[StBernard] Governor's Response to Congress

[Westley Annis]

Governor's response to Congress 

To view the PDF of this document click
<http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/PDFs/Gov.response.12.2.05.pdf>  or
copy and paste link into browser

LOUISIANA OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

RESPONSE TO U. S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNNMENTAL
AFFAIRS DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION REQUEST DATED OCTOBER 7, 2005 AND TO THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

SUBMITTED DECEMBER 2, 2005:

OVERVIEW OF GOVERNOR KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO'S ACTIONS
IN PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA


As a supplement to the tens of thousands of pages of documents provided by
the Governor's office and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness, the following overview details key actions taken by
Governor Blanco in the days immediately proceeding and following Hurricane
Katrina.  This overview is in no way intended as a complete documentation of
all actions, but is intended to be responsive to questions 8 and 10
specifically, and to capture the key events as they developed to the best of
our knowledge.


A Brewing Storm

Hurricane Katrina first receives Governor Blanco's attention when it appears
as a newly formed tropical depression, days before August 26th and prior to
the storm receiving an official name.  For the past decade, Terry Ryder,
Executive Counsel to the Governor, has been entrusted with the
responsibility for keeping his eye on the tropics, advising Governor Blanco
and her predecessor of potential hurricanes.  Governor Blanco instructs
Ryder to alert her the moment he learns of a tropical depression.  Once a
tropical depression develops into a tropical storm, it receives an official
name from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) and Ryder begins providing
regular updates while tracking the storm on software provided by the Center.
He also serves as the point person who communicates with the Louisiana
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to obtain needed
information and to orchestrate the operational process.    

As Ryder and the Governor begin discussing Katrina, all indications suggest
that Louisiana will fall well outside of Katrina's cone.  Since models
initially project Katrina will target the Florida panhandle, Governor Blanco
tentatively continues her longstanding plans to  
attend the Southern Governor's Association Conference in Atlanta, where she
is to be installed as Chair.   Her Executive Assistant, Paine Gowen, and her
Legislative Director, Rochelle Michaud Dugas, travel ahead to Atlanta
preparing for the Governor's participation.  Up until the  
storm shifts and Louisiana moves into the cone late on Friday, based on NHC
tracking charts and staff discussions, Hurricane Katrina appears no more
threatening than many of the storms that the Governor and Ryder track during
hurricane season. 

FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005

A Sudden Shift

 Early predictions deteriorate on Friday as NHC steering factors evolve, and
the Governor sounds the alert.  Periodic updates have been filtering in all
day long.  By mid-afternoon, the National Weather Service reports that
Katrina has shifted westward, with landfall now projected to fall near
Mobile along the Alabama/Mississippi line instead of the anticipated Florida
panhandle.  Upon learning of the storm's dramatic and unprecedented shift,
Governor Blanco signs and immediately issues Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005,
Declaring a State of Emergency, and places the Louisiana National Guard and
all State agencies on full alert.  She warns that "Hurricane Katrina poses
an imminent threat to the state of Louisiana, carrying severe storms, high
winds, and torrential rain that may cause flooding and damage to private
property and public facilities, and threaten the safety and security of the
citizens of Louisiana."

As Louisiana falls within the hurricane's cone, Governor Blanco cancels her
trip to Georgia for the Southern Governor's Association Conference, and
begins working with emergency preparedness officials to address the rapidly
changing situation.  The situation grows dire at around 10PM that evening as
the storm again shifts westward, for the first time bearing down on
Louisiana.  
  
The Governor immediately begins arrangements for a massive evacuation,
conferring with her staff to strategize implementation of her recently
restructured contra-flow evacuation plan for coastal Southeast Louisiana and
the New Orleans region.  She participates in an evening conference call with
the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
(LOHSEP) regarding Hurricane Katrina, and is assured that all parishes and
State agencies are on high alert and ready to activate the agreed-upon
evacuation plans.  

 Friday evening, Governor Blanco focuses on the evacuation and contra-flow
plan, knowing firsthand the urgency of moving people to safety.  She confers
with State Police Superintendent Colonel Henry Whitehorn regarding her
intent to activate the contra-flow plan to facilitate the evacuation, and
receives his assurance that the Louisiana State Police and the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development will begin staging the
equipment and manpower needed to move the masses.  The Governor places a
similar late-night call to Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour to alert him,
per their prior agreement, that she is urging an evacuation of the New
Orleans metropolitan area and requests that he be prepared to activate
contra-flow of I-59 through Mississippi on Saturday.  

Early Evacuation Planning Saves Lives

 The successfully retooled evacuation plan was well executed, and can be
lauded for avoiding additional loss of life during Hurricane Katrina.
Governor Blanco's evacuation plan using contra-flow rapidly moves an
unprecedented 1 million plus people out of harm's way relying on a system of
phased evacuations.  Governor Blanco had ordered the evacuation plan
overhauled as a result of the lessons learned earlier in her term from
Hurricane Ivan, when it became apparent to her that the evacuation of a
large metro area with low-lying parishes under the State's existing plan
could be more efficient.  Because of frustrations caused by evacuations
during previous storm threats, Governor Blanco recognizes that evacuations
must flow smoothly.  Otherwise, the risk is great that people will become so
discouraged by gridlock that they opt to weather the storm at home.  

Katrina confirms the value of this early planning, and demonstrates the
importance of a well-planned evacuation to save lives.  Evacuations also
depend on the cooperation of the general public and local government
agencies.  The State's new evacuation plan has been designed in cooperation
with local parish leaders who signed agreements and are asked to follow the
plan.  There are invariably those who will not or perhaps cannot leave an
area, which is why Mayor Nagin set up the Superdome as the shelter of last
resort.  It is therefore recognized that some will always be in need of
rescue.  The goal is to minimize the numbers. Hurricane Katrina resulted in
a devastating loss of life and property for Louisiana, but the tragedy would
have been far worse if the initial evacuation had not been so efficient and
safe.    

SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005

Leave While You Can

With the National Weather Service now predicting that Hurricane Katrina
could slam into Southeast Louisiana, Governor Blanco begins the day early on
Saturday at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge at LOHSEP
to participate in the morning conference call led by Colonel Jeff Smith.
She prioritizes this call because she wants to hear again that with
evacuations set to begin at 9AM that morning, all parish presidents remain
committed to following the phased plan as discussed and agreed upon the
previous evening.  Throughout the morning, the Governor personally calls
parish presidents to verify their plans and to encourage evacuation efforts
in compliance with the State's plan.  


>From Saturday, August 27, through Katrina and until the aftermath of

Hurricane Rita, Governor Blanco sets up her primary headquarters in the
Emergency Operations Center as it allows her to personally oversee the
rapidly developing situation that often requires spur of the moment
decisions.  Working side by side with the National Guard, the State Police
and other State agencies is essential, especially considering the local
communications degradation that would occur later.     

The Governor follows Friday's State of Emergency declaration with the first
of many Hurricane Katrina-related letters issued to President Bush and other
federal officials, urging him to declare a federal State of Emergency for
the State of Louisiana under the Stafford Act, which he does.  She expects
early on that Katrina could be a catastrophic event that would overwhelm
State resources, and wants to ensure that Louisiana would receive every form
of assistance the federal government could provide.
   
Governor Blanco engages in a considerable number of public appearances over
the weekend, urging citizens to take this storm seriously and evacuate
Southeast Louisiana and the New Orleans metropolitan area.  As someone who
has grown up with hurricanes, she worries that many people would play a
familiar game of "hurricane roulette" - tempting fate and staying home in a
gamble that this storm would be no worse than the last one that they !
weathered in their home.  Believing this could be the "big one" talked about
for years, she was adamant in urging people to avoid complacency and to
leave, as evident in the news footage from Saturday and Sunday.

At around 1:00PM on Saturday afternoon, Governor Blanco stands first with
Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard and parish officials, and then
with New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and city officials for press conferences
emphasizing the importance of an immediate evacuation.  In a state where
hurricanes are a way of life, it is almost unprecedented for a Governor to
participate with local officials in news conferences urging evacuations.
Governor Blanco encourages local citizens to go door to door and plead with
their neighbors to leave their homes and evacuate the region.       

 With the evacuations well underway as scheduled and traffic growing heavy,
contra-flow officially begins at 4PM on Saturday.  Both lanes of interstate
highways will be utilized for travel in the same direction going away from
the urban center.  Louisiana National Guard members join State police and
Department of Transportation officials in moving well over a million people
to safety.  At 5:30PM, the Governor is back on the phone on a conference
call with statewide elected officials and the 65 legislators in the affected
areas, warning them of the seriousness of the storm and the importance of
leaving, as well as encouraging others to do so. 

"Pray and Pack"

 Late Saturday afternoon, Governor Blanco acts on a report from State
Representative Cedric Richmond of New Orleans.  Representative Richmond
visited a local ballpark that evening where approximately 700 people were
present, and learned that some people had not paid attention to the weekend
news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New
Orleans.  He worries that many may have thought that the hurricane was still
targeting the Florida panhandle, as reported by the National Hurricane
Center up until late Friday afternoon.  Governor Blanco calls her Assistant
Chief of Staff, Johnny Anderson, and asks him to contact the African
American ministers in the affected areas.  The Governor suggests that they
call their members urging immediate evacuations, and then advise those
attending Sunday morning services to "Pray and Pack" without delay.
Anderson stays up through the night making the calls to ministers and other
le! aders.    

National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfield calls Governor Blanco on
Saturday evening to share his professional opinion of the severity of
Katrina.  The Governor calls Mayor Nagin and urges him to call Mayfield and
speak with him directly to hear the dire warning for himself.  Nagin calls
the Governor back after his conversation with Mayfield, and tells her that
he would order a mandatory evacuation first thing in the morning.  Governor
Blanco offers to join him to add her authority and support to this
announcement.  

Weekend: Pre-Positioning and Statewide Preparations Underway

 On Saturday and Sunday, Governor Blanco oversees the State agencies as they
move forward in a coordinated effort under the State of Emergency Operations
Plan to pre-position and prepare for the storm.  For example, as soon as the
hurricane is in the Gulf of Mexico, Governor Blanco authorizes the Adjutant
General of Louisiana, Major General Bennett Landreneau, to mobilize 2000
Louisiana National Guard soldiers and airmen, with the numbers increasing to
4,000 and continuing to grow as the storm continues to shift west.  The
Louisiana State Police and the Department of Transportation and Development
deploy personnel across the state to assist evacuating motorists and to help
direct evacuees to appropriate shelters.  As this occurs, the Public Service
Commission stages utility repair vehicles and personnel in advance of the
storm.  

The Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS), local parishes and the
Red Cross identify shelters to accept pre-storm evacuees in Baton Rouge,
Alexandria, Monroe, and other areas, with certain shelters designated for
the special needs population.  The Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals works closely with DSS during this critical time to stage medical
personnel to offer medical assistance to evacuees.  The Louisiana Shelter
Task Force diligently works to man shelter checkpoints and supply personnel
to open the shelters.  Further, Dr. Fred Cerise, Secretary of the Department
of Health and Hospitals, assembles a team of officials staged to travel to
New Orleans to oversee medical care for evacuees.      

Aware that some areas will always experience flooding, the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries stages some 400 watercraft at regional
locations so they are poised to engage in search and rescue efforts.  In
addition to conducting needed rescues, these Wildlife and Fisheries agents
would be able to provide early insight when little information is available
from the affected areas immediately after the storm.  The actions detailed
above provide only a limited overview of the extensive planning process
underway under the State Emergency Operations Plan, as the full resources of
the State come together as planned in preparation for Hurricane Katrina.  

SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005

Governor Continues Urging Residents to Leave

 Governor Blanco rises at 4AM on Sunday to appear on Good Morning America
and four other news programs, continuing to urge the people of Southeast
Louisiana to immediately evacuate.  The Governor follows her request for a
federal emergency declaration by requesting that President Bush issue an
Expedited Major Disaster Declaration beginning on Sunday, thereby freeing up
additional federal relief for the State.  

 General Landreneau keeps the Governor apprised as additional Louisiana
National Guardsmen are activated, alerting her that 4,000 will be on duty by
Monday.  In addition, the General begins Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) coordination with individual states asking them to send their
National Guard troops.  Louisiana has a long history of sending National
Guard members to help neighboring states recover from natural disasters, and
now appreciates the reciprocation of Louisiana's neighbors.    

 Per their agreement on Saturday, Governor Blanco joins Mayor Nagin in New
Orleans on Sunday as he calls for a mandatory evacuation of Orleans Parish.
Governor Blanco receives a call from President Bush just before she walks
into the news conference, telling him that she is with the Mayor and he will
order a mandatory evacuation in just a few minutes.  She tells the President
that the evacuation of the affected areas started early yesterday morning
and proceeded all through the night, and she thanks the President for
signing the disaster declaration.  

At the news conference, the Governor again urges people to heed the
mandatory evacuation order.  She advises people who have not done so to pick
up evacuation maps at easy to reach locations around town and plan their
routes and destinations.  The Governor also advises families to pack as
though they are going on a camping trip with food, water, toys, clothing,
etc. for at least three days.  She urges drivers to proceed with caution to
avoid auto accidents.    

  On Sunday night, Governor Blanco holds a press conference to announce the
end of contra-flow (which needs to end before the high winds begin so that
DOTD and State Police employees and their equipment can be moved to safety)
and to urge continued evacuations.  The Governor chose to continue
contra-flow until the last possible moment, sending a state police
helicopter to fly over contra-flow loading points to make sure that there
were no traffic backups remaining, and keeping it activated two hours after
it was scheduled to conclude.  She thanks the "citizens of the Greater New
Orleans area for the heroic, serious and courteous manner in which they have
conducted themselves in the past several days," and expresses "grave
concern" about reports that some people are not evacuating.  Even though
contra-flow has ended, Governor Blanco stresses that people should still
leave and get out of town now, as evacuation routes are still open.  ! 

 The Governor participates in yet another conference call with legislators,
statewide elected officials, and members of the Congressional delegation,
updating them on all recent actions.  

MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005

Landfall

 Governor Blanco awakes at 4:45AM to participate on the morning television
shows, continuing to provide reports as Katrina makes landfall.  She remains
throughout the day at the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), participating in Emergency Operations
Conference Calls at 7:30AM and again at 5:30PM, and monitoring reports of
storm damage throughout the day.  Major General Landreneau assures the
Governor that the Louisiana National Guard has now alerted all available
5700 (eventually this number would grow to 6100) Louisiana members of the
Guard who are not serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.  

 Throughout the day reports pour in from the affected areas, and the
Governor learns that approximately 10,000 evacuees are riding out the storm
in the Superdome.  Agencies have their assets prepositioned and ready to
roll as soon as it is safe to venture into the winds.  The Governor's Chief
of Staff, Andy Kopplin, sends out an alert to all staff telling everyone to
be prepared to be proactive in providing information, coordination and
assistance.  

"We Need Everything You've Got"

Governor Blanco again speaks with President Bush, informing him that she
would need every resource possible from the federal government.  She recalls
telling him, "We need your help.  We need everything you've got."  Based on
their conversation, she believes he understands the urgency of the
situation, and has every intention to send all of the resources and
assistance within the power of the federal government.  From the beginning,
she believed and continues to believe President Bush desired to be as
helpful as he could be in the face of such an unprecedented catastrophe.

Governor Blanco meets with Mike Brown, the Director of FEMA, who reviews
what FEMA will do for disaster assistance and assures the Governor not to
worry about costs, that all the State's needs will be provided.  He mentions
supplies, money for those with destroyed homes ($26,200) and that FEMA has
500 buses on standby, ready to be deployed.  He cautions that drivers can
only drive for 12-hour shifts and must rest.  The Governor recommends that
they double team and alternate drivers, and Brown replies that some do but
others do not. 
  
Worst Case Scenario

 On Monday, it becomes clear that New Orleans has not dodged the bullet as
some commentators initially suggested, and that was obvious throughout the
day at the Emergency Operations Center as reports of a breach in the roof of
the Superdome, major flooding in Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes and
the Lower Ninth Ward are reported.  The catastrophic damage of Katrina - the
double punch of first the hurricane winds and then the surging floodwaters -
becomes increasingly apparent.
  
The Governor orders Secretary Dwight Landreneau of the Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries to deploy rescue boats as soon as winds die down to
gale force at 40 mph, so they can begin to rescue stranded people.  Sam
Jones, the Governor's Deputy Director of Community Programs, speaks with her
by phone Monday night, and she orders him to begin recruiting private boats
and volunteers to aid in the rescue effort.  The LDWF directs a growing
battalion of! first responders and other spontaneous volunteers arriving
with boats and equipment to assigned staging areas for rescue missions.  

National Guard members rescue people from the Lower Ninth Ward waters, where
Jackson Barracks, the National Guard headquarters, is located and has also
flooded.  In and around Jackson Barracks and St. Bernard Parish, the storm
surge causes the waters to rise as much as twelve feet in a span of 30 to 40
minutes.  Louisiana-based members of the Coast Guard are also running rescue
missions.  The heroism and selfless acts of bravery exhibited by these early
rescuers and the thousands of volunteers who joined them cannot be
overstated.    

