[StBernard] Engineers Say Lessons from Katrina Studies Can Benefit Communities Nationwide

Westley Annis westley at da-parish.com
Wed Jun 6 23:42:12 EDT 2007


Move Beyond Sound-bites and "Armchair" Theories to Make the Nation Safer

>From Disaster, Engineers Say Lessons from Katrina Studies Can Benefit

Communities Nationwide



Reston, Va.-Almost two years have passed since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. The nation has invested millions
of dollars in research conducted by the world's leading engineers and
scientists. Do we now have definitive answers to what went wrong and, more
importantly, can that knowledge make us safer?

In a report issued today by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE),
experts who have studied the disaster make public their opinions about what
went wrong in New Orleans-and why.

"It's so easy to react to armchair theories and colorful sound-bites," said
David Daniel, PhD, P.E., president of the University of Texas at Dallas and
chair of the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. "Few people have
the time to sort through 7,000 pages of technical data. Unfortunately,
people sometimes end up making policy based on headlines, not science. In
our report, we offer a rational basis from which the nation can move
forward."

With the start of another hurricane season upon us, experts from the
External Review Panel say that the findings from the research efforts
conducted after Hurricane Katrina in some cases challenge conventional
wisdom. The conclusions of the research also hold important lessons that
extend beyond New Orleans and the Gulf Coast to affect:

. Areas protected by levee systems throughout the U.S.;

. Hurricane-prone coastal communities;

. Population centers located in areas at high risk from natural
disasters including flooding, wildfires, and earthquakes; and

. Large-scale and complex engineering projects or agencies responsible
for major infrastructure.

The ASCE External Review Panel was established at the request of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to conduct real-time expert peer review of
the USACE's Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET). The IPET
has published a nearly 7,000-page report documenting its findings. In
addition, reports have been issued by research teams organized by the
University of California, Berkeley, with funding from the National Science
Foundation, and by Louisiana State University.

Taken together, these reports represent a body of scientific research that
can provide clear direction for national and local authorities charged with
protecting communities from natural and man-made disasters. The External
Review Panel warns, however, that science may be overshadowed by lingering
misperceptions and unsubstantiated theories.



Separating Fact from Fiction



Examples of some of the commonly held misperceptions related to Hurricane
Katrina and its devastating effects on New Orleans include:

PERCEPTION: Hurricane Katrina was only a Category 3 hurricane at
landfall-how could it have overwhelmed the levees?

REALITY: Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest and strongest storms to
hit the coast of the United States. As Hurricane Katrina crossed the Gulf of
Mexico from Florida, it rapidly gained strength and grew to a Category 5
hurricane offshore creating a tremendous storm surge that was carried
onshore. The surge level in coastal Mississippi exceeded that of the Indian
Ocean tsunami of December 2004.

As Hurricane Katrina approached land, it weakened to a Category 3 hurricane.
However, the storm remained very large, and the surge from the offshore
Category 5 was immense. The storm surge was the cause of the widespread
flooding and damage in New Orleans.

PERCEPTION: Without the levee failures, New Orleans would not have been
devastated.

REALITY: During Hurricane Katrina, parts of New Orleans-a bowl partially
below sea-level-were inundated with 13.6 inches of rainfall in 24 hours. The
storm surge along the Lake Pontchartrain lakeshore was about 12 feet above
sea level.

The IPET developed models to compare deaths and property damage caused by
the breaches in the hurricane protection system to scenarios in which the
floodwalls and levees remained intact but overtopping occurred, though the
pumping system did not operate.

The conclusions? Even without breaching, Hurricane Katrina's rainfall and
surge overtopping would have caused extensive and severe flooding-and the
worst loss of life and property loss ever experienced in New Orleans.

As of August 2, 2006, 1,118 New Orleanians were confirmed dead and 135
people were still missing as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina. By
comparison, the IPET estimated that approximately 686 people would have
died-even if system had not breached. The IPET estimated that approximately
$21 billion in property damage occurred as a result of Hurricane Katrina. By
comparison, $17 billion worth of property damage would have occurred even if
the hurricane protection system had not breached.

PERCEPTION: The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) is a "Hurricane
Highway."

REALITY: The myth that MRGO, a rarely used shipping channel, is a hurricane
highway was widely reported after Hurricane Katrina, and continues today. It
goes something like this: during a hurricane, storm surge from the Gulf of
Mexico is amplified within the long section of the MRGO and funneled
straight toward New Orleans.

Not so, according to complex computer models that re-created storm
conditions. The reality is that for large storms, the channel of the MRGO
simply cannot carry enough water to cause flooding. On the contrary, the
modeling indicated that following Katrina, the MRGO enhanced the post-storm
drainage of surge waters from flooded New Orleans back out to the Gulf.

The computer modeling did indicate that for smaller hurricanes, the geometry
of MRGO and nearby canals might have the effect of increasing the storm
surge by a small amount (less than half a foot).

While there may be valid reasons for and benefits to closing the channel,
the false perception that MRGO is a hurricane highway should not influence
that decision.

PERCEPTION: The hurricane protection system failed, in part, due to
malfeasance during construction.

REALITY: "Malfeasance" in the construction industry refers to intentional
unlawful acts such as substituting inferior materials or using substandard
construction techniques.

The engineering studies performed by the IPET and others were not criminal
or forensic investigations. However, the researchers found no indication of
malfeasance in the constructed projects for those sections of levee that
were carefully investigated. On the contrary, actual conditions (called "as
built" conditions) were consistent with the design and construction
specifications.



"The flaws that led to the system's failure," says Daniel, "can be primarily
attributed to questionable engineering and management decisions resulting
from external pressure, cost concerns, and flawed system management-not
construction malfeasance."



Lessons Learned



During the course of its work, the External Review Panel developed a deep
understanding the underlying issues that led to this tragedy. Recognizing
their obligation to share these findings so others may learn from this
tragedy, the Panel developed a list of lessons learns and associated calls
to action. This report is published today, in its entirety, on the ASCE Web
site (www.asce.org).

"The lessons we have learned from the devastating tragedy in New Orleans
will have profound implications for other American communities, and should
serve as a sobering reminder to people nationwide that we must place the
protection of public safety, health and welfare at the forefront of our
nation's priorities," Daniel says.

Organizations must be structured to enable, not to inhibit, the focus on
safety, according to the External Review Panel, and engineers must
continually evaluate the appropriateness of design criteria, always
considering how the performance of individual components affects the overall
performance of a system.

Specific recommendations included in the External Review Panel report are:

. Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities by having all
responsible agencies reevaluate their policies and practices to ensure that
protection of public safety, health and welfare is the top priority for
infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding.

. Encourage Congress to establish and fund a mechanism for nation-wide
"Levee Safety and Rehabilitation" program, as is done for major dams.

. Determine the level of acceptable risk in communities through
quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other areas
threatened by hurricanes and flooding.

. Upgrade engineering design procedures to place greater emphasis on
safety.

. Engage independent experts in high-level reviews of all critical
life safety structures, including hurricane and flood protection systems.

"The first Fundamental Canon of ASCE's Code of Ethics states that 'Engineers
shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.," said
Daniel. "This canon must the guiding principle for rebuilding the hurricane
protection system in New Orleans. And it must be applied with equal rigor to
every aspect of an engineer's work-in New Orleans, in America, and
throughout the world."

Founded in 1852, the American Society of Civil Engineers represents more
than 139,000 civil engineers worldwide and is America's oldest national
engineering society. For more information, visit www.asce.org.

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