[StBernard] Governor says federal environmental assessment for oil and gas offshore lease sale not good enough

[Westley Annis]

Governor says federal environmental assessment for oil and gas offshore
lease sale not good enough


"I was very disappointed to learn that the Environmental Assessment for
Western Gulf Lease Sale 200 is woefully insufficient to address the needs of
the state. On May 18, I directed officials at the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources to detail these concerns in a letter to the Minerals
Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department of Interior. 

"The letter calls into question the failure of MMS to consider in its EA the
impacts of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina on our coastal landscape and our
ability to sustain the onshore support required for future leases in the
Gulf. In fact, the landscape itself is vital to the ecological, cultural and
economic security of Louisiana and the nation.

"The letter calls for MMS to analyze the altered environmental baseline and
what the indirect and cumulative impacts of any further OCS activities may
be before proceeding with Lease Sale 200. The welfare of the people and the
environment of this state cannot afford the potential harm that may result
from inadequate plans for OCS development. For that reason, the letter
states that following through with the lease sale at this time is premature.

"I will do everything in my power to ensure our fragile coast is protected,
that our communities are safe, our fisheries sustainable, our infrastructure
that serves this nation's navigation needs and supports its domestic energy
production is secure. This letter is yet another step in that process."


To view the complete letter from the Department of Natural Resources to the
Minerals Management Service, click on the following link. The text of the
letter is below. Note: The text below does not include footnotes. 

http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/MMSletter52406.pdf
<http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/MMSletter52406.pdf> 

May 17, 2006

Regional Supervisor
Leasing and Environment (MS 5410)
Minerals Management Service
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region
1201 Elmwood Park Boulevard
New Orleans, Louisiana 70123-2394

Re: Comments on Lease Sale 200 EA

Dear Mr. Oynes:

On April 4, 2006, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) published public
notice (Notice) in the Federal Register that MMS had prepared an
environmental assessment (EA) and Finding of No New Significant Impact
(FONNSI) for proposed Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas Lease Sale
200 in the Western Gulf of Mexico, scheduled for August 2006. This Notice
provided a period of 30 days from the date of the Notice's publication
(i.e., until May 4, 2006) for interested parties to submit comments on the
EA and FONNSI. On April 28, 2006, the State of Louisiana requested an
extension of the comment period until May 18, 2006, which the MMS granted on
May 1, 2006. Following are the State's comments on the EA and FONNSI.

I. INTRODUCTION

Louisiana generally supports the development of our nation's domestic energy
resources, and looks forward to continuing to play a critical part in
helping meet our nation's energy needs. Indeed, Louisiana has served an
important role in encouraging and promoting oil and gas development in the
Gulf of Mexico since the first days of leasing in the OCS. 

Unfortunately, the devastating impacts to the State from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, which were clearly exacerbated by the effects of oil and gas
development on the OCS off Louisiana's coastline, make clear that the State
cannot afford to support new oil and gas leasing activity on the OCS off its
coast where that activity is not consistent with the State's coastal zone
management plan. MMS must take the requisite "hard look" at the impacts of
OCS leasing activity on the State and its resources and communities and
until provision is made for both (a) militating against adverse future
environmental and societal impacts associated with the exploration,
production, and transportation of OCS mineral resources and (b) addressing
the ongoing cumulative and secondary impacts of prior OCS-related activity.
MMS must also include the most current and updated data in this assessment.
The State believes that, once the MMS has adequately studied and considered
the impacts of OCS o! il and gas leasing activity, in the significantly
changed post-Katrina and Rita environment, it will become clear that the
federal government (which collects substantial revenues from State-supported
oil and gas leasing activity in the OCS) must provide substantial additional
assistance to the State to mitigate the impacts of such activity as well as
to provide for a stable environmental and infrastructure platform from which
to continue and expand OCS development in the region.

The 2005 hurricane season made clear that the well documented collapse of
Louisiana's coastal landscape and estuaries is a matter of urgent concern to
the State and the nation. The first and most severe blow from the season was
dealt when Hurricane Katrina rolled ashore in southeast Louisiana and then
south Mississippi early in the morning on August 29, 2005. Katrina wrought
havoc on the coastal parishes and New Orleans itself. As the storm surge
lashed at the levees protecting New Orleans, they succumbed, spilling the
contents of Lake Pontchartrain into New Orleans. Flood waters poured into
the bowl-shaped city, swamping virtually everything in their path. The
coastal storm surge brought substantial floodwaters into neighboring St.
Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, and adjacent Jefferson Parish was overcome
by the massive amounts of rainfall. When the storm passed, the path of
devastation was staggering. Early estimates of the toll of Hurricane Katrina
on south Lo! uisiana top all previous damage costs from other tropical
cyclones in the United States. The storm flooded the entire New Orleans
metropolitan area, displaced over a million people, obliterated wetlands,
and caused oil spills and other environmental contamination.