 Scattered reports begin filtering in to the Governor from the affected
areas.  Representative Nita Hutter reports being stranded with the Parish
President and a large number of people on the second floor of a building in
St. Bernard Parish with water filling the first floor and with high water as
far as the eye can see.  Mayor Nagin alerts the Governor that the
catastrophic damage of the storm may escalate, as they believe the 17th
Street Canal wall is failing.  The Governor reports this to Major General
Landreneau.  As early reports come in, the extent of the breach is not
clear, but the 17th Street breach results in the flooding of vast
residential areas as well as downtown New Orleans. The first signs of
serious problems with the communications systems also become apparent on
Monday as it becomes more and more difficult to reach the affected areas by
phone.  
 
TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005

Assessing the Damage

FEMA Director Mike Brown and Senators Landrieu and Vitter join Governor
Blanco for a Blackhawk flight to survey Katrina's damage on Tuesday morning.
Their group meets with Mayor Nagin and receives an overview of the situation
before returning to Baton Rouge.  The Governor returns from the trip
extremely concerned by the extent of the devastation and the limits of the
State's resources.    

The floodwaters continue to deepen and encompass most parts of the city and
area parishes also flooded from other effects of the storm.  On Tuesday,
floodwaters are still surging across New Orleans and surrounding
neighborhoods from levee breaks.  It is now becoming harrowingly clear that
the dreaded "big one" has arrived, and the city that lies below sea level is
in dire trouble.    

 As the extent of the flood damage becomes apparent, Governor Blanco meets
with Leonard Kleinpeter and other members of her staff, ordering them to
locate buses to evacuate people who remained in New Orleans.  It was still
unclear at this point how many bus evacuations would need to occur, but
Kleinpeter begins lining up buses from local school districts and churches.


 The Governor's Office staff, under the direction of Kim Hunter Reed, sets
up a call center and a staffing system to field the massive volume of
incoming emergency rescue calls.  The Governor orders that incoming calls
are to be answered on an around the clock basis, as these incoming calls are
primarily rescue requests and/or people seeking assistance in locating
family members.  Initially the calls are fielded directly from the
Governor's office.  Later in the week, the Governor's staff arranges for a
higher volume 800-number to be issued, and relocates the operation to a call
center at the Department of Public Safety's Office of Motor Vehicles.  

 As floodwaters spread, the crowd surges beyond the initial evacuees at the
Superdome.  Initially many drive from their homes and arrive by car, with
more arriving on foot and pushing family members on rafts as the water
rises.  Governor Blanco travels for a second time to the Superdome on
Tuesday, to see for herself the developing situation as the communications
systems are severely degraded.  She wants to learn additional information
and speak with the people who are gathering there.  She sees that people are
worried about being separated from their families in the rescue efforts, as
so many are being forced to board separate boats.  They say that the food
and water lines are long, but the Governor is assured that at least there is
food, water and medical care.  With limited communications ability, it is
difficult to calm nerves and communicate information to a crowd that large.
The Governor leaves for Baton Rouge extrem! ely concerned by the difficult
situations these families face, and determined that the Superdome must be
evacuated as soon as possible.  

Governor Blanco calls General Landreneau after her return from the Superdome
and expresses her escalating concern about the lack of significant federal
resources to supplement the State's efforts.   She instructs the General to
ask for all available assistance from the National Guard and the United
States Government, specifically federal military assistance.  The Governor
wants to know the status of the troops and if he has any information about
the pending arrival of the FEMA buses, as she plans to use them to evacuate
the Superdome on Wednesday.  

Major General Landreneau reports to the Governor that he receives a call
from United States Army Lieutenant General Russ Honore and relayed to Honore
their request for significant federal troops and resources.  General
Landreneau reports that he also asks National Guard Bureau Chief Lieutenant
General H. Steven Blum to assist with generating additional assistance from
the National Guard units from across the country to help with the effort,
and the Governor is assured that General Blum begins to do so immediately.  

 Late on Tuesday night, Governor Blanco calls Ann Williamson, Secretary of
the Department of Social Services, and instructs her to find a shelter by
6AM for at least 25,000 people.    
  
 
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005

Governor Declares August 31st an Official Day of Prayer for the Victims,
their Families, and the Rescuers 

Need for Federal Resources Escalates

 When the expected and promised federal resources still have not arrived on
Wednesday, Governor Blanco places an urgent morning call to the White House
in an effort to reach President Bush and express the need for significant
resources.  She is unable to reach President Bush or his Chief of Staff,
Andrew Card.  A later phone call reaches Maggie Grant in the White House
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs.  The Governor receives a call from
Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend.  Andrew Card later returns her
call too, and she requests his help in getting the promised FEMA buses into
the New Orleans area.  She suggests that 500 will not be enough, and that
she might need as many as 5,000 buses.  He affirms that he believes he can
help with this.  

 Later Wednesday afternoon, the Governor places a second call to President
Bush.  She stresses to him that the situation is extremely grave and asks
for additional resources.  Governor Blanco also specifically stresses that
she wants to continue to be his partner in a unity of effort as is called
for under the National Response Plan.  To relay the urgency and the
magnitude of the need at that point in time, the Governor tells the
President she estimates 40,000 troops would be needed, and again reiterates
her frustration about the FEMA buses.       

 In the meantime, the Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of
Transportation, and the National Guard attempt to fill the breach in the
canal wall.  Major General Landreneau dispatches engineers and helicopters
from the National Guard to airlift 3,000 pound sandbags to drop into the
ruptured 17th Street Canal wall.  The General later reports that the hole is
far too deep and too large and there is no significant relief from the
floodwaters in spite of early efforts to fill the breach.  Reports are
received that large crowds are beginning to gather at the Convention Center.
The city has not pre-planned this building as an evacuation site.  The
Governor grows more concerned recognizing this situation makes the need for
FEMA buses even more acute.  

