the
possibility of failure. 

The only way to guarantee one's safety is to stay out of the hazard zones.
Flooding from storms like Katrina is inevitable, regardless of the Corps of
Engineers' level of competence or incompetence. 

That isn't to say that the corps may not have played a role in the flooding
from Katrina, but certainly this ruling should not absolve all others of
some responsibility. The real question here is who should assume the
responsibility and financial liability for private property in areas subject
to flooding and storm damage.

The corps should not be standing trial alone. The system is broken. Congress
is just as guilty for not reforming the way the corps is funded and the way
corps projects are generated. 

Because most corps activities are funded on a project-by-project basis, it
rarely turns down a project. It can't afford to. No work, no corps. That's
why, to the corps, every project is a good project -- even the MR-GO.

Unfortunately, this method of funding leads to an overly optimistic
assessment of project feasibility, economic benefits and environmental
impacts. It also leads to bad engineering, bad science and project failure.
It is a poor way to fund a federal agency.

Local politicians and business interests are also culpable. Many that
support the development of corps projects like the MR-GO are happy to see
federal dollars come into their state, but quick to look for a scapegoat
when things go wrong. And certainly, those who continue to choose to live
and rebuild in hazardous areas must accept responsibility for this decision.

We do feel sympathy for the many people in Louisiana who truly felt
protected by the failed levees. Certainly, the risk of failure is not a
comfortable topic of discussion for any politician or engineer. So there are
many folks who may not have been aware of the risk.

Yet we all must begin to embrace what Louisiana State University's R. Eugene
Turner calls the "ignorance-based-world-view." In a recently published
article in the journal Estuaries and Coasts, Turner argues that most storm
protection and restoration efforts are carried out under a
knowledge-based-world-view which assumes that we know all we need to know,
and that gaps in our knowledge are insignificant.

In fact, it is the uncertainty and the gaps in our knowledge that may be
critical to understanding the true risk of living in a vulnerable area, or
how best to proceed with levee building or environmental restoration. 

Turner concludes that we must expect surprises. In practice that means that
every corps storm protection project has the real potential for failure as a
result of unexpected "surprises" in any given storm that result from
potential gaps in our knowledge.

Will this failure be construed as negligent or incompetent engineering and
warrant another lawsuit, or is it simply the cost of doing business in a
region that has been battered by storms for centuries?

In truth, the corps is being asked to do an impossible job (which they
happily accept). It is time for the corps leadership and Louisiana's
political leaders to admit they cannot guarantee the safety of property
located in hazardous areas.

No matter how much money is spent, and no matter how competent and massive
the engineered defenses are, nature will always find a hole in the dike,
somewhere.
***
Rob Young is the director of the Program for the Study of Developed
Shorelines at Western Carolina University in Cullowhee, N.C. He is co-author
of "The Rising Sea," published this year by Island Press. Andrew Coburn is
associate director of the Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines.
Contact the authors at ryoung at email.wcu.edu.