As if the damage wrought upon Louisiana from Katrina was not enough, less
than a month later, Hurricane Rita hit the western portion of the State.
This storm devastated coastal communities in Calcasieu, Cameron and
Vermilion Parishes, which support substantial OCS-related infrastructure,
and destroyed even more of the State's precious coastal wetlands.

In the aftermath of these unprecedented, devastating, and life-altering
natural disasters, the State of Louisiana must rebuild in a responsible and
sustainable manner. The energy needs of this nation have, for decades, been
supplied by the State of Louisiana, both with her own resources and by
serving as a base of supply and support for energy activity in the Gulf of
Mexico. While Louisiana is cognizant that the State's energy industry must
be rebuilt and expanded in order to help the nation meet its ever-growing
energy demands, and to reduce its reliance on foreign oil, it is now
tragically clear that the State has borne an unsustainable and
disproportionate burden in the course of providing that energy and support.
Although this rebuilding must be done expeditiously, we must not allow our
need for expediency to preclude wise decisions. Because the production of
energy and the general welfare of this State are so closely intertwined, it
is prudent to take deliberate ! steps to assure responsible plans are in
place for the development of the OCS. The welfare of the people and the
environment of this State cannot afford the potential harm that may result
from inadequate plans for OCS development. Simply put, one of the costs of
the development and support OCS oil and gas activity has been the very
survival of the landscape that is vital to the ecologic, cultural, and
economic security of Louisiana and the nation. This realization is not new.
The State and others have been warning that the day was approaching when
those costs would be too much to bear and that absent a commitment from the
nation to address those impacts, the State would no longer be able to
subsidize, with its lands, waters, and infrastructure, the nation's need for
oil and gas and the federal government's need for revenues. That day has
arrived.

Indeed, if the State is to survive, economically and environmentally, then
the goals and policies underlying such laws as the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) must be followed to ensure that informed decisions are
made about the effects of OCS-related activities on an already battered and
fragile coastal system. It is our responsibility to assure our citizens that
there is an adequate plan to restore and strengthen our coastline so that
they will not have to endure such devastation again. In sum, the imperatives
of coastal protection in Louisiana are now clear. The EA and FONNSI for
Lease Sale 200 issued pursuant to these laws, however, are simply
insufficient to reasonably address the shortcomings in coastal protection
laid bare by the storms MMS has failed, perhaps in the simple rush to stay
on the schedule identified in the Multisale 2002 Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) , to take! the necessary steps with which it is charged
under these laws to ensure for the protection of Louisiana's coastal zone
and the infrastructure that makes the exploration and production of energy
resources off our coast possible in an efficient and economic fashion.
Nonetheless, such oversights and inadequacies cannot be taken lightly. What
is at stake here is the protection of our coastal resources, and indeed our
very homes and lives, as well as our continuing ability to care for the
energy needs of our nation.

II. GENERAL COMMENTS

The EA is inadequate as an environmental document to ensure that the MMS
will make an informed decision on Lease Sale 200. NEPA requires that federal
agencies prepare environmental documents to ensure that the agency has taken
the requisite "hard look" at the environmental consequences of its proposed
action. Unfortunately, Louisiana is concerned that the EA for Lease Sale 200
suffers from several serious flaws. As it currently exists, the EA cannot
reasonably assure the State that the MMS has complied with the Service's
obligations under NEPA. 

To begin with, although Louisiana has actively supported MMS's approach
toward the development of previous environmental documents for lease sales
in the Gulf of Mexico, this EA is questionable. It is deficient in approach
and implementation. 

MMS initially prepared an EIS for 9 lease sales, including Lease Sale 200,
in 2002. The Department indicated that it was preparing such an EIS
analyzing 9 separate proposed actions, consistent with 40 CFR § 1502.4. In
doing so, it indicated that it would develop an additional environmental
analysis for each proposed action, including Lease Sale 200. The agency
noted: "By eliminating essentially duplicate EIS's, MMS will be able focus
[sic] the subsequent environmental reviews on new and changing issues." Such
an approach appears consistent with the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations, which suggest that agencies must prepare supplemental
environmental impact statements when, inter alia, "[t]here are significant
new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its impacts," and it "[m]ay also prepare
supplements when the agency determines that the purposes of the Act will be
furthered by doi! ng so." The present EA does not satisfy these standards.