Governor Pushes Forward with Evacuation

 Governor Blanco is determined to move ahead on evacuating the Superdome
with or without the federal resources.  With designated shelters, hotels and
most households in Louisiana bursting at the seams from evacuees who left
during contra-flow, she knows she has to secure additional locations where
she can transport those who are still in New Orleans.  
 
Wednesday morning, Governor Blanco calls Governor Rick Perry of Texas to
coordinate the arrival of evacuees from New Orleans to Texas.  It was agreed
that the Astrodome would be opened to accept evacuees.  In addition to
Governor Perry, she also calls to secure the support of Houston Mayor Bill
White and Harris County Judge Robert Echols of Texas to pave the way for
temporarily housing evacuees in the Astrodome.      

 General Landreneau presents Lieutenant General Russ Honore to Governor
Blanco when he arrives on Wednesday at the Office of Emergency Preparedness.
Everyone welcomes the appearance of Louisiana native General Honore, as the
assumption is that his arrival indicates the federal troops are here or on
their way with the equipment needed to help get the job done in response to
the Governor's requests.  The Governor asks him to coordinate the evacuation
efforts in New Orleans, so that General Landreneau can concentrate on saving
lives, search and rescue, and law and order issues.  Governor Blanco later
asks Honore if he brought a large number of soldiers, and learns that he
arrived with only a small support staff.  The evacuation must be conducted
by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has not arrived.    


Brigade of Buses

 With no sign of the promised FEMA buses in sight on Wednesday, General
Honore requests more school buses and Governor Blanco issues Executive Order
No. KBB 2005-31 later in the day, allowing her to officially commandeer or
utilize any private property she finds necessary to cope with the disaster
or emergency.  Governor Blanco's office continues to direct each school
superintendent to provide an inventory of school buses and bus drivers in
their districts.  

 An estimated 1500 school buses were commandeered.  Although all of the
buses were not ultimately used, initial estimates indicate that at least 800
school bus trips were made shuttling evacuees to safety.  The Governor's
staff arranges a staging and implementation plan that keeps the buses
flowing in convoys once the order is issued.  It is important to note that
as reports of violence escalate on the news, many potential bus drivers
become understandably concerned about the safety of driving into the city on
rescue missions.  All available first responders from the Baton Rouge area
and surrounding parishes are involved in the rescue efforts, so are not able
to ride the individual buses on their missions.  Police escorts accompany
convoys in groups of ten buses.  Those who respond to the call for bus
drivers are saluted for their bravery.      

With the FEMA buses rumored to be on the way and helicopter rescue
operations increasing, at some point, it is suggested that the school bus
convoys are not needed.  Governor Blanco refuses to halt the school bus
convoys, and instructs her staff to proceed with securing every bus -
school, church or tour bus - they can acquire.  She pushes to move the bus
convoy full speed ahead as it is uncertain whether or not the rumored FEMA
buses would ever materialize, and she is not willing to rely solely on
helicopter operations to move people to safety.  As of 10:30PM on Wednesday
night, there was still no word about the status of significant numbers of
FEMA buses.  

Governor Blanco flies over the Cloverleaf area and sees the crowds gathering
on raised highways and levees.  She instructs her staff to send available
school bus convoys to those areas too.  As horrible and uncomfortable as
conditions are in the Superdome, there is at least food, water and shelter
from the sun.  People brought to the raised surfaces as they transitioned to
safety had no shelter from the sun, and many of these children, elderly and
other adults had been subjected to the elements.  As people were bused out
from the highways, others took their place in a constant flow of evacuees
deposited by the boat and helicopter rescuers.    

 Just before midnight on Wednesday, the Governor learns that a number of the
promised FEMA buses are finally crossing into North Louisiana, some 7 or 8
hours away from New Orleans. 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005

With all shelters and communities bursting at the seams, on Thursday
Governor Blanco issues Executive Order KBB 2005-24 allowing all evacuees
occupying hotel rooms to continue occupying the room under the normal terms,
conditions and rates.  The Governor takes this precaution because she does
not want evacuees competing for rooms with non-evacuees.  In an effort to
address the housing shortfall, Governor Blanco also writes to U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson and
urges him to consider both immediate and long-term housing solutions for
evacuees.   

A Growing Contingent of National Guard Troops

 In response to widespread reports of looting and violence, a large number
of security forces including Military Police that the Governor had ordered
earlier in the week from the National Guard arrive on the streets of New
Orleans.  Governor Blanco announces that they are just back from Iraq, armed
with M-16s that are "locked and loaded," that they are trained to shoot to
kill and would accommodate anyone threatening the lives of evacuees or
rescuers.  They never fire their weapons, but law and order is restored.    
 
 On Thursday evening, General Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
arrives in Baton Rouge.  His arrival is in response to General Landreneau's
appeal for Blum's assistance in continuing efforts to recruit larger
contingents of National Guard troops needed from across the country and the
territories.  General Blum meets with the Governor and General Landreneau to
report on his progress! and to inform the Governor that he has a large
number of National Guard troops that have arrived with more on the way.  The
discussion turns to the role of the National Guard, and the Governor's
desire for federal troops to assist the State.  

 General Blum provides his candid assessment that the Governor should not
federalize the troops, recommending the dual command structure.  He confirms
the Governor's position that a joint command is appropriate, with Lieutenant
General Honore commanding federal forces and Major General Landreneau
commanding State forces, and that federalization would not be necessary to
receive more federal assets.  Additionally, any such move to place Guard
troops on Title 10 status would have significantly limited our capacity to
conduct law enforcement missions.  We all know that the Posse Comitatus Act
significantly limits the situations when the army and air force can conduct
law enforcement missions.  The reality is that thousands of Guard troops are
pouring into the State, yet very few federal troops are on the ground to
meet the Governor's request.   

 On Thursday evening, Governor Blanco decides to hire an experienced expert
to serve as the State's liaison with FEMA and to cut through the red tape as
the disaster recovery efforts continue.  Governor Blanco hires former FEMA
Director James Lee Witt to assist in the recovery.  Witt is well respected
within FEMA, and with more than 25 years of disaster management experience,
is one of the country's foremost experts on responding to natural disasters.
Executive Counsel Terry Ryder called Friday morning from the Governor's
office to extend the offer to James Lee Witt, and he agrees to start
immediately, arriving ready to work on Friday night.  


FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 2005

Bring the 256th Home

 With all available Louisiana National Guard troops activated and thousands
of National Guard forces pouring in from across the country to meet the
tremendous needs of the State, Governor Blanco delivers another official
request to President Bush urging him to allow for the expeditious return of
the soldiers of the 256th Brigade Combat Team as they have completed their
mission in the Iraqi theatre of operations and they are urgently needed here
at home to assist in the recovery efforts.  Her letter also requests federal
assistance with aerial and ground firefighting support; a fleet of military
vehicles that would remain in the affected areas; at least 175 generators;
medical supplies including personnel, equipment, drugs and vaccines;
assistance with mortuary affairs; and assistance in dealing with injured
animals and animal remains.  She prioritizes the need for federal help in
rebuilding Louisiana's communications grid.    &n! bsp;   

In an effort to utilize the services of doctors who were answering
Louisiana's much needed calls for medical assistance, Governor Blanco issues
Executive Order No. KBB 2005-26, declaring a state of public health
emergency and facilitating the acceptance of additional medical professional
assistance.  This order temporarily suspends Louisiana's licensure laws,
rules and regulations for medical professionals and personnel who possess
medical licenses in good standing in their respective states, thereby
helping out-of-state medical professionals and personnel treat those in need
of urgent care.     

Louisiana's Fund for Louisiana's People

 On Friday, Governor Blanco creates and announces the Louisiana Disaster
Recovery Foundation, a non-profit foundation developed to accept donations
pouring in to the State to meet the needs of Louisiana's people.  In an
overwhelming show of generosity and support, people from across the United
States and the globe reach out to Louisiana in her time of need, sending
their contributions and their prayers.  

The Tide Begins to Turn

 General Landreneau assures the Governor that some 30,000 occupants of the
Superdome have now been evacuated, but alerts her that thousands more
continue to come.  He also notifies the Governor that improvement is
underway at the Convention Center, with large shares of rations and security
in place brought in by the National Guard.  He reports on the continued
escalation of EMAC forces.  On day four after Katrina hits Louisiana,
Governor Blanco sees the tide beginning to turn in search and rescue
missions, evacuations and peacekeeping efforts.  The first responders,
National Guard, State officials, in and out of State volunteers, and
citizens of Louisiana stepped up and pulled together to get through the
crisis moments created by the largest natural disaster ever to strike this
country.  It was not pleasant to experience or watch, but tens of thousands
of lives were saved.   


Governor Meets with President

 President Bush arrives in New Orleans on Friday for his first visit since
Katrina, and schedules a meeting with Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and other
members of the Louisiana Congressional delegation aboard Air Force One.
Each local leader briefs the President on the situation, and gives him an
overview of his or her concerns.  As the official meeting concludes,
President Bush invites Governor Blanco to join him in a private office with
a member of the White House Staff.  

The Governor has a private conversation with President Bush about the
command structure of the operations, and reiterates her need for a
significant number of federal troops.  The President asks Governor Blanco to
put her troops, the Louisiana National Guard and EMAC National Guard, under
control of a Department of Defense appointed General.  By the time of
Friday's conversation, the situation has evolved and the immediate needs on
the ground are far different than the needs when federal troops were first
requested earlier in the week.  By Friday, the State has received a massive
National Guard presence including troops from other States under the command
of Louisiana's Adjutant General (TAG), General Bennett Landreneau.  Over
8,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen and women are on the ground,
working in Louisiana as part of Task Force Pelican.  Three thousand of these
troops are from other states, with an additional 15,000 reinforcemen! ts
expected by Monday.  They are making giant strides stabilizing the situation
and evacuating the Superdome and the Convention Center using the commercial
buses that have finally arrived, but there are no significant numbers of
federal troops in Louisiana.    

In spite of the significant progress that has been made in the last two
days, the Governor insists on securing more federal troops and assets that
she realizes will be required to accomplish the work that lies ahead.
Governor Blanco reiterates that she is satisfied with General Landreneau
heading up the massive effort underway by the National Guard.  When federal
troops did not arrive, the National Guard increased their troops through
EMACs, and moved mountains to turn the corner.  This was the largest and
quickest EMAC activation in American history, including the participation of
forty-eight states and four territories.  The Governor suggests that
President Bush assign Lieutenant General Honore to command the federal
troops that would be deployed to Louisiana, as there is still so much work
that needs to be done.  Even though Lieutenant General Honore arrived
without his army, he is performing a valuable service helping to coordinate
t! he evacuation of the city, and working side by side to complement the
National Guard effort.    

By Friday, unity of effort is already achieved.  The supporting governors
have already placed their National Guard forces under Governor Blanco's
operational control.  The President has directed Lieutenant General Honore
to conduct the military assistance to civil authorities mission.  Governor
Blanco has communicated her intent and purpose to Lieutenant General Honore.
He and Major General Landreneau are both executing that intent and purpose. 
   
Out of respect for the President, Governor Blanco agrees that she would talk
to General Landreneau and her Executive Counsel and review the President's
reorganization proposal.  She remains clear and steadfast, however, that the
present command structure is appropriate and fully capable to command both
federal and Guard troops.  Historically, the joint command structure worked
well in other federal emergency responses such as Hurricane Andrew in
Florida.  The fed! eral government could send troops under this organization
that would remain under the command of Lieutenant General Honore, which is
exactly what was done. 