As with past EAs for lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico, this EA focuses on
whether the proposed action presents any "new significant impact." The EA
concludes that:

no new significant impacts were identified for proposed Lease Sale 200 that
were not already assessed in the multisale EIS, nor is it necessary to
change the conclusions of the kinds, levels, or locations of impacts
described in that document. Therefore, MMS has determined that a
supplemental EIS is not required and is issuing this FONNSI (EA, at iii). 

Louisiana quite obviously is troubled by this statement. It overlooks the
reality that much has changed since 2002, and that new information has been
developed that is "relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the
proposed action or its impacts." And, perhaps even more importantly,
critical additional information must be developed and analyzed rather than
proceeding as if Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had not occurred. 

The ensuing aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita not only represents
"significant new circumstances," but these hurricanes also bring into
question the efficacy of past information. The EA provides only a cursory
analysis of the damage caused by hurricanes to OCS facilities and the
corresponding environment. This is particularly troubling, because the
events of last summer are quite telling. It would be inappropriate,
therefore, to proceed precipitously without first engaging in a thorough
analysis of how the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have changed the
physical, economic and social landscape along the Gulf Coast. Yet, this is
precisely what MMS appears to be on the verge of doing.

Change in the Environmental Baseline and Description of the Affected
Environment. The environmental baseline, for instance, is entirely different
than what the MMS considered in 2002, during the release of the Multisale
EIS. The landscapes, physi! cal and cultural, of coastal Louisiana have been
forever changed by the storms of 2005. The EA acknowledges that the
hurricanes damaged much of the shore-based oil and gas infrastructure on the
Gulf Coast. In January 2006, "MMS estimate[d] that 3,050 of the Gulf's 4,000
platforms and 22,000 of the 33,000 miles of Gulf pipelines were in the
direct path of either Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita. Because of the
large amount of infrastructure in the path of hurricane-force winds and
waves, the amount of damage was substantial. In comparison with Hurricane
Ivan in 2004, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita accounted for considerably more
damage because of the paths taken by these two devastating storms." In May,
MMS estimated that 113 platforms have been destroyed, and the number of
damaged pipelines is now estimated to be over four times the amount
previously indicated-that is, 457 pipelines (101 large diameter pipelines,
with 32 now returned to service). Additional evidence! of the extensive
damage to Louisiana's onshore infrastructure, which is needed to support OCS
activity off the State's coast, is presented later in these comments. 

Indeed, the future landscape of much of the Louisiana Coastal Zone is very
uncertain Not only have large portions of coastal Louisiana been damaged,
but new environmental and economic factors will mean that these areas will
be rebuilt in a different manner than before. The infrastructure and
workforce that support OCS development are a part of this changing coastal
zone. The redevelopment of the Louisiana Coastal Zone and the resulting
impacts on the State's ability to host OCS development need to be addressed
before the lease sale proceeds. 

Because extractive enterprises (such as OCS development) cannot necessarily
locate near existing development (they must locate in proximity to the
resource), and thus take advantage of shared labor supplies and support
sectors, they must often rebuild the local environment (social, economic,
and physical) to provide support for the extractive activity. This
rebuilding of the environment has several consequences. First, the
specialized development (social, economic, and physical) surrounding the
extractive activity is often not transferable to new activities; thus,
flexibility is lost. Second, the creation of the new support sectors may
deplete or destroy local resources. Third, the existence of high-paying jobs
in the extractive sector makes the competition for labor keen, and thus the
introduction of alternative economic activities becomes difficult. When the
new extractive activity ceases or declines, the local area is more
specialized than before the extractive ac! tivity started, and there is less
of the local resource base available. Thus, the development cycles
associated with extractive activities can lead to over-adaptation,
inflexibility, and problems down the road. 

In addition to the typical sociological impacts of OCS activities on
Louisiana's coastal zone, there is now the added uncertainty about the
integrity of the infrastructure as a result of the 2005 hurricanes. Can the
coastal zone infrastructure support a return of the workers and equipment
necessary to carry out OCS activities? Can the coastal zone's environment
withstand the increased demands for infrastructure to support new OCS
activities in its fragile post-hurricane state? These are but a few of the
unanswered sociological questions that have arisen since the last "hard
look" at the sustainability of Louisiana's coastal zone to sustain new OCS
activities was undertaken, years before the 2005 storms. Despite the
importance of these questions to a full analysis of the impacts of Lease
Sale 200, they are ignored by the EA and FONNSI.

Specific examples of the impacts of OCS activities on the Louisiana coastal
zone infrastructure that have not been identified in the existing MMS
environmental analyses are legion. For example, as OCS activities increased,
the Larose to Golden Meadow Hurricane Protection Levee became increasingly
important as the main protected staging area in the South Lafourche area.
The levee system is also critical in protecting LA 1 and LA 3235 from Golden
Meadow to Larose. Another area for concern is the intersection of LA 1 as it
crosses the levee south of Golden Meadow. The ramp for the road crossing was
constructed by 1985 and it has now subsided 4 feet below design grade for
the needed flood protection. Larger vehicles and increased traffic
associated with OCS activities have contributed to the increased flood
threat in this area due to lower elevation of the road and the ramp.