Much has been said and written about the Governor's private meeting with the
President, and erroneous reports have been circulated that she denied
federal troops or delayed help for 24-hours.  The facts are clear and
evidence confirms that the Governor requests early and often the need for
additional military presence, including a federal military presence and
assets.  At no time does anyone from the federal government tell her that
federal troops are withheld because the existing structure was inadequate.
In fact, the new proposal is first presented to her aboard Air Force One on
Friday, four days after the storm struck on Monday, and the President never
suggests that federal troops were reliant on this new structure nor did he
convey that the joint command structure is insufficient.  She believes that
the President is sincere in his pledge to help Louisiana.  She is clear
about needing that help, particularly in the immediate aftermath! of the
storm.  

In agreeing to discuss the reorganization with General Landreneau and her
Executive Counsel, the Governor is concerned that restructuring could
confuse the steadily improving situation on the ground.  The National Guard
troops have risen to the occasion, and making an abrupt change in command
for no apparent reason may disrupt ongoing operations.  Sending the federal
troops under the command of General Honore, as the Governor suggests, is
indeed what the President decides to do on Saturday, five days after the
storm, using the existing command structure.    

 Close to midnight on Friday, Governor Blanco receives phone calls from
General Steve Blum, just after his return to DC, and White House Chief of
Staff Andrew Card who want to discuss with her their proposed organizational
restructuring.  She hears them out, but continues to believe, given the
stabilization now underway and the massive National Guard buildup on the
ground, that bringing in the federal forces and putting them under the
command of General Honore to coordinate with General Landreneau who leads
the Guard forces is the most effective solution.   

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2005

Federal Troops on Their Way

 Just before the President delivers his Radio Address on Saturday morning,
Governor Blanco speaks to Andrew Card who tells her that she will be pleased
with the President's announcement.  The Governor listens intently as the
President speaks, and is thankful that he has authorized federal troops to
work with the National Guard.    

At noon, Governor Blanco reports to the press on her meeting with the
President where she again asks for federal assistance.  The State has now
received his assurance that 7,000 additional troops are on the way.  The
troops are coming from the 82nd Airborne, the 1st Calvary, and the 1st and
2nd Marine Expeditionary Forces, and they would operate under the direct
command of Louisiana native Lieutenant General Russ Honore, who commands
Joint Task Force Katrina.    

 In the days that follow, the Governor and her staff are deeply involved in
getting help to local communities, identifying housing, fighting to make
sure Louisiana's people are employed in the recovery, reuniting families,
visiting people in shelters both in state and out of state, meeting with
visiting members of Congress, Secretary Chertoff, Admiral Allen, the Vice
President, the President and his staff, and leading many follow-up visits to
the affected areas.  The magnitude of the devastation demands the full time
and attention of the Governor.  She and her staff work 14 to 18 hours, seven
days a week, for weeks afterward.  

 Just last year, FEMA ran a federal, state, and local doomsday scenario
called Hurricane Pam with emergency preparedness people from the State and
the New Orleans area.  While the analysis is still pending, nearly
everything negative predicted in this fictional disaster comes true during
the very real Katrina.  There is one glaring exception.  Pam predicts some
61,000 deaths would occur.  Instead, at the time of submission, the Governor
and Louisiana mourn the deaths of 1,067, a tragedy for the State but
thankfully a far cry from predictions.  Because of a well-organized
initiative, well over one million people pre-evacuated the New Orleans
region.  Thousands who stayed were pulled from attics and rooftops; with
some 78,000 bused or flown to safety in the aftermath of Katrina.  We must
never forget the heroes of Katrina.  

 State officials did not rest from the moment Katrina turned her firepower
toward Louisiana.  All the resources the State had to bear were brought to
aid in the evacuation, rescue, recovery and rebuilding efforts.  In a
demonstration of the resolve and commitment to move forward, the State
turned from Hurricane Katrina to successfully prepare for and respond to the
additional devastation unleashed by Hurricane Rita and the floods that
followed that storm.  Today, Governor Blanco leads a massive rebuilding
effort.  Our people stand unified together as we rebuild Louisiana safer,
stronger and better than before Katrina and Rita.

And, now, in response to the specific questions posed by the document
request dated October 7, 2005, please accept the following responses:

1. Organization charts of the Governor's office and of each component of
state 
government involved in the preparation for, and response to, Hurricane
Katrina.  Identify the individual(s) who hold or held each key position from
August 23, 2005, to September 6, 2005.

A copy of the organization chart of the Governor's Office is attached.

The Governor's executive staff between August 23 to September 6, 2005, was
comprised of the following individuals:

Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff 
Leonard Kleinpeter, Special Assistant 
Terry Ryder , Executive Counsel 
Kim Hunter Reed , Policy Director 
Johnny Anderson, Assistant Chief of Staff 
Bob Mann, Communications Director 
Rochelle Michaud Dugas, Legislative Director 
Denise Bottcher, Press Secretary 
Paine Gowen, Executive Assistant to the Governor 
Erin Mosely, Director of Scheduling (on maternity leave during the period at
issue).
Jerry Luke LeBlanc, Commissioner of Administration

Each of these individuals reports directly to the Governor.

Additional individuals holding key positions during the response effort are
the following:

Sam Jones, Deputy Director and Liaison to Parochial and Municipal
Governments
Ty Brommel, Executive Director of the Office or Rural Development
  
2.  A detailed description of the Governor's roles, responsibilities, and
authorities in preparing for and responding to a major disaster.  Moreover,
with respect to each specific role, responsibility or authority described,
please:

a. list the statutory, regulatory or other source for that role,
responsibility or authority; and
b. identify the key personnel within the Louisiana Office of the Governor
and the Louisiana state government involved in acting pursuant to that
authority or discharging that role or responsibility.

(a) The Governor's duties, responsibilities, and authority in preparing for
and responding to a major disaster is contained in the following:

  Art. 4, Sec. 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
  La. R.S. 29:7
  La. R.S. 30:2109
  La. R.S. 29:766
  La. R.S. 14:329.6
  La. R.S. 29:724
  The State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan
  Executive Orders
  Emergency Management Assistance Compact
  Stafford Act
  National Response Plan

 (b) Key Personnel:
See Governor's executive staff set forth in response to No. 1.

3.  Identify and provide copies of all authorities, regulations, procedures,
policies and operating guidance related to the Office of the Governor's
ability to act or task, assign missions to, or seek assistance from other
entities or organizations, including, but not limited to, any other State of
Federal agency, in responding to an emergency or major disaster.  Provide
all documents that refer or relate to any such acts, tasks, requests, or
mission assignments by the Office of the Governor in connection with
Hurricane Katrina.

Please see response to No. 2.  See also the documents produced by LOHSEP,
the Executive Orders and Governor's correspondence on the Attorney General's
document management system and the other documents provided with this
response.


4. All documents from the past five years that evaluate, assess, or
describe, in any way, the risks posed to the State of Louisiana by a
hurricane or flood, including, but not limited to, documents that relate to
the knowledge of such risks held by the Federal, State or local officials,
including, but not limited, to the East Jefferson, Orleans, West Jefferson,
Lake Borgne Basin, and Plaquemine Levee District Boards, prior to the
landfall of Hurricane Katrina.  This also includes, but is not limited to,
all documents from the past five years that refer or relate to the
vulnerability of the levee system, or particular levees, in or around the
City of New Orleans, to damage, breach or overflow, including, but not
limited to, documents that refer or relate to the knowledge of Federal,
State, or local officials of such vulnerability.

The Governor was well aware of Ivor van Heerden's well publicized warnings
and predictions that storm surge from a Cat 4 or Cat 5 hurricane would cause
overtopping of the levees, which would result in massive flooding in the
City of New Orleans.  No one expected, or predicted, that the levees would
fail in the manner which occurred after Hurricane Katrina.

Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No.
4 would be the same as are found in the Attorney General's document
management system, particularly the Hurricane Ivan After Action Report found
at Bates No. LOH-0019, and Hurricane Pam Exercise found at Bates No.
LOH-0034.

As reflected in the chart entitled, "Louisiana Congressional Budget
Requests" and the documents contained in the folder labeled, "DOTD Requests
for Federal Funding of Levees and Hurricane Studies," which are provided
herein, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development has
repeatedly made requests to the United States Congress for funding of
hurricane studies, as well as requests for full funding of the state's
portion of the cost of levee construction.  To date, these efforts have had
marginal success, at best, as reflected by the request in FYI 2004 for
$16,000,000 in construction costs, with only $7,000,000 being appropriated.
The budget requests submitted by the Army Corps of Engineers to Congress for
levee construction around the City of New Orleans area have been met with a
similar response.


5. All documents that refer or relate to any planning or exercises conducted
to respond to a hurricane scenario in Louisiana, including, but not limited
to, all documents that refer or relate to the hurricane planning exercise
known as "Hurricane Pam," including but not limited to, all plans, reports,
after-action reviews and other analyses, whether they be in final or draft
form, that refer or relate to Hurricane Pam.


Any documents in the Office of the Governor which would be responsive to No.
5 would be the same as are found in the Attorney General's document
management system, particularly 
the Hurricane Ivan After Action Review found at Bates No. LOH-0019 and the
Hurricane Pam Exercise found at Bates No. LOH-0034.


6. Identify any individual(s) appointed as State Coordinating Officer (SCO)
and Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) for the emergencies and major
disasters declared for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana.  For each individual,
state when he or she was first notified of potential deployment, state when
the individual was actually deployed, and state when the individual was
appointed as SCO or GAR.  For each such individual, identify all prior
emergencies and disasters for which he or she had served as SCO or GAR,
describe any other relevant experience, and explain why the individual was
selected to serve as SCO or GAR.  Provide all documents that refer or relate
to these individual(s) from August 23, 2005, through September 6, 2005.

Governor Blanco appointed Arthur G. Jones as SCO and Jeff Smith as GAR in
her letter to President Bush dated August 27, 2005.  Subsequently, Jeff
Smith was appointed both SCO and GAR for the combined Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita disaster declaration.  See folder attached to LOHSEP response
labeled "LOHSEP Responses Nos. 14 and 15" and on CD No. 6.
Art Jones
Art Jones is the LOHSEP Division Chief of the Disaster Recovery Division.
He joined LOHSEP in April 1991, just prior to two Presidential Declarations
(FEMA 902/904) and has since administered twelve Presidential Disaster
Declarations. His background includes extensive public service experience in
State Government in both Louisiana and Alabama, corporate experience as a
subcontractor for the Federal Aviation Administration during Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, and military as a US Air Force Combat Fighter Pilot in
Southeast Asia.
In his current position, Mr. Jones provide! s overall management for the
Public Assistance Program and the Individual Assistance Program for the
State of Louisiana.  He also serves in the State Emergency Operations Center
during periods of disaster alerts and exercises and provides Disaster
Recovery Operations Training, Debris Management Operations and Damage
Assessment Courses to Emergency Management Officials throughout the state
and around the country.
As an Active Duty Officer in the US Air Force, Mr. Jones served as an
Aircraft Commander and Instructor Pilot flying the F-4 C/D and E Phantom,
and T-38 Talon.  In addition to accumulating more than 2,500 hours of Jet
Fighter time, including nearly 1,000 hours of instructor time, he logged
nearly 500 hours of combat time in Southeast Asia and received numerous
awards and declarations including The Distinguished Flying Cross with one
oak leaf cluster, and The Air Medal with twelve oak leaf clusters.
Mr. Jones works closely with FEMA Region VI Offi! cials in order to
coordinate Individual Assistance and Public Assistan ce programs.  He is a
member of the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association (LEPA) and has
completed many Emergency Management Institute Training Courses in ad  

 	 
Office of the Governor | P.O. Box 94004 | Baton Rouge, LA. 70804-9004