The EA fails to address the effects of continued land loss and storm events
on the ability to maintain the infrastructure that is vital to the Gulf's
economic well-being and national energy policy. As explained throughout
these comments, section 4.2 of the EA (Update of Information on the Affected
Environment) fails to fully account for new problems in the affected
environment, as they exist post-storms. MMS has not yet analyzed the impacts
of the storms on OCS infrastructure. Is that infrastructure truly engineered
to withstand future storms equal to Katrina and Rita? Based on anecdotal
information presently available, there is reason to believe that the answer
is no. There were significant losses of production facilities as well as
movement of pipeline facilities not previously experienced that must be
analyzed for future scenario predictions. The EA, therefore, purports to
evaluate the potential impacts of OCS oil and gas activities under Lease
Sale 200, without ! (admittedly) fully considering the existing
infrastructure, demographic, and economic conditions that should be used as
the baseline for analyzing these impacts.

Under these circumstances, Louisiana finds it hard to believe that MMS is
suggesting that the affected environment, as described in the 2002 Multisale
EIS (particularly the Socioeconomic Activities) has not been dramatically
altered by the damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Even though the
EA recognizes the significant population and demographic related changes
caused by the hurricanes, and appreciates that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
". . . damaged much of the shore-based infrastructure in the Gulf of
Mexico," and noted that ". . . [t]he widespread destruction caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will have both short- and long-term employment
consequences," the EA nevertheless concludes, without any analysis, that " .
. . activities resulting from the proposed action are expected to affect
minimally the analysis area's land use, infrastructure, or demographic
characteristics of the Gulf coast communities." Not only does this overlook
the fact that it is t! he affected environment that has significantly
changed since 2002, largely due to the tragic events of last year, but this
conclusory suggestion conflicts with other information that is readily
available to MMS and abundantly obvious to the entire nation. This
conclusion cannot pass the "reasonably foreseeable" test that is the basic
standard that agencies must use in determining secondary and cumulative
impacts or effects of the projects they undertake. The reality of what can
happen as the result of a major storm, and therefore the "reasonably
foreseeable" impacts or effects, have been forever and unalterably changed
in coastal Louisiana.

Indirect and Cumulative Impacts. The significance of the altered baseline is
most acute when considering the quite different indirect (or secondary) and
cumulative impacts on coastal wetlands associated with any future OCS lease
sales from those analyzed in the 2002 Multisale EIS. The coastal wetlands
are part of the environmental baseline, and the devastation to these coastal
wetlands is undoubtedly a changed circumstance. Louisiana's coastal wetlands
loss is catastrophic, and it is a matter of both local and national concern.
The National Research Council observed that " . . . the environmental and
social challenges confronting coastal Louisiana in the near and distant
future are without precedent in North America." As that entity noted: "The
disappearance of Louisiana's wetlands threatens the enormous productivity of
its coastal ecosystems, the economic viability of its industries, and the
safety of its residents," supporting numerous functions t! hat include
ecological sustainability, recreational activities, commercial activities,
flood control and buffering protection from storms. 

Although OCS activity to date has been directly linked to substantial land
loss , there can be no doubt that OCS activities have been responsible for
the exacerbation of wetlands loss. A glance at a map of the pipelines and
navigation channels in the coastal zone of Louisiana reveals a honeycomb of
oilfield impacts (much of them OCS-related), more than any other coastal
zone in the world. There are, in fact, 14,800 miles of pipeline (of over 4
inches in diameter) in our coastal wetlands, and 3,000 miles of navigation
channels. Indeed it has now become a heavy burden upon the treasury of the
State to maintain the bridges that have multiplied on the southwest coast to
span navigation channels. Without a consideration of the new wetland losses
that resulted from the 2005 storms, OCS activities present a threat to the
Nation's energy independence (a goal of the CZMA), because damage caused by
the activities threatens the infrastructure that will carry the very
resources ! being discovered and produced to refiners and, ultimately,
consumers. 
The EA fails to appreciate the significance of the amount of wetlands loss
caused by the storms, now estimated to be approximately 225 square miles and
not the 118 square miles suggested by the EA in section 4.2.2.1. Louisiana
appreciates that the EA recognizes the indirect (secondary) impacts to
wetlands from OCS activities, but nowhere in the EA has MMS evaluated, in
light of the altered environmental baseline following the 2005 storms, the
potential future coastal wetland impacts from such activities. Nor has the
EA even purported to analyze the incremental impact (or the cumulative
impact) associated with future OCS activities on the increasingly fragile
coastal wetland system that presently exists. The EA simply states that the
cumulative effects have been analyzed elsewhere in the EA and then simply
concludes without any discussion of the analysis that the "overall
conclusions regardi! ng cumulative effects of OCS impacts presented in the
Multisale EIS re main unchanged." Louisiana is concerned that the MMS has
reached this conclusion without any analysis-at least without any supporting
discussion, study or assessment. This is particularly problematic, because
the strength and vitality of future OCS activity is dependent upon a sound
and stable coastal system, and only through a thorough understanding of the
incremental impact of future activity and how any adverse affects will be
addressed can that goal be assured. Indeed, absent assurances that
sufficient reconstruction and mitigation is available for coastal wetlands
and communities, the State is concerned that the incremental impact of OCS
activities could, in the near future, be too detrimental to the long-term
sustainability of the coastal resources.

The State, therefore, suggests that MMS analyze, before proceeding with
Lease Sale 200, the altered environmental baseline and what the indirect
(secondary) and incremental (cumulative) impacts of any further OCS
activities might be.

The Issuance of the EA and FONNSI, and the Proposed Action as Well, are
Premature. Last year's hurricane season has given us both a tragic
understanding of poor planning and an unprecedented opportunity to rectify
the past decisions that have contributed to the situation in which the State
now finds itself. To not do so would be doubly tragic. Given the
post-Katrina/Rita world in which we now live, the State maintains that
following through with Lease Sale 200 at this time is premature. It is
unquestioned, even in MMS's own documents, that OCS oil and gas activities
have impacts on the Louisiana coast. There are ongoing studies that MMS has
initiated, some at the State's request, which are now seeking the answers to
critical questions regarding the extent and breadth of these impacts. There
is an urgent need for a more definitive understanding of the extent of the
storm damage and what restoration efforts along the Louisiana coast will
occur follow! ing Hurricanes Katrina and Rita before conducting any further
lease sales. There is a concomitant need for a more definitive understanding
of the measures that will be necessary for the protection of Louisiana's
citizens and property-all along the coast-from future major hurricanes and
from the anthropogenic erosion and environmental degradation occasioned by
OCS activities. Given these realities, the State maintains that it is
inappropriate for the MMS to proceed with Lease Sale 200 until after the MMS
has studied and answered these questions, and until the ability of present
and future infrastructure in the State to support new OCS oil and gas
leasing activity can be better understood. This is particularly the case
given predictions that the Gulf of Mexico is in a "new era" of increased
hurricane activity that is likely to continue for at least another 15 to 20
years. 

Necessary Ongoing Studies. Any decision to proceed with Lease Sale 200
before MMS has had the opportunity to gather and analyze information on the
impacts of the hurricanes on the affected environment, and to incorporate
this information into its decisionmaking process, is grossly premature. As
the EA recognizes: "Hurricanes Katrina and Rita damaged much of the
shore-based infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, many of the
demographic and economic factors (employment, income and wealth, etc.) for
individual counties and economic areas (LA1, LA2, etc.) have changed as a
result of the 2005 hurricane season." The EA itself further recognizes that
"{i}t will be some time before the full extent of these changes is known." 

MMS even acknowledges the existence of additional informational needs
regarding OCS leasing activity in the Gulf of Mexico. According to the EA,
MMS is working with Louisiana State University's (LSU) Coastal Marine
Institute (CMI) to design and fund two studies to gather information on
these hurricane-related issues: 

*	"Spatial Restructuring and Fiscal Impacts in the Wake of Disaster:
The Case of the Oil and Gas Industry Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita";
and 
*	"Post Hurricane Assessment of OCS-Related Infrastructure and
Communities in the Gulf of Mexico Region." 

Appropriately, the EA states that "[i]nformation from these studies will be
incorporated into future MMS NEPA documents." The information from these two
studies is clearly critical to understanding the impact of the hurricanes on
existing OCS-related onshore infrastructure and the development of future
infrastructure, and therefore to an accurate analysis of the impacts of
Lease Sale 200. To act in advance of this information is neither wise nor
necessary. And we agree that the information from these studies should be
incorporated into the NEPA documents, including a revised EA or a
supplemental EIS for Lease Sale 200. 

Also, earlier this year, MMS released an "Impact Assessment of Offshore
Facilities from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita" further illustrating the MMS's
need for updated information in the wake of the hurricanes. According to the
Impact Assessment, the agency requested research proposals on the following
six subject areas "related to the hurricanes and the damage to offshore oil
and gas facilities": 

*	an assessment and evaluation of pipeline movement or damage; 
*	an assessment and evaluation of platform damage;
*	hurricane hindcast data; 
*	an evaluation and assessment of the performance of jack-up rigs;
*	an assessment of methods to eliminate hydrates in pipelines and
risers during startups after a hurricane; and
*	an assessment of the response of waves and currents throughout the
water column in the northern Gulf of Mexico slope and shelf. 

Although the information to be gained from these proposals clearly would
enhance any analysis of impacts of future oil and gas leasing activity in
the Gulf of Mexico OCS, including the impacts of Lease Sale 200, the EA was
prepared too early to ensure that any of this information would be
incorporated into the Lease Sale 200 environmental review.

In addition, the MMS Environmental Studies Program is conducting an ongoing
study, "Coastal Wetland Impacts - OCS Canal Widening Rates and Effectiveness
of OCS Pipeline Canal Mitigation (GM-97-X07)," due to be completed in
September 2006. This study is designed to address the agency's admitted lack
of information regarding "the dynamics of pipeline canals and associated
mitigation structures," and "the effectiveness or longevity of canal-related
mitigation studies." MMS recognizes that the information that will be gained
from the study on Gulf-coastal pipeline infrastructure will help enhance the
agency's NEPA information and help verify certain analytical assumptions.
Indeed, according to MMS, the study will help MMS "make reliable impact
projections"; determine types and size of wetlands impacted by OCS-related
canals; "deduce 'typical' initial and secondary impacts of future pipeline
landfalls upon wetlands in [sic] for use in future" NEPA documentation; and
"estim! ate how long typical canal mitigation structures may be effective at
reducing adverse impacts upon wetlands." The EA further notes that the U.S.
Geological Survey National Wetlands Research Center is nearing completion on
another critically relevant study to protecting Louisiana's wetlands from
the impacts of OCS oil and gas leasing activity, "The Outer Continental
Shelf Pipeline and Navigation Canal Impacts and Mitigation Effects on
Wetland Habitats of Coastal Western and Central Gulf of Mexico." Given the
significant loss of wetlands in the State of Louisiana that occurred during
the 2005 hurricane season, the State believes that it is premature and risky
to continue with Lease Sale 200 without the benefit of this critical
information.

The MMS's approach in the EA with regard to the purpose for these studies
and the need for the information that they may be expected to yield is
unclear. But there appears to be a significant and inexplicable disconnect
in the MMS's statements. On the one hand, MMS appears to recognize that
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have significantly affected the Gulf of Mexico
region and the infrastructure in the area needed to support OCS oil and gas
leasing activity. Furthermore, it appears to appreciate the need for
significant additional information in order to fully understand these
impacts, and the consequences for future oil and gas leasing activity in the
region. On the other hand, MMS nevertheless appears pre-determined to press
ahead with Lease Sale 200 regardless of the lack of critical information
that may be gained from ongoing and not-yet-completed studies, and summarily
dismissing the impacts of the hurricanes as nearly irrelevant to the
agency's decisionmaking proce! ss. Under these circumstances, MMS's decision
to proceed with Lease Sale 200, as reflected in the EA and FONNSI, without
first fully studying and understanding the impacts of the hurricanes on the
affected environment and on oil and gas leasing activity in the Gulf of
Mexico OCS, is premature and we believe irresponsible.

Uncertainty Surrounding Necessary Infrastructure. The MMS's issuance of the
EA before critical questions have been resolved concerning the future of the
infrastructure on which the offshore oil and gas activity under Lease Sale
200 will depend, is similarly premature. As MMS has recognized:

The tropical activity of 2005 emphasized both the importance and unique
interrelationship between offshore activities and onshore infrastructure.
Further, the storm highlighted the unique relationship between various
different types of infrastructure supporting offshore activities. For
instance, failures associated with power delivery impacted pumping stations
that would be unable to deliver crude from producing wells (or import
terminals) to refineries which were relatively unaffected by the storms.
Failures in gas processing resulted in shut-in production in the GOM.
Further, and most importantly, the tropical activity created significant
destruction th! roughout the Gulf Coast energy corridor. This raises
questions about which types of infrastructure will be rehabilitated, which
will be expanded, and which will be moved to other regions along the Gulf,
or even out of region. These changes, in turn, have important impacts on the
economies and communities of the region. 

Until the answers to these questions are more certain, it is impossible to
meaningfully assess the impacts of any future OCS leasing activity that will
rely on infrastructure in areas affected by the 2005 hurricanes. 

Although, even today, the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on both
offshore and onshore infrastructure are still being assessed, it is beyond
question that the damage is of a catastrophic scale. With respect to
offshore infrastructure, the MMS's final Evacuation and Production Shut-in
Statistics Report, reflecting recovery of oil and gas development facilities
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, indicates that, as of May 3, 2006, nearly
10 percent of the manned platforms in the Gulf were still evacuated; and
over 21 percent of daily oil production and almost 13 percent of daily gas
production in the Gulf remained shut-in. Although MMS expects that there
will be incremental movement in these numbers over the next several months,
the restoration and recovery of these production facilities remains
uncertain. 

In addition to damage to offshore facilities, Katrina alone forced 36
pipelines of 10-inch diameter or larger to be shut-in, and damaged or
destroyed onshore facilities including gas processing plants, pipeline
terminals, and hubs. As is well known, the hurricanes also caused
catastrophic damage to the State's levee system, as well as to roads,
bridges, ferries, railroad equipment and infrastructure, industrial ports,
airports, public transit equipment and facilities, the federal navigation
system, and other critical infrastructure facilities. 

In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Governor and Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development made a Special Appropriations
Request to Congress seeking $32.6 billion to address the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development's assessment of immediate and
future infrastructure needs as a direct result of the hurricanes: $5.5
billion for immediate repairs, replacements, and upgrades; $5! .1 billion
for critical future transportation needs; and $22 billion for hurricane
protection upgrades, including completion and improvement of the State's
levee system to withstand a Category 5 hurricane. This did not include needs
to fund a comprehensive coastal restoration effort, estimated to cost $14
billion, which is integral to providing necessary protection for the State's
coastal communities and the nation's critical energy infrastructure. These
needs and upgrades are necessary if southern Lousiana, which provides the
backbone for oil and gas leasing in the Gulf of Mexico OCS, is to be
properly rebuilt.

To contemplate continued leasing in the OCS without the knowledge of when
and how, or even if, the onshore infrastructure that supports it will be
rebuilt is not wise decisionmaking. To imply that Louisiana alone has
benefited from the fact that MMS has done the OCS leasing all these years is
also shortsighted. In business, one tries to ensure, to the extent one can,
that its material and human resources "supplies" and the modes to move those
supplies, are as close and protected to the production and manufacture sites
as possible. No business and no human resources will be keen on relocating
to areas that will not afford at least some predictable modicum of
protection. Even if they do, the "cost of doing business" will be
substantially increased. Our alternatives are to provide, to the extent
practicable a stable, safe, and predictable infrastructure, as close as
possible to the "work zone" in order to most efficiently conserve all of our
resources.

The Governor's and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development's Special Appropriations Request to Congress made in the wake of
the hurricanes identified, inter alia, the following damage to the State's
infrastructure: 

*	An estimated 20,000 miles of roads in need of repair.
*	Damage to the Port of New Orleans, Greater Lafourche Port, St.
Bernard Port, Plaquemines Parish Port, Port of South Louisiana, and Port of
Lake Charles.
*	Damage to public airport facilities, including New Orleans
International Airport, Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport, Lake Charles
Regional Airport, Chennault Airport, and a number of general aviation
airports.
*	Critical damage to railroad infrastructure across the region,
including to the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad equipment and
infrastructure.
*	Obliteration of public transit systems and facilities throughout
Southeast Louisiana.
*	Significant damage to the navigation system, including to facilities
needed to access offshore oil and gas facilities-obstruction of waterways
due to shoaling and sunken vessels; damage to locks; destruction of aids to
navigation; and damage to lift bridges. 

In addition, as stated in the State's request, a comprehensive hurricane
protection system is necessary to protect the State of Lousiana from tidal
surges and rainfall events from Category 5 hurricanes. As Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita showed, the State is completely unprotected from storm events
greater than Category 3, and perhaps even less severe storms depending upon
storm track, speed, and other factors. 

The jury is still out on this aspect of readiness for this hurricane season
and future ones. Of direct relevance to the impacts of OCS activities as a
result of tropical cyclone activity is the questionable readiness of current
onshore infrastructure to bear the brunt of future storms. This matter has
been brought into bold relief by the massive Murphy Oil spill in St. Bernard
Parish. Storm damage to oil storage and pipelines, like the damage caused by
Hurricane Katrina to Murphy's crude oil storage tanks that resulted in the
release of 25,100 barrels of crude oil into a residential area of St.
Bernard Parish, is an omnipresent threat for onshore OCS-related facilities
that has yet to be addressed by MMS. The MMS should be evaluating the
potential of such impacts, as well as re-evaluating, in the light of
previous forecasts, whether or not we have the information and/or plans to
deal with those that have occurred and those that we now can "reasonably
foresee" based o! n the information we gain as a result of the storms.

There remain significant questions with respect to the future of the onshore
infrastructure on which OCS oil and gas leasing activity relies. Government
entities at the federal and state levels are still deliberating over
important funding and policy decisions with regard to the rebuilding of
Louisiana's infrastructure. The redistribution of population and workforce
in the wake of the hurricanes could influence whether certain infrastructure
will be rebuilt, or relocated out of Southern Louisiana. Although the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has been appropriated funds to restore the levee
system to pre-storm conditions, Congress is still in the process of
considering appropriations to complete and strengthen the levee system to
provide additional protection. Due to escalating costs of materials and
other factors, the extent to which federal assistance will be provided to
the State to improve its levee system and ensure the protection of its
residents, businesses, and in! frastructure from future large storm events
remains uncertain. Without more certainty as to the future of the onshore
infrastructure, the MMS cannot meaningfully assess the impacts of future OCS
leasing activity under Lease Sale 200. 

Overall Adequacy of the EA. Louisiana further believes that the EA fails to
accomplish its primary mission. The purpose of the EA was to ensure that MMS
can make an informed decision before proceeding with Lease Sale 200, and as
such has taken a "hard look" at the potential consequences of its decision.
The EA, unfortunately, avoids ensuring that the MMS has taken the requisite
"hard look." It neither represents a typical EA that adequately analyzes the
direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental effects of a proposed action,
nor does it serve as an adequate document to determine whether a SEIS is
necessary, because quite clearly there are changed circumstances and there
is both new information and critical information that must still be
gathered. 

III. CONCLUSION

The lease sale documents are based on, and tier off of, now outdated NEPA
documents, which do not adequately account for the altered environment
caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In fact, most of these documents were
prepared prior to the storms, and are therefore particularly unequipped to
address the current situation. Unproven methodologies for predictions of
environmental and sociological effects of the lease sale make those
predictions suspect. The absence of any analyses of the reliability of past
assumptions and predictions to judge the validity of the continued use of
those methods is also a cause for our concerns with Lease Sale 200 and for
questioning the results of the NEPA documents. 

As the agency charged with implementing the OCS Lands Act, the MMS carries
out its responsibilities under the Act in a manner that is consistent with
the authorities and purposes of the Act. The State enjoys working
cooperatively with MMS as MMS administers oil and gas activities in the OCS.
As a strong partner in the effort to responsibly develop the resources in
the OCS, the State believes that oil and gas development in the OCS is
critical to energy security of the nation. However, the State is concerned
that the present EA is not consistent with the purposes of the OCSLA. First,
the EA does not demonstrate that Lease Sale 200 will provide for the
development of OCS oil and gas resources in a manner that is "consistent
with the need . . . to balance orderly energy resource development with
protection of the human, marine, and coastal environments, [and] to insure
the public a fair and equitable return on the resources of the Outer
Continental Shelf ." Second, b! ecause the EA is admittedly not based upon a
full understanding of the current "human, marine, and coastal environments"
in the Gulf of Mexico region, particularly as those conditions were
unquestionably and significantly changed by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, it
cannot appropriately seek to encourage measures that will "eliminate or
minimize risk of damage" to those environments. 

Third, because the EA is based upon outdated baseline conditions and fails
to adequately identify and analyze the impacts of OCS oil and gas activity
on the State of Louisiana, it does not assist the State in anticipating and
planning for such impacts, "and thereby to assure adequate protection of the
human environment." For these same reasons, the EA also does not assure that
the State and local governments "have timely access to information regarding
activities on the Outer Continental Shelf, and opportunity to review and
comment on decisions relating to such activities, in order to anticipate,
ameliorate, and plan for the impacts of such activities." Instead, the
truncated analysis in the EA effectively deprives the State and local
governments of "an opportunity to participate in policy and planning
decisions relating to management of the resources of the Outer Continental
Shelf." Finally, because the EA is admittedly based upon an incomplete
understanding of the! impacts of OCS oil and gas leasing activity on the
current environment, it cannot meaningfully "minimize or eliminate conflicts
between the exploration, development, and production of oil and natural gas,
and the recovery of other resources." Consequently, the EA fails to provide
Louisiana with any measure of confidence that, based upon the state of
knowledge about post Katrina-Rita Louisiana, MMS has demonstrated that it
has satisfied these standards.

Louisiana would welcome the opportunity to work with the MMS and develop
either a new EA or a supplemental environmental impact statement that
adequately addresses the State's concerns. Any questions you may have can be
addressed by Mr. Gregory J. DuCote. He can be reached at 225.342.5052 or
800.267.4019 or by electronic mail at gregory.ducote at la.gov.


Sincerely,

Gerald M. Duszynski
Acting Assistant Secretary

GMD:gjd

cc: Scott Angelle
Scott Kirkpatrick
Sidney Coffee
Jim Rives
Gregory J. DuCote
NOAA